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PART II.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Sir R. Bodd (Rome)	429	Dec. 28, 1918	Constantinople. Italy claims right to share in international occupation of Anatolia. Italy resents her independent action being deprecated. Asia Minor and Adriatic. Trade against French proceedings. Interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs	1
2	M. de Fleurbaey (Communique)	---	Jan. 2, 1919	Note from French Minister for Foreign Affairs to King of the Hedjaz offering hospitality to Emir Feisal on his return from London	5
3	M. Cambon (Communique)	---	Dec. 27, 1918	Juridical reform in Turkey. Mr. Waugh and M. Gilière might exchange views on...	3
4	"	---	Jan. 6, 1919	Juridical reform in Turkey. Note on necessity for. Adoption of French model seems to be appropriate	3
5	Sir H. Bodd (Rome)	10	7,	Asia Minor. Orders given to suspend military preparations for a landing in	7
6	M. de Fleurbaey (Communique)	---	13,	Mesopotamia. Protest against action of British military authorities in requesting the French officer attached to the British forces to leave Mesopotamia	7
7	To War Office	---	16,	Armistice with Turkey. Does responsibility for securing fulfilment of terms rest solely upon British Government, particularly in Asiatic Turkey?	5
8	Earl of Derby (Paris)	155 Tel.	23,	Syria. French Government hope British officers will be instructed not to encourage anti-French intrigues	6
9	M. de Fleurbaey (Communique)	---	25,	Constantinople. Instructions issued to assistants to French High Commissioner. Hopes instructions to British officials will be on similar lines	2
10	M. Cambon	---	30,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Note by manager of the company to General Allenby respecting present state of line and changes which are desirable	13
11	War Office	---	Feb. 2,	Armistice with Turkey. Replies to No. 7. Consider French Government should be consulted as regards military action in Turkey in Europe but not in Turkey in Asia	15
12	Earl of Derby (Paris)	144	7,	Asia Minor. Transmits note from French Government detailing alleged unfriendly attitude and acts of British authorities in Syria and Mesopotamia	16
13	Sir A. Calhorne (Constantinople)	288 Tel.	9,	Asia Minor. Conditions imposed on Turkey by General Allenby on 7th February	19
14	To Earl of Derby	283	12,	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Dilatory proceedings of Peace Conference; proposed meeting with representatives of all Russian parties; resumption of blockade of Germany; complaints of French at British attitude in Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Constantinople; Emir Feisal's visit to Europe	20
15	Mr. Balfour (Peace Delegation, Paris)	64	12,	Turkey in Asia. Italian interests in. Transmits notes from and to Italian Peace Delegation	25

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

111

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
16	Earl of Derby (Paris)	321 Tel.	Feb. 12, 1919	Constantinople. French object to proceedings of British authorities, and suggest meeting of a commission in Paris to arrange matters	24
17	To Mr. Balfour	794	21,	Mesopotamia and Syria. French Ambassador complains of attitude of British military authorities towards the French	25
18	To Earl of Derby	340	25,	Constantinople. Memorandum on various points at issue with the French. C.I.O.S. will discuss matter in Paris	26
19	Earl of Derby (Paris)	294	24,	Syria. Transmits notes from French Government respecting alleged refusal of Sherifian authorities to recognise position of French Financial Adviser at Damascus	29
20	To Earl of Derby	408	Mar. 5,	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway; Financial Adviser to Persia; future of Constantinople	30
21	M. Cambon	---	5,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Draws attention to interests of French company, which are involved	32
22	Mr. Balfour (Peace Delegation, Paris)	216	12,	Turkey in Asia. Refers to No. 12. Further memorandum on complaints of French at proceedings of the British authorities. Would like to be informed of British reply to allegations	32
23	Memorandum	---	15,	Meece pilgrimage, 1919. Arrangements in connection with minutes of meeting at Foreign Office	38
24	M. Cambon	---	18,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Refers to No. 21. Company again protest against military working of	42
25	To M. Cambon	---	19,	Syria and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 12. His Majesty's Government recent tone and matter of French complaints. Sykes-Picot Agreement is imperative while military occupation continues, and must be submitted to Peace Conference	42
26	India Office	---	21,	Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 17. Unable to attach any credence to the French charges against British officers, who have been instructed to respect French rights	44
27	Director of Military Operations	---	21,	Constantinople and Syria. French comments on enclosure in No. 18. Questions in abeyance pending General Allenby's visit to Paris	46
28	To Mr. Balfour	1323	24,	The Papacy. Conversation between Archbishop Corretti and Sir E. Graham. Topics: Protection of Holy Places; German Franciscans in Palestine; the Pope in Rome	51
29	To M. Cambon	---	24,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Refers to No. 24. Report has been called for	52
30	Earl Curzon (Memorandum)	---	25,	Middle East. Note of warning on present state of affairs in Turkey and possibility of fresh military operations	52
31	To Earl of Derby	623	Apr. 3,	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Aliens Bill in relation to Frenchmen in United Kingdom; French claims vis-à-vis Germany; friction at Constantinople between British and French authorities	54

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
22	To Sir R. Bodd ...	194	Apr. 5, 1919	Asia Minor. Italian Charge d'Affaires asks that His Majesty's Government may prevent Greek landing at Smyrna. Was informed that Italian landing at Adalia was likely to provoke Greek suspicion ...	56
23	Earl of Derby ... (Paris)	611 Tel.	9.	Constantinople and Asia Minor. French Government urge early meeting of Commission to settle points in dispute ...	58
24	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	453	9.	Turkey. Conversation with Grand Vizier, who submitted statement of issues offered by the Sultan regarding future status of Turkey. Offers submission to Kephed. Potential dangers of Pan-Islamism ...	52
25	To India Office	17.	Arabia. Transmits report by Captain Leo Warner on recent visit to the Hadramaut. Would like opinion on proposed instructions to Sir E. Allenby ...	61
26	To Earl of Derby ...	771 Tel.	18.	Constantinople and Asia Minor. Refers to No. 52. Commission appears to be a cumbersome method, prefers meeting of two representatives. Will accept any plan for speedy settlement of disputes ...	81
27	Earl Curzon ... (Memorandum)	...	22.	Middle East. Note sent to Mr. Balfour at Paris. Summary of present position. Suggestions as to settlement of Turkish Treaty. Despatch of Eastern Commission appears to be important ...	81
28	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	628	30.	Syria. Correspondence between M. Clemenceau and Emir Faisal. Form of independence which France is prepared to recognize for Syria ...	69
29	M. Cambon	May 5.	Syria. That orders may be sent to General Allenby to allow certain movements of French troops ...	91
40	To Earl of Derby ...	749	8.	Syria. Conversation with French Ambassador respecting No. 39. Has promised to refer matter to General Allenby ...	91
41	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	678	7.	Engineering works at Jaffa. No definite commercial policy can be adopted until the future control of Palestine has been settled ...	93
42	To M. Cambon	13.	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Refers to No. 29. Control by military authorities must be retained during military occupation of the country. Requests of French company cannot be entertained ...	94
43	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	894	6.	Turkey. Interview between military attaché and newspaper editor, who urged immediate arrest of members of Committee of Union and Progress. Intrigues of French ...	95
44	To Earl of Derby ...	785	19.	Constantinople. Interview between French Ambassador and Sir R. Graham respecting differences between British and French at ...	97
45	M. Cambon	18.	Syria. French Government ask that position of French Financial Adviser at Damascus may be recognized by General Allenby ...	98
46	To Mr. Balfour ...	5475	28.	Syria. French Ambassador states that the note from M. Clemenceau enclosed in No. 34 was never sent to Emir Faisal ...	98
47	Rear Admiral Webb ... (Constantinople)	760	14.	Smyrna. Grand Vizier protests against occupation of town by Hellenic troops ...	92

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
48	To M. Cambon	May 27, 1919	Syria. Refers to No. 45. In view of early departure of Inter-Allied Commission to the East, His Majesty Government consider it would be premature to alter existing arrangements ...	100
49	To Earl of Derby ...	842	30.	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Agreement respecting division of military commands in Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia; control of Heraclea port and coal mines; Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway ...	101
50	To Mr. Balfour ...	2482	31.	Arabia. Conversation with the Resident at Aden respecting Proposed Treaty with the Imam; boundary and administration of Aden protectorate; the Idrial ...	102
51	M. Cambon	27.	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. French Government consider the company should be indemnified for the seizure as soon as peace has been signed. Also that manager of the company may be received by the British authorities ...	103
52	To Earl of Derby ...	876	June 11.	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Differences between Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain in regard to terms of German Peace Treaty; proposal to appoint French officials in service of Persian Government; attendance of Grand Vizier at Paris Peace Conference; telegram from French Government to Turkish Crown Prince; speech of M. Picot at Beirut ...	105
53	M. Cambon	13.	Syria. Refers to No. 48. Again refers to position of French Financial Adviser at Damascus ...	107
54	General Clayton ... (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	...	5.	Arabia. Report by British Liaison Officer on political situation. Emir Faisal's agitation ...	107
55	Sir E. Allenby ... (Cairo)	260	11.	Arabia. Transmits memorandum on Khirsa dispute between King Hussein and Ibn Saud ...	113
56	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	1007	14.	Smyrna. Transmits reports of atrocities perpetrated by Greek troops on occupation of ...	117
57	To Mr. Balfour ...	4009	28.	Asia Minor. Italian and Greek military penetration. Have any limits been placed on? ...	129
58	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	959	4.	Turkey. French intrigues to hurry favour openly increasing. Incident of visit of Turkish delegates to Paris Peace Conference. Internal unrest is rapidly increasing ...	131
59	To M. Cambon	25.	Syria. Refers to No. 58. There is no opportunity for discussing modification of existing arrangement as to Financial Adviser ...	134
60	Sir E. Allenby ... (Cairo)	278	15.	Arabia. Refers to No. 55. Present position of Khirsa dispute ...	134
61	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1047	18.	Turkey. Interim Cabinet appointments made during absence of Ministers at Paris Peace Conference ...	136
62	" " ...	1050	22.	Turkey. Growth of national defence movement under Kemal Pasha. Transmits memorandum ...	137

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
63	General Clayton ... (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	111	June 23, 1919	Syria. Report on situation. Emir Faisal's opposition to any form of French intervention. Lebanese opposition to Pan-Arab State ...	139
64	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	1148	July 2,	Palestine. Transmits correspondence respecting proposed Zionist activities. Particulars of concessions desired by Zionist organisation ...	145
65	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1091	June 27,	Turkey. Attention of Acting Grand Vizier has been called to serious nature of agitation conducted by Kemal Pasha. Transmits memorandum ...	148
66	" " ...	1152	July 5,	Asia Minor. Creation of Italian naval base in the Dodecanese. Instructions given to British naval authorities to continue visits to ports concerned ...	149
67	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	1350	19,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Refers to No. 51. His Majesty's Government cannot admit claim of French company. Question must be settled by the mandatory ...	150
68	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1127	June 30,	Turkey. Circular issued by Minister of the Interior prohibiting agitation has led to his resignation ...	151
69	" " ...	1129	July 1,	Armenia. Reports continue to arrive of atrocities committed on Christian communities ...	152
70	To Mr. Wadrop	22,	Trans-Caucasia. Appointment as Chief British Commissioner. Instructions for guidance ...	153
71	To Mr. Balfour ...	4979	23,	Caucasus and the Caspian. Italian Ambassador has been asked whether his Government have decided not to take charge of ...	156
72	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1230	17,	Turkey. Turkish Government have been asked to dismiss Kemal Pasha and Tunal Pasha who are organising resistance to the interests of the Allies ...	155
73	" " ...	1232	17,	Smyrna. Report on recent events at Pergama. Trouble originated in action of Turkish irregulars ...	158
74	" " ...	1245	20,	Smyrna. Question of Greek evacuation of Aidin ...	159
75	" " ...	1247	20,	Smyrna. Turks ask that limits of Greek occupation may be clearly defined ...	159
76	Colonel French ... (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	...	19,	Syria and Palestine. Conclusions formed by American Commission of Enquiry ...	161
77	To Sir G. Grahame ...	1041	Aug. 8,	Syria. Sir E. Graham has complained to M. de Fleurbaey of anti-British campaign in French press. To make representations to French Government on similar lines ...	161
78	To Mr. Lindsay ...	459	11,	Caucasus. Conversation with United States Ambassador respecting withdrawal of British forces. Mr. Davis is of opinion that the United States will not accept mandate for Armenia or Constantinople ...	162
79	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1126	1,	Turkey. Hostility of all parties to present Government. Chauvinism in the ascendant ...	163

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
80	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1353	July 31, 1919	Turkey. If necessary, proposes to ensure safety of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier. All power now appears to be in hands of Committee of Union and Progress ...	166
81	To Sir G. Grahame ...	1061	Aug. 13,	Persia. Has complained to M. de Fleurbaey of impending despatch of French Judicial Mission to Tebran. Attention called to growing tendency of French press to foment ill-feeling against England ...	169
82	Sir G. Grahame ... (Paris)	791	12,	Syria. Refers to No. 77. Has complained to M. Pichon of French press attacks. M. Pichon declares inability of Government to control the press, but reiterates complaints against British officers of anti-French propaganda ...	170
83	To Mr. Balfour ...	5363	14,	Constantinople. Military sphere. Exception taken to French view of agreement in regard to General Milne's authority ...	172
84	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1368	5,	Turkey. Refers to No. 80. Note concerning delimitation of Italian and Greek zones in Asia Minor handed to Grand Vizier. Has urged strong measures against members of Committee of Union and Progress. Kemal Pasha is organising an army at Erzerum ...	172
85	Rear-Admiral Webb ... (Constantinople)	1412	9,	Asia Minor. Transmits report on atrocities in Aidin Vilayet ...	174
86	" " ...	1417	9,	Turkey. Refers to No. 84. Interview between Crown Prince and Mr. Ryan. Former denied being implicated in Kemal Pasha's agitation ...	179
87	Colonel French ... (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	...	11,	Palestine. Transmits copy of letter from General Allenby to War Office reporting on Mr. Justice Brandeis' tour in Palestine with the Zionist Commission ...	182
88	Colonel Wilson	23,	Arabia. Ownership of Khamsa. Transmits memorandum supporting King Hussein's claim ...	184
89	To Rear-Admiral Webb ...	1416 Tel.	27,	Turkey. Refers to No. 86. To discourage project of sending Turkish agitators to Italy ...	184
90	Rear-Admiral Webb ... (Constantinople)	1437	17,	Asia Minor. Massacre of Christians. Turkish Government are devoid of all authority in Anatolia. Suggests withdrawal of Greek and Italian forces ...	187
91	To Mr. Lindsay ...	497	27,	Caucasus. Refers to No. 76. American Ambassador states that his Government are unable to defray expense of British forces in Armenia; they are unable to help, and appeal to His Majesty's Government not to withdraw forces as responsibility will be placed on England ...	188
92	Rear-Admiral Webb ... (Constantinople)	1745 Tel.	29,	Turkey. Grand Vizier has asked Peace Conference to hasten conclusion of peace ...	189
93	To M. Cambon	Sept. 1,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Refers to No. 51. Line is now in a better condition than when taken over by British military authorities. His Majesty's Government can admit no claim ...	190
94	Rear-Admiral Webb ... (Constantinople)	1525	Aug. 25,	Turkey. Grand Vizier asks that a telegram may be sent to the Peace Conference pointing out effects of delay in conclusion of peace ...	191

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
95	M. de Florian (Constantinople)	...	Sept. 9, 1919	Red Sea lights. Asks that control may be transferred to the Lights Company as soon as possible	193
96	Rear-Admiral Webb (Constantinople)	1533	Aug. 27.	Turkey. Summary of political situation since reconstruction of Cabinet	193
97	To Mr. Balfour	5964	Sept. 11.	Constantinople. Summary of events leading up to British occupation. Consternation aroused at news of British withdrawal and proposed substitution of Italian forces. American unwillingness to share in task. British held responsible in event of massacre of Armenians. French willingness to send troops	195
98	Colonel French (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	...	Aug. 30.	Syria and Palestine. Summary of situation. American Commission have finished their inquiry. Political pressure and propaganda of French. Relations of Zionist Commission and the British authorities not very satisfactory. Zionists inclined to ignore practical difficulties in way of agreeing to their requests	199
99	Rear-Admiral Webb (Constantinople)	1601	Sept. 3.	Turkey. Transmits report of conversation between Governor of Samos and a British relief officer. Provincial governors are powerless against the National Defence movement	201
100	"	1624	7.	Asia Minor. Transmits reports on present situation in Anatolia. Hostility to Greek occupation continuing. Mandate under England or the United States would be accepted	203
101	"	1629	8.	Asia Minor. Transmits report on trial by court-martial of Greek officer in command of garrison at Adia. Report drawn up by Pan-Hellenist propagandist	205
102	"	1630	9.	Asia Minor. Transmits report on events at Adia from an English eye-witness	210
103	"	1633	8.	Turkey. Grand Vizier has suggested the conclusion of a secret understanding with Great Britain. Has negatived the proposal	212
104	Admiral, Paris	...	12.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Allocation of territories between British, French and Arabs. Railway and pipe lines. Withdrawal of British troops. Despatch of French troops	213
105	Rear-Admiral Webb (Constantinople)	1645	7.	Turkish prisons. Owing to unsatisfactory conditions prevailing, an Inter-Allied Commission for Prisons has been constituted	214
106	Mr. Balfour (Peace Delegation, Paris)	1647	10.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Memorandum (August 11) on existing conflicting agreements. Outline of scheme which might satisfy aspirations of all parties	216
107	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	21.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Protest against arrangements in No. 104. Asks for cancellation and continuance of status quo pending conclusion of peace with Turkey	223
108	To Sir R. Cross	6206	24.	Syria. Lord Hardinge has complained to French Ambassador of French press attacks on action of British officers, and also of French action in Tehran	224

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
109	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	Sept. 23, 1919	Syria. Refers to No. 105. Has declined to discuss question of evacuation of British forces. That Arabs may be allowed to occupy Beirut, or maintenance of status quo	225
110	Rear-Admiral Webb (Constantinople)	1676	11.	Armenia. Transmits report by a relief officer on tour along south coast of Black Sea. Conditions in the interior are deplorable. There will be no improvement till a mandate has been given	226
111	Mr. Balfour (Peace Delegation, Paris)	1903	Oct. 3.	Constantinople. Transmits letter from Vienna Bank protesting against restrictions imposed on them by the Inter-Allied Financial Control, for transmission to Constantinople	229
112	To Emir Feisal	...	9.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 107. Points out that No. 104 is not an agreement, but only contains proposals for collaboration. His contentions are based on misunderstandings. Reasons for withdrawal of British troops and necessity for substitution of other European troops. Military conditions would be fatal to Arab aspirations	231
112*	Sir M. Clootham (Cairo)	457	Sept. 22.	Arabia. Transmits report by Arab Bureau on capture of Colonel Jacob's Mission to the Izzat Yaks	234a
113	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	Oct. 9.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 107. Requests request for cancellation or suspension of Paris arrangements	234
114	To Emir Feisal (From Mr. Lloyd George)	...	10.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 113. Reasons prompting action of His Majesty's Government are explained in No. 112. Unable to alter decision to withdraw British troops. Ready to arrange meeting of representatives to adjust differences	235
115	M. Clemenceau (Constantinople)	...	10.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 104. Criticisms on proposed arrangement	236
116	Colonel Cornwallis	...	11.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Report on meeting between Emir Feisal and two French officers in London. Suggests meeting between British and French military representatives and Emir Feisal	237
117	To Earl of Derby	1160 Tel.	18.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Message from Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau. Urges meeting in London between Emir Feisal, Lord Allenby and General Gouraud. Emir Feisal would like an American representative also to be present	238
118	To Sir R. Redd	619	14.	Egypt. Lord Hardinge has asked the Italian Ambassador why Italy delays to recognise the British protectorate	239
119	M. Clemenceau to Earl of Derby	...	14.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 117. Unable to agree to proposed meeting. Recognises difficult position of His Majesty's Government vis-à-vis the Arabs and France. Emir Feisal should be told he must negotiate direct with France	240
120	To Earl of Derby	1170 Tel.	16.	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Emir Feisal will leave for Paris on 20th October, and accepts M. Clemenceau's invitation	241

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
121	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	Oct. 11, 1919	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 114. If His Majesty's Government cannot alter the decision to withdraw British forces, he will agree to meeting of British, French and American representatives to consider the matters involved ...	241
122	Earl of Derby (Paris)	1209 Tel.	19,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 120. M. Clemenceau will receive Emir Feisal on 21st October ...	242
123	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	19,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Will go to Paris and endeavour to persuade French to maintain the status quo ...	242
124	Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau	...	19,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 123. Requests implicit charge of duplicity. Traces course of negotiations leading up to Anglo-French Agreement of 1916. Reasons for understanding come to in December 1918. His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to bring about a Franco-Arab understanding in spite of Syrian opposition. Having declined to accept mandate for Syria, His Majesty's Government put forward proposals in No. 104, and have tried to induce Emir Feisal to accept them. Regrets that proposal to hold meeting between English, French and Arab representatives has been rejected. Fears a high-handed policy will drive Arabs into hostility. His Majesty's Government cannot disown themselves of their responsibility to the Arabs. Denies charge of increasing the armament of the Arabs. If the French press attacks are continued His Majesty's Government will have to consider the question of publication of the papers ...	243
125	To Earl Granville	258	22,	Thrace. M. Venizelos has urged the claims of Greece. Constantinople. His views as to future of ...	250
126	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	1836	10,	Turkey. Present political situation consequent on change of Government. Delay in conclusion of peace has enabled Nationalist movement to strengthen its position, and will involve difficulty in enforcement of peace terms ...	251
127	"	1835	6,	Turkey. Government hope to arrange matters with Mustapha Kemal ...	257
128	"	1885	10,	Turkey. Threats of Mustapha Kemal against members of the late Government ...	258
129	To Earl of Derby	1296	22,	Syria. Has again complained to French Ambassador of tone and matter of French official notes and press articles ...	259
130	To Mr. Kennard	658	22,	Asia Minor. Italian Ambassador complains of British opposition at Paris to inclusion of Italian troops in forces of occupation at Aidin. Fiume. Italian Ambassador also asked for British support of Italian aspirations ...	260
131	M. Venizelos (Communicated)	...	15,	Smyrna. Complaints of lack of impartiality of Commission appointed by the Supreme Council to enquire into recent occurrences ...	261

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
132	Mr. P. Kery (10, Downing Street)	...	Oct. 24, 1919	Syria. Telegrams exchanged between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau on September 11 respecting discussion of matters with Emir Feisal ...	265
133	Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)	674 Tel.	26,	Egypt. Italy promises to recognise British protectorate, but wishes to call attention to certain matters ...	266
134	To M. Cambon	...	2,	Red Sea lights. Refers to No. 95. As the lights belong to the Ottoman Government their disposal will have to be settled by the Treaty of Peace ...	267
135	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	1910	18,	Turkish prisons. Refers to No. 105. Transmits reports on inspections made by the Inter-Allied Prison Commission ...	268
136	"	1915	18,	Turkey. Refers to No. 124. Present position is one of unstable equilibrium between Constantinople and the provinces ...	274
137	"	1918	18,	Smyrna. Report of Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry. Greeks and Turks are both held responsible for occurrences ...	280
138	"	1933	20,	Smyrna. Italian activities in and around. Greek and Italian troops should both be withdrawn ...	282
139	"	1938	18,	Anatolia. Conditions prevailing in Samsoun area ...	291
140	"	1939	18,	Turkey. American sympathies are encouraging Turkish Nationalist agitation ...	293
141	To Viscount Grey	681	20,	Oil. American Ambassador has complained of British refusal to allow representatives of Standard Oil Company to make investigations in Palestine. Turkey. Attention of American Ambassador has been called to unfriendly attitude of American Admiral at Constantinople ...	299
142	Viscount Allenby (Cairo)	808	16,	Arabs. Possibility of resignation of King Hussein. Emir Abdullah would be the most suitable successor. He will probably ask for maintenance of a senior British official at Jeddah ...	301
143	Mr. Davis	...	31,	Oil. Asks that representatives of Standard Oil Company may be allowed to make investigations in Mesopotamia. Representative of the Shell group has been allowed facilities ...	301
144	To Sir R. Crowe	7338	Nov. 3,	Smyrna. M. Venizelos asks for a fresh Commission of Enquiry at which a Greek representative may be present ...	302
145	Sir M. Chestham (Cairo)	526	Oct. 27,	Arabs. Refers to No. 111*. Transmits further report on detention at Hajj of Colonel Jacob's Mission to the Imam Yahya ...	303
146	Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)	241	Nov. 3,	Georgia. Commercial negotiations between Georgians and Italians ...	308
147	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	6,	Syria. Unable to induce the French to arrange a meeting to arrange for the withdrawal of British troops. Refers matter to the Supreme Council ...	309
148	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	2031	Oct. 28,	Turkey. Notes on the Nationalist movement in the Samsoun area ...	315

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
149	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2043	Oct. 30, 1919	Turkey. Has called attention of United States High Commissioner to inundations and harmful statements disseminated by the "United States Naval Radio Press" ...	318
150	"	2044	30,	Turkey. Returns showing present military situation and resources of the Turkish Empire ...	319
151	Sir E. Crowe ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	2123	Nov. 10,	Smyrna. Supreme Council will urge Greeks to exercise restraint, and will point out that Greek occupation is provisional pending final decisions of the Peace Conference ...	323
152	Earl Curzon ... (Memorandum)	...	12,	Syria. Interview with M. Pichon, who gave a very optimistic account of French negotiations with Emir Feisal. Lord Curzon mentioned matters connected with British evacuation requiring consideration, and urged early resumption of Peace Conference in London to settle the whole Eastern question ...	325
153	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2045	2,	Turkey. Political situation in the Samson area. Position of Christians in the interior is dependent on goodwill of the Turks ...	327
154	"	2046	4,	Turkey. Question of new Parliament meeting at Erzurum has been raised. Transmits memorandum on question of expulsion of Turks from Constantinople ...	328
155	"	2047	4,	Trans-Caucasia. Transmits report on situation in the provinces of ...	330
156	India Office	14,	Arabia. Statement made by Naji Mission on behalf of Ibn Saud in connection with recent disturbances ...	337
157	Colonel Wilson	3,	Arabia. Refers to No. 142. Every effort should be made to prevent King Hussein's abdication ...	338
158	Correspondence	Arabia. Boundaries of the Arab State. Correspondence between Sheriff of Mecca and Sir H. McMahon, 14th July, 1915, to 25th January, 1916 ...	340
159	Sir E. Crowe ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	2143	17,	Syria. Transmits note from Emir Feisal to the Supreme Council asking permission to prevent his name and note from French Delegation maintaining that Syrian portion cannot be considered apart from whole question of Turkey ...	348
160	Admiralty	20,	Black Sea. Transmits notes by Admiral de Robeck on a recent cruise and visits to Samson, Trebizond, Tiflis, Novorossiysk and Sevastopol. Potentialities of Georgia. Appreciation of General Denikin ...	352
161	To Mr. Davis	21,	Oil. Refers to No. 143. Explains policy in regard to surveys, &c. Representative of the Shell group has been recalled ...	359
162	Mr. Wardrop ... (Tiflis)	59	Oct. 23,	Armenia. Report on journey in. Conditions are deplorable ...	359
163	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2085	Nov. 6,	Smyrna. Refers to No. 138. Italian propaganda continues ...	363
164	"	2052-401	10,	Turkey. Emphasises abnormal conditions consequent on prolongation of armistice. Asks for recall of French generalissimo ...	363

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
165	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2110	Nov. 11, 1919	Turkey. Question of relief of the native Christian population is becoming very serious. Urges that England should assume the responsibility ...	365
166	To M. Cambon	22,	Syria. Description of the coastal area by British troops is without prejudice to future determination of the boundaries of Palestine ...	368
167	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2124	12,	Turkey. Elections to the new Chamber are being conducted under pressure of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Nationalists ...	368
168	To Earl of Derby ...	1891	25,	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Renewal of Belgian Guarantee Treaty of 1839; French apprehension of British negotiations with Russian Soviet representative in Copenhagen; French disinclination to transfer of Peace Conference to London; attitude of United States Senate to League of Nations Covenant ...	372
169	M. Clemenceau to Mr. Lloyd George	...	5,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 124. Has never doubted sentiments of His Majesty's Government. Attributes divergencies to subordinate officers. Cannot altogether accept point as to Mosul. Still hopes to convert Emir Feisal to an agreement ...	374
170	Emir Feisal to Earl of Derby	...	21,	Syria. Transmits letter to Mr. Lloyd George stating that French occupation of certain districts evacuated by British troops will be considered an act of aggression by the Arabs, and copy of letter to M. Clemenceau in reply to enclosure 2 in No. 159, suggesting appointment of an Anglo-Franco-Arab Commission to arrange matters ...	375
171	Foreign Office Memo- randum	...	25,	Arabia. Refers to enclosure in No. 156. Notes of conversation with Naji Mission. Hostilities between King Hussein and Ibn Saud must cease. A meeting must be arranged to settle differences. Failing this, His Majesty's Government are prepared to appoint an arbitrator ...	377
172	Sir E. Crowe ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	2122	28,	Smyrna. Refers to No. 151. M. Venizelos takes exception to statement that Greeks were warned of provisional nature of occupation entrusted to them. Supports M. Venizelos' contention ...	379
173	Colonel Meinertzhagen (Egyptian Ex- peditionary Force)	311	10,	Syria and Palestine. Report on present situation in. Pan-Islamic feeling is growing in Syria. Suggests that Zionists should be allowed to start measures for building up their national home ...	383
174	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2143	16,	Turkey. Government are negotiating with the leaders of the Nationalist movement ...	386
175	"	2146	15,	Cilicia. French occupation of Alatak, Mamah and Oufis has caused violent outburst by Nationalist leaders ...	389
176	To Colonel Wilson	Dec. 1,	Arabia. To induce King Hussein to meet Ibn Saud in order to settle differences. Arguments to be used. Ibn Saud will also be informed. After agreement visit of King Hussein to England will be welcomed ...	391

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
177	War Office...	...	Dec. 2, 1919	Turkey. Military force may be necessary to enforce the peace terms, it is therefore essential that the military authorities should be made aware of the terms in advance ...	393
178	To British officer on Supreme Economic Council	...	3,	Turkey. Transmits copy of No. 145. To call attention of Supreme Economic Council to state of destitution prevailing in Turkey, with a view to adoption of relief measures by the Allied Powers ...	394
179	Sir E. Crowe (Peace Delegation, Paris)	2248	3,	Turkey. Refers to No. 148. M. Clemenceau will not agree to Peace Conference meeting in London to draw up Turkish Treaty. This attitude is due to desire to preserve what remains of French prestige in the Near East. Suggests that negotiations might be conducted in London, but signature of treaty to take place in Paris ...	395
180	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	2234	Nov. 23,	Turkey. Nationalist movement is now unpopular in Samsun district ...	396
181	"	2208	24,	Armenia. Refers to No. 110. State of security is deteriorating. Christian refugees are leaving in increasing numbers...	396
182	War Office...	...	Dec. 8,	Palestine. Question of northern boundary should be settled at once. Possibility of friction between English and French commanders ...	400
183	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	2213	Nov. 23,	Asia Minor. Reports from British Advanced Headquarters. Greek activities. Situation in Western Anatolia. Economic situation in Adana viayet ...	402
184	Viscount Allenby (Cairo)	571	22,	Arabia. Letter received from King Hussein for transmission to Emir Feisal, which has been returned to Jeddah to be given back to the King ...	407
185	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	2242	25,	Asia Minor. Report by British Relief Officer on conditions in viayet of Bursa and sanjak of Balikesir ...	408
186	"	2232	Dec. 2,	Turkey. Opposition to Nationalist movement is spreading in Anatolia ...	411
187	"	...	2,	Turkey. Opposition to Nationalist movement in Izmit district ...	412
188	Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)	136 Tol.	10,	Asseraijan. Prime Minister has asked whether His Majesty's Government support proposal to federate with Persia ...	413
189	To Earl of Derby	1479	17,	Palestine. Transmits copy of No. 182. His Majesty's Government have decided to make a concession to Arab feelings, and hope French Government will agree to existing boundary between British and French spheres of occupation ...	414
190	Colonel Meindertabagen (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	74	5,	Syria and Palestine. Indirect evidence warrants conclusion that Babca di Roma is acting prejudicially to British interests ...	415
191	"	92	2,	Syria. Feeling in favour of French mandate is growing. Turkish propaganda is increasing. Sherifian family are losing influence ...	415

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
192	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	2221	Dec. 4, 1919	Kurdistan. Conversation between Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. Ryan, who stated that His Majesty's Government maintain an attitude of reserve as regards Kurdish question ...	419
193	"	2286	4,	Turkey. Armenian and Greek Patriarchates complain of growing want of public security. Increasing need of relief to prevent starvation ...	421
194	"	2511	9,	Kurdistan. Conversation between Mr. Hohler and Kurdish chief. Latter stated that Turkish Government have offered autonomy to Kurds; he asked for advice. Was informed Kurdish aspirations would be dealt with in the Turkish Peace Treaty ...	424
195	"	2417	11,	Turkey. Turkish Government have telegraphed to Supreme Council asking for early settlement of Peace Treaty ...	425
196	"	2321	12,	Officia. Refers to No. 172. Mustafa Kemal complains of proceedings of French at Adana ...	429
197	"	2336	13,	Kurdistan and Armenia. Refers to No. 194. Armenian Patriarch confirms statement of agreement between Kurds and Armenians ...	430
198	"	2341	13,	Turkey. List of economic concessions held by foreigners (other than British) in late Turkish Empire ...	431
199	"	2344	16,	Smyrna. Note to Greek High Commissioner from Allied High Commissioners stating that enquiry is to be held into question of Greek interference in administration of ...	432
200	"	2353	16,	Turkey. Notes from Armenian and Greek Patriarchates appealing for advance of funds from Allied Governments for relief of Christian populations. Italian High Commission urges claims of Muslim refugees also ...	435
201	"	2354	18,	Turkey. Further appeals of Greek and Armenian Patriarchates on behalf of Christians ...	435
202	Earl of Derby (Paris)	1235	27,	Palestine. Refers to No. 189. French Government cannot accept boundary suggested. French Commander must carry out decision of the Supreme Council ...	436

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs

[1105]

(No. 429) Confidential

remind the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had not yet answered my question as to the meaning of a passage in the memorandum which he had communicated to you while in London, referring to an eventual despatch of a contingent from the

and as there were now British and French troops in Constantinople, he

I asked him whether he was in

the Allies were only represented there by naval forces. Baron Sommaro replied that he had been informed that troops were there also. If this information was incorrect, it was of itself but if it were correct he expected equal treatment. I inquired graph whether any troops had been sent, but that I believed he was mistaken.

He was evidently considerably nettled by the contention that

The armistice was deprecated on the ground that Greece would follow suit. He suggested that Italy was one of the Great Powers, she had fought throughout this war with the Allies to the utmost extent of her resources and capacity, and had labored undoubted service to the general cause. Greece had created a difficulty for the Powers through a great part of the war, and had only come in towards the end in the campaign against Bulgaria. The argument of what Greece might do late was not one which should affect the action of the Great Powers. I said we had to consider was not the relative position of Greece with the other Great Powers, but the actual one of preventing that Government from taking advantage of the actual state of Turkey to cause an grave embarrassment, which there was every possibility of their doing if the example were given by one of the Great Powers. Baron Sonnino said that Greece would not venture to do anything contrary to the wishes of Great Britain and France.

I have, etc
RENNEIL RODD

[1382]



Je tiens à affirmer à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français a été très heureux et sera encore très heureux d'offrir l'hospitalité à S.A.R. l'Emir Faysal et son ami et au fils d'un Souverain indépendant et allié. Il a regretté de n'être pas au courant des intentions de S.M. le Roi Hussein. S'il eût été prévenu à temps voulu, il n'eût pas manqué de lui faire connaître, d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique, qu'aucune décision définitive n'a encore été prise quant à la représentation au Congrès de la Paix des États qui, ainsi que la République de Heshaz, ne sont formés au cours de la présente guerre. Leur participation à la Conférence de la Paix n'est donc pas reconnue par tous les États alliés devenus définitifs.

[3006]

No. 8.

EN attendant l'établissement d'un nouveau régime juridique en Turquie, le Gouvernement français, par l'intermédiaire de son légation à Constantinople même, Mr. Waugh et M. Giliardi puissent échanger leurs vues sur cette question, de façon à apporter à leurs Gouvernements respectifs les éclaircissements nécessaires.

En se référant à sa note du 18 de ce mois, l'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur de demander au Gouvernement britannique de vouloir bien, s'il est du même avis, donner à Mr. Waugh des instructions dans ce sens.

M. Paul Cambron, owner, etc.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 décembre, 1918

30071

No. 4

Note on the Necessity for Judicial Reform in Turkey.—(Communicated by M. Camhon
January 6, 1919.)

...eau les portes de
...ance de la France

... ont d'une bonne justice. Pour
que nous créérions à l'avenir en Turquie
puissent prospérer pour que les capitaux si considérables que nous y avons engagés et
ceux que nous serons amenés à y engager encore puissent fructifier, il faut qu'ils soient
sûrés de trouver dans ce pays ce qui leur a fait jusqu'ici complètement défaut—une
justice qui soit une justice.

Il n'a déploré souvent la décadence de notre commerce en Orient; c'est un fait qui

[1356]

B 2

à des causes diverses. Une des premières, la principale peut-être, est le manque de sécurité judiciaire et la conviction que nos commerçants avaient de voir leurs intérêts toujours sacrifiés en cas de contestation, avec leurs correspondants indigènes, ils voyaient, par exemple, les faillites ottomanes se terminer régulièrement par des conditions, et en fait ils se désintéressaient de plus en plus d'un marché où les garanties les plus nécessaires leur faisaient défaut. Les maisons françaises les plus importantes ne voulaient plus faire d'affaires en Turquie. On ne pouvait plus y trouver une justice saine et impartiale. On ne pouvait plus y compter sur un bon lieu d'espérer qu'il reprendrait son caractère qui doit tout naturellement lui appartenir.

Le premier est de créer en Turquie un nouveau régime judiciaire. Que doit-il être ? et tout d'abord dans quelle mesure y a-t-il lieu de rétablir les Capitulations ?

Le Gouvernement jeune-turc, à la veille du jour où il allait se lancer dans la guerre à la renouée de l'Allemagne, a décrété solennellement la dénonciation des Capitulations. Cette décision, unilatérale et arbitraire, procédant avec emphase et par la violence, a pu entrer en vigueur par suite des circonstances, mais elle n'a pas été acceptée par les Puissances intéressées. En droit, elle est nulle et nous empêcher de retoucher purement et simplement les Capitulations. Elles restent vraies, utiles, et dans quelle mesure y avons-nous intérêt ?

L'Allemagne et l'Autriche ont protesté quand le Gouvernement ottoman a décrété l'abolition des Capitulations. Protestation de pure forme et sans suite. Plus tard, elles ont, au moins tacitement, adhéré à un ordre de choses fondé, dès les bénéficiaires, les Capitulations ne pouvant qu'être une gêne pour ceux qui ne considèrent comme les futurs maîtres de la Turquie. L'Allemagne et l'Autriche ont ainsi perdu tout droit à réclamer le retour de l'ancien état de choses. possible, cependant, si on rétablissait purement et simplement les Capitulations en ce qui concerne ? Ne risquons nous pas alors de faire le jeu de nos ennemis ? L'union des Alliés qui doit être dominante maintenant en Orient ; elle doit être débarrassée de toute gêne. En dehors même de ces considérations, le retour pur et simple à l'ancien état de choses est-il souhaitable ?

Examinons quel était dans ses grandes lignes, avant la pré-
Capitulation par les jeunes Turcs, la régime judiciaire de l'étranger en
triple point de vue de ses rapports avec a
e au avec les sujets ottomans.

Dans ses rapports avec son tribunal consulaire, tant en matière pénale que civile, l'agent consulaire a le privilège d'une importance capitale qu'il ne saurait être question d'abandonner. Sur ce point les Capitulations doivent être maintenues.

Les tribunaux concurrens étaient également compétens, dans les mêmes matières, pour toutes les concentrations entre étrangers de nationalités différentes. La compétence était de règle absolue, tant qu'il n'y avait pas d'étrangers en cause. L'affaire, dans ce cas, conformément à la règle de droit *secundum forum rei*, était portée devant le tribunal du défendeur. Celui-ci était donc assuré d'être jugé par ses juges naturels et conformément à ses lois.

Cette procédure, qui a succédé à celle des Commissions mixtes instituées au début et qui a fonctionné régulièrement pendant trois quarts de siècle environ, a rendu les plus grands services aux étrangers de toutes nationalités et plus en Turquie où y faisant des opérations commerciales. C'était la solution la plus heureuse qu'il fût possible d'imaginer sous l'empire des capitulations. Mais ce régime n'était pas sans inconvénients. Nos compatriotes, obligés d'attester leurs adversaires devant les certains de ces tribunaux toutes les garanties désirables, tout au point de vue du savoir que de l'importance des juges. Ceux-ci, même quand ils avaient eu une éducation heureusement le cas le plus souvent, la conscience et le respect de leurs devoirs de magistrats, ne pouvaient pas toujours se défendre de certaines inclinations pour leurs nationaux.

D'autre part, l'existence des décisions des tribunaux communaux n'est admise qu'à l'égard de leurs nationaux, l'introduction d'une demande reconventionnelle n'étant pas possible devant le tribunal sans la demande principale quand le demandeur était étranger. Cette action devait être portée devant le tribunal du demandeur principal ou le chacun d'entre eux s'il y avait plusieurs demandeurs de nationalités différentes. De là, dans certains cas, des lenteurs et des frais excessifs, et cette conséquence fâcheuse quelquefois, que des actions résultant d'une même affaire pouvaient être résolues de façon très différente par chacun des tribunaux saisis, jugeant chacun d'après une loi

différente. Le système n'était donc pas parfait. Il est possible d'en trouver un plus heureux.

plus heureux.

Maïs, c'est surtout dans les différends entre étrangers et indigènes que le régime qui fonctionnait en Turquie avant la guerre laissait à désirer. Dès qu'il y avait un intérêt ottoman en cause, les tribunaux ottomans étaient seuls compétents, soit que l'étranger fût demandeur, soit qu'il fût défendeur. Certaines garanties étaient seulement assurées à l'étranger devant les tribunaux ottomans. Ces garanties étaient de deux sortes : une garantie générale, d'abord l'assistance du drogman devant les tribunaux mixtes de commerce et devant les tribunaux de répression pénale ; une autre, spéciale aux tribunaux mixtes de commerce, la jonction dans chaque affaire où un étranger était partie, de deux assesseurs de sa nationalité, garantie illusoire en réalité, car à côté de ces deux assesseurs pris dans la colonne de l'étranger, juges d'occasion, désignés par le consul et acceptant quelquefois cette mission à titre honorifique, venaient souvent la présidence et les usages turcs, se trouvaient toujours trois juges ottomans de carrière, dont le président, qui avaient seul réellement la direction des débats et la décision de l'affaire. On peut dire que les prétendus tribunaux mixtes de commerce, tels qu'ils existaient en Turquie avant la guerre, n'étaient mixtes qu'en apparence. Pour qui connaît la mentalité des indigènes musulmans ou rayas, et les influences qui s'exercent dans les prétoires ottomans, il est facile de comprendre combien les jugements rendus dans ces conditions offraient et de faibles garanties de justice et de moralité.

drogman et l'étendue très large que les missions étrangères, à son droit de contrôle, appartenait au certain corridor à ces inconvenients, mais dans un cas seulement : quand l'étranger était défendeur. Dans ce cas, la garantie était complète, l'exécution des décisions judiciaires rendues par les tribunaux ottomans contre un étranger n'étant possible que par l'intermédiaire de son consulat. Si le drogman avait refusé de signer le verdict, l'exécution était refusée et le jugement restait lettre morte -- solution très avantageuse évidemment pour l'étranger mais qui n'était pas sans inconvénient en droit pur, car l'indigène lui-même protestait contre ce qu'il considérait, avec raison, comme un délit de justice. Un conflit diplomatique se produisait sur un différend d'ordre judiciaire. Le mal entendu s'aggravait ainsi chaque fois que le système était continuellement violé.

[illegible]

du Ticharet. Non compatriotes. Respectueux observateurs des lois du pays, profession, ils ont rarement l'occasion commerciale. Il est encore plus rare qu'ils aient qu'il y en ait très peu nombreux fort peu intéressants et qui, par un effet des capitulations, ne trouvent bon plaisir en fait très souvent d'une scandaleuse impunité. Il peut arriver, d'autre part, en matière pénale, qu'un français honorable, victime d'une infraction préventive dans les provinces, ait à subir les effets d'une condamnation excessive ou même nique dans ce cas, de peine matérielle. Il en résulte que nos compatriotes sont en peu près privés en fait de la garantie réelle du justice devant les tribunaux.

il dure. Il est indispensable de créer en Turquie une
 juiverie et jamais les conditions n'ont été plus favorables à
 devrait être conçue d'

Il n'a abouti qu'à la suite de longues et laborieuses négociations. Toutefois, à la fin de 1825, par Nubar Pacha elle s'est courtoisement longuement aux résistances des Pachaïses. Cette réforme qui, dans l'esprit de Nubar Pacha, a été l'œuvre de la justice, a eu, cependant, les plus heureux effets pour les Européens en instituant en Egypte une justice éclairée et impartiale qui est un vœu si bien mérité pour ce pays.

plus gênantes des Capitula nous a eu, cependant, les plus heureux effets pour les Européens en instituant en Egypte une justice éclairée et impartiale qui est un v

Sans entrer dans le détail de cette organisation, il suffit de rappeler ici que les tribunaux mixtes d'Égypte sont composés de juges indigènes et de juges étrangers nommés par le Gouvernement égyptien, et que la majorité dans chaque tribunal et pour chaque affaire ont toujours assurée à l'élément étranger. Les juges étrangers sont présentés au Gouvernement égyptien par le Gouvernement du pays auquel ils appartiennent.

Il y aurait lieu d'instituer en Turquie les nouveaux tribunaux.

À la majorité de juges ottomans, en toute matière, dans toute cause où des étrangers seraient parties, et à tous les degrés de juridiction, doit être substituée la majorité de juges étrangers. On pourrait également envisager une réforme qui s'étendrait non seulement aux tribunaux appelés à connaître des procès où des étrangers sont intéressés, mais aux tribunaux spéciaux aux indigènes, eux-mêmes, par l'introduction sous une forme à déterminer d'un haut contrôle étranger dans l'intérêt supérieur de la justice. Certes, une pareille innovation rencontrerait des résistances de la part des Gouvernements ottomans, mais ce serait le plus grand service à rendre aux indigènes. La révolution jeune-turque a adopté notre belle devise : *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*, à laquelle elle a ajouté le mot *Justice*. Cette adjonction, dans l'esprit de la plupart des Jeunes-Turcs, était en réalité une sorte de protestat les privilèges assurés aux étrangers par les Capitulations. Mais, prise à la lettre, cette adjonction ne fût plus justifiée. Jamais,

justice n'a existé en Turquie, et cela plus encore pour les indigènes que pour les étrangers protégés en, comme par les Capitulations et par l'action de leurs Ambassadeurs et de leurs consuls. Ce serait rendre au pays tout entier un service éminent que de la doter, par une sorte de tutelle étrangère, d'une justice digne de ce nom. Les

actuelles permettraient sans doute d'imposer au Gouvernement ottoman le principe en est admis par nous et par nos Alliés.

Quoi qu'il en soit, réclame aux affaires dans lesquelles les étrangers sont

en Turquie. Pour cela, un accord entre les Puissances alliées est nécessaire et il doit suffire. L'Allemagne et l'Autriche ont perdu tout droit à réclamer les Capitulations. Quant aux autres États intéressés, ils souffrent des mêmes maux qu'eux, et ne refuseraient certainement pas d'accepter une réforme dont leurs ne profiteraient comme les nôtres. Ils ne devraient, en fait, que la préparation et la mise en œuvre de la défense, dont la direction ne peut être qu'à la France. C'est notre droit, en effet, qui a servi de base à la première réforme d'où sont sortis les tribunaux en Turquie. Les codes ottomans sont calqués sur les

base unique à celle des tribunaux mixtes de commerce ottoman. C'est à nos codes que recouraient toujours les magistrats du Tiharet avant la promulgation de Mejhelle, pour combler les lacunes des codes ottomans. Si cette situation s'est quelque peu modifiée depuis cette promulgation (de la façon la plus désavantageuse d'ailleurs aux droits de tous les étrangers) il n'en est pas moins vrai que le droit français est le seul droit admis devant les tribunaux de la réforme en Turquie dont il est la loi principale. Enfin, la langue française est la seule langue étrangère admise à côté de la langue turque devant ces mêmes tribunaux. C'est presque toujours en français qu'ont lieu les plaidoiries, les avocats ottomans eux-mêmes plaident le plus souvent en

réforme judiciaire devrait être faite. Elle ne serait en réalité que le développement logique et nécessaire de la réforme inaugurée sous le règne d'Abdul Aziz et poursuivie par le Gouvernement ottoman avec plus d'apparence que de réalité, mais toujours

Tous ces étrangers résidant en Turquie et les Ottomans eux-mêmes, pendant quelques temps applaudiraient à une réforme qui assurerait le bien-être et la fortune du pays, en lui donnant cette chose inappréciable et nouvelle en Turquie : la justice. Nous trouverions, de notre côté, dans la nouveauté un puissant et très

instrument d'influence, car il serait naturel que les juges étrangers fussent nommés en majorité parmi les magistrats français, car notre langue, même si une langue étrangère est admise plus tard dans les plaidoiries ottomanes, serait toujours en fait la véritable langue judiciaire, notre droit enfin sera de plus en plus la loi de nouveaux tribunaux, les codes existants devront être revus et complétés d'après nos codes, en tenant compte seulement de certains usages locaux.

[6861]

No. 5.

Sir R. Bold to Mr. Balfour. — (Received January 13.

(No. 10.)

Sir,

Rome, January 7, 1919

WITH reference to my telegram No. 11 of yesterday's date, announcing that orders had been given to suspend the military preparations for a landing in Asia Minor, it may be as well, in view of the importance of the question, that I should transmit to you translations of the two private communications in which this decision was conveyed to me by the President of the Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The letter of the President of the Council is as follows:—

"Dear Ambassador,

in accordance with my promise I have conferred this evening with Sonnino, and I am happy to inform you that he had spontaneously adopted the point of view which I spontaneously also expressed to you, that is to say, that we were bound to defer amicably to the desire expressed by the British Government, which was based on reasons carrying undeniable weight. Sonnino assured me that he had written to you in this sense, and his letter will have already reached you, or is no doubt about to

The letter from Baron Sonnino is to the following effect:

"Dear Ambassador,

"In reply to your letter, and in deference to the urgent representations which you have made in the name of the British Government, as well as to give time for the necessary understanding, I have begged our military authorities to suspend operations in Asia Minor.

F. ANNELL RÖDD

[7179]

No. 6

Note communicated by M. de Fleurbaey, 10.1.19.

Le Chef de l'État-Major de l'Armée de Mésopotamie a remis à l'officier français chargé de cette armée une note, dont voici le principal passage:

Il n'y a plus de chance de vous donner l'occasion de suivre des opérations militaires. Aussi le Général Marshall pense que vous seriez heureux de quitter la Mésopotamie et de retourner en France; et il a télégraphié au War Office que, comme votre mission ici vous fait seulement perdre un temps précieux, il propose de vous renvoyer en France aussitôt que l'occasion favorable d'un bateau se présente.

Aussitôt après cette communication, et sans attendre la réponse du War Office, des dispositions ont été prises par les autorités militaires de Mésopotamie afin d'assurer le départ du Commandant de l'Armée.

M. de Fleurbaey, attaché à l'Armée de Mésopotamie, a été nommé à la tête de Bagdad vis-à-vis d'un officier français, attaché à l'Armée britannique de Mésopotamie. Ce n'est pas le premier procès de ce genre que l'Ambassade est obligée de relever et il rappelle notamment la note de M. Paul Cambon à Mr. Balfour, en date du 1^{er} de janvier dernier. Parce qu'il est formellement résolu à ne pas entraver l'action de nos Alliés dans la zone qui leur est réservée par les accords existants et à secondar au besoin cette action, le Gouvernement français ressent très vivement l'effet de procédés et d'intrigues qui ont à l'égard de ses agents un caractère desobligeant. M. Pichon est bien persuadé que les fonctionnaires britanniques en Mésopotamie n'agissent pas ainsi sur des instructions de Londres, et il demande que ces fonctionnaires soient contraints à s'inspirer dans leurs rapports avec les agents et officiers français d'un esprit conforme aux devoirs de l'Allié.

Ambassade de France, Londres,

le 13 janvier, 1919.

[213617]

No. 7.

Foreign Office to War Office

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 16, 1919

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state, for the information of the Army Council, that recent correspondence on the subject of retaliatory measures to be taken in the event of the surrender of Medina has emphasized the necessity for arriving at a more definite understanding than has hitherto been reached as to the division of responsibility between the Allied Governments for the position in those districts of Asiatic Turkey which are not in our possession. The former point has already been raised casually by Baron Soudan in conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, while the latter is likely to assume practical importance in the near future owing to the intention of the French to send consular officers and Red Cross units to Smyrna. The imminent arrival of a large American Relief Mission in Asia

In these circumstances Lord Curzon would be glad to be informed what the opinion of the Army Council

a.) The responsibility for securing the fulfilment of the wishes of Turkey devolves solely upon His Majesty's Government; and, if so, whether His Majesty's Government intend to pursue this purpose without consulting their Allies.

(b.) Whether there is any foundation for the belief which appears to be current that while the supreme command in European Turkey is vested in General Franchet d'Espèrey, British commanders enjoy full independence on the other side of the Straits and throughout Asiatic Turkey, including the districts which are not yet in Allied military occupation, such as Smyrna, Trebizond, &c. Can it be assumed, for instance, that our military position in Asiatic Turkey entitles us to claim to be consulted before any expedition or mission is despatched by another Power to the unoccupied regions of that area?

I am, &c.
J. A. C. TILLEY

[13762]

No. 8

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon. — (Received January 25.)

By Bag

I have just received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating that, according to information which has reached that Department, General Franchet d'Espèrey, commanding Allied Forces in the Levant is opposed to despatch of reinforcements which French Government had decided to send to the Levant, and that this opposition would appear to be due to the fear lest the arrival in Syria of fresh French troops should arouse feelings of uneasiness and discontent among the Mussulmans. Note observes that His Majesty's Government is aware of the expressions of attachment which all the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon, whether Christian or Mussulman, have visibly expressed to France since beginning of Allied advance in the Levant. There have been, or should there be in the future, manifestations of another nature in certain points of the zone reserved to French interest according to the Armistice of May, 1918, respecting Asia Minor, such manifestations can only be considered as due to single individuals, coming, for the most part, from districts outside that zone, and acting at the instigation of Pan Arab groups or of Xenophobe elements.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, can only have importance if their authors believe themselves in a position to benefit from the support, or at least the friendly tolerance, of all, or a part, of the elements of occupation, and in this connection Ministry states that it considers it its duty to point out to the Embassy that according to information which it has received, certain British officers in the Levant appear to be animated by a spirit which is little in accord with the Anglo-French Agreement of May, 1918, and which His Majesty's Government

Government have no doubt sent to them in regard to the manner in which these arrangements are to be carried out.

It is noted, note states that the French Government has no doubt that His Majesty's Government will make a point of drawing the attention of these officers to the necessity of taking care that their attitude can in no way be considered as countering the intrigues mentioned above. French Government consequently are of opinion that no weight should be attached to the considerations which may have been put forward with a view to postponing the despatch of reinforcements which they have decided to send to Syria with a view to undertaking for themselves, at least to a great extent, the administration of the territorial zone attributed to the French sphere of influence in Asia Minor.

(Communicated to peace delegation.)

[3008]

No. 9

Papers communicated by M. de Flouriau, January 26.)

(1.)

L'AGENT du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Constantinople estime que, pour assurer la coopération des autorités turques, il est nécessaire d'enlever à la Porte tout élément de discord politique ottomane de bascule entre les Puissances, et de manifester une entente complète entre les représentants français et britanniques. M. Fournes Duparc a constaté que les instructions des représentants français étaient plus larges que celles des représentants britanniques, et il a exprimé l'avis que ses collègues anglais reçoivent des instructions les autorisant à envisager toutes les autres que l'exécution pure et simple de la mission. M. Fournes Duparc partage le sentiment de M. Fournes Duparc et il a autorisé M. de Flouriau à communiquer, à titre confidentiel et avec prière de restitution, les instructions qu'il a données aux collaborateurs civils de l'Amiral Amet.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 6 janvier, 1919

Pour faire suite à la communication de M. de Flouriau en date du 6 de ce mois, et en réponse à la demande faite le 24 courant par téléphone, l'Ambassade de France a communiqué au Foreign Office les lettres de services et instructions envoyées au point de vue des agents de son agence à Constantinople. L'Ambassade de France serait très reconnaissante au Foreign Office de vouloir bien lui renvoyer ces documents lorsqu'ils auront cessé d'être utiles.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 24 janvier, 1919

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à M. le Lieutenant-Colonel Weyl, Paris.

(Lettre de M. de Flouriau, 26 janvier 1919.)
La République à Constantinople jusqu'au moment où la période d'armistice prendra fin. Vous avez été désigné pour remplir les fonctions de conseiller pour les questions industrielles et commerciales. Vous consisterez, en premier lieu, à fournir au Haut-Commissaire tous avis et renseignements sur les problèmes d'ordre industriel et économique qui se poseront; en second lieu, à faciliter la reprise de l'activité des sociétés et établissements français, à les grouper de façon à manifester entre eux une bonne entente et l'union nécessaire à la restauration de l'influence française. J'ai confiance que votre haute compétence, votre profonde connaissance des questions d'Orient, le crédit moral dont vous jouissez à Constantinople,

[1356]

faciliteront grandement la tâche de l'Amiral Haut-Commissaire, et que réunis autour de vous les chefs d'entreprises et de sociétés françaises sauront rétablir et développer, même pendant la période d'armistice le prestige de notre industrie et de notre commerce.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à M. le Colonel Foulon, chargé de la Reorganisation de la Police et de la Gendarmerie en Turquie

(Lettre de service)

Le Gouvernement a décidé de nommer le Vice-Amiral Anet Haut-Commissaire de la République à Constantinople jusqu'au moment où la période de l'armistice prendra fin. Un certain nombre de conseillers lui sont adjoints. Vous avez été nommé l'un d'eux dans toutes les questions de sûreté générale et de surveillance des points de contact entre la France et les pays alliés. Vous aurez en outre à étudier les réformes qui vous paraîtront souhaitables dans l'organisation de la police et de la gendarmerie en Turquie.

Vous recevrez à ce titre une indemnité mensuelle de 2,000 fr. sur le chapitre G du budget de mon Département en plus de votre solde.

Je me réserve de vous faire adjoindre ultérieurement M. le Lieutenant Fouilloux, qui a été attaché pendant la plus grande partie des hostilités au service de presse de l'Ambassade de France à Berne pour les questions de presse.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à M. Cellier, Ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française, Paris.

(Lettre de service)

Le Gouvernement a décidé de nommer le Vice-Amiral Anet, Haut-Commissaire de la République française à Constantinople, jusqu'au moment où la période de l'armistice prendra fin. Un certain nombre de conseillers civils lui sont adjoints. Vous avez été désigné pour remplir les fonctions de conseiller technique en matière de travaux publics. Vous recevrez à ce titre une indemnité mensuelle de 6,000 fr. sur le chapitre G du budget de mon Département.

Le rôle consistant à donner au Haut-Commissaire tous avis sur les questions administratives et judiciaires qui se poseront et à l'assister dans le régime des finances, soit avec les autorités locales, soit avec les autorités alliées. En outre, vous aurez à étudier les réformes qui vous paraîtront souhaitables dans l'organisation de la police et de la gendarmerie en Turquie, et à envoyer à mon Département des propositions précises et pratiques pouvant servir aux négociations des traités de paix à préparer.

Dans la période d'armistice il me paraît nécessaire de ne placer sur le terrain des Capitulations, Elus ont été abolies par un acte unilatéral des Turcs. Les États-Unis ont protesté. Il y aura donc un problème pour les Hautes Puissances alliées d'obtenir pour les nations alliées, et les autres le rétablissement des garanties que leur assurement le régime dit des Capitulations.

Il faut étudier le régime qui peut être appliqué à ces capitulations. Une part les tribunaux ottomans et les fonctions des officiers ottomans. Une autre part les tribunaux alliés et les fonctions des officiers alliés. Une troisième part les tribunaux internationaux et les fonctions des officiers internationaux. Vous recevrez à ce titre une indemnité mensuelle de 2,000 fr. sur le chapitre G du budget de mon Département.

Enfin, la parfaite connaissance que vous avez de la Colonie Constantinople me fait souhaiter que M. du Gardier qui sera particulièrement chargé des intérêts de cette colonie, prenne auprès de vous des conseils et des renseignements.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à M. Picard, ingénieur en chef des Travaux publics

(Lettre de service)

Le Gouvernement a décidé de nommer le Vice-Amiral Anet, Haut-Commissaire de la République à Constantinople, jusqu'au moment où la période de l'armistice prendra fin. Un certain nombre de conseillers civils lui sont adjoints. Vous avez été nommé l'un d'eux dans toutes les questions de sûreté générale et de surveillance des points de contact entre la France et les pays alliés. Vous aurez en outre à étudier les réformes qui vous paraîtront souhaitables dans l'organisation de la police et de la gendarmerie en Turquie.

prendre fin. Un certain nombre de conseillers civils lui sont adjoints. Vous avez été désigné pour remplir les fonctions de conseiller technique en matière de travaux publics. Vous recevrez à ce titre une indemnité mensuelle de 6,000 fr. sur le chapitre G du budget de mon Département.

Le rôle consistant à donner au Haut-Commissaire tous avis sur les questions administratives et judiciaires qui se poseront et à l'assister dans le régime des finances, soit avec les autorités locales, soit avec les autorités alliées. En outre, vous aurez à étudier les réformes qui vous paraîtront souhaitables dans l'organisation générale des services des travaux publics en Turquie et à envoyer à mon Département des propositions précises et d'ordre pratique pouvant servir aux négociations des traités de paix à préparer.

Paris le 25 novembre, 1918.

Questions à étudier.

Établissement d'une monnaie saine dans le pays

Il semble que la solution du problème monétaire pourrait être trouvée dans la mise en circulation d'une monnaie saine.

Il suppose que les billets de la Banque ottomane en circulation valent 100 millions de livres turques. La Banque ottomane remettrait au porteur de ces billets 100 millions de livres turques émises par la Banque ottomane, et ces billets seraient remboursés par l'Empire allemand de 4 livres turques remboursables.

La mise en circulation de billets faite par la Banque ottomane en vue de cet échange serait pour compte du Trésor turc. Celui-ci devrait affecter comme garantie des revenus libres suffisants pour amortir cette dette en cinq ou trente ans au plus. Les revenus ainsi effectués seraient gérés par la Dette publique ottomane prévue pour l'amortissement contre une somme égale de billets annulés.

Questions à examiner

(a) Quel est le montant exact du papier-monnaie émis par l'entremise de la Dette publique? Quel est le montant des billets garantis par l'or déposé auprès des banques étrangères? Est-ce que la totalité des billets garantis par l'or est encore en circulation? Quelle a été la valeur moyenne de tous ces billets par rapport à la valeur actuelle?

(b) Quels sont les arrangements passés avec le Gouvernement allemand au sujet de ces emprunts?

(c) Le projet envisagé ci-dessus et consistant à échanger le papier-monnaie contre des billets de banque représentant la valeur moyenne de ce papier et la remise pour la différence de bons spéciaux remboursables, lorsque le Gouvernement allemand paiera les bons du Trésor, est-il praticable?

(d) Ce projet paraît équitable au point de vue des intérêts des détenteurs du papier-monnaie, mais quelle est cependant la répercussion que son application pourrait avoir sur les conditions économiques du pays, cherté de vie, salaires, etc.

(e) Si le projet en question est praticable, dans l'intérêt général, s'il peut avoir une répercussion avantageuse pour les différents intérêts français au point de vue de la monnaie saine tant des revenus affectés au service des emprunts, que des revenus des chemins de fer et autres, quels sont, d'autre part, les avantages et les inconvénients de son application (Banque Impériale ottomane, Régie des Travaux publics, Salomon ou autres sociétés, particuliers).

(f) Pour le remboursement des dépôts en banque et l'exécution des contrats, quel est le moyen de déterminer la monnaie exigible? Un dépôt en banque devrait être remboursé après la réforme que pour un citoyen ottoman.

(g) Comment doit être appliquée et que la Banque Impériale ottomane doit-elle faire pour assurer l'amortissement annuel des billets de banque à émettre?

(h) Quelles sont les garanties et les avantages qui doivent être conférés et quelles seraient les garanties qui doivent être données pour assurer l'amortissement annuel des billets de banque à émettre?

2. *Emprunt du Gouvernement ottoman—Coupons restés en souffrance.*

(b.) Quel est le montant approximatif des coupons restés en souffrance et appartenant aux ressortissants des Etats alliés? Même distinction qu'au paragraphe (a); même question pour les titres aturris.

En quelle monnaie et où ces disponibilités sont-elles liées ?

(4) Montant et composition des réserves de la Dette ou sont-elles de...

(c) Pour les coupons et titres amortis des emprunts non gérés par la DCA, peut-on demander au Gouvernement ottoman de verser immédiatement les fonds

(7) En répondant à ces questions, considérer que le paiement des coupons et titres amortis en question doit être assuré de toute nécessité, puisque les ressortissants des Etats ennemis et des pays neutres ont été régulièrement payés.

V R.—Dans la suggestion à faire il faudrait, autant que possible, tenir compte de l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à ce que les revenus futurs qui constituent la garantie des emprunts soient utilisés (mais doivent l'être) sans compromettre le service de ces emprunts dans l'avenir.

3. Garantie kilométrique des Chemins de Fer

(a) Quelles sont les sommes dues aux compagnies de :

b.) Y a-t-il dans les caisses de la Dette publique des sommes disponibles pour faire face au paiement, même partiel, des sommes dues aux coupables? En quelle monnaie et où se trouvent ces disponibilités?

(e) En tout cas, quels sont les moyens qu'on peut suggérer pour le règlement en souffrance? Ne pas perdre de vue qu'il y a intérêt à laisser libre un futur, du moins en tant qu'il est nécessaire au service de la garantie.

(d.) Dans cet ordre d'idées, examiner s'il ne conviendrait pas pour les consignataires d'obtenir une prolongation et des améliorations de concession, qui compenseraient le paiement des titres de concession.

(c) Quelles sont les sommes qui seraient approximativement nécessaires aux
plus tôt ?

Quels sont les moyens proposés pour faire constater au plus tôt les sommes dues par le Gouvernement du Canada?

(7) A supposer que le recouvrement à opérer sur le Gouvernement soit réalisé, quels sont les arrangements qu'on pourrait faire avec les établissements financiers pour se procurer ces sommes et avec quelles garanties ? Convient-il provisoirement de faire opérer en Turquie les ordres de paiement ?

(g) Y a-t-il d'autres compagnies, appartenant à des ressortissants alliés, qui soient dans le cas des compagnies françaises, quelle est leur situation ?

Ajouter tous renseignements relatifs aux compagnies ressortissant à des Etats

4. Autres sociétés financières et industrielles dont la reprise d'exploitation est en souffrance.

Quelle sont les moyens propres à leur permettre de reprendre : 1° leur exploitation, 2° la
leur des leurs titres ?

5. Concessions nuisibles aux intérêts français.

(a.) Quelles sont les concessions accordées à des sujets ennemis ou à des sujets du pays et qui sont nuisibles aux intérêts français? Leur date, leur importance et leur valeur.

l'importance de ces entreprises au point de vue de l'influence et des intérêts qu'il y aurait à les acheter?

(c. Quelles sont les sommes que la Turquie (État, sociétés financières ou autres) doit à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche ?

6. Situation financière générale de la Turquie.

(a.) Quelle était la dette de l'État avant la guerre et comment était-elle répartie à l'étranger ?

(b) Quelles sont les dettes contractées pendant la guerre envers les États alliés

les dettes contractées dans le pays ?

Turquie ?

Empire avant la guerre de 1914?
 minution des revenus de l'Empire qu'on prévoit du chef de
 la Syrie de l'Arabie et éventuellement de

la Dette publique qui reviendrait à l'Etat, qu'après la liquidation des dettes ex-station ayant

On calcula en tenant compte que la répartition des dettes pourrait être en rapport à ses revenus totaux.

autres pourraient être créés ?

(1) Quelle économie représentant la suppression du budget de la marine et la

(k) Convient-il d'établir un contrôle financier et sous qu...

Isatis publicus.

Le Conseil a-t-il dépassé ses attributions ou négligé l'exercice de ses droits ?

vient-il d'élargir les attributions de la Dette? Dans quelle mesure? Quelle part doit-on porter à la composition du Conseil? Les membres du Conseil doivent-ils être choisis parmi les créanciers ou parmi les débiteurs? Ne conviendrait-il pas qu'il y eût des porteurs?

LE Gouvernement français vient de faire savoir à M. Paul Cambon que le directeur de la Société du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem avait par deux notes, en date du 22 novembre dernier, attiré l'attention du Général Aubrey et du Colonel Stace sur les difficultés intervenues par suite de la guerre dans l'exploitation de la voie ferrée et sur les promesses faites par le Gouvernement anglais de rétablir la voie normale, si la situation le permettait.

L'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-joint à sa Seigneurie

Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères copie de la note adressée par M. Pavie au Général Allenby

M. Pichon a invité M. Paul Cambon à signaler à toute l'attention du Gouvernement britannique les considérations exposées dans ce document.

M. Paul Cambon a signé &c

Ambassade de France, Londres

le 30 janvier 1919.

Et closure in No 10

Note communicated to General Allenby by M. Pavie respecting Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway.

Le Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem, qui s'est trouvé pendant trois années à la main des Turcs et pendant plus d'un an aux mains des Alliés pour les besoins de la guerre, a subi les pires dégâts.

Amalgamé aux autres lignes par les Turcs, il fut en partie détruit pendant les opérations et surtout au moment de la retraite des armées alliées.

Les Alliés, pour la poursuite de leurs succès, ont nécessairement fait disparaître tout ce qui restait encore des installations primitives, pour mettre à la place des voies et du matériel spécialement destinés à la guerre.

Il résulte

1. La voie de 1 mètre d'écartement n'existe plus entre Jaffa et Lydda, et qu'elle a été mise à voie large de 1 m. 44 centim. par les Alliés entre Lydda et Jérusalem.

Que la gare principale de Jaffa n'a plus d'atelier de réparations, plus de magasins à atèles et de pièces de rechange, plus de bureaux, &c.

Que les gares intermédiaires sont ou démolies ou déplacées.

Que le matériel roulant et moteur est disparu; il ne reste ni une locomotive, ni une voiture à voyageurs, ni un wagon.

Qu'enfin les archives, plans, dossiers, &c., sont ou détruits ou éparpillés à Damas ailleurs.

Le personnel lui-même est à reconstruire, des agents sont morts, d'autres partis pour ne plus revenir.

Il résulte de cette situation déplorable que la remise en route de l'exploitation dans sa forme primitive sera très difficile et demandera sans doute de longs mois, et ce, double la pénurie des matières premières, la difficulté de trouver du matériel en Europe ou ailleurs, et la presque impossibilité de se trouver actuellement un approvisionnement.

Pendant, il semble bien qu'un moyen est actuellement à disposition pour arriver très rapidement à un meilleur résultat.

L'armée anglaise exploite pour ses besoins la ligne à voie étroite Lydda et Jérusalem. Elle possède une main d'œuvre considérable, des ateliers de voie, ainsi que le matériel roulant et moteur en quantité; elle possède également en abondance des approvisionnements de matières de consommation et d'entretien, fer, cuivre, acier, bois, &c.

Il serait donc aisé de reconstruire, d'accord avec la société du chemin de fer la partie de voie Lydda-Jaffa avec ses ateliers, magasins et bureaux; il serait de même possible de fournir à la société des locomotives, des voitures à voyageurs et des wagons, et fournir, pendant qu'il y en a des quantités dans la région.

Le chemin de fer pourrait si l'on procédait ainsi, être rapidement rétabli et fonctionner, et la société pourrait reprendre un service régulier.

Il n'y a pas de conditions à déterminer les services de l'armée, mais de cette façon, aucune interruption n'aurait lieu entre la cessation de l'exploitation par les militaires et la reprise par les civils, et la Palestine n'aurait pas à subir après quatre années de service les privations de tout moyen de transport entre Jaffa, son port naturel, et Jérusalem, sa capitale.

Il y a toutes sortes de raisons, qui seraient ainsi faites par l'Etat, en l'état le chemin de fer, seraient facturées au prix actuel, et il y aurait un chapitre des dépenses à rembourser par les Turcs.

Il y a, croyons-nous, un moyen facile et rapide de redonner à la Palestine la

jouissance d'un organisme qui est grandement nécessaire pour le rétablissement de la vie normale, et même pour la liquidation des affaires militaires.

Cette solution offrirait l'avantage d'être facile à réaliser et il suffirait d'un peu de bonne volonté pour faire l'accord desirable entre les intéressés.

La Société du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem est prête, en ce qui la concerne, à se mettre à l'œuvre dès maintenant.

A PAVIE

Jaffa, le 23 décembre 1918

8609

No. 11

Foreign Office.—(Received February 3.)

AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 16th January relative to the responsibility for securing the fulfilment by the Turks of the terms of the armistice concluded with her, and the position of British commanders in the General Franchet d'Espèrey.

As regards the former question, I am to state that the responsibility for enforcing compliance with the armistice terms has never been laid definitely upon any single Power and the appointment by the French, Italian, and Greek Governments of High Commissioners at Constantinople shows that these Governments consider that they too, to some extent, share the responsibility for securing the fulfilment of the terms.

I am to say that the fact that the terms of the armistice were discussed at 10, Downing Street, on the 3rd December, 1918, at which the following resolution was passed—

The British, French, and Italian Governments agreed that while the British army should remain under General Franchet d'Espèrey, the rest of General Mordue's army might be transferred to the Caucasus and elsewhere, and in that case should be under the command of General Franchet d'Espèrey. The transfer was to be in such case by the Government concerned.

From this it would appear that the French are responsible for Turkey in Europe while it might be inferred that Turkey in Asia has been placed under British control.

The Army Council do not consider His Majesty's Government are entitled to take military action in Turkey in Europe without consultation with the French Government. As regards Turkey in Asia, the Council are of opinion that should the question of taking military action arise, His Majesty's Government would be entitled to take such action, if necessary, without consulting their Allies. In the latter case I am to say that the fact that the terms of the armistice were discussed and concluded by representatives of Turkey and Great Britain only, and that the war in Turkey, except the Gallipoli campaign, has been carried out almost entirely by British troops, while any future military action to ensure the fulfilment of the terms of the armistice as regards Turkey in Asia would devolve mainly on British troops, strengthens the claim that we can take such action.

As regards the second question in paragraph 2 of your letter, the Army Council are of opinion that it can be safely assumed that any expedition or mission which other Powers may at any time desire to despatch to the unoccupied regions in Asiatic Turkey should certainly not be sent without consultation with His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c

R. H. KRADY

[21940]

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon. — (Received February 7)

(No. 144.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 7

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with refer-

No. 271 of this morning, copy of the French Com-

complaining of the attitude of British officers and officials.

DERBY

Enclosure in

Note

LE Gouvernement de la République se voit, à son vif regret, dans la nécessité de signaler de nouveau à la plus sérieuse attention du Gouvernement de Londres l'attitude inamicale adoptée à l'égard des intérêts français par certains officiers de l'armée anglaise. Cette attitude est en fait la plus opposée à celle qu'on serait en droit d'attendre de représentants instruits des devoirs que l'alliance leur impose. Fidèle à une ligne de conduite dont il ne cesse, pour sa part, de se rendre compte, le Gouvernement français considère qu'une telle politique ne peut se prolonger sans de graves inconvénients. Il a donc dû, à plusieurs reprises, adresser à ses fonctionnaires, et les ordres ont été si souvent mal interprétés par certains de ses fonctionnaires, au point qu'il est nécessaire de rappeler tous ces fonctionnaires et officiers à une juste appréciation du respect réciproque dû aux intérêts et aux aspirations respectifs des deux Puissances alliées.

Les faits de cet ordre se sont multipliés, depuis deux ou trois mois particulièrement, sur tous les points des territoires occupés en Asie Mineure par les contingents alliés, au point que leur nombre même leur donne, aux yeux des populations locales, une importance excessive. Les agents de l'armée anglaise, en particulier, ont souvent inspiré plus docilement des vues que le Cabinet de Londres ne peut accepter. L'étroite coopération franco-anglaise en Asie Mineure, oblige le Gouvernement de la République à signaler brièvement les manifestations les plus récentes de cet état d'esprit.

En Mésopotamie, ce sont les déclarations répétées de l'état-major anglais, se refusant à reconnaître les droits traditionnels, confirmés à notre pays par les accords de 1910, sur le vilayet de Mossoul, proclamant même leur ignorance de ces accords dont notre attaché militaire se voit contraint de leur prouver l'existence. Ce sont les bruits de la création d'un futur Empire arabe s'étendant jusqu'aux frontières persanes, d'un Kurdistan autonome protégé par l'Angleterre, d'un morcellement éventuel de la Mésopotamie entre deux ou trois Puissances rivales, bruits semés à profusion par les centres de propagande créés par l'état-major dès son entrée en zone française. De telles rumeurs, propres à semer le trouble et l'inquiétude dans l'esprit des indigènes, permettent d'exploiter à son tour cet ébranlement factice et de le transformer en manifestations de la volonté populaire, cette agitation, œuvre d'une minorité turbulente, étant d'ailleurs toujours au préjudice de l'influence française. Les avanies aux écoles françaises, aux protégés français, aux chefs religieux animés de sentiments favorables à la France, les insultes infligées par le Colonel Leachman aux indigènes parlant notre langue ne se comptent plus. Il semble que certains officiers anglais aient pris à tâche de prouver de toute manière à la population que la France n'est qu'une Puissance inférieure qu'il est même inutile de mentionner son nom dans les déclarations officielles et qu'en surplus le rôle déjà bien effacé qu'elle y joue en ce moment est essentiellement négatif.

Marshall et le Colonel Wilson trouvent un regrettable écho dans le Capitaine Salmon, de l'Intelligence Office de Bagdad, lorsqu'il se permet d'y ajouter que "la France sera bien assez payée avec l'Alsace-Lorraine."

Et non seulement on affecte d'ignorer et nos agents et les droits formels qu'ils

représentent, mais on les empêche d'accomplir les missions officielles dont ils sont chargés. On leur refuse obstinément à notre consul à Bassorah l'autorisation de se rendre à Mossoul afin d'y répartir entre les indigents au nom de la France la somme qui lui a été envoyée à cet effet. Aux représentations faites à Londres par M. Paul Cambon, l'Office objecte qu'à son grand regret il ne peut s'immiscer dans une affaire purement militaire, et aux réclamations du consul au High Civil Commissioner, on répond qu'il n'est pas désirable que la France soit admise à suppléer la faiblesse anglaise, tandis que M. Roux, consul français, est mis finalement dans l'impossibilité de s'acquiescer lui-même de sa mission, un agent américain porteur de sommes considérables s'est vu ouvrir sans délai l'accès de Mossoul, après tant d'autres.

Tout récemment enfin, c'est le propre chef de notre Mission militaire que le commandement anglais prend sur lui de congédier de la manière la plus offensante ne pouvant supporter qu'il remplisse son devoir avec la plus entière correction, en désignant, conformément à ses instructions, faciliter la tâche des officiers anglais dans la zone d'influence reconnue à la Grande Bretagne par des accords portant la signature des deux Gouvernements.

Si nous passons maintenant à la situation en Syrie, il est évident que ce même esprit y règne. La tactique est identique, donner aux populations l'impression que, dans la zone même où doit s'exercer leur influence, les agents français ne sont en tout que les seconds doctes et effacés de leurs collègues anglais. vis-à-vis du Haut Commissaire de la République ou de son adjoint, certains membres de l'état-major du Général Allenby manifestent une attitude agressive. On prétend limiter dans des bornes arbitrairement fixées l'activité et les fonctions des représentants français, et lorsque M. G. Picot objecte qu'une telle attitude est évidemment contraire aux vœux des Gouvernements intéressés, son interlocuteur lui répond qu'il ignore les Gouvernements et ne connaît que les ordres du War Office.

Certains officiers semblent prendre à tâche d'aggraver encore l'effet de cette attitude, en se lançant en toute occasion, comme leurs collègues de Mésopotamie, que la France en Syrie est appelée à disparaître à bref délai. C'est Djemil Bey, accrédité à Beyrouth par le G. H. Q., allant chaque matin prendre les ordres de l'Intelligence Office et réunissant ensuite les éléments les plus antifrancs de la population.

Il est d'ailleurs évident que va répétant dans les milieux politiques de Beyrouth et de Damas que "la seule solution possible pour la Syrie est la domination chrétienne avec collaboration britannique," opinion à laquelle sa situation d'ancien chef des Affaires indigènes adjoint au Gouverneur de Jérusalem en 1917, donne une singulière autorité. C'est le Général Money, cherchant à provoquer chez les musulmans de Palestine un mouvement hostile à l'influence française qu'il déclare soumise, pour la zone syrienne, à la ratification ultérieure des Puissances et de la population elle-même. C'est, enfin, le Général Allenby lui-même entraîné par son entourage à donner en octobre 1918 sa parole à l'Emir Feysal "que les mesures prises pour confier certains territoires occupés à l'administration française, ne sauraient en aucune façon engager l'avenir."

Le Général Bullfin colporte publiquement cette thèse et répète aux indigènes que les agents du Haut Commissariat français n'engagent que leur propre responsabilité en prétendant fixer l'avenir du pays, c'est le même qui refusait naguère, de relever de leurs fonctions les autorités chrétiennes à Beyrouth et dans les villes de la Syrie ou même, singulière prétention de sa part, d'autoriser les troupes françaises à effectuer leurs déplacements sur des navires français. Le Général Bullfin, dont l'attitude à l'égard de nos représentants est souvent à peine correcte, constitue pour nos officiers l'obstacle le plus sérieux à l'exercice normal de leur mission.

En présence de pareils faits, le Gouvernement français ne peut que renouveler de la manière la plus pressante les observations qu'il a déjà faites en si grand nombre. Il est regrettable qu'au mépris évident des ordres du Gouvernement de Londres, ces officiers continuent par tous les moyens une propagande qui va s'accroissant chaque jour et dont le but avoué est de faire mépriser et haïr la France par les populations indigènes, au risque de susciter des mouvements aussi contraires à leurs propres intérêts qu'aux nôtres. Il ne manque déjà pas de voix en Syrie pour réclamer contre l'impérialisme anglais, et l'on ne s'aurait s'en étonner en présence d'une multitude de faits aussi offensants pour les droits des Syriens que pour

ceux de la Puissance protectrice. Depuis le jour où les émissaires chrétiens avec la bienveillante tolérance d'officiers britanniques, devancèrent les troupes pour planter sur toute la côte syrienne le drapeau du Roi du Hedjaz, jusqu'à la soustraction à l'administration française quatre districts Hasbeya, Rasbeia, Baalbeck et Safed, formellement compris dans la région dévolue à notre action directe par les accords de 1916, rien n'a été épargné par certains officiers et fonctionnaires de ce régime pour empêcher la France de remplir ses obligations. L'obligation de timbres-poste anglais, la création de journaux, la publication de tracts renfermant les accusations les moins fondées contre nous (par exemple, notre intention prétendue de supprimer l'usage de la langue arabe), ne sont que des épisodes de cette campagne si peu conforme à l'esprit de conciliation que la France ne cesse, pour sa part, de faire observer par ses officiers.

À la propagande active pour le régime anglo-chérifien correspond, si l'on peut dire, une propagande passive contre tout ce qui peut contribuer à donner aux

délégations syriennes ou libanaises à destination de Paris, interdiction de débarquer opposée avec entêtement aux demandes répétées des religieux français de Terre-Sainte, difficultés créées en Egypte aux commerçants français qui veulent reprendre leurs affaires en Palestine ou en Syrie, refus d'accueillir, pour le contingent français, des renforts réclamés d'urgence par les autorités françaises responsables de l'ordre public dans les territoires confiés à leurs soins, refus d'autoriser ces mêmes autorités à créer à Beyrouth, un organisme facilitant le ravitaillement de nos troupes.

Il n'est pas jusqu'à la censure égyptienne qui ne concoure à cette politique, en ordonnant la suppression, dans les journaux, de toute "définition exacte de l'action française en Syrie", c'est cette même censure qui n'a pas craint d'appliquer ses descriptions au discours prononcé le 20 décembre, au Parlement français, par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Il est remarquable que le zèle déployé en Syrie par ces agents britanniques le soit plus souvent, au profit de la souveraineté du Malik du Hedjaz. Grâce à la complicité de ces agents, l'Emir Feysal, chef de nomades tra-

culture et ses traditions historiques devaient opposer à une domination des Bedouins. Ses émissaires installent partout des fonctionnaires en son nom, arborescent son drapeau envers et contre toutes les remontrances justifiées à ce sujet, organisent à leur chef, grâce à la complicité des éléments les plus suspects des réceptions triomphales dans les villes où il lui plaît d'affirmer prématurément son triomphe.

Doté par le Gouvernement anglais, l'Emir Feysal dépense la plus grande partie de ses revenus en dons en espèces ou en nature, le plus souvent assez considérables, connaissant la valeur d'arguments de cette espèce auprès des populations orientales. À Alep, à Beyrouth, à Damas où son frère lui succède durant son absence actuelle, il tranche du Souverain, maintient ses garnisons et ses fonctionnaires en face des nôtres, prétend constituer la Syrie en royaume indépendant au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi Hussein et déclare que le Liban, "cette perle de l'Empire arabe," étant "un bien sans maître," il est aussi fondé que quiconque à s'en rendre possesseur.

Il fait entrer ses troupes à Antioche au lendemain même du jour où l'accès de la ville, zone française, a été interdit aux détachements français. Partout reçu et toléré par les officiers britanniques, surtout par le Général Bullfin, auquel il cède les chevaux qui servent à ce général à récompenser toutes les personnalités antichrétiennes, l'Emir Feysal encourage ouvertement ses partisans et réussit à inquiéter jusqu'aux Druses et à inquiéter la population musulmane désireuse de se soustraire à l'autorité d'une "théocratie fanatique."

L'attitude de certains agents anglais s'est encore affirmée, lorsque, non contents de décliner la proposition d'un contrôle financier commun limitant les largesses intéressées de l'Emir, ils ont envoyé celui-ci en France à l'insu du Gouvernement français, qui ne fut officiellement prévenu qu'après l'embarquement de l'Emir à Beyrouth. Il y a eu là, au simple point de vue de la correction diplomatique, une faute grave de la part de ceux qui ont pris l'initiative de ce voyage, sans même se préoccuper de ménager la dignité du pays allié dans lequel devait se rendre ce chef arabe.

Le but de toutes ces intrigues, non moins que leur résultat trop évident, a été de mettre chaque fois la France en présence d'un fait accompli. Hier encore, le Haut-Commissaire français se voyait obligé de signaler au Département une marque nouvelle de la désinvolture avec laquelle on traite les engagements signés par la Grande-Bretagne, de sa propre initiative, l'état-major des forces alliées en Palestine-

Syrie s'est permis de modifier d'une manière essentiellement arbitraire la limite des circonscriptions territoriales soumises à l'influence française dans la région d'Alep et en Cilicie.

Le Gouvernement de la République, confiant dans l'esprit amical qui anime le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, et persuadé qu'il ne peut couvrir les manœuvres de subordonnés mal éclairés, se devait de les relever, afin qu'on ne puisse un jour lui reprocher d'avoir laissé se développer une action de nature à nuire à la confiance et à l'amitié qui doit régner entre deux nations unies par des sacrifices et un idéal communs.

Paris, le 6 février 1919

S. P.

[23473]

No. 13.

Vice-Admiral Sir S. Colthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 288) R.

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, February 9, 1919.

FOLLOWING from General Allenby, dated the 8th February, which he requests may be communicated to War Office:—

I have been informed that conditions given below were to be observed in area under the command of my force. I allowed no argument or conditions by them. Conditions were as follows:—

1. All Ischan, G.O.C. 6th Army, to be removed.
2. 6th Army to be disbanded, and its guns, machine-guns, and rifles to be handed over to a specified place.
3. Inhabitants will be disbanded when ordered by me.
4. Such Turkish gendarmerie in areas under my control as are not required by me shall be directly demobilised under my control.
5. Such Turkish officials as are reported unsatisfactory will be removed by my order. The names of such officials to be reported to me for my approval.
6. Armenians will be repatriated by me when this is desirable. Their houses, lands, and property to be restored to them.
7. Facilities shall be given for my officers to visit any places to assist in repatriation of Armenians.
8. At my discretion I shall arrest any persons charged with crimes and may send them to the courts of law.
9. I shall control all railways east of Konia.
10. I shall control all telegraphs and telephones in area under my control. No Turkish telegraph or telephone shall be used.
11. I propose to repatriate troops of the disbanded 6th Army at the rate of 900 a week, commencing on (date to be arranged later).
12. Turkish authorities are to surrender all deserters, including those of our Indian Army.
13. It must be understood that I have the power to occupy any place I wish.

Note.—The word "continue" in paragraph 8 means: the Egyptian Expeditionary Force shall have power to control Bagdad railways (including kind of transport by rail, road, and water) in such areas as may be required and at such times as Egyptian authorities may require, and to prevent Bagdad railways from carrying any kind of traffic at any time.

The Secretary of State for War, General French, and French and Italian High Commissioners, I informed them of my reasons for visiting Constantinople and of the above conditions.

[25211]

No. 14.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 2521)

My Lord

The French Ambassador came to and personal, rather than official, conversations, in which he excels, but which not infrequently develop into discussions of a serious and strictly official character. On the present occasion he discoursed for considerably more than an hour upon several aspects of the situation.

To the first of these, namely, the progress of the Peace Conference in Paris,

Ambrose did little more than repeat the views which he had urged on a previous occasion, and which I have already placed on record.

I did, however, on this occasion state with much greater fulness than before the opposite side of the case.

In reply to his reminder that the preliminary peace negotiations between France and Germany in 1871 had occupied but a few weeks before the signature of peace, while the territorial and other details had been left to be thrashed out afterwards and had occupied a period of fifteen months, I urged that there was no anal-
ogy in this. The fate of Alsace-Lorraine was then determined by the completeness of the German victory: the only two parties to the negotiations were France and Germany, and the determination of the actual frontier was a small matter which could with safety be postponed. Now, in the case of Germany, we were dealing not with one frontier or with one State alone. The whole of Europe was interested in the settlement, the greater part of it was directly involved, the frontiers of Germany could not be determined without in the first place settling the frontiers of various other States, and the solution of these matters, of which I gave Poland as an illustration, was an indispensable preliminary to the drawing up of peace terms and their ultimate dictation to the enemy.

I also explained to the Ambassador the point of view from which the British representatives in Paris had advocated the Prinkipo suggestion. With a view to ascertaining the French attitude, I

ambassador's military and forward policy, to declare war on Germany and destroy the Bolshevik Government. But this policy required

I gathered, none of the great Allies were willing to provide the necessary expenditure, which none would accept.

M. Cambon agreed that this policy was out of the question.

A middle course might, I pointed out, be pursued by continuing to support the various Russian political groups or quasi-Governments by such means as lay in our power, without actually assisting them with troops or invading Russia.

This policy, the Ambassador thought, had already been rendered futile by its almost complete lack of success. All the various Governments or groups to which I referred were crumbling: the Ukraine had collapsed, Krasnof had disappeared, Donkai could not be trusted to do anything effective, and Omak seemed to be on the verge of failure. He could not think that any good would result from a continuation of these futile efforts.

M. Cambon accordingly favoured the third alternative, which was to abandon these efforts, to leave the country, and allow Russia to determine her own fate. He admitted the extreme undesirability and danger of a triumphant Bolshevism which would probably combine with Germany to crush Poland and the other States on that side, and which might easily become a menace to the world. But he saw no other alternative. He said that any such conclusion, if arrived at and advocated by ourselves, would meet with support in Paris.

In urging the rapid settlement of peace with Germany, the Ambassador said that he contemplated with genuine alarm the situation in which, after months had been spent in negotiations, the German Government which the latter would absolutely decline to accept. In such circumstances, he asked, what would be done?

I replied that the principal weapon which would remain in the hands of the Allies

then would be their military strength, and I hoped that as little as possible would be done to impair it; another weapon would be the military occupation of German territory; a third would be the influence that could still be exercised by the British fleet; and the fourth, and probably most effective, would be the continuance of the blockade.

This led M. Cambon to urge, with great emphasis, the policy of not yielding to the pressure of President Wilson and the Americans for the relaxation or raising of the blockade, but resolutely adhering to it until the conclusion of peace.

I informed him that, in a discussion at the War Cabinet that morning, the same view had been expressed and had met with unanimous approval, that I believed it was equally the view of our representatives in Paris, and that, for my own part, I hoped most strongly that we should keep intact what I considered to be the most powerful of the offensive weapons that remained in our hands.

From these subjects the Ambassador passed on to discuss that which was his real topic, namely, the uncomfortable condition of affairs that had arisen between Britain and herself out of many incidents in the Middle East. He brought after another, the numerous cases in which the French Government that their officials or sympathisers or subjects had been treated in the most unfavourable manner by the British civil or military authorities in those regions. He said that the atmosphere was being engendered in which, although the individual incidents might sometimes be small, in their totality they could not fail to be injurious to harmonious relations between the two peoples in those countries, while they produced not without its dangerous features. He mentioned in

turn the refusal by the British military authorities to numerous French subjects and Syrian merchants under French protection of permission to return to Syria; the refusal of the Mesopotamian authorities to allow the French consul to take relief to the same authorities to allow the French

military authorities in Mesopotamia to turn the French military attaché out of the country. He attributed the greater part of these incidents to the temper and tone of young officers of the Indian army, who came to Mesopotamia, Syria, and India, impregnated with the autocratic ideas and manners which they had acquired in dealing with the natives in India, and who showed an unconcealed hostility to the French. He could only regard these incidents as a deliberate plot to deprive the French of the legitimate objects of their mission in the East. He further instanced a number of recent incidents in Constantinople, notably the seizure, by the orders of General Milne, of the Ottoman banks. He said that this step, which had been under daily discussion between the Allied Powers in that city, was taken by General Milne without notice to anyone, even the British High Commissioner (Admiral Calhorne), and that it was an abuse of the powers entrusted to the British general officer in command. The Ambassador did not, however, mention the taking over of the temporary administration of Constantinople by the British High Commissioner a few weeks ago.

In reply, I seized the opportunity to tell the Ambassador that there was another side to the case, which I was quite prepared to place before him, which threw a very different complexion on several of the incidents to which he referred, and the main features of which, speaking from memory, I proceeded to outline. I said that General Allenby seemed throughout not only to have taken up an attitude of rigid impartiality, but to have shown wherever he could not only reasonable, but exceptional, consideration to French claims.

To this the Ambassador did not demur.

I went on to say that, before I accepted the charge against the young officers of the Indian army, I should wish to know whether it was these officers who were at fault, and that, even if the Ambassador were correct in assuming that military service in India led to an autocratic manner towards natives, I did not see why a British officer of Indian experience should be any more unfriendly to the French than one who had served in Europe. I said that I should be able to place before M. Cambon a series of cases in which French officers had acted with extreme impetuosity and indiscretion, and had in some cases required the protection and assistance of the British military authorities, because of the unwisdom of their conduct. As regards French action in Syria, I should like him to know that, whereas the French had arranged for a special deputation from the Lebanon, whose impartiality and representative character were open to grave doubt, to proceed from Beirut to Paris to advocate the claims of France, the British authorities had consistently deprecated, and even refused permission for the

embarkation of many other bodies who had wished to go to Paris in order to state the anti-French side of the case. I said that I thought the Ambassador was mistaken in thinking that the French were everywhere welcomed in the regions to which he was referring, and that, had our attitude been really what he supposed, things might have been made much less pleasant for them than had actually been the case.

As regards the particular incidents in Mesopotamia I replied that the French had not been encouraged to go to Mosul, because relief arrangements were quite provided for by the military authorities in that region. I was not familiar with the case of the French consul at Basra. I did, however, deprecate the action which had been proposed by our military authorities with regard to the French military attaché in Bagdad.

In regard to Constantinople, I believed that the action of General Milne in respect of the banks was justified by him on military grounds, and as such fell within his general officer in supreme military command. The Committee of Progress in Constantinople was in close touch with these banks, which were also engaged in transactions with German institutions. The prompt suspension of the banks therefore became a matter of military necessity. So little had it been intended to affront the French and Italians, that controllers of those nationalities had been placed in charge on the succeeding day.

When M. Cambon mentioned the subject of the unannounced arrival of the Emir Feisal at Marseilles, I answered that I believed this had been due to a delay in the arrival or deciphering of a telegram, and that really it was too absurd to suppose that anyone would wish to spring upon the French Government a surprise which, inasmuch as the Emir was going first to their country, they had so many means of meeting. But as regards the Emir Feisal, I said that the boot appeared to me to be upon the other leg, and that I had noted with equal surprise and regret the line which had been taken by leading French newspapers, even those supposed to be in close connection with the French Government, with regard to the statement of his claims which had been made by the Emir at a meeting of the Peace Conference last week. It seemed to me almost an outrage that this Arab potentate, who had been deputed to Paris to represent the views of his father—a monarch who had fought bravely on our side and assisted us to win the war—should, because he stated the claims of his family and race in an extreme form (a form for which we had no responsibility, and one which contained proposals with which I did not in every instance agree), therefore be denounced as a British puppet in receipt of British pay.

I further said that I did not think that an amicable solution of these difficulties was likely to be facilitated by the publication of carefully prepared schemes of French administration, French acquisition, and even French annexation in the entire group of territories from Palestine on the south to the Black Sea on the north, which were being promulgated in France. It was not surprising that claims of this description should excite suspicion, and I agreed with the Ambassador in thinking that it was high time that the air should be cleared.

I also asked leave to tell him quite frankly that, in my view, the main ground of the irritation which existed if it did exist, in Syria and Mesopotamia was the belief that the French were disposed to take undue advantage of the conditions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and to insist upon adherence not merely to the spirit but to the letter of a document which was by the progress of events both obsolete and impracticable; which both Governments knew must be superseded by some other arrangement when in effect a promise was made by the British Government cancelled by the Self-Determination Agreement of the French and British Governments in November last. I asked why it should not be possible to admit at once that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was impossible and out of date, and thus to put an end to pretensions based upon it, which were evidently the source of increasing friction between the two Governments. It was, I thought, better that the few petty incidents should be allowed to occur, and that anything of such a nature should be allowed to cloud the atmosphere of Anglo-French relations at a time when the closest co-operation and harmony was in the widest interests essential.

The Ambassador said, in reply, that he would like nothing better than an opportunity of discussing the larger question; that, though he had spoken to me without official inspiration, there was nothing that he would welcome more than official authority to pursue the matter without delay; and that, whether this were accorded to him or not, whether the matter was to be discussed in Paris or elsewhere (and in Paris he seemed to think that an excess of emotion was not balanced by a corresponding excess of knowledge), he thought that nothing but good could result from an interchange of views here.

I gathered from what he said, both on this and previous occasions, that he has in his mind a scheme for the entire settlement of the Syrian question, and that he seeks an opportunity of placing it before the British Government. Whether such a policy would be that of the Quai d'Orsay in Paris or not, I have no means of knowing. But he confessed to a grave feeling of dismay lest, in the absence of President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and Signor Orlando, and the alleged illness of Mr. Balfour, the matter should be slurred over or forgotten in Paris, while incidents continue to occur in the Eastern parts of the world which would make an amicable solution more and more difficult. He declared to me his intention of informing M. Pichon of the general character of our conversation and the advice with which he had ended it. I undertook to write to Mr. Balfour and ascertain from him what action was being taken in Paris, and whether any steps should be taken here.

My own position would, I feel, be rendered easier by a clear understanding on this point, for it is more than embarrassing to listen every week to long statements of French grievances, coupled with urgent appeals for an early consideration of the matter in its widest aspect, and to find myself in a position where I can say so little in reply.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[24702]

No. 15

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 64.)

MR. BALFOUR presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith notes respecting Italian interests in Turkey in Asia.

*British Delegation, Paris,
February 12, 1919.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 15

M. de Martino to Lord Hardinge.

*Délégation italienne à la Conférence de la Paix,
Paris, le 6 février, 1919.*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

CONFORMÉMENT au désir que vous avez bien voulu m'exprimer à l'occasion de notre conversation d'hier, je m'empresse de vous fournir quelques indications concernant la situation actuelle de l'Italie par rapport aux questions de la Turquie d'Asie.

1. Les demandes de M. Vénizelos concernant l'Asie Mineure s'étendent sur une partie considérable de la zone qui a été reconnue aux intérêts italiens par suite des accords avec les Alliés. Une commission technique va se réunir incessamment pour examiner ces demandes. Il semble opportun qu'une entente s'établisse entre les Alliés avant de discuter les aspirations grecques.

2. Les accords entre les Alliés sont les suivants :

Convention de mai 1914, entre les sociétés anglaise et italienne, conclue sous les auspices de la Commission des transports, pour le chemin de fer Smyrne-Aidin et prolongement.
Article 9 du Traité de Londres du 30 avril, 1915.
Entente de Saint-Jean de Maurienne (avril 1917).
Accord anglo-franco-italien du 18 août, 1917.

3. Nous ne pouvons pas nous ranger à la thèse que ce dernier accord n'est plus valable parce qu'il manque de l'assentiment du Gouvernement russe, mais nous ne pouvons pas non plus nous en tenir à l'entente de Saint-Jean de Maurienne. Dans tout cas, tant que de nouveaux accords ne soient intervenus, l'accord de 1917 lie les parties contractantes.

4. Nous ne faisons pas d'objection, pour ce qui nous concerne, au point de vue exposé dans la déclaration anglo-française de novembre dernier, qui concerne simplement les principes d'administration des territoires envisagés, mais ne touche pas le fond de la question, c'est-à-dire le principe de proportionnalité et d'équité. Du reste,

la note du Marquis Impérati du 6 novembre, 1918, contient une déclaration de la part des deux Gouvernements alliés.

5. Le Gouvernement italien, pour démontrer son attitude tenir compte du désir à maintes reprises exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique de ne se refuserait pas à faire des concessions en Grèce, à condition d'être assuré que le restant de la zone reconnue d'intérêt italien soit mis hors de contestation, et qu'il n'y ait aucune difficulté en faveur de la Grèce comportant des concessions à l'Italie.

Il est donc, après des concessions éventuelles à la Grèce, soit assuré à l'Italie et qu'il n'y ait en principe que ces concessions à la Grèce comportant des concessions auxquelles devraient être négociées amicalement entre les Alliés.

Je suis à votre disposition pour tout éclaircissement ultérieur, et je suis, &c.

G. DE MARTINO

Enclosure 2 in No. 15

Lord Hardinge to M. de Martino

February 11, 1919

Dear M. de Martino

I wish to thank you for the note which you were good enough to send me on the 6th February, concerning the views of the Italian Government on the question of Asiatic Turkey.

These views have been laid by me before Mr. Balfour, but having regard to the fact that the Italian Government has, however, been in the past, the question in dispute between Greece and Turkey.

As regards the agreement of 1917, I am instructed to draw the attention of the Italian Government to Mr. Balfour's note to Marquis Impérati of the 20th November, a copy of which is enclosed herewith for convenience of reference.

I believe me, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

[25904]

No. 16

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 17.,

[By Bag]

Paris, February 14, 1919

(No 391)

(Telegraphic. En clair.)

My telegram No. 192 of 28th January and Sir G. Grahame's telegram No. 262 of 5th February.

Further note from French Government states that in view of certain measures taken during past few weeks at Constantinople French Government consider it expedient to draw attention of His Majesty's Government to the unilateral nature of decisions carried out by British authorities without concurrence of French General and Admiral entrusted respectively with the land and sea forces in the East.

It is observed that fact of French Government having agreed to allow British military authorities to take such measures as they may deem necessary in the interests of the Allies does not imply any abandonment of the principle of co-operation in question, which is the basis of the agreement of 1917.

French Government consider that these separate initiatives on the part of British authorities are necessary, more especially as regards measures taken in respect of control of (1) police, (2) banks, and (3) railways.

As regards (1) French Government express surprise that step affecting safety of

* See Part I, No 37.

troops could have been taken without consulting in any way General Franchet d'Espèrey, Commander-in-chief of Allied Armies.

As regards (2) French Government point out that note by which French representative was informed of occupation of enemy banks, stated that detachments of British troops employed for this purpose had no need of assistance of French troops, and that British officer had already been instructed to assume general control of occupied oil fields. In opinion of French Government these two points are irreconcilable both with equality of rights of occupying Powers and with predominance of French interests in banks at Constantinople.

French Government state that they learn that General M. de Martino proposes to set up an exclusively British control of railways in Turkey in Asia, but that in view of importance of French interests invested in these enterprises French Government cannot but take the most serious note of this proposal.

French Government are aware that British High Commissioner and military authorities have already been spread abroad, and have much disturbed French public opinion, which takes special interest in Mediterranean questions, and would not understand that the hereditary influence exercised for many ages in the Turkish Empire should be ruined by the very Ally in whom she placed her fullest confidence.

French Government being anxious to avoid any discussion among Allies before the Turks, but rightly anxious to safeguard interests of her nationals in the East, propose that a Commission composed of British and French representatives be immediately at Paris to settle conditions for rigorous execution in Turkey of the clauses included by Allies concerning conduct of war and application of clauses of armistice. They propose to appoint following representatives on this Commission: M. de Martino, Under Secretary of State at Ministry of Finance, M. Gout, who is a Member of the Chamber of Deputies, and M. Kammerer, who has rank of consul general.

In appointing British delegates, French Government hope that, in accordance with wish expressed by M. Piebon in his note of the 5th February (No. 262) His Majesty's Government will at once request British Government to refrain from taking any initiative calculated to prejudice the work of the Commission with their

(Copy sent Peace Delegation)

[17673]

No. 17

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

Foreign Office, February 21, 1919.

THE French Ambassador called upon Sir R. Graham on the 30th January and spoke with regard to the proposals for British and French co-operation in the oil fields. His Excellency left a paper which is being dealt with separately.

His Excellency then said, that, although speaking without authority from the French Government, he desired to call Sir R. Graham's serious attention to the attitude of the British military authorities in the Middle and Near East towards the French, and the series of small but disagreeable incidents which were continually arising between the British and French in that part of the world. He recognised that nothing of this kind could seriously affect the good relations which existed, and must continue to exist, between the British and French Governments. At the same time they were bound to produce a very real feeling of irritation and mistrust. His Excellency

referred to the treatment of the French consul at Bagdad, and the French military attaché by the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, and complained further that, although under the agreement of 1916 the control of Mosul has been allotted to France, the British military authorities were refusing permission to any French agents or officers to proceed there. He realised perfectly well that there were important oil deposits at Mosul of which the British desired to obtain control. French interests at Mosul were not vital, and although they held to the agreement come to, the French Government would probably be very ready to surrender their rights in Mosul in return for participation in the development of the oil industry in the district. There was, however, another locality in which no compromise was possible. This was

[1356]

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Syria. His Excellency recognised that French interests in the country were possibly rather sentimental than material, and that French feeling in regard to them was exaggerated. At the same time the feeling that existed was very strong indeed. Yet in spite of the agreement, which gave France a predominant rôle in Syria, the British military authorities were doing everything in their power to prevent the French from paying the proper tribute to damage French influence and prestige. When the French Government made complaints on the subject, the Foreign Office sheltered behind the War Office, and the War Office behind the forceful personality of the British general officer commanding. His Excellency cited one or two cases in which General Allenby or his subordinates had, he said, behaved with scant consideration to French officers. He accused our subordinates of encouraging a local campaign against the French and a future French General Allenby was now objecting to a similar French move being despatched to Beirut. It was, however, absolutely necessary for French authority and prestige that there should be a greater display of French military force in Syria. At present the inhabitants only saw, or believed in, the British Army. M. Cambon concluded by saying that both the letter and spirit of the Agreement of 1916 should be carried into effect, and he expressed his conviction that no serious imputation would ever be cast on British good faith in the matter.

Sir R. Graham replied to his Excellency that, speaking with even less and only but equal frankness, he felt bound to say that we had received certain recent communications from the French Government which seemed matters with surprise. Their tone was quite unwarranted by the facts of the situation. Peace had not yet been reached, and the British Army was still in the Middle East, and not yet been ordered by the Peace Conference. General Allenby was responsible not only for military operations but also for order and good government in the occupied districts. If, as Sir R. Graham believed, he considered that the arrival of fresh French troops would be a danger, he was perfectly right to insist upon his point. The General had acted with perfect loyalty throughout, and had appointed French officers to administer the French area whenever this was possible. But we had heard through General Clayton how ineffective and unsatisfactory the young officers appointed had been. General Allenby had pressed for the despatch of competent French administrative officials, but instead of that only an increase of military forces was contemplated.

M. Cambon said that what was now wanted was rather more French military force, but that he noted with interest the suggestion that French officials should be sent to the occupied areas, and would like to have it made to him official. It might be considered by his Government. If such officials arrived, they would have to take their orders from the British military authorities, and would have a certain degree of independence. Sir R. Graham replied that it was not encouraging. Sir R. Graham replied that it seemed to him evident that so long as General Allenby was commander-in-chief, all officials would have to take orders from him.

URZON OF KEDLESTON

30046

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

Foreign Office, February 25, 1919

WITH reference to your telegram No. 387 of the 24th instant, relative to the Anglo-French difficulty in Constantinople, I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a memorandum prepared by my direction in this Department setting forth our various points at issue, together with a further memorandum drawn up at the War Office, making certain additions to these points.

These memoranda will, I think, make the present position quite clear to your Excellency.

Meanwhile it is proposed that the Committee of the Imperial General Staff should proceed to take up the matter with the French Government, and, if circumstances permit, with the President of the Council himself.

URZON OF KEDLESTON

Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 18

Memorandum respecting Anglo-French Difficulties at Constantinople

General.

1. WE must insist that the situation in Syria is on an entirely different footing from that at Constantinople and that no possible parallel exists between them.

Syria is in the military occupation of a victorious army, and no Government or authority exists there save that which the General in command may consider it advisable to impose.

At Constantinople, on the other hand, it is the seat of the Turkish Government, and the proper channel for all communications is through the Turkish Government, and the proper channel for all communications is through the Turkish Government, and the proper channel for all communications is through the Turkish Government.

A Committee of Commissioners who have been appointed for that purpose. A Committee of Commissioners who have been appointed for that purpose. A Committee of Commissioners who have been appointed for that purpose.

of war still exists between the Allies and Turkey, and no measures should be taken. of war still exists between the Allies and Turkey, and no measures should be taken. of war still exists between the Allies and Turkey, and no measures should be taken.

the view of the British military authorities is that General Franchet d'Espèrey's command is confined to the territory of those countries against which he has conducted operations, and that any other territory as may fall within his sphere as a result of the war should be taken.

General headquarters at Constantinople is a purely military headquarters, and is in accordance with the arrangements reached at Versailles on the subject of the occupation of Constantinople.

of interference there than General Allenby would have, say, in the case of the occupation of the Balkans via Constantinople. of interference there than General Allenby would have, say, in the case of the occupation of the Balkans via Constantinople.

The relations between General Franchet d'Espèrey and the Turkish Government are entirely a matter of military discipline, but neither General nor the Turkish Government are in a position to interfere in effective military occupation, to save purely military matters affecting the command, the Turkish Government on all other questions being reserved to the High Commissioner.

Particular.

1. Taking over of Police and Sanitation of Constantinople.

The French complain that this step was taken without previous consultation with the British Government. It is true that the measure was desirable in itself, and our military authorities must have been justified in taking this step on purely military grounds.

2. Gendarmerie

General Franchet d'Espèrey's intention, apparently, is to institute, in co-operation with the Turkish Government, a gendarmerie force under Colonel Foulon for the whole of Turkey, both European and Asiatic.

Such a scheme conflicts in three important respects with the general principles mentioned in the first part of this memorandum.

(a) It ignores the state of war, the institution of a gendarmerie by a French officer in an enemy country being obviously incompatible with war conditions.

(b) It contemplates the exercise of authority in what is claimed to be an exclusively British military sphere.

(c) It is not a purely military matter, and therefore is outside General Franchet's sphere of action.

General Milne were to approach the Government at Nicosia with a scheme for the institution of a gendarmerie force under a French officer is advised against.

[1356]

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[illegible]4. *Herveya*.

We had been given to understand by Admiral Falthorpe that a satisfactory arrangement had been reached that

whole intricate question of the ultimate disposal of the Turkish railway must be decided by the Powers, and, pending such decision and the resumption of peace, a suitable and sensible agreement.

tion ought to be susceptible of arrangement locally and is

U. f. *gustaviana*

General's action in ignoring the authority of the latter and

7. Arrest and Punishment of Turkish

General Franchet d'Espèrey has interfered with the arrangements which we had made for the arrest and custody of Turkish offenders. He insists that guilty persons should be kept in the hands of the Turks, and that preliminary proceedings against them should be left to the Turkish authorities. Our contention is that the Turks cannot be trusted to take safe custody, as witnessed the recent escape of Rashid Bey, and that the proceedings should take place in France.

The matter is under discussion with the French Government, to whom we have intimated that if they are unable to agree to any other safe place which they

he present situation as showing the universal
ry's propensity for interference.

8. Proposed Visit of General Franchet d'Espèrey to Black Sea Ports.

and his time

[91750]

It is not true that the ...

[illegible]

I have, &c
DERBY

1. 1. 1.

Notes respecting attitude of Shereefian Authorities

(1.)

en l'absence de l'administrateur, les lettres seraient également adressées pour la

commandant en chef eût accredité auprès de lui le payeur principal. Celui-ci reconnaît maintenant qu'il a en effet reçu à ce sujet un conseil du G.H.Q., mais qu'il ne se considère nullement tenu par cette communication.

Le cas de l'émigration des Français auprès de l'autorité locale à l'étranger est une situation créée par le Gouvernement britannique, cette situation dérogant dans le même but par le Gouvernement britannique, de la loi de l'émigration des Français auprès de l'autorité locale à l'étranger.

anglais, [REDACTED] qui devient et grave à laisser ainsi soustraits à toute surveillance, les [REDACTED] considérables qu'ils ne commentent en vue d'assurer la marche régulière de l'administration locale.

qui se croient assez soutenus par certaines autorités à leur refus de tout contrôle des fonds considérables qu'ils emploient à la propagande active et toujours la

Paris, le 16 février.

(2.)

En se référant à l'attitude des autorités
chérifiennes vis-à-vis des Français, le
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a attiré l'attention de
l'Amirauté de Sa Majesté britannique sur l'urgence que présente
la question où les deux pays ont également intérêt.

Le Haut Commissaire de la République en Syrie vient de communiquer au Département, sous la date du 14 février dernier, des renseignements d'où il ressort que

Le C. a. état de choses aussi regrettable se prolonge au détriment de ... de ses intérêts. Il

serait donc très obligé à l'Ambassade de vouloir bien insister auprès du Gouvernement
Sa Majesté afin que le Commandement militaire anglais en Syrie reçoive les
instructions nécessaires pour faire respecter par les fonctionnaires syriens en accord
avec le Haut Commissaire de la République le droit de contrôle que les Alliés se sont
engagés à exercer à cet égard.

Paris, le 21 février, 1919

38361

No. 20

Karl Curzon to the Earl of Derby

(No. 408.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 5, 1919

THE weekly visit of the French Ambassador to the Foreign Office provided him
with an opportunity of raising several points of minor and or two of

He was concerned with the present position of the Jaffa. The French Government had been requested
French ownership and management of which had been completely set on one side since
the commencement of the war in Palestine, but which he thought might now be safely
reinstated in the general interest. He strongly urged that representations might be
made to General Allenby to this effect.

The next question raised by the Ambassador related to the proposal to send a
French financial adviser to Persia. This the French Government had been requested
by the Persian Government to do, and, in view of their previous connection with the

Government had no political interests or ambitions in Persia, which they frankly
recognize falls within the British sphere of influence, and, if we desired that they should
not comply with the request, they were quite willing to desert. The Ambassador
informed me that he believed that the Persian Government had addressed a
somewhat similar appeal for assistance to America. I replied that I was not
at the information, because it was the fact.

It was merely two strings, but half a dozen strings. It was, and that
Oriental diplomacy was to employ one Power against the other.

was being kept upon her financial legs exclusively by Great Britain
for her army; to some extent for her

whether we thought it desirable that the French should
been addressed to them I could only answer in the
to a note which he handed to me, and him a copy.

He said he was not at all clear in his own mind as to what ought
of that city, whether the Turks should be expelled or not from
international administration should, in the former
up in its place, or whether Constantinople should be handed over to the
mandatory Power. He was not aware of the opinions of his own
them, but as I had devoted a good deal of my life to a study of the questions of the
East, he would like to discuss the matter with me, and to hear my views with a view to
forming his own. I replied that I could not speak officially on the part of His Majesty's
Government, for two reasons. In the first place, although the matter had been

wider significance, I was quite prepared to give them.

I may say, in passing, that my part in for desiring to give them, and for
it was afforded to me for doing so, was that I wished to divert the

the future controlling power of Constantinople themselves. Differing of
held as to the degree of advantage or peril resulting from such an arrangement.

It was, however, a matter of some importance, and I was aware that the
French Government had been requested to do so, and, in view of their previous connection with the

Government had no political interests or ambitions in Persia, which they frankly
recognize falls within the British sphere of influence, and, if we desired that they should

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East, he would like to discuss the matter with me, and to hear my views with a view to
forming his own. I replied that I could not speak officially on the part of His Majesty's
Government, for two reasons. In the first place, although the matter had been

one of the stated objects of the Allies since the
in the event of Allied victory Constantinople
promised by Great Britain and France to Russia.

Personally I regarded this promise to Russia as one of the great mistakes of the
I could not understand how the
British and French Governments had ever agreed to such a concession. In point
which the Ambassador expressed his cordial agreement. As a Russian myself, I should have regarded it as
down the Bosphorus, and involved in all the dangers and intrigues of the Mediterranean
and the Levant.

As to the other great European Powers,
it was unwelcome in their own as well as in the public
eye. Were the invitation addressed to my

in their hands, urging that, as Britain was the
world and as all the countries between Europe and
a fell more or less within the British sphere of influence, the gate of the East should
therefore, naturally, be entrusted to our hands, I would yet, if the decision rested
with me, decline to be tempted by such an offer and would unhesitatingly refuse it.

I know what was the view entertained in France. I was aware that
in her position I should

as a friend of France I was greatly surprised, and indeed
astonished when she had reached the south of her

position which she already occupies in so many parts of the world, he apparently
to extend the sphere of her influence so as to embrace Tangier on the one side.

It was, however, a matter of some importance, and I was aware that the
French Government had been requested to do so, and, in view of their previous connection with the

Government had no political interests or ambitions in Persia, which they frankly
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was being kept upon her financial legs exclusively by Great Britain
for her army; to some extent for her

out for fresh loads which would certainly be troublesome, and might even be crushing in the days to come. People in England are not likely to be so easily satisfied with the present situation. I should myself prefer to see it set up on the Bosphorus rather than that it should be left to such an administration in the event of the expulsion of the Turks and of the restricted functions which it would be called upon to perform, a body or commission might not be charged with the task. There could hardly be any misgovernment because there would be so little to govern. The questions concerned would be mainly those of commerce and navigation, and with the disappearance of the Turk the greater part of the opportunity for intrigue would disappear also.

These were the views which my study of the question had led me to form, but I repeated in conclusion that they were only those of a student and traveller and carried no official authority. The Ambassador appeared to attach greater importance to my utterances than I was disposed to do myself, and said that they accorded in the main with the opinions he had himself formed.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KIDLESTON

(36425)

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 7.)

PAR une note en date du 30 janvier dernier, l'Ambassadeur de France avait attiré l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur la situation de la Société française du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem, telle qu'elle se trouvait exposée dans une communication de son directeur, M. Pavie, au Général Allenby, en date du 23 décembre dernier.

Le grand quartier général anglais en Asie Mineure a répondu à M. Pavie, le 16 janvier, qu'il n'était pas à même de traiter ce qui touche la politique d'après guerre des chemins de fer militaires.

M. Cambon a pris connaissance de cette réponse de votre part, et a exprimé à M. Pichon l'assurance que cette société doit bénéficier des droits reconnus à d'autres entreprises similaires dans les territoires occupés de la Turquie d'Asie.

Le Gouvernement français a invité M. Paul Cambon à demander au Gouvernement britannique de bien vouloir envoyer des instructions au quartier général du Général Allenby pour que la situation de chemin de fer ne soit plus l'objet du régime particulier qui lui est actuellement appliqué.

M. Paul Cambon, Ministre, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 5 mars, 1919.

(40673)

No. 1

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 14)

(No. 1)

My Lord

British Delegation, Paris, March 12, 1919

I HAVE to refer to a note communicated to His Majesty's Ambassador here by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 6th February regarding Franco-British relations in the occupied territories of Turkey in Asia, which was transmitted to you officially by Lord Derby. I now transmit to you a copy of a further memorandum handed to Lord Milner by M. Pichon on the 6th March on the same subject.

I should be glad to be informed of the reply which has been, or may eventually be, sent to M. Pichon's memorandum of the 6th February, and at the same time to be

furnished with your Lordship's observations on the specific incidents referred to in the memorandum, so far as they are directly covered by the reply sent or to be sent by the Foreign Office to M. Pichon's previous communication.

I am, &c.

(For Mr. Balfour),

LOUIS MALLET

Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

Memorandum communicated by M. Pichon to Lord Milner

RELEVÉ DE QUELQUES-UNES DES MENÉES DIRIGÉES CONTRE L'ÉTAT DE FRANCE
ET CONTRE LES AGENCES FRANÇAISES EN ASIE MINÉURE.

Territoires syriens soustraits à l'influence française.

LE 27 octobre, 1918, le Haut-Commissaire français en Palestine informe le Département de la situation des affaires syriennes et le conseil d'administration de la Société française du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem.

Le 17 novembre, le Département a été informé par le Général Allenby que le Patriarche de Safed a l'intention de se rendre à Bagdad.

Le 22 janvier, M. Picot a été avisé par Sir Mark Sykes que le fait de la destruction de la ville de Mossoul a été constaté par les 2^e et 3^e corps d'armée et que la situation est instable.

(2)

Patriarche chaldéen

Le 17 novembre, le Département a été informé par le Général Allenby que les autorités britanniques des nouvelles du Patriarche chaldéen du Mossoul.

Le 17 novembre, il a été avisé le Département qu'il n'a pas encore la réponse du Patriarche.

Le 17 novembre, le Département a été informé par le Général Allenby que le Patriarche, faute de secours, se trouve dans une misère noire.

Le 17 novembre, le Département a été informé par le Général Allenby que le Colonel Leachman a ordonné au Patriarche de ne même pas répondre aux lettres annonçant les envois de fonds par le Gouvernement français.

Le 17 novembre, le Département a été informé par le Général Allenby que le 12 janvier, 1919, qu'il ignore encore si cette date le Patriarche a enfin reçu les fonds à lui destinés.

Le 17 novembre, le Département a été informé par le Général Allenby que le Patriarche, arrivé la veille à Bagdad, a voyagé dans un wagon à bestiaux et que personne n'a été le saluer à la gare de la part des Anglais.

(3)

Secours aux Indigènes de Mossoul.

Le 6 novembre, 1918, le Département ouvre au consul de France à Bassora, M. Lecomte, la possibilité de solliciter des secours en faveur des Indigènes de Mossoul, et le Cabinet de Londres de ses intentions à cet égard.

Le 14 novembre, M. Lecomte informe que plusieurs Indigènes ne peuvent rentrer dans cette ville, avisé le Département qu'il sollicite des autorités anglaises la même permission.

Le 16 novembre M. Balfour informe M. P. Cambon qu'il est obligé de ne pas consentir au voyage de nos représentants de prendre au préalable l'avis du Commandant en Chef anglais.

Le 17 novembre M. Balfour informe le Département que le Consul de France à Bassora, M. Lecomte, a été avisé par le Commandant en Chef anglais que le plus d'une agence s'occupe de cette question.

Le 20 novembre M. Balfour fait savoir au Département que le Consul de France à Bassora, M. Lecomte, a été avisé par le Commandant en Chef anglais que le plus d'une agence s'occupe de cette question.

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lui a répondu que les autorités militaires anglaises en voient pas le moyen de modifier les précédents ordres.

Le 28 novembre, M. Roux signale que l'argent recueilli par la Croix-Rouge de Bagdad est mis à la disposition des fonctionnaires britanniques de Mossoul pour secourir les misérables de la ville. Le même jour, M. Balfour répond à M. P. Cambon qu'il attend l'avis des autorités militaires britanniques pour autoriser nos agents à aller à Mossoul.

Le 30 décembre, 1918, M. Roux télégraphie qu'en vue d'obvier aux difficultés que causent les dépenses de Mossoul, le Gouvernement britannique a décidé de faire parvenir la somme dont il est chargé par des traités à son ordre.

Le 6 janvier, 1919, M. Roux et le Commandant Sciard, au bout de près de deux mois d'attente inutile, confient la distribution des secours à Mgr Sero.

Colonel Leachman.

Bassora télégraphie le 26 novembre, 1918, que le Lieutenant-Colonel Leachman a été désigné comme administrateur civil de la ville et du vilayet de Mossoul, dont le Gouvernement britannique a assumé la charge, par le Général Marshall.

Le même télégraphie le 25 décembre au Département que le Colonel Leachman a réuni les membres des communautés pour leur défendre de recevoir de l'argent français et de répondre aux instructions envoyées à ce sujet par le consul de France.

Le 8 février une dépêche de M. Roux confirme la précédente. Le Colonel Leachman a interdit les secours français sous peine de punition. En revanche, il en fait distribuer au nom de l'Angleterre et autorise un missionnaire américain faisant la propagande anglaise à circuler librement dans la région de Mossoul. Le Colonel Leachman a proféré devant le Patriarche chaldéen la menace de la déportation.

Le 10 janvier, M. Roux informe le Département que le Colonel Leachman refuse à l'archevêque arménien de Bagdad le droit de télégraphier ses vœux de nouvelle année au consul de France, et le force à restituer aux Turcs de petits esclaves arméniens qu'il a naguère retrouvés.

Le Commandant Sciard télégraphie que le Lieutenant-Colonel Leachman répand en Mésopotamie le bruit de violents mouvements antifrancophiles en Syrie ainsi qu'en Liban, et d'une révolte contre la garnison française de Beyrouth.

(1)

Propagande anglaise.

Le 28 novembre, 1918, le consul de France à Bassora signale au Département l'intensité croissante de la propagande anglaise en Mésopotamie sur les notables et les chefs musulmans pour les amener à réclamer le protectorat anglais.

Le 3 décembre, le même consul de France télégraphie en rendant compte de l'état d'esprit fâcheux à l'égard de la France créé par la propagande zélée des fonctionnaires.

Le 10 décembre, le même signale l'ouverture de bureaux de poste civile anglais en Mossoul.

Le 15 décembre, le même signale l'ouverture de bureaux de poste civile anglais en Mossoul, où les anglais cherchent à entretenir l'impression qu'ils doivent y rester.

Le 8 février, M. Roux annonce que le drapeau anglais a été officiellement hissé, en zone française.

M. G. Picot signale le 3 décembre, 1918, à l'issue de sa tournée dans le Liban, la mauvaise humeur sensible des officiers anglais à l'égard des démonstrations en sa faveur. A Sgorta, ces officiers proclament l'annulation des accords de 1916.

(7.)

M. Picot signale le 4 décembre, 1918, qu'une garnison chrétienne est entrée à Antioche le lendemain du jour où on a refusé l'entrée de la ville aux contingents français.

(8.)

Le consul de France à Larnaca télégraphie en date du 9 décembre, 1918, que l'Intelligence Service de Famagouste travaille les Druzes en faveur de l'Angleterre et envoie des émissaires recueillir des signatures en ce sens dans le Liban.

(9.)

M. G. Picot signale dans sa dépêche du 10 décembre que l'Emir Zeid, dépense au compte, à Damas, pour la propagande chrétienne, l'argent que l'Angleterre et la France lui avancent pour les besoins de l'administration.

(10)

Officiers anglais en Syrie

M. Coulondre, délégué du Haut-Commissaire français en Palestine-Syrie, déclare ce qui suit :

L. G. et M. J. y ont vu l'œuvre de l'Angleterre se faire jour pour confier à l'administration française certains territoires occupés ne sauraient en aucune façon engager l'avenir.

Le Général Balfour déclare aux Syriens que les représentants français n'engagent que leur responsabilité personnelle ou procédant à l'organisation futur du pays.

Le Général Balfour refuse d'amener le drapeau chrétien et de relever de leurs fonctions les autorités chrétiennes dans les villes de la zone d'action française; il faut un ordre exprès du Commandant en Chef pour le forcer à reconnaître nos droits.

(11)

Le 10 décembre, le consul de France à Bassora signale au Département l'intensité croissante de la propagande anglaise en Mésopotamie sur les notables et les chefs musulmans pour les amener à réclamer le protectorat anglais.

Le 10 décembre, le même signale l'ouverture de bureaux de poste civile anglais en Mossoul. Le 15 décembre, le même signale l'ouverture de bureaux de poste civile anglais en Mossoul, où les anglais cherchent à entretenir l'impression qu'ils doivent y rester.

(13)

Le consul de France à Port-Saïd télégraphie le 31 décembre, 1918, que les délégués libanais arrêtés par la police égyptienne le 27 décembre n'ont pu repartir; il faut attendre les ordres du Général Allenby ou du Haut-Commissaire britannique au Caire.

(14.)

Censure égyptienne.

M. Lecomte-Petit a écrit au Département en date du 2 janvier 1919 que la Censure égyptienne a reçu l'ordre de signaler au G. Q. G. anglais les pièces émanant de fonctionnaires français et faisant mention du refus opposé par les autorités britanniques au départ des délégués syriens.

Le 7 janvier, M. Pontalis, signale au Département le discours prononcé par M. P. à la Chambre de la France en Syrie, le 25 novembre 1918, à l'occasion du départ du Général Allenby.

Le 9 janvier, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères télégraphie à Londres sa protestation très vive contre cette mesure.

Le 18 janvier, M. Pontalis informe le Département que le seul résultat de cette protestation a été de faire publier par les autorités britanniques un résumé du discours en question en y omettant toute allusion à la Palestine. La Censure continue à laisser à nos adversaires toute liberté de s'exprimer.

(15.)

Commandant Seiard.

Le Commandant Seiard signale le 3 janvier, 1919, que l'on cherche à déchiffrer ses télégrammes de service.

Il télégraphie le 4 janvier que le Colonel Wilson, Civil Commissioner à Bagdad, a écrit au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Londres pour réclamer le rappel du chef de la Mission militaire française, le Colonel Seiard, ancien ambassadeur honoraire du consulat français de Bagdad. Le Commandant Seiard et ses collègues sont surveillés.

Le Commandant Seiard informe par dépêche du 9 janvier le Ministre de la Guerre qu'il a reçu du chef d'Etat Major général britannique une lettre l'invitant au nom du Général Marshall à quitter la Mésopotamie aussitôt. Le 11 janvier, l'Etat Major britannique prend les dispositions destinées à assurer son départ avant d'avoir reçu les réponses de la France et de l'Italie.

Le 14 janvier, le Chargé d'Affaires de France à Londres avise qu'il a protesté contre l'expulsion arbitraire et inamicale du Commandant Seiard par les autorités militaires anglaises.

(16.)

L'Amiral Couraud télégraphie le 8 janvier que les autorités britanniques pour le Liban, l'ont notifié et par les moyens les moins recommandables une politique de répression. Il signale notamment :

Le Général Bullen, qui s'acharne en toute occasion à desservir la France.

Le Colonel Bey et Haddad Bey.

Le Général Bello.

Le Général Mahney, qui a donné l'ordre de "faire du bruit en Syrie pour contraindre l'action de la France".

Le Général Clinton, principal agent de la politique antifranaise.

Le Colonel Storrs, Gouverneur de Jérusalem (territoire int.).

L'autorisation d'interdire en Palestine, toujours accordée aux pèlerins, est refusée aux pèlerins et même à nos nationaux.

Le War Trade Department nous suscite partout de grandes difficultés.

(17.)

Le Commandant Storrs signale dans son rapport en date du 18 janvier que lors de sa tournée au Caire et à Alexandrie, du 3 au 7 janvier, l'Alliance libanaise et l'Alliance syrienne continuaient avec acharnement leur campagne de presse antifranaise. Le Commandant Storrs signale que les autorités anglaises ont mis à la disposition de nos adversaires par tous les moyens à sa disposition la propagande intense menée contre notre action en Syrie ; à signaler le Colonel Lawrence et le Général Clayton.

M. Picot signale dans sa dépêche du 14 janvier que la propagande chrétienne redouble d'intensité, les agents extorquent par la menace ou par l'or des signatures en faveur du Malik. Une coopérative d'officiers britanniques encourage cette propagande et se refuse à laisser passer les journaux qui s'occupent de la question. Les services se passent à Beyrouth et en zone d'action directe française.

(19.)

M. Picot signale au Département le 19 janvier, 1919, que le Général Sir D. G. Highmore, Chef des forces britanniques en Syrie, me fait savoir à l'attache à Beyrouth qu'il s'oppose à l'envoi des renforts pour le corps expéditionnaire français.

(20.)

L'Amiral du Casard télégraphie le 22 janvier, 1919, que le retour à Jérusalem du Patriarche Damianos est exploité par les Anglais contre l'influence française et que le mouvement est dirigé par le Général Storrs, Gouverneur de Jérusalem.

(21.)

Le consul de France à Larnaca avise le Département par sa dépêche du 27 janvier qu'il a été informé des sommes considérables que les autorités anglaises dépensent en Syrie pour détruire l'influence française, contre laquelle ils subventionnent notamment le journaliste égyptien Kourri. L'action anglaise à Chypre est de jour en jour plus visible.

(22.)

Le Consul de France à Larnaca avise le Département en date du 28 janvier que les agents anglais ont demandé à signer une pétition demandant la suppression de la mission française en Syrie et la suppression de la mission française en Syrie.

(23.)

M. Georges Picot télégraphie au Département en date du 11 février, 1919. Le Commandant en Chef des forces alliées en Syrie a fait notifier par le général commandant le XXI^e Corps britannique au Capitaine de vaisseau Duchemin, commandant la base navale de Beyrouth que ce port était sous son seul contrôle et sous l'autorité unique du délégué du G. H. Q., le rôle de l'officier français se bornant à la liaison avec les forces navales françaises.

(24.)

Le Capitaine de vaisseau Duchemin ne relevant, en vertu des instructions formelles qu'il a reçues, que de l'Amiral Nancy, il est inadmissible que l'Etat-Major britannique en Syrie veuille le mettre à profit l'absence momentanée du Général Allenby pour tenter d'envoyer de ses fonctions un officier français, auquel le commandant des forces navales alliées du Levant a confié le commandement de la base navale de Beyrouth.

Le consul de France à Larnaca télégraphie au Département en date du 11 février, 1919, que les autorités anglaises, après avoir dressé la liste des réfugiés français à Larnaca, ont essayé de retourner dans cette ville, prennent leurs dispositions pour rapatrier au plus tôt les derniers, alors que les réfugiés de Latakia, tous protégés français, se voient refuser le retour.

Minutes of a Conference on the Pilgrimage, held at the Foreign Office on Tuesday, March 18, 1915.

Present

	Mr. Keston
Foreign Office...	Mr. Lovd.
	Major Young
War Office...	Captain Macindoe.
Treasury...	Mr. Waterfield
Ministry of Shipping	Mr. Alcock
	Mr. L. J.
Colonial Office...	Mr. Cowell
Local Government Board	Dr. Low
	Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson
India Office...	Mr. Wakely

THE following points were discussed:—

- 1.—(a.) *Policy towards the Pilgrimage.* Are His Majesty's Government to confine themselves, as in the past, to guarding the interests of British subjects, or are they to accept general responsibility for ensuring that King Hussein

The Meeting were of opinion that, in view of the political situation arising out of the Arab revolt and of the support given by His Majesty's Government to King Hussein during the war, His Majesty's Government could not confine themselves, as in the past, to guarding the interests of British pilgrims.

In view of the fact that His Majesty's Government will undoubtedly be blamed for any obvious falling off in the local pilgrimage arrangements in the Hedjaz, it was considered that, although no general responsibility could be accepted by His Majesty's Government, it was desirable, from the point of view of His Majesty's Government, that adequate precautions should be taken during the coming pilgrimage for the protection of pilgrims both from the point of view of defence and sanitation. While there was no reason to encourage a bumper pilgrimage, it was essential that it should be successful, and that no handle should be given to pro-Turkish and anti-Sherif propaganda.

- 1.—(b.) *In the latter case what financial support will be necessary for King Hussein, and on which Department of His Majesty's Government should the necessary expenditure be a charge?*

The Meeting were of opinion that for this year, at any rate, King Hussein would require financial support to enable him, among other things, to carry out the necessary measures to ensure that the pilgrimage should be a success, and they considered that this support should in the first place, be a charge on Imperial funds. It was understood that the Treasury were averse from contributing directly towards the pilgrimage arrangements as such, but that they would accept the general principle that the expenditure involved in these arrangements should be taken into consideration when dealing with the financial support of King Hussein. This understanding was without prejudice to the discretion of the Treasury to suggest that the Indian and Egyptian Governments ought to be asked to bear some proportion of the expenditure involved in payments of the subsidy.

The expense of the necessary sanitary arrangements at Jeddah and Yenbo was estimated at £10,000 for this year. As regards the defence measures, it was suggested that the Foreign Office should telegraph to Sir M. Chetani for an estimate of the normal expenditure under this head. It was realised that, in the event of hostile aggression on the part of Ibn Saud, it might become necessary to contemplate the provision of further financial support.

It was understood, however, that the Treasury were strongly of opinion that any expenses on account of military defence should be met by King Hussein from the

existing subsidy, which includes a very large sum for military purposes generally, and that pressure should be put upon him to take adequate precautions for the protection of the pilgrims by threat of reducing or discontinuing his subsidy.

2. *What shipping facilities can be made available, and what is the approximate number of pilgrims who will have to be dealt with?*

The Meeting, while recognising the desirability of reopening the pilgrimage to the full extent, considered that special steps should not be taken to provide shipping facilities for pilgrims, but that the disposal of such tonnage as would be free from control at the pilgrimage season. It was not anticipated that any very large quantity of shipping was likely to be available, though an accurate forecast would be difficult to obtain. It was agreed that it might be advisable that a general warning of the probable shortage of shipping should be issued, with a view to obtaining as far as possible the necessary for providing special facilities. As far as possible, no step should be taken which might be interpreted as a discouragement to the pilgrimage on other grounds, and that every effort should be made to provide accommodation for such pilgrims as might present themselves at British ports in spite of the general warning that there was likely to be a shortage of shipping.

With regard to the Dutch East Indies, it was thought that the shipping situation would almost certainly admit of the small number of pilgrims anticipated by Captain Lee Warner being conveyed to the Hedjaz.

3. *What facilities, if any, should be given to pilgrims from Syria and Palestine?*

The Meeting considered that this question could not be answered without previous reference to General Allenby. It was suggested that the War Office, in consultation with the Foreign Office, should obtain his general views on the number of pilgrims likely to proceed from Syria and Palestine, and should also inform him generally of the position as regards quarantine, at the same time making it clear that it was, from a political point of view, essential that he should take no step which might be interpreted as discouraging intending pilgrims except to their own advantage.

4. *What measures are desirable, from the purely sanitary point of view, for pilgrims proceeding (a) by sea, (b) by land?*

(a.) It was considered that pilgrims should be quarantined both on their inward and outward journey at Kamaran, Tor, and Suakin, and also at Jeddah and Yenbo. It was agreed that the formation of a small inter-departmental committee consisting of representatives of the Foreign Office, Egyptian Government, Government of India, and Local Government Board (Ministry of Health) was highly desirable for the purpose of working out in detail proposals as to sanitary arrangements. It was suggested that this committee should meet at an early date and, after hearing the views of Major C. P. Thomson, D.S.O., R.A.M.C., and possibly of Dr. Norman White, who is shortly expected from India, should make recommendations on the lines of Dr. Buchanan's proposals, of which a copy is attached, subject to the conclusions arrived at by the meeting in the course of their general discussion. It was agreed that this inter-departmental committee should not only consider the steps necessary for the quarantine arrangements connected with the pilgrimage, for submission to the Government, but also to ensure co-ordination of the steps taken by the various Departments of His Majesty's Government.

(b.) With regard to pilgrims proceeding by land, it was understood that the Government should allow a month for pilgrims from Syria and Palestine. There was some difference of opinion as to whether this was in itself a sufficient safeguard, and it was foreseen that in the event of an outbreak of infectious disease at Mecca it might be necessary to impose quarantine for the return journey at some suitable station on the existing line. The alternative of encouraging pilgrims from Syria and Palestine to proceed by sea was also considered. It was suggested that the position should be discussed in the proposed War Office telegram to General Allenby.

5. By what administrative authorities should the various measures be applied?

The Meeting were of opinion that quarantine arrangements in connection with this year's pilgrimage should be undertaken as follows:—

- (a) Kameran: by the Government of India.
- (b) Tor: by the Egyptian Government
- (c) Suakin: by the Sudan Government
- (d) Jeddah and Yembo: by King Hussein, under the supervision of the British Agent at Jeddah, acting under the orders of the High Commissioner.

Each of these administrative authorities should conform to the requirements laid down by the International Sanitary Convention.

It was agreed that the measure of interference or control necessary to ensure that King Hussein should fulfil the conditions laid down by international quarantine regulations, was primarily a question for the High Commissioner at Cairo, and it was suggested that the Foreign Office should instruct Sir M. Cheetam to report as soon as possible whether, in his opinion, it would be possible or expedient to bring pressure to bear upon King Hussein through his authority, or whether it was necessary that quarantine arrangements at Jeddah should be placed under direct British control.

6. How should these measures be financed?

At the discussion it was generally agreed that the respective administrative authorities mentioned under (a), (b), and (c) above should, in the first place, finance the measures adopted by them, and that they should levy such dues from pilgrims as were formerly levied by the Turkish Government, subject to any modifications which might be approved by His Majesty's Government. The question of the ultimate incidence of any expenditure on the measures was not decided until it was known what authority or authorities would in future be responsible in each case for the discharge of the duties formerly entrusted to the Constantinople Board of Health. It was, however, agreed that, pending the final settlement of the question, the necessary expenditure should be met by the administrative authorities concerned on the understanding that it would ultimately be debited in each case to the authority becoming responsible in future for the sanitary arrangements in question, in anticipation of possible future recovery.

As regards the expenditure at Jeddah and Yembo, the Meeting were of opinion that it should be met by King Hussein, who should be encouraged to levy such dues as were formerly levied by the Turkish Government.

Annex

Note by Dr. Buchanan, handed in by Dr. Low.

Mecca Pilgrimage.

ASSUMING that the Conference to-morrow takes the line that to meet 1919 conditions

- (a) Kameran should be made of
- (b) Tor should be fully re-established (Egyptian Government);
- (c) A British quarantine station should be established at Jeddah (free of all expense to the King of the Hedjaz, but obligatory as regards all vessels bringing pilgrims).

The Jeddah station to deal with the direct African traffic, and to supplement Kameran and Tor.

- (d) Co-ordination of the system at Kameran, Tor, and Jeddah is essential;
- (e) For 1919 land pilgrimage via the Hedjaz Railway will not be allowed, so that the railway quarantine station is not of importance at the moment;

... pilgrims, we ought to be able to make our own arrangements that the Jeddah station must be an effective one.

The following scheme might be considered:—

(A.) The Conference to appoint a small working Inter-Departmental Committee in London, say one member each representing:—

Foreign Office,
India Office,

Local Government Board (Ministry of Health).

(B.) The Committee to be arranged by the Foreign Office, and to report to the Foreign Office, which would apply to the Treasury, for sanction.

(C.) The Committee to be approved by the Treasury and have power to spend money (amount need not be large—see G below).

(D.) The duty of the Committee to be—

1. To secure a sufficient interim arrangement to safeguard the pilgrimage in 1919.
2. To report on measures which appear practicable for future pilgrimages, and which can be submitted as a British policy to the next International Conference.

(E.) The Committee would at once appoint a medical officer of experience to go to Egypt and the Red Sea and advise—

- (a.) What interim measures are practicable and necessary at Kameran
- (b.) " " " " at Tor
- (c.) " " " " at Jeddah.
- (d.) How, when the pilgrim season is on, regular co-operation and systematic

He should be empowered, within necessary limits, to take action on the spot for the above purposes.

(F.) The Committee to appoint this officer, or another officer, to act as director, of the Hedjaz quarantine service during the pilgrimage, to have authority (with the sanction of Indian and Egyptian Governments respectively) over Kameran and Tor qua the pilgrim arrangements.

(G.) It is anticipated that the Committee will not need much direct expenditure at Kameran or Tor. The whole arrangement is temporary, and the work of the Committee or its representative will be mainly in laying down the essential minimal requirements which are practicable, and could be carried out, at Kameran, at the expense of the Italian Government, and at Tor, at the expense of the Egyptian Government.

At Jeddah, however, it may not be practicable for the quarantine station to be arranged and worked by the Indian or Egyptian authorities. In that case the Committee, through its representative, would have to arrange for the station and staff. For the short period of the pilgrim season, the personnel, material, and transport could be obtained largely by arrangement with the military or naval authorities. The Committee, either direct or through the Foreign Office, would invite the assistance of the War Office, Admiralty, &c., in the matter.

(H.) The simplest plan would be to ask the Foreign Office to include a sum for the Committee in their estimates and consider afterwards its allocation between the Foreign Office, Ministry of Health, Egypt, and India Office if this is necessary. (Say, £6,000, if the Committee is to be responsible for Jeddah.)

(I.) Representation:—

Sir H. Charles might perhaps act for the India Office; Dr. Goodman, late Assistant-Director Egyptian Public Health Service, now retired, address, the Union, Cambridge—would probably be approved by the Egyptian authorities, and be most useful to the Foreign Office. It will probably have a representative member of the Egyptian Department or of their Commercial and Quarantine Department; for the Local Government Board I could be a member if desired.

I think the Committee ought to get Dr. Thomson to meet them as soon as he comes over from Egypt (see the papers—he starts about the 15th); and also should see Dr. Norman White, who is to be over for the Inter-Allied Sanitary Conference at Paris.

These men could help in various ways, and in the selection of a representative medical officer to go and settle matters. If the Local Government Board is asked or asked to send a man, I should be prepared to ask the Board to send Dr. Wilkinson if possible.

G. S. R.

March 17, 1919

[43332]

N. 24

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 19.)

L'AR une note en date du 5 de ce mois, l'Ambassadeur de France a attiré l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur la communication adressée, le 16 janvier par le grand quartier général anglais en Asie Mineure au directeur de la Compagnie des Chemins de fer de la région.

Cette même affaire a été, le 15 février dernier, une nouvelle protestation au Général Allenby contre :

1. L'engagement par les officiers de l'armée anglaise d'anciens agents de la société, à titre d'employés civils, sur la ligne de Jaffa à Jérusalem.
2. L'exploitation commerciale de la ligne par les autorités militaires britanniques qui effectuaient des transports de voyageurs civils et de marchandises privées avec tarifs spéciaux.

Le Gouvernement français estime justifiées ces protestations de la compagnie. Il serait heureux de recevoir aussi rapidement que possible, au sujet de ces affaires, une réponse du Gouvernement britannique.

M. Paul Cambon avait

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 18 mars 1919

21910]

No. 25.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon

Your Excellency, Paris, 19 March 1919

I RECEIVED from His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris some time ago a copy of a note addressed to him by M. Pichon on the 6th February in which the French Government complained of the attitude adopted by certain British military officers and officials in the occupied territories of Syria and Mesopotamia. The text of this note was doubtless also communicated to your Excellency, but I have the honour to enclose a copy for convenience of reference.

His Majesty's Government were greatly surprised at both the tone and substance of this communication. They could not but regret that the French Government should have thought it necessary to make these accusations couched in so unusual and even unfriendly a form, at a time when the Peace Conference is engaged in the French capital in endeavouring to reach a lasting settlement of all international disputes. Indeed, I had hoped, particularly after my conversations with your Excellency, in which we have reviewed the entire situation in a very different spirit, that it might not have been necessary to take up the challenge so sharply thrown down at Paris. However, during the last few days there has arrived another long list of alleged grievances handed by M. Pichon in Paris to Lord Milner reflecting the same frame of mind, and in some cases reiterating the same complaints. In these circumstances I have no alternative but to address to your Excellency the more sustained and serious reply from which I would gladly have abstained. I must, however, make this preliminary observation. Your Excellency will readily understand that the persons accused by a friendly and Allied Government of having so far forgotten their duty as to enter into intrigues of the nature indicated in M. Pichon's notes must be given the opportunity of defending themselves, and that it will therefore, be impossible for me to deal in detail with the various accusations made until the Commanders-in-chief of the two armies have been consulted and have been able to question their subordinates. The fact that the French Government have made such an enquiry inevitable both by the nature of the charges and the form

in which they have considered it necessary to present them, is regrettable, since an enquiry on these lines is a serious one, and it is a matter of course that the relations between the officers and members of the two nations which His Majesty's Government so earnestly desire to see established in every theatre of action.

But M. Pichon's two notes raise, besides the more personal questions, others of a more general character, on which I have more than once had the honour of expressing to your Excellency the views of His Majesty's Government. The atmosphere of mistrust which has engendered these accusations has arisen in my opinion in the first place from the conclusion of an agreement between our two Governments which a wider knowledge at the time would have shown to be impracticable, and which the progress of events has long since rendered obsolete, and in the second place from the attempt to apply its terms and conditions without modification to a position to which they are entirely unsuited.

There would appear, moreover, to exist fundamental differences of opinion between the two Governments as to the circumstances in which this Agreement of 1916 was intended to take effect, and as to the extent to which it has already been affected by subsequent declarations and arrangements. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the whole text and spirit of the Agreement show that it was not meant to become operative save as a part of the final settlement of all matters arising out of the war. It is a state of war, and it is my point of view in passing that it still exists—a military régime must be maintained in full force in enemy-occupied territory. Such is understood to be the considered view of the French Government with regard to the Western Front, and it is obvious that the principle which has been applied to the Western Front must be applied with even greater force to semi-civilized territories such as those which are now under consideration. Such a régime is obviously incompatible with the full and immediate realization of the programme laid down in the 1916 Agreement, even were the full and textual validity of that document assumed, and if His Majesty's Government have so far relaxed the application of this principle as to allow by the *modus vivendi* of the 30th September, 1918, their French Allies to enjoy some of the privileges accruing to them under the Agreement before they have reached the final settlement, it is to the desire of His Majesty's Government to show their willingness to meet French wishes in a friendly spirit and not to any obligation imposed by the terms of the Agreement itself. The Commanders-in-chief of the Armies of Occupation, therefore, retain sole responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the areas of the occupied territories, and it is from the rights of supreme authority which this responsibility implies,

that, whatever the intrinsic value of the Agreement may be, its application cannot be claimed so long as a state of war exists and that the only powers which the French can claim to exercise by right in the occupied territories are those conceded to them by the *modus vivendi* of the 30th September, 1918.

The second point of difference between the two Governments relates to the validity of the Agreement itself, and this, in the light of the considerations set forth above, is a matter of great importance. It is a question which will eventually be given to it at the contemplated termination of the state of war has already been largely modified by the Anglo-French Declaration of the 18th November 1918. It is a question which will be decided by the Peace Conference between the Allied Governments as a basis of the war settlement must necessarily come within the purview of the Peace Conference and be ratified, modified or rescinded by that body. Indeed that process has already been commenced in Paris, and may be expected before long to reach a final stage.

It is to a genuine misunderstanding on these fundamental questions rather than to any desire to create or to magnify points of local difference that I am inclined to attribute the unfortunate incidents and disagreements that have arisen, culminating as they have done in a series of grave personal charges which the French Government have thought fit to bring against British officers and even against the Generals in command of the British armies in the field. Upon this point I must speak with frankness.

Far from thwarting legitimate French aspirations, General Allenby has, to the knowledge of His Majesty's Government, urged the French Representative for many months past to give to him more efficient co-operation, and with this end in view to secure the appointment of French officers of standing with ripe administrative

[1356]

G 2

tive experience to aid him in his difficult task. So far all his efforts in this direction have been in vain. He has seen with the greatest solicitude the danger of serious trouble with the Arabs which the failure to supply sufficient or efficient administrative French personnel has frequently caused, and in every case he has done his best to help and advise. The late Sir Mark Sykes was a man of great experience and ability, and his death has been a great loss to the French Government. At the same time, it is a fact that the French Government has not been able to supply sufficient personnel to the Syrian and Mesopotamian Governments. M. Pichon's latest note is a repudiation of the charge of undermining the position, if required, to confirm and substantiate in the course of his impending visit to Paris. To His Majesty's Government added the charge of undermining the popularity of the French in Syria is peculiarly galling and unjustified, since all the information in their possession tends to show that both General Allenby and his officers have throughout exerted themselves to combat the anti-French feeling which, in spite of the existence of many French officers and officials, undoubtedly exists in that country, and which (as it would be easily within my power, were I so disposed, to prove), the action of French officers and officials has not invariably tended to allay.

The French Government in their note have also complained that the censorship in exercised to the detriment of their cause in Syria. To this accusation His Majesty's Government take no notice. It is a fact that the British Government has been very careful throughout to suppress with vigour the many attempts which have been made to ventilate in the press manifestations of anti-French feeling. So loyally indeed has this policy been followed that it has caused grave popular discontent on many occasions, and has caused serious embarrassment to the local authorities. Similar difficulties have arisen in regard to the control of the Syrian press in Egypt.

I venture to hope that your Excellency, in bringing the views of His Majesty's Government to the notice of your Government, will inform M. Pichon that the tone of his Excellency's communication is far from being one of equal surprise and regret, and that His Majesty's Government consider, from the information received by them, that the British administration officers in the occupied territories, far from working against French interests, have done their best to co-operate with their French Allies in the very difficult circumstances produced on the one hand by the antagonistic attitude of the Arabs towards the French, and on the other hand by the failure of the French Government to supply an administrative personnel possessing the experience and authority necessary to cope with so complex and delicate a situation.

The information contained in M. Pichon's latest note seems indeed to indicate that a number of these officials find an outlet for their activities in telegraphing to the French Government complaints as to incidents which appear to be of a trivial nature, and which in the large majority of cases ought to admit of local solution.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[44988]

No. 26.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 22.)

Sir,

India Office, March 21, 1919.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th February, 1919, transmitting, for the observations of this Department, copy of a note from the French Government formulating a series of complaints against the attitude said to be adopted by local British officials towards French interests and officers in Syria and Mesopotamia.

Mr Secretary Montagu proposes to confine his reply to the section of the note dealing with Mesopotamia, with which he is directly connected. He states that the specific complaints brought against British authorities in Mesopotamia relate to two incidents only, viz.:

1. The treatment of the French military attaché; and
2. The refusal to permit the French consul, M. Roux, to proceed to Mosul.

As regards 1, Mr Montagu understands that the case of Commandant Suard has been dealt with in your letter of the 24th February. There seems nothing further to be said on this point. The circumstances in which it was thought necessary to discourage M. Roux's project of undertaking a charitable mission to Mosul were explained in the Civil Commissioner's telegram dated the 15th November, 1918, a copy of which is enclosed herewith for convenience of reference. It appears from Earl Curzon's despatch to the Secretary of State, dated the 15th November, 1918, that at this point have been taken into consideration the following points:—

1. The fact that the French Government has been acting in a spirit of authority to French rights and pretensions in Mesopotamia, their alleged

Government in the eyes of the native inhabitants, and activity in spreading rumour and in countenancing propaganda work detrimental to the repute of France as a great Power. In the absence of any evidence supporting these serious charges, the British Government is entitled to meet them by an expression of

of in the possibility of British officers acting in a spirit so utterly contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government. Mr Montagu has on more than one occasion (see the despatch of the 15th November, 1918) expressed his regret that the British Government had Wilson the necessity of scrupulously respecting French rights in those portions of Mesopotamia which are under British administration. The British Government in all other respects with such whole-hearted zeal and energy, that in this one particular, have neglected either the spirit or the letter of the orders conveyed to him from this Office.

Mr Montagu would add that it was his desire (as is far from being the case) that the British Government should not be put to any unnecessary expense or difficulty material for counter-charges against French officials and others in Mesopotamia.

I have, &c

T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 26

Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, to Viceroy of India.

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, November 15, 1918.

FRENCH consul at Basra telegraphs, 15th November:—

"Having received orders from my Government to undertake a charitable mission to Mosul, I am, in accordance with the instructions of my Government, desirous of being much obliged if you would ask military authorities to give me the necessary facility to accomplish this mission."

With the approval of General Officer Commanding-in-chief, I have replied that poor relief is at present a responsibility which is being undertaken by military administration in Mosul, and that it is not considered necessary or desirable that more than one agency should deal with matter.

(Repeated to Delhi and Cairo)

Enclosure 2 in No. 26.

Secretary of State for India to Civil Commissioner, Bagdad.

(Telegraphic)

India Office, December 9, 1918.

YOUR telegram, dated 24th November. Political arrangements in Upper Euphrates.

My telegram of 5th November conveyed instructions of His Majesty's Government as to policy to be pursued in occupied districts falling within Area A as defined by

Sykes-Picot agreement. There is nothing in those instructions to preclude appointment of political officers in Area A wherever requirements of military administration necessitate, but they hardly cover despatch of political officer to spot so remote from zone of military occupation as Deir-az-Zor. Unless there are strong reasons to contrary based on needs of military administration, Political Officer Abu Kemal should be instructed not to proceed further up Euphrates into Area A without specific instructions from His Majesty's Government. Similar considerations apply to political measures in northern districts of Mosul Vilayet, see your telegram dated 3rd December. Genuine needs of military administration must be criterion of political action.

(Very confidential.)

We are hopeful of inducing French Government to renounce claims in Mosul area, but in meantime it is most important to avoid giving them impression that we are acting in disregard of provisions of Sykes-Picot agreement. Only result would be to make them more tenacious of their claims.

(Repeated to Viceroy.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 26.

From Secretary of State for India to Civil Commissioner, Bagdad.

(Telegraphic.)

India Office, December 20, 1918.

YOUR telegram, dated 20th November - Railway construction.

His Majesty's Government fully appreciate your point. But as you have already been informed, French Government regard Sykes-Picot agreement as still valid. We hope to persuade them to withdraw their claim to Mosul, but until we have done so, any infringement of Sykes-Picot agreement will only make negotiations more difficult and thus tend to defeat our object. This must be governing consideration in dealing with all proposals for extending British influence in Area A, except in matters of necessity to military administration. There appears to be no such necessity for construction of earthworks beyond British sphere, which must accordingly be disallowed.

Similar considerations apply to railway surveys into Kurd country and extensions to and beyond Tikrit as discussed in your telegram dated 14th November. Up to the British sphere work may be undertaken, provided necessary personnel available and local officers satisfied there is no undue risk of disturbance. But it must not be extended into Area A.

(Repeated to Viceroy.)

[44835]

No. 7

Director of Military Operations to Foreign Office.—(Received March 22.)

(Secret.)

THE Director of Military Operations presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward for the information of Lord Curzon a copy of a French note handed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in Paris by M. Clemenceau. This note contains the French observations on the subject of Franco-British relations in Constantinople and Syria.

Major-General Radcliffe understands that since the receipt of this note no action has been taken in Paris pending the arrival of General Allenby, in consultation with whom the whole matter was to be discussed.

Major-General Radcliffe also understands that General Franchet d'Esperey has now gone to Odessa, where the serious military situation may possibly require his presence for some time to come. In these circumstances it may be anticipated that no further action by the French authorities at Constantinople is probable for the present.

War Office, March 21, 1919.

Enclosure in No. 27

French Observations respecting Franco-British Relations in Constantinople and Syria.

Observations.

Situation générale.

1. Il a été allégué que la situation en Syrie est d'une nature entièrement différente de celle qui existe à Constantinople et qu'il n'est pas possible d'établir entre elles un parallèle.

La Syrie est sous l'occupation militaire d'une armée victorieuse et il n'existe aucun autre Gouvernement. Les armées alliées d'occupation sont commandées par le Général Franchet d'Esperey, commandant en chef de toutes les armées alliées d'Orient. Les autres alliés qui ont été nommés dans ce but.

Situation générale.

1. Les Hautes-Commissaires de Constantinople ont été institués pour faire appliquer les clauses de l'Armistice du 31 octobre 1918 avec la Turquie.

Les armées alliées d'occupation sont commandées par le Général Franchet d'Esperey, commandant en chef de toutes les armées alliées d'Orient. Les autres alliés qui ont été nommés dans ce but.

La preuve en est que le Général Milne, commandant en chef des armées alliées d'Orient, a pris une série de mesures pour l'occupation de la T.S.F., des banques, postes et hygiène de la ville, etc., qui sont nettement des actes de commandement et qui n'étaient pas en effet du ressort des Hautes-Commissaires.

Il était naturel que le Général d'Esperey, commandant en chef des armées alliées d'Orient, transportant le siège de son commandement à Constantinople ait revêtu et adapté à la situation nouvelle les mesures qui avaient été prises par le Général Milne.

A remarquer que le Général Milne, pendant le temps où il a occupé la ville, a fait participer que les Anglais aux mesures qu'il a prises, tandis que le Général d'Esperey a fait participer les Français aux mesures qu'il a prescrites.

2. Il a été allégué que le commandement du Général Franchet d'Esperey est limité aux territoires des pays contre lesquels il a conduit les opérations militaires et tous autres territoires pouvant tomber dans sa sphère comme résultat direct de ses opérations. Sa sphère est donc les Balkans; l'établissement de son Quartier général à Constantinople n'a eu pour unique but que de faciliter ses communications avec les Balkans et Constantinople.

Par analogie et conformément à l'accord de Versailles, les sphères des Généraux Allenby, Milne et Marshall s'étendent sur toute la Turquie d'Asie, et le Général Franchet d'Esperey n'a pas plus de droit d'y intervenir que le Général Allenby ne l'aurait, par exemple, en Bulgarie.

Le Général d'Esperey a conduit les opérations contre la Turquie au même titre que le Général Allenby.

Il est même probable que les succès de l'armée d'Orient et la menace d'une offensive directe et déjà commencée sur Constantinople, plus encore que l'entrée des armées alliées dans la ville, ont fait passer le commandement de la ville au Général d'Esperey.

Le fait que le Général Milne avait, sous l'autorité du Général Franchet d'Esperey, le commandement de l'aile droite des armées d'Orient, comme le Voivode Michitch en commandait le centre et le Général Henrys l'aile gauche, ne signifie pas que la Turquie d'Europe ni d'Asie fut sous son commandement.

A aucun moment, il n'a été convenu

que le commandement du Général Franchet d'Espèrey s'étendait à la Turquie d'Europe et à la Turquie d'Asie. Cette région n'a jamais été occupée par les troupes du Général Allenby; par suite, ces troupes n'ont pas plus de droits que celles du Général d'Espèrey à s'étendre en Anatolie.

La seule convention connue est celle de Paris du 23 décembre 1917, relative à l'action en Russie méridionale et qui attribue à la zone anglaise le Caucase, la Géorgie et le Kurdistan; à la zone française la Bessarabie, l'Ukraine, etc.

La résolution 6 de l'accord de Londres du 8 décembre 1918, spécifie que les troupes anglaises de l'armée du Général Milne, qui passent d'Europe en Asie, sous la condition d'un accord préalable entre les Gouvernements alliés, cessent d'être sous les ordres du Général d'Espèrey. Cela ne signifie nullement que ce Général ait besoin d'une autorisation desdits Gouvernements pour porter en Anatolie des troupes relevant de son autorité.

1. Ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut, les Hauts-Commissaires sont chargés de l'application des clauses de l'Armistice avec la Turquie.

En ce qui concerne les mesures prises par le Général Franchet d'Espèrey, il est arrivé à Constantinople, il est resté tant que commandant en chef local, par suite de l'absence du Général d'Espèrey) pris des mesures du même ordre et sans l'intervention des Hauts-Commissaires — voir ci-dessous "Banques".

Il était donc naturel qu'à son arrivée le Général Franchet d'Espèrey reprenne ces mesures à son compte, les revise ou les adapte à la situation nouvelle.

Situation particulière.

1. Mesures de Police et d'Hygiène à Constantinople.

La France se plaint que ces mesures ont été prises sans consultation préalable du Général Franchet d'Espèrey. Il ne semble pas contesté que cette mesure était désirable en même temps le Général Milne, comme officier le plus ancien commandant effectivement à ce moment, avait qualité pour prendre cette décision sur le terrain purement militaire.

2. Gendarmerie.

L'intention du Général Franchet d'Espèrey semble être d'instituer en coopération avec le Gouvernement turc une force de gendarmerie sous les ordres du

Situation particulière.

1. Mesures de Police et d'Hygiène à Constantinople.

(Sans observations.)
(Voir IV ci-dessus.)

2. Organisation de la Gendarmerie.

Il est à remarquer :

(1.) Qu'en Turquie, c'est une mesure de sûreté générale qui intéresse directement

Colonel Foulon pour toute la Turquie, l'Europe et l'Asie.

Un tel plan ne s'accorde pas avec les principes généraux mentionnés précédemment, sur trois points différents :

(a.) Il ignore l'état de guerre, l'institution d'une gendarmerie par un officier français dans un pays ennemi étant évidemment incompatible avec les conditions de la guerre.

(b.) Il projette l'exercice de l'autorité dans une sphère revendiquée comme celle de l'autorité militaire britannique à l'exclusion de toute autre.

(c.) Il n'est pas d'ordre purement militaire; il n'est donc pas de la compétence du Général Franchet d'Espèrey.

C'est comme si le Général Milne communiquait avec le Gouvernement de Sofia dans le but d'instituer une gendarmerie pour toute la Bulgarie sous les ordres du Général d'Espèrey.

D'autre part le droit du Général d'Espèrey d'organiser la police à Constantinople sous les ordres d'un officier français est reconnu.

3. Banques.

Ici aussi il est admis qu'une intervention était désirable et les Hauts-Commissaires alliés viennent de prendre une résolution dans le même sens.

Le grief de la France semble être que cette intervention a été faite sans en avoir été avertie, et que la participation des troupes françaises a été refusée. On pourrait faire remarquer à la France que le secret était essentiel pour le succès de l'opération dans le but d'empêcher l'enlèvement de livres compromettants et le transfert de Comités d'Union et Progrès ou de fonds ennemis. Mais il eût été préférable que le Général Milne agisse en cette occasion d'accord avec les Hauts-Commissaires, et le refus d'employer des troupes françaises semble avoir été une faute malheureuse, et des regrets peuvent être exprimés pour ce motif.

4. Chemins de fer.

On a cru comprendre par l'Amiral Calthorpe qu'un arrangement satisfaisant avait été obtenu localement sur cette question et que les Français avaient satisfait en assumant le contrôle des chemins de fer en Turquie d'Europe et en Bulgarie le contrôle des chemins de fer de Turquie d'Asie devant être entre les mains anglaises.

Toute la question compliquée du contrôle des chemins de fer turcs doit être décidée par la Conférence de la Paix; en attendant sa décision et la reprise de l'état de paix, le seul arrangement possible et utile semble

les armées alliées, donc une mesure d'ordre militaire.

(2.) Que le Général d'Espèrey a demandé aux armées alliées de participer à cette organisation en fournissant des officiers, &c.;

(3.) Qu'en outre une fois, si l'autorité militaire britannique revendique comme la sienne une certaine zone (vraisemblablement l'Anatolie), aucun accord entre les Gouvernements n'a encore attribué de zone séparée sinon en Russie méridionale, Caucase ou Levant.

3. Banques.

(Sans observations.)

4. Chemins de fer.

Une Commission supérieure des chemins de fer turcs a été instituée à Constantinople sous la présidence du Colonel Delauney dans les conditions générales adoptées pour l'"affaire alliée" des chemins de fer de Macédoine. Cette Commission attribuant au contrôle français les chemins de fer de Turquie d'Europe, au contrôle anglais les chemins de fer de Turquie d'Asie. Ce *modus vivendi* paraît convenable, étant entendu que la question compliquée des chemins de fer turcs sera résolue à la Conférence de la Paix.

être que le contrôle des chemins de fer soit réparti suivant les sphères militaires respectives.

La station de T.S.F. d'Osmanie.

Cette question semble être l'objet d'un arrangement local et d'un caractère militaire plutôt que politique.

6. Censure.

Le Général Franchet d'Esperey semble avoir pris ses propres arrangements pour la censure avec le Gouvernement turc et écarté ainsi le plan arrangé par les Hauts-Commissaires alliés avec les autorités turques. La question n'est pas que les arrangements du Général Franchet d'Esperey soient bons ou mauvais en eux-mêmes, mais une sérieuse question de principe est intéressée, et le fait de l'intervention du Général ignorant les Hauts-Commissaires ne peut avoir qu'un effet sérieux sur l'autorité de ces derniers et sur leur situation auprès du Gouvernement turc.

7. Arrestation et punition d'Officiers turcs coupables d'atrocités, etc.

Le Général Franchet d'Esperey est intervenu dans les arrangements faits par les Anglais pour l'arrestation et la garde des Turcs coupables. Il insiste sur ce point que les délinquants en territoires non occupés doivent être arrêtés et gardés par les Turcs, et que les premières poursuites doivent être effectuées par les tribunaux turcs.

On ne peut faire confiance aux Turcs pour assurer la garde certaine de ces hommes, comme le prouve l'évasion récente de Rachid Bey, et qu'il n'est pas désirable que les poursuites préliminaires soient faites par les tribunaux turcs contre des criminels qui seront finalement jugés par les Alliés. Cette question est en cours de discussion avec le Gouvernement français, et il a été avisé qu'au cas où il n'accepterait pas Malte comme lieu de détention, tout autre endroit sûr qu'il voudrait choisir serait agréé.

Cette question n'a d'importance que parce qu'elle montre la tendance constante du caractère du Général Franchet d'Esperey à l'intervention.

8. Projet de Visite du Général Franchet d'Esperey dans les Ports de la mer Noire.

Le Général Franchet d'Esperey a annoncé son intention de visiter les ports

5. T.S.F. d'Osmanie.

Sans observations.

C'est une question d'ordre essentiellement militaire, car elle intéresse directement la sécurité des armées placées sous le haut commandement du Général d'Esperey. C'est donc au général commandant les armées alliées et non aux Hauts-Commissaires que revient cette intervention.

7. Arrestation et punition des Officiers turcs, etc.

Le Général d'Esperey a agi comme l'avait fait le Général Milne avant son arrivée, conformément à son pouvoir de commandant en chef. Les questions peuvent d'ailleurs être résolues par entente entre les deux Gouvernements.

Par contre, il n'est pas inutile de rappeler que le Général Liman von Sanders, commandant en chef des Turcs, a été arrêté pour l'Allemagne avant l'arrivée du Général d'Esperey à Constantinople et a dû être arrêté en cours de route à Malte.

Le Général Franchet d'Esperey a des responsabilités comme commandant en chef qui lui font une obligation stricte d'intervenir dans toutes les affaires qui intéressent les armées alliées, et on ne saurait lui faire une critique au sujet de sa manière d'agir dans cette situation.

8. Projet de Visite du Général d'Esperey dans les Ports de la mer Noire.

Le Général d'Esperey sait fort bien que les ports de Novorossiysk, Batoum, &c.,

de la mer Noire, et l'on craint qu'il ne désire y établir des postes français.

sont dans la zone anglaise définie par la Convention du 23 décembre 1917, et il n'y installera certainement aucun poste.

Par contre, on se voit pas pourquoi il ne pourrait visiter les ports d'Héraclée, Trébizonde, &c., qui ne sont dans aucune zone séparée. On se souvient d'ailleurs que le Général Allenby est venu à Constantinople.

Les Français ont également offert l'assistance militaire à la Mission de Secours américaine, qui doit fonctionner dans l'intérieur de l'Asie Mineure. Ces mesures sont évidemment calculées pour prouver à un point quelconque la responsabilité de la Turquie dans les crimes de guerre et pour montrer aux Turcs que de sérieux efforts ont été faits pour empêcher les crimes et pour retirer les plus grands avantages.

Enfin, en ce qui concerne l'assistance militaire à la Mission de Secours américaine en Arménie, les Français n'ont fait que se conformer à ce que font déjà les Anglais à l'égard de cette mission : il ne paraît pas admissible qu'on puisse voir dans ces mesures une quelconque tentative d'apparaître aux yeux des Turcs des divergences entre les Alliés. L'histoire de la France et de l'Arménie, et de la Turquie depuis des siècles de solides relations, ne serait comprise par personne, alors que ces relations sont de nature à permettre de soutenir efficacement la Mission américaine en Arménie.

[42978]

No. 28.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.*

(No. 1523.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 24, 1919.

ARCHBISHOP CERRETTI, whose visit to England was foreshadowed in a recent telegram from Washington, called upon Sir Ronald Graham on the 14th.

He was received with the utmost cordiality, and in accordance with his request immediate arrangements were made with the Passport Office and the Railway authorities for the continuance of his journey to Paris on the following day, as well as for that of the priest accompanying him.

Archbishop Cerretti stated that there were one or two subjects which he wished to discuss with Sir R. Graham.

In the first place, his Grace alluded to the Holy Places and to the anxiety the Pope felt in regard to them. For many years past their history had been one of bitter and constant struggle between the Greek and the Turkish Governments, supported by the Russian Government.

The support which the French Government, as the protector of the Catholic Church in the East, had afforded to the Greek cause had been and was not now forthcoming, and the Pope looked rather to His Majesty's Government than to any other to see that the rights and interests of his Church in the Holy Places were protected. I will be glad that no objection was made to the Greek suggestion.

Sir R. Graham assured the Archbishop that the one desire of His Majesty's Government was to see that justice was done to all branches of the Christian religion in the Holy Places and that their respective interests were protected. As the Archbishop declared that he had nothing more to say on this subject, Sir R. Graham reminded him of the question of the German Franciscans. The Archbishop replied that the Holy See was most anxious that the German Franciscans should not be expelled from Palestine until steps could be taken to substitute other brothers in their place. He only asked this in respect of those German Franciscans who had not, by their conduct, invited suspicion or reproach. On being asked how soon it could be expected that these steps would be taken, his Grace said that it was a very difficult, as none were forthcoming at present and might not be for some time to come. Sir R. Graham replied that this fact did constitute a difficulty, as it was desired to expel the German Franciscans at an early date, but that his recommendations would be borne in mind.

* Also to Valeran, No. 38, and Washington, No. 135.

[1356]

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Archbishop Cerretti went on to say that he would like to state privately and confidentially that the Roman question would almost certainly be raised at the Peace Conference. It would not be brought forward by the Vatican, which held itself entirely aloof, but by some other Government or persons interested in its welfare, and he mentioned the Belgian Government as being a probable champion in the Holy See in this matter. He said that he believed that Mr. Balfour was fully informed on the question through Sir Eric Drummond and Sir William Tyrrell, and he trusted that when the moment came the British delegates would give their support to the Pope's desiderata. Sir R. Graham thanked him for his information and said that it would be interesting to have some knowledge of what these desiderata were. The Archbishop replied that all that the Pope asked for was 'an estate of an English lord,' a piece of territory, quite small, possibly not more than a few kilometres in extent, which his Holiness could regard as his own absolute property. The Archbishop thought that this was not much to ask and that it was a proposal which the British delegates would well support. He said that when some resolution in this sense had been reached there would be no healing of the breach between the Vatican and the Italian Government which was so detrimental to the interests of both, and to those of Italy also.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

(43332)

No. 29

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Paris, 19th March 1919.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the letter which you were so good as to address to me on the 18th inst. with regard to the proposed extension of the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway and the crossing of the railway at the point of the present to return a definite reply to your proposal of the 11th inst. on the subject.

2. The military authorities have been requested to obtain a telegraphic report on the position of the railway and with regard to the complaints made by the company and I trust to be in a position to reply to your Excellency's note at an early date.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

(46887)

No. 30

Memorandum by Earl Curzon.

A Note of Warning about the Middle East.

I WISH to express to my colleagues certain apprehensions which I cannot help entertaining about the progress of events in the Near and Middle East. They may turn out to be quite unfounded, but I think that as the situation is so uncertain, certain eventualities which, if they occur, will probably come as a great shock to all those in this and other countries who are preparing for the conclusion and celebration of a speedy and glorious peace.

I say nothing about the prospect of Germany signing the sort of Peace Treaty which it appears will be the result of the present situation. It is, in my opinion, to count implicitly upon her acceptance. The weakness of her Government, her menacing attitude on the Eastern frontier of Germany and in Poland, the growth of dissensions among the Allies in Paris, may all tempt her to risk refusal.

While, however, everyone is discussing the probable or possible attitude of Germany, no one appears to turn a thought to what may happen in Turkey. Ever since the conclusion of the armistice, it appears to have been taken for granted that Turkey, with our fleet at Constantinople, could be compelled to accept whatever terms we may dictate to her. I pleaded more than once at the time, but without success, that the terms of the armistice with Turkey should be made much more comprehensive and severe. They were not made so, and our position at Constantinople is such

rested more upon the calculating self-interest of the Turks on the one hand, and bluff on our part on the other, than it has done upon any confession of defeat on the part of the enemy, or convincing display of power by ourselves.

The end result of the present situation is a state of very imperfect peace, though disarmament is being slowly pursued. A Government is in power that alternately takes the Turkish claims in the near future. Meanwhile, the Committee of Union and Progress so far from being dissolved, is everywhere active in the background. It is still the dominant force in the greater part of the Turkish Empire. Enver is still a national hero. The forts of the Dardanelles have never been destroyed, only occupied by weak Allied forces.

Now, let us see what is happening in that world which is the political environment of the Turkish capital. Everywhere are manifest symptoms of Allied weakness or failure. The Bolsheviks have just turned the French and Greeks out of the Ukraine, and have nearly turned them out of Odessa. General Denikin, to whom we have widely advertised our assistance, is not doing particularly well on the Don and in the Caucasus. It is known that we are going to clear out of the Caucasus as soon as we can, leaving, I can assure my colleagues, a legacy of certain chaos and bloodshed behind us. We are already retiring from Transcaucasia. Our flag will presently cease to fly on the Caspian.

If they look to another part of the horizon, the Turks cannot fail to see with a chuckle of deep satisfaction that there is a serious and widespread revolt against the British in Egypt, and that the Turkish flag has actually been raised again in the Valley of the Nile. The fate of Palestine is not yet decided. The French and British are engaged in a bitter struggle in Syria. The fate of these regions, where an attempt ought to have been made to settle in the early days of the Conference, is once more to be postponed until a Commission has been sent out to examine and report. I need hardly point out what magnificent opportunities for intrigue this will present. Moreover, the Turkish Government will be able to play off the British on as to whether the Greeks and Italians are to be allowed into Asia Minor, and if so to what extent, and in what capacity.

The above is the picture upon which the Old Turk, who still hopes to re-establish the former régime, and the young Turk, who means to cheat us if he can of the spoils of victory, are both looking. Both are profoundly aware that they cannot escape the loss of Mesopotamia, of Arabia, and the Holy Places (although I am far from thinking that the new Arab State has any guarantees for stable existence), of Palestine, and in Europe of Eastern Thrace. But when they realise that they are to be deprived altogether of Armenia, that they are to be turned out of Constantinople and of Europe, and that even their reduced patrimony in Asia Minor and Anatolia is either to be parcelled out between enemies (Greeks, and Italy), whom they abhor, or is to be patronised by some foreign mandatory Power who will equally be anathema to them, I sometimes ask myself—what will they do? Will they once more bow to Kismet? Or will they think it worth while to strike another blow (even if it be a local and abortive blow) for Islam and the few remaining vestiges of their freedom?

I suggest to the military and naval authorities that they should not ignore these possibilities; and I pointed out to my colleagues, not as a prophecy but as a warning, that fresh trouble may even now be brewing in the East, which may disarrange some of our best-laid plans.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have seen an Admiralty telegram dated the 22nd March, from Admiral Calthorpe at Constantinople, which supplies a very significant confirmation of my argument. He strongly deprecates any reduction of British naval strength in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, on the very grounds which I have urged, viz.:

1. The failure of the French in the Ukraine and the Crimea.
2. The situation in the Caucasus.
3. The position at Smyrna.
4. The unrest in Egypt.

All these events cause him to fear that he may be unable to cope with any serious crisis that may arise.

Foreign Office, March 25, 1919.

C. or K.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 4)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, April 2, 1919.

THE French Ambassador commenced his conversation with me this afternoon by producing an extract from "The Times," summarising the contents of the proposed Aliens Bill of the Government, which appeared to indicate that the contemplated legislation was to apply to aliens of every nationality, including, of course, the French, for a period of two years after the war. Representations had, he said already, been made to him by the French Ambassador in London, who had expressed the greatest apprehension as to the restrictions to which they were to be submitted. The Bill, he presumed, was intended to be directed against enemy aliens but its terms suggested no distinction between them and the subjects of friendly Powers. Frenchmen in England had already during the war been subjected to many inconveniences and restraints, which they had borne without murmuring, but that these should be continued under the new conditions appeared to him to be very hard. He suggested that, in the case of Frenchmen of good standing and of well-ascertained probity in this country, a system of special permits might be devised in order to relieve them from the necessity of frequent reports, and he expressed a hope that the Bill, when it became law, would be administered in a liberal and equitable manner, as possible to the citizens of a great and friendly country like his own.

I listened to his Excellency's representations with much sympathy, and promised to communicate with the Home Office, who were responsible for the Bill, at once.

After a short interval, the Ambassador then passed on to speak at great length and with extreme gravity of the serious situation which had arisen from his correspondence, official and private, was developing in France with regard to the attitude taken up by the British Government, and, it was alleged, by the Prime Minister in particular, towards the aspirations of France. What was actually passing in the Council of Four he did not pretend accurately to know, but information reached him from his brother, and from persons even more highly placed, which caused him no small alarm. Indeed, he regarded the Council of Four as by no means an ideal tribunal for dealing with great questions of political and territorial readjustment, such as those which now confronted it. None of the statesmen concerned, not even M. Clemenceau, had had training in foreign affairs; and many of the suggestions that the Council had made, or was believed to have made—be it instanced the despatch of a wandering Commission to Asia Minor and Syria—seemed to him to have been conceived in ignorance of the facts.

When I asked him what were the grounds of his present apprehension, and what particular ill-feelings he thought our Prime Minister was in any way un sympathetic towards the claims of France—a charge for which, I said, I knew of no foundation whatever in his attitude or utterances as reported to me—his Excellency proceeded once again to state the claims of France as regards the two banks of the Rhine, the buffer State, and the Sarre coalfields. He urged that to his country, these were matters of life and death, that no one who had not shared the melancholy experience of France in the past could understand the way in which it impressed the national mind, and that any failure now to relieve his country of the perils by which it would continue to be threatened would produce a lasting soreness, to which he looked forward with the utmost alarm.

In reply, apart from my repudiation of what I truly believe to be a misjudgment on his part of the attitude of the British representatives in Paris, I urged the following considerations. I asked him to consider whether France, in her views about the Rhine frontier, was not a little too much affected by bygone memories. Was it likely that Germany, defeated, humiliated, and left with relatively inferior military forces, would once again make the great adventure that had so signally failed? Would not France, with Alsace-Lorraine in her secure possession, and with such arrangements made about the neutralisation of the Rhine territories as seemed to be not unlikely, be in a far better military position than she had ever before been? Was it not probable, and even certain, that the political and military ambitions of Germany, should they revive, would be directed to the East rather than to the West, and that the object of any future attack would not be her old enemy, but the congeries of small and feeble States whom we were trying to conjure into existence between Germany and Russia, but in whose continued

stability I personally did not feel any great confidence? Long before France had taken any part in the war, we were not all engaged in a war for the recovery or the security of Eastern Europe!

The Ambassador did not contest these generalisations, but quoted a recent published statement of Baron Kuhlmann, declaring that Germany would never give up the idea of revenge, that she was unchanged and unchangeable, and that whatever the lures of the East, she would never rest until she had attempted to win back what she had lost on the West. The interests not only of France, but of all the Allies, were involved in preventing such a consummation.

If these, I asked, were the convictions of the Ambassador about the future sentiments and action of Germany, would not France be creating a new Germania Irredenta if she insisted on having the coal fields of the Sarre and the creation of a buffer State on the left bank of the Rhine?

As regards the buffer State, he hoped that the arrangements to be made need not raise the ethical question in a serious form.

Not knowing the exact position which our Prime Minister is taking up in the Council of Four, I was not able to deal in more than a general way with the warnings and lamentations of M. Cambon; but I could not help recognising the truth in certain seriousness in which they were uttered. I had I promised them the respectful consideration of His Majesty's Government.

I then turned the conversation to the East, and alluded to the unfortunate position which had grown up in Constantinople, arising out of the differences between the French and British military and naval representatives. These difficulties, I said, assumed in the main two forms: those which came from the absence of any clear understanding as to the line of division between the British and French spheres of influence in the East, and those which arose from the fact that the British and French military and naval representatives in Constantinople were not in agreement as to the line of demarcation between the military zones for which the French and the British were responsible in Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia. As regards the former, I called the attention of the Ambassador to an article from a Constantinople correspondent of "The Times," of the 31st March, which described the ridiculous and almost ignominious position in Constantinople, over which the old Turk, with his pipe in his mouth, must be smiling inwardly and rubbing his hands. Only a little while ago, the British and French military and naval representatives in Constantinople were engaged in a series of conferences, and I said that I had now lying on my table equally long lists of cases of similar and much greater indiscretions charged against French officers of higher rank in Constantinople. I did not, however, wish to adopt the French plan of sending in a rather bitterly worded despatch with a long list of individual charges at its tail. Such a procedure—and here M. Cambon cordially agreed with me—did not make either for a speedy or an amicable settlement. I wanted an agreement as to spheres of action and responsibility concluded between the highest authorities, laid down on paper, and adhered to in future on both sides. The same condition applied to the division of military commands in Asia and Europe. The British believed that an agreement of this kind had been reached in Paris. The French seemed to dispute this. Why could not a definite decision be made? When these matters had become acute a few weeks ago, we had sent General Wilson to Paris with a view to settling them by personal interviews on the spot. He had seen M. Clemenceau, who had expressed the utmost willingness to get rid of such minor causes of friction, and we had been led to believe that a solution was in sight. So far from this being the case, no settlement had been arrived at. The cases of disagreement continued to multiply, and I even had before me papers which showed that the French were trying to take over the control of the medical schools in Constantinople. If, I said, the British had disinterested themselves from the future of Constantinople and had no desire to be responsible for the ultimate administration of that city, why on earth should our respective representatives fight each other? It was not until a final solution was arrived at. It merely bred ill feeling between the two nations, the very thing which, a few minutes earlier, in relation to the frontiers of France, the Ambassador had so earnestly deplored.

M. Cambon asked me if I had any proposal to make.

I replied that I should be prepared to authorise either General Wilson or some other representative to meet in Paris any officer or official deputed by the French

The Ambassador thought that by means of one of these suggestions, a settlement might be found and he undertook to submit them to the Government.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 32.

Done in Paris, 13^e 11 1819

Sir,

Signor Proximi was told that no information had reached His Majesty's Government as to any actual or possible action on the part of the Greeks. It was, indeed, thought that some such thing was taking place, and there was in consequence the possibility of giving the Greeks a just cause. If justice would, however, be made. At the same time, it was pointed out to Signor Proximi that the Italian landing at Adalia, in contravention of the various assurances they had given on the subject, was a step likely to provoke Greek suspicion and misgivings, and to induce the Greeks to take corresponding action elsewhere.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 33.

Paris (France) 1912

(Telegraphie.) En clair.

M. Pichon stresses that British flag of co-operation and he instructed to support his French ally with a view to realization of aims which French Government announced in 1918, that the number and importance of French interests at stake are well known to you. As it was Turkey, of whom Turkey is indebted, are the only country at stake in the world. M. Pichon further states that his note of 13th February last, summary of which was telegraphed to you in my telegram No. 821 of 13th February, drawing attention to unilateral nature of certain decisions carried out by British authorities, and suggesting, with view to ensure Allied co-ordination in Turkey from military, as well as political and economic point of view, the meeting at Paris of a Franco-British commission to settle questions arising out of armistice, has similarly remained without a reply.

M. Pichon adds that, in accordance with information which he has received, General Milne has on his own authority organised distinct zones of command in Anatolia, and seems to consider the whole of Turkey in Asia exclusively reserved to British action. The command of the Allied forces in the East belonging to General French. On 22 February, 1918, the British Government considered that no modification in that situation can be made except by agreement between two Governments, whereas measures taken by General Milne are not the result of any agreement and French Government cannot admit the view which the British military authorities have endeavoured to impose.

(Copy sent to peace delegation)

1

(No. 458, Very Confidential)

Constantinople, April 3, 1919

There were two sets of questions which His Imperial Majesty had been considering, viz. the external and internal situations of Turkey.

4. His father, the Sultan Abdul Medjid, had brought him up to consider England English as his friends, and experience and observation had confirmed him in it.

5. As this was in great part a repetition of what His Highness had said on the previous occasion, I pressed him to be more precise and to indicate exactly what it was that the Sultan and he desired that His Majesty's Government should in a practical way do, for it was clear that he had some such object.

6 He replied that together with His Sovereign he had in fact worked out a scheme which he desired I would submit to you. Every other creed and party had been allowed to present an expression of their desires, and whilst the Turkish Government was debarred from sending delegates to Paris, it seemed at least only

just that the Sultan himself should also present to you his views, though in a strictly confidential way.

I said that in doing so in this way a different course would be followed from that adopted by the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Reshid Pasha, who had handed me a statement of the Turkish case for presentation to the Peace Conference; and while I was ready to forward to you any proposal in the manner he desired, he must quite clearly understand, firstly, that it could not have at all the same weight as a proposal openly laid before the Conference; secondly, that just as we had made peace with our Allies, so we would make peace, also, conjointly with them; but I would not encourage him to believe that any decision as regards the Turkish Empire had already been taken, or that even not an unshakable intention had already been formed.

8. Ferid Pasha said that whilst Great Britain had certainly made war conjointly with her Allies, yet Turkey had only fought with England and only recognised at her hands, and it was intolerably hard and bitter to be placed in subordination to others than the acknowledged victors. But he fully appreciated the bearing of my words, and, nevertheless, would submit through me his views.

9. He drew from his pocket a paper which he said was a hasty translation of a Turkish draft prepared by the Sultan and himself, and I have the honour to enclose a paper herewith. He said, before handing it to me, that I should not be with the first part though I should be with the end; but it presented the best possible solution, which could be as well as for Great Britain, whether as a Great Muslim Power or as a great material interest. He himself was an enticer in civilisation, but there was the Oriental civilisation as well as he was equally painted with that.

10. I ventured to think that Great Britain might commit a great error were she to allow her Allies into taking any action which would create an impassable barrier between the two. The dissolution of the Turkish Empire was not quite comparable to the effects that might be produced by the disappearance of the Monarchy or of the Austrian Empire, for a great religious issue was involved as well as more than a great temporal stake.

11. Speaking again for the Sultan as Caliph and for himself as the representative of the Turkish people, he reaffirmed the submission of Turkey to England and supported British action in return have every support of the Turkish people.

12. I went on to report his words to you, Sir, which I did in accordance with the terms of your telegram No. 443 of the 11th March. I stated once more the same time I could hold out no sort of hope to him, that the fate of Turkey had been decided by the action of the Committee of Union and Progress, and that I was certain that His Majesty's Government would do nothing save in conformity and consultation with their Allies. This concluded a somewhat lengthy interview.

13. I desire to offer a few observations upon it as well as upon the document which I am forwarding to you.

14. I have no doubt of the sincerity of Ferid Pasha, and little, if any, of the Sultan, whom, however, I have never seen, but I believe the Grand Vizier reflects him very accurately. I feel certain that no similar advances have been or will be made to either of my colleagues, for it is not to the French or the Italians that Turkey has looked for aid in the past, almost as a matter of tradition; but such evidence that the desire for British help and guidance is widely spread throughout the country as a whole, and not only among the Turks. This feeling, I should add, has been considerably encouraged in any place where the British soldier happens to be stationed, as his conduct almost invariably produces a most favourable impression upon those among whom he lives, especially when it is compared with the conduct of other foreign troops.

15. It cannot but be of real public utility that such impression should exist, and the Turks cannot fail to remain as a factor, and a very important one, which has to be reckoned with.

16. But despite this fact I cannot help thinking that our first duty—whatever our duty may be—lies towards the subject Christian races of this country whose cruel treatment must never be forgotten and cannot be condoned. Punishment absolutely must be inflicted on the Turks as a people, and upon individuals as examples.

The first will be achieved by the diminution of their empire; the second by the verdicts of the tribunal to be set up, as I understand, by the Peace Conference, to try those persons now almost daily being arrested.

17. But it is as useless an endeavour to reach all the guilty as it is, in a general way, to be vindictive, and it appears to me that once the two aims above mentioned have been achieved—and almost even sooner—it behoves us to look to the future rather than to the past, and to consider what régime is most likely to grant some tranquillity, some breathing space, not only to the Christians but also to the sorely pressed Muslims of this unfortunate empire.

18. It is our earnest hope in this High Commission that the rumours which reach us of an independent Armenia may be true, and that such a State will be established, once that is done I think every effort should be made to induce all Armenians to such territory as may be left to the Turks, and to seek new and safe homes in their own new country.

19. No less earnest is my hope, which I am venturing to express to you by telegraph, that the Hellenic Kingdom will not spread itself to the eastern shores of the Aegean; not because I have not the warmest sympathy with their aspirations for liberation from the tyranny of the past, but because I do not believe that this action would advance either the prosperity or the happiness of any of the parties concerned, but quite the reverse.

20. In a recent despatch you, Sir, concurred with an opinion expressed by the War Office that Mussulman Mahajirs in Christian houses should not be forced to leave in favour of their previous proprietors until some sort of provision had been made for the Moslems. This is the principle upon which I believe it is in the endeavour to settle the problem set before us in Asia Minor.

What seeking to be just to the Christian, it is most necessary not to be just to the Moslem, and, further, to do this would be most unwise. As Ferid Pasha has said, the borderland between East and West, and I can conceive no more important for us to define, so far as possible, on racial grounds, for it is obvious that there is no country, not excluding the Ottoman Empire, which has an interest even comparable to that of His Majesty's Government on the Eastern side of the line.

22. In fact I find it very hard to believe that the true natural Western limits of the Indian Empire are not now the Eastern shores of the Aegean. It is equally hard to believe that the methods which were so successfully employed to control the savage tribes of Central Asia cannot be used with like success towards the Ottoman Empire.

The memorandum which the Grand Vizier left with me deals first of all with the Holy Places, and it is evident from this and from other statements I have laid before you that the Sultan attaches more importance to his title as Caliph and Haram-ul-Haramum than to anything else. To comment on this matter in any way is beyond my province, but it is my duty to point out its weight. The great traditions that have given majesty to the Sultan of Turkey and to the Caliphs of Islam are certainly not yet extinct, any more than are their connections with the clerical families or with other great Arab chiefs, just as we shall have to live along with 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 of Turks, so shall we also have to live with the moral and religious influences which are concentrated in their Sovereign; and whilst on the one hand it appears to me a mistake to exaggerate the spiritual power of the Caliphate, so it is no less a mistake to underestimate the potential dangers of Pan-Islamism, and I suggest that it is as important to have a friendly and dependent Sultan in the north, as it is to have a King of like disposition in the south, of Western Asia.

It appears to be room for anxiety lest the Turks, not being represented at the Peace Conference, should be ignored and treated as a negligible quantity. This they certainly are not, and if the principle of self-determination is too entirely set aside in their case, there can be no lasting peace in the Near East, and as pointed out in my telegram No. 589 of this day's date, it seems only too probable that the task of quelling a sanguinary war and of re-establishing order will devolve as usual on Great Britain.

I have, &c.
(For the High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB.

Memorandum.

Asie

PAYS de la langue turque, ainsi que les provinces se trouvant entre l'Anatolie et l'Arabie. Les pays de la langue arabe auront la plus large autonomie.

Le Hedjaz sera octroyé héréditairement à la famille d'Aou (famille actuelle). Indépendance absolue dans les affaires intérieures, mais un agent politique sera placé à côté de l'Emir (Prince) pour assurer l'harmonie de sa politique extérieure avec celle de l'Empire. L'agent ottoman aura à sa disposition un bataillon de 100 hommes. A Médine il y aura une garnison turque avec un général—symbole de l'unité religieuse.

Les pays gouvernés par Imam Yahia et Idris (Yémen) statu quo ante.

Les pays gouvernés par le Sultan de Zanzibar, Oman, restent sous son autorité.

Dans tous ces pays le droit de frapper la monnaie appartiendra au Sultan; c'est au nom du Khalif qu'on fera la prière de vendredi (Hutbe), le drapeau ottoman flottera partout.

L'Angleterre occupera en Europe et en Asie pendant quinze ans, soit dans les provinces directement soumises à la souveraineté du Sultan, soit dans celles jouissant d'une certaine autonomie, les points qu'elle croira nécessaires, en vue d'assurer l'indépendance de la Turquie, et d'assurer la tranquillité de l'intérieur.

La Turquie sera une République indépendante ou autonome, selon le désir de ses habitants.

En Europe.

La Turquie sera limitée par la mer Noire, le Bosphore, le Danube, et la mer Egée, débouchant les frontières de l'Europe. C'est la frontière naturelle du vilayet d'Andrinople que ces limites définissent, entourant comme les murs d'une propriété l'Etat.

Les Détroits.

Dans les deux détroits de la mer Noire et des Dardanelles toutes les fortifications seront rasées, et ils seront occupés par l'Armée.

Interne.

L'Angleterre, par un sentiment d'amitié, voudra bien consentir à la nomination par le Sultan des Sous-Secrétaires d'Etat anglais dans les Ministères ottomans, où leur présence est nécessaire.

De plus, il sera nommé dans chaque vilayet un consul général anglais qui remplira les fonctions de représentant.

Les élections municipales aux conseils provinciaux et au Parlement se feront sous le contrôle des consuls anglais.

L'Angleterre aura le droit d'établir un contrôle sur les finances, soit à la capitale, soit en province.

La Constitution sera simplifiée conformément à l'aptitude et à la capacité politique des peuples de l'Orient. A ce sujet j'avais présenté au Sénat un rapport, il y a dix ans (le 15 février 1909).

Les Chambres seront appelées à voter le budget et à faire connaître au Gouvernement central les besoins locaux. Le Sultan sera absolument libre de diriger la politique extérieure de l'Empire.

[50899]

No. 35.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 17, 1919.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit herewith in original for early return a report from Captain Lee-Warner on his recent visit to the Hadramaut.

While realising that Kathiri emigration to the Dutch East Indies and the Malay Peninsula places the connection between the Hadramaut and the outside world on a different footing from that of other parts of Arabia proper, Lord Curzon is of opinion that the position in this part of Arabia is analogous to that in other areas where His Majesty's Government wish to exercise influence over the actions of hinterland tribes without the reach of their direct control.

His Lordship proposes to instruct Sir Edmund Allenby to put forward a suggestion after consulting the Political Resident at Aden, on the lines that pressure should if possible be brought to bear upon the Kathiri through the Sultan without our necessarily interfering in the relations between the Kathiris and the Ghautis. He considers that Captain Lee-Warner's suggestion, that some effort should be made to encourage the two rival factions to come to a more satisfactory arrangement, is in line with the policy of non-interference which has been followed by His Majesty's Government, but at the same time he considers it inadvisable for us to enter into direct relations with hinterland rulers so long as the desired result can be obtained by working through the ruler of the coastal area.

As Mr Secretary Montagu is doubtless aware, the contentment of the Kathiris is a matter of some concern to His Majesty's Government, in view of the powerful influence exercised by Kathiri immigrants over the Moslem population of the Dutch East Indies and the Malay Peninsula.

Lord Curzon considers it highly desirable, subject to the consent of the Colonial Office, that the existing embargoes on money remittances at Singapore and Aden should be removed as soon as possible, and that the Netherlands Government should be approached with a view to inducing them to reconsider their decision to stop immigration.

But before either of these steps can well be taken, it appears necessary that the internal politics of the Hadramaut should be placed on a more satisfactory footing, and his Lordship would be glad of Mr Montagu's opinion on the instructions which the proposed to send to Sir Edmund Allenby.

I am, &c.
G. SPICER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35

Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden

Secret.)
Sir,

Aden, March 3, 1919

I HAVE the honour to report that I reached Makalla on the 13th January, 1919, where I presented to His Highness the Sultan the photograph of Makalla and the specimen box of oils sent by His Excellency Sir Reginald Wingate from Cairo. I was received with both the presents, and has, I understand, written to his Excellency a letter of appreciation.

1. On the 16th I had a long interview with Sultan Ghaleb, in the course of which I handed to him your letter. I informed him of the general position as regards the war, as regards Ali Said Pasha's surrender, and of the despatch of the Turkish prisoners from Aden to Egypt. His Highness evinced much curiosity about Hadramah, the Yemen, and Imam Yahya.

2. We then turned to the more special objects of my visit. I explained the position of the Hadramaut Arabs in Java and Singapore, the folly of some of their number in meddling with Dutch colonial politics; and the dangers of restrictions on

their further emigration. I referred to Sarikat Islam, and pointed out that the majority of its Arab supporters were Kathiris.

5. I told His Highness of my desire to proceed inland in the hope of influencing Kathiris in the required direction, and I informed him that such a journey could only be made with his "approval," and not merely with his "concurrence" (vide your instructions to me).

6. His Highness immediately concurred with the proposal for the journey, he held that it might serve a most useful purpose; and he sent a messenger to his Wazir, Syed Hussein bin Hamid al-Minhar, at Wadi Doan.

7. I then wrote a reply, suggesting that as influenza had been rampant in the Wadi I might prefer to meet the Wazir at Shibam.

8. I deemed it better, however, not to cause the Syed the trouble of this journey, and accordingly I proceeded (as soon as the necessary camels and escort had been obtained) to Wadi Doan, where I was hospitably received. As a result of our visit we were able to discuss the Kathiri question from both sides.

9. Subsequently, accompanied by his son Syed Abubakar, I went on to Shibam, and was able to meet the Kathiri Sultana, on the 8th February, just beyond that village called Hazm, a neutral Syed village, although situated in Kathiri territory.

10. I then proceeded to Sayyun, and with a few days' journey reached the environs of Terim in 1874. I was then informed that not only the Wazir of the Kathiris but also the Kathiri Sultana looked on a visit to these centres at the present time as injudicious; not merely were the Hummus, the ancient allies of the Kathiris, in a ferment, but disease was rampant in Sayyun. Your orders on the point were also explicit, and I accordingly returned by my former route, reaching Makalla via Qatan, Hawrah, Hajarain, Sif, Kowarah, and Wadi Humman on the 22nd February, 1919.

11. The accompanying report gives particulars on various points, but I would here state one or two items.

(a.) The Wadi Humman route by which I travelled had not been covered by either the Honta or by Leo Hirsch, and by using this route I was enabled to enter Wadi Doan at its very beginning. It has thus been possible to present a full sketch map of this valley, which in the present political condition of the country has become the main Kathiri line of communication. Some additions and corrections to route 67 ("Handbook of Arabia," vol. II) have also thus been obtained.

(b.) The presence of a British officer who could speak Malay was suggested by the common people, many of whom have been in Batavia. As no such man was to be found in the Malay Peninsula, I was obliged to employ a few Europeans at various places for fourteen, and in others for seven, months, and as the entire cultivation of Wadi Doan, Wadi al-Amar, and the other southern wadis relies on an annual "mel" (or spate caused by upland rain rushing into the wadis) it was a matter of considerable good fortune to my journey that on arrival at Kowarah clouds began to collect while rain overtook us at Hajarain, and on my arrival at Shibam the "mel" was in Wadi Doan, El Amar, Arud, and Aid. On my return to Doan planting was nearly completed all along the valley.

(c.) While the Sultan in Makalla and his Wazir in Wadi Doan not only did not object to my visit, but were most friendly, the Kathiris, the leading persons in Shibam, especially the Governor, Sheikh Abdulkarim, were clearly not only incensed at any attempt to give friendly advice to the Kathiris, but they also somewhat resented the presence of a European in their town. The reasons for this attitude are more fully set out in the accompanying report.

12. On my return to Makalla I visited Siyid al-Hajj, the owner of the famous "humus" tobacco cultivation, the purchase of which brings in an annual sum of 10,000 riyals.

13. On the 26th February native dances were held before several hundreds of people in Makalla, while on the 28th athletic sports, including foot races, jumping, tug-of-war, sack races, &c., were held outside the western gate. Over 1,000 spectators were enthusiastic over the display.

14. I left Makalla in H.M.S. "Diana" on the 2nd March and arrived in Aden on the 3rd March, 1919.

15. In a separate letter—which is of interest only to the authorities in Egypt and Aden—I have set out the results of my visit to the Kathiris in the S. Arabian Gulf.

I have, &c.

W. H. LEE WARNER

Enclosure in No. 35

Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent Visit to the Hadhramaut

Preliminary Quotations from an Expert

Hadhramaut is practically a closed country. It is for us to initiate and develop its resources.

Introduction.

THE visit to Makalla and the journey to Wadi Doan and Shibam were undertaken partly with the object of reporting to the Foreign Office the conditions of the Kathiri and Kathiri country, with especial reference to the question of the Kathiri administration and

influence of which is jeopardised by the Dutch Colonial Government's avowed intention of annexing the country. The Dutch East India Company, of whom the Kathiris are the mainstay, the matter of continued and free emigration is vital to the Kathiris.

The policy of the Foreign Office as regards the Dutch East India Company was directed in 1918 to a systematic effort to attract the Arabs, the intellectual leaders of the wave of the rising millions of Java's Muslims. These Arabs were at the time to British and

Unfortunately, while the Dutch Government attended the effort to win over this Arab opinion to the British side, an extreme sect is, mainly located in Sourabaya, under German pressure, mixed in the more seditions part of the great society called

aimed to classify all the Arabs as untrustworthy.

of warning the Kathiris of the danger that I visited the Wadi

in Wadi Doan I was approached on more than one occasion by Arabs who were now being refused by the Dutch authorities.

Examples increased as Kathiri territory was approached, and I was glad to see that at the interview which I was able to have with the Kathiri Sultana a large number of Kathiris was present, and overheard the whole of the address which I gave

The Sultana appeared struck by the danger and promised to write to the leading Kathiris all over Java and warn them not to meddle with Dutch colonial politics.

I went to Hadhramaut with a strong inclination towards the Kathiris as the rightful owners of the soil, as a valiant and independent people, if anything rather harshly treated.

I left the Hadhramaut a convinced and confirmed supporter of the Kathiris, as the only hope for a future happy, contented country.

of extortion and robbery, their leading Sultans and Sheikhs are openly hostile to them, and it is not too much to state that the Kathiris are free from the presence of the Kathiri royal family.

In spite of the Shibam authorities, I was able to meet various persons who spoke Malay, and thus I was in a position to know the exact meaning, of which those who knew Arab only were unaware.

Unless the Kathiri Government gives stronger proof of its ability to carry out the

impossible for His Majesty's consular officers in Java to champion the cause of the Kathiris with any honesty. And lack of such help will mean restriction on emigration

at the consequent alienation from the British of the Arabs in Java and Singapore, with a corresponding hatred of the British in Kathiri territory.

Hence my suggestions, as set out in the paragraph headed "The future," in connection with which the three short quotations which commence this report cannot be too closely borne in mind.

While in Shibam I was struck by the absence of friendliness to my visit, a point which I was naturally desirous of elucidating, all the more so as from the moment I entered this territory I was met by a K. . . . y, if, luckily, not wholly effectually . . . my information being gained by me. I feel measurably confident that three reasons existed for this attitude—

There is a strong, in fact, an entirely predominant—commercial element in Shibam, consisting mainly of Sjecha and of several Dyeda, who compose the trading portion of the population.

It is an undeniable fact that the Turkish forces received considerable supplies from the regions east of Lahaj.

It is indisputable that Makalla is the chief port, in fact, the only considerable port east of Aden.

Makalla has other sources of import than Aden, i.e., Bombay, Oman, &c.

It is, I believe, overwhelmingly evident that the supplies in question must have originally entered south-west Arabia either at Shihir or Makalla, both ports under Kathiri rule.

I am convinced—

(a.) That supplies reached the Turks which entered south-east Arabia either at . . . or Makalla.

(b.) That these supplies could not have travelled west along the coast route for (1) the use of such a route would indubitably have been reported to Aden. (2) His Highness Sultan Ghaleb of Makalla would equally indubitably have heard of any efforts to use such a route, and would at once have cut short such methods, for (i) his alertness is considerable; (ii) the only western coast route from Shihir and Makalla runs through his western gate within 10 yards of his residence; and (iii) his entire loyalty to His Majesty's Government is a matter for which I can unhesitatingly and absolutely vouch.

(c.) That these supplies were carried northward ostensibly for the Shibam, and . . . for the eastern Wadi Hadhramaut trade (Soyyun Teris Terim, &c.).

That once in Shibam they were despatched along Wadi Hadhramaut westward . . . tribes exist along this route), until by a . . .

Shibam is extremely prosperous. The description later in this report of the town . . . obtain (and forward) considerable supplies inland. Not one merchant was permitted to come and speak with me alone, and not one word of the information . . . directly from this town.

And the main opponents to my obtaining any information were Sjech Abdolkadir (Governor of Shibam) and a Malay-speaking Sjech, Abubakar bin Mohamed Attawi, whose original fortune was and is being made at Singapore, and who, while professing delight at meeting me, dogged my every movement, and more than once managed to prevent a conversation which he saw I was about to commence.

An Arab trader with marvellable commodities of which he holds the monopoly will not let slip a unique opportunity for unusually large profits. Nor if, as in this case it is essential to hide his actions, will he hesitate to put every conceivable obstacle in an investigator's path.

Many of these merchants, from a second (an additional) point of view desired to conceal their present prosperity. I found that they wished to keep up the fiction that by restricting free and unalimited export of commodities from Aden during the war the British Government had seriously injured their trade, and hence that "unjust" such as the war tax, which many of them were having to pay in . . . doubly hard.

Shibam has always—with other towns of Wadi Hadhramaut proper—boasted that it has kept free from any contamination engendered by the presence of . . .

"unbeliever." This somewhat fanatic pride has been strengthened by the fact that Hirsch and the Benta (the former a fluent Arabic scholar, travelling in Arab guise, and posing more as a Moslem than a Christian) have been the only Europeans known to have entered Shibam, and that as long ago as 18 . . .

4. Finally, both the Governor and others considered any attempt at giving to the K. . . .

M. . . . in families, are inserted on purpose to furnish a basis of information for His Britannic Majesty's Consulate-General in Java, for which in so many ways this report is mainly intended.

The
K.
The future—

(a.) Aden, Makalla, Hadhramaut,

(b.) Action in Java

1. Wadi Duan, importance, inhabitants, &c.

2. Kathiri military resources and garrisons.

3.

4. Makalla to Wadi Duan (and on to S. . . .)

5. and ruins in Wadi Duan

6. Corrigenda and addenda for "Handbook of Arabia."

A. Sketch map of Hadhramaut (main towns and wadis,

B. Tribal sketch map of Hadhramaut

C. Sketch map of Wadi Duan (to Shibam)

SECTION I.—KATHIRI PERSONALITIES—GOVERNMENT—TAXATION, &c.

Sultan Sir Ghaleb bin-Awadh bin-Ghaleb bin-K.
Shihir. He has a son, Sultan Saleh bin-Ghaleb, who in turn has an infant son.

Both the Sultan and his son are warmly Anglophile—they are closely connected with Hyderabad, where, indeed, Sultan Saleh lives. Sultan Saleh speaks English, and Sultan Ghaleb has a small knowledge of this language.

There were three brothers, Sultan Omar, Hussein, and Manasar-al-Kasbi. With Sultan Ghaleb quarrelled. Previously Sultan Manasar (now deceased) ruled Ghali and Sultan Hussein Shihir, until the present ruler expelled them from the country. With his remaining brother, Sultan Omar bin-Awadh, Sultan Ghaleb appears

for comparatively y four or five years, and it is he who is in bidding the just inside the east gate of Makalla town.

There are some thirty-five members of the Kasbi family in Hyderabad, but the succession to the Makalla and Shihir Sultanate is vested in and confined to the direct blood Sultan Ghaleb is by no means an

ruler. He is far-sighted, and fully alive to the possibilities of agriculture.

But he sees that the first need is the final settlement of the Kathiri

He is very popular with all his subjects.

Syed Hussein bin Hamid bin-Abd al-Muhdar. For the past fifteen years

W. The virtual ruler of the country, although recently the troubles with the

H. Hamudis have called for his presence, over considerable intervals of time,

W. time and Shihir. A diplomat of much dexterity, who has, mainly by

and private wire pulling, seduced from the Kathiri allegiance many

More important successes have been the gaining over of the

the powerful and numerous Manbil, and the importantly situated Tunimi

interests. The tribal sketch map—(B) attached—shows the extent of his diplomatic

as a result of the "treaty" of 1918 between Sultan Ghaleb and the K.

whose crushing disaster is described elsewhere in this report.

The "treaty," however, is otherwise of no practical political use. It possesses no

sufficient guarantees, and from a perusal of the attached subheadings, "Kathiri

Personalities, &c.," and "The Future," it will be seen that what is needed is a much more efficient internal Government. Otherwise K... cannot be guarded against, and the main object of the treaty policy... Hadhramaut, wherein the magnificent agricultural possibilities of the entire main "Wadi Hadhramaut" can be adequately and uniformly utilized... peoples, remains unguaranteed in toto. I... to invite a reasoned consideration of this state.

Syeed Abdulkadir-bin-Syeed A... Yafa... made his fortune in the Straits and Java... the major part... and retired with the remainder to Shibam... fifteen... of the town, under the title of Moquddam, about eight...

man and a bitter enemy... the Kathiri... who—although... he has left... matters... He openly detests... of his... dependable, if harsh, ruler in his own sphere... Wazir and good-humouredly somewhat... in which he has no... Anglized... quite unscrupulous... money, provided that

Governor of Haurah Qatan (and Shibam)... Sultan Ghaleb, lives in Qatan, with nominal... over Shibam. His father, Sultan Salih, brother of Sultan Awam and previously held this post. Sultan Ali is a young man of 20 years of age, extremely prepossessing (although he has never travelled overseas), quiet, and respected. His power, however, is entirely under the dominance of the Wazir immediately, of the real Governor of Kaati Wadi Hadhramaut, Syech Shibam.

The "Governors" of Makalla (Syed Abdulrahman-bin-Hamid, brother of the Wazir of Muhr (Nasser Ahmad) are figureheads, the one a Syed and the other of the soldier (Askar) class, totally subservient to Wazir Syed Hussein.

Finally, mention should be made of Omar-bi-Ahmed (Hassarah), paramount chief of the great Saitan tribe, and adjudicator in all Amiri disputes: a Bedouin, whose chief village is Qurrah. Details about this man will be found in the... "Wadi Doan," but he is not mentioned because he is the greatest Bedouin chief in Kaati territory and because his influence, which is great, is entirely on the Kaati and British side.

...ry to detail the various merchant... of Makalla, they are

A few authorities mention, however, must be made... traders in Shibam—

Syeed Abdulkadir-bin-Syeed...

Syeed Mohammed bin Abdullah-bin-Jafar-al-Habshi, connected with...

Salim bin Umar bin-Darq, connected with Makalla and Aden.

Awad-bin-Abdullah bin-Darq, connected with Makalla and Aden.

Mohammed bin Hussein-bin-Mohammed-bin-Gharb, connected with...

Awadh bin-Abdullah-bin-Swaidan, connected with Singapore.

Madullah bin Bakar bin A...

Al bin-Mohammed bin A...

Mohammed bin-Awadh bin-Darq, connected with Java; and

Omar bin-Mohammed bin-Yusuf, connected with Java.

And of the great Syed families:

Al-Mohar from Wadi Doan, Koweirah.

Al-Attas, mainly from Doan (Mestred), also Seetab (near Haurah).

Al-Iddas partly from neighbourhood of Shibam (Haurah and Haurah).

The Sultan (1919) obtains revenue amounting to 340,000 Maria Theresa dollars.

...report duties... Makalla are farmed by public auction... and Joomahyoo Lajoo held these duties as their monopoly.

They pay... sum of 160,000 dollars. In return, they may charge a per cent. ad valorem export and import duty on all articles, foods, &c., leaving or entering Makalla. The exceptions are dates and twigs, which pay 5 per cent.

(b) Similar duties for Shibeir and Shuhr are farmed by Syech Abdulkadir Hasharheel (combined at Shuhr (Ghail) with Abu Sabar).

(c) For general articles, as above, they pay a sum of 75,000 dollars, while in... the sole right to be purchasers and exporters of the Ghail... Wazir tobacco crop they pay a sum of 105,000 dollars.

Import and export from other points are forbidden, and it seems that the method of farming is on the whole satisfactory, as it is stated that no trouble occurs over the effect of the 5 per cent. and 15 per cent. duties.

The townspeople incur no other taxation, beyond the payment of the above duties. Landowners pay no land tax to the Government. A tax of 1/2 dollar per date tree to Government is paid.

(Inland, &c., in Wadi Doan, the rate would seem to be 1 dollar only paid to the tribal chief.)

Note 1.—Kathiri merchants buying for Terun, Seyyem, Ghurfi, Teria, &c., from... Shibam, pay to Syech Abdulkadir, the Kaati Governor, "Ashur," 1 rupee.

Comparison with the Kathiri "taxation," as set out in the next... Kathiri personalities, &c.," will show in what fortunate circumstances the... trials have.

The Sultan frequently has to supplement this revenue by payments made... fortune, for this purpose he draws money from Hyderabad.

The general line of administration is exceedingly benevolent. Taxation is limited to payment of import and export duties. In the towns (e.g., Makalla) a complete civil and criminal jurisdiction exists. Thus in Makalla the Mufti (Syech Abdulkadir bin-Syech) with his Kazi (Syech Abdullateh bin-Ahmed Attawi) deals with civil, religious, and most of the criminal cases. The police under the "Sawash" an had an named Nasser, look adequately after internal order.

SUPPLY

Fish and vegetable markets are held in the open space by the landing stage of... along the central street.

Water is plentiful being supplied by... pipes from an inland spring, and is well... and mutton is ridiculously small.

...be made to Sultan Ghaleb's activity in the spheres of agriculture.

...is well aware of... facilities existing in various localities such as Wadi Hadhramaut, Maifa, &c., for extensive and extended cultivation, and on some of these points a special... has been addressed to the result.

At Ghail bin-Wazir and in the line of villages El Gara, Wadi bin-Baker, El Habyar, &c., running east-south-east, thence towards Shuhr, is cultivated the famous "Hannan" tobacco, the necessary water coming from five deep grottoes whence exceedingly well-traced but very deeply cut water-channels lead the supply to the...

...105,000 dollars annually for the purchase of... fertility of this spot may be gauged. The... should not be established at other places.

In Wadi Hadhramaut exists an immense area of potential cultivation... largely exploited. Wadi Hadhramaut (upper reaches), Wadi Hunan...

...Wadi And, Wadi Am, Wadi el-Ansar, and Wadi Doan (to mention the... experience on an average at least one annual "se" or spate. The

waters left over from these "se" merge underground as they reach Wadi Hadhramaut and there can be but little doubt that with properly dug wells worked by proper water-lifting engines a complete water supply to enable practically the whole Wadi to be cultivated would be practicable.

The same at all are.

- (a.) A guaranteed treaty with the Kathiri, or a final solution of the Kathiri question whereby not only lasting peace is assured for the Wadi, but also participation by the Kathiri Government in a Kaati scheme for irrigation, and for the road communications which Sultan Ghulib has in mind.
- (b.) The seconding of a capable European engineer and of an agricultural expert to examine and report on the whole position. Were his report favourable it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this potential granary and date supply.

In road-making His Highness has already completed the following:

1. A well-traced carriage road from Mukalla to Harshiyat, 8 miles.
2. A well-traced road with culverts where necessary, west from Mukalla, past Bas Mukalla, and thence, skirting sea, for 10 miles, thence on the firm beach transport is easy for 10 miles to Sumar, whence a practicable road runs 9 miles north to Ghaf Bi Wazir the last 4 miles being a

His Highness contemplates in due course a road from Mount Hozarah to

sketch map (B) in an interests it is to be earnestly hoped that Kaati influence will shortly embrace the whole of Wadi Hadhramaut.

Section 2.—KATHIRI PERSONALITIES—GOVERNMENT—TAXATION

Sultans	Sultan Mansur bin-Ghalib bin-Muhammad
	Sultan Mahmud bin-Salim al-Kathiri

Salim bin Ahmad governs Terim. Terim is the property of Sultan Mansur; Seyyun that of Sultan Mahmud. But for many years both Sultans have been absent visiting Terim at intervals.

Of the two Sultans Sultan Mansur, who suffers from a chronic native, and it is his brother Sultan Mahmud who is the vigorous intellect. Salim bin-Ahmad is Mahmud's evil genius. Sultan Mansur is afraid of his brother, whose harsh face and somewhat sinister appearance denote a virile intellect. At least Terim some twenty years ago in preference for Seyyun, owing to friction with the Syeds. In his day they have their most open and, most probably, their only capable opponent.

Salim bin Ahmad occupies position among the F. held by Syed Hossain, the Sultan of Mukalla's Wadi, unscrupulous and harsh ruler.

There appears to be but one system among the Kathiri from all the Syeds, with a few notable exceptions.

At Seyyun, it is stated, there are some thirty persons of whom the most are Abdulrahman bin-Abdullah bin Mahmud Almagoff, sometimes called Obaidullah bin Mahmud, and Syed Mahmud bin-Abdullah Almagoff who were other functionaries exempt from taxation of any kind.

The above excepted, every well-to-do Syed and Sjech (i.e., the vast majority of the nobles of Seyyun, Terim, Guria, and Ilat, whose ancestors centuries had, like themselves, regularly emigrated, mainly to Java traded and made money) is liable to domiciliary visits and exacting oppression of this type, mainly on the part of Sultan Mahmud and his sons. This has led to a deep feeling of hatred for the two Sultans and their stated that whenever a Syed or Sjech returns from Java he is expected

* Sultan Mansur's children give evidence of promise. This is not the case with them.

but some payment to the "Government." In the case of rich men this may run to a thousand dollars or more. Nor is this all: his house is liable to search, and any jewellery or valuable commodity may be taken away. Syed Mahomed Ali Ahmad Aided for example, has over 10,000 dollars in the last twenty years, and the rich house of Alkaff must have been a rich man be about to marry. On occasion is taken for further extortion, and if the plain hint is ignored a domestic visit from Salim's "Abid" (or slave-soldiers) results.

On the other hand the Sultans (possibly from policy, probably also from inability) make no calls on the Bedouins of the Hadhramaut. So long as these latter observe peace when in the main wadi they are free to follow their inclinations.

Thus against the solid bulk of the industries and well-to-do Kathiri population (the townspeople of the four main towns above mentioned) are ranged the Sultans with their slave soldiers (who may perhaps number a thousand) and the unstable Bedouins, who receive dolars when they come down to visit their nominal rulers.

Of the educated classes, with a few exceptions, it is reported to be disgusted with the principles of the present Kathiri regime, and who it may be too

to be welcomed by the vast majority of the Kathiris, who are welcomed by many and

to the Kaati, and to British influence are—

- In Seyyun neighbourhood, the Aidat family (connected with Singapore), Salim bin-Khalid, Omar bin-Awadh bin-Shamman, Abdul Karim bin-Karim.
- In Terim and neighbourhood, Syed Hussein bin-Abdullah al-Idroos, Omar bin-Awadh Shatri, Syed Abdulah bin-Awadh Shatri, the Al Djofri family connected with Singapore, Java,

the leading Kathiris who are pro-British, and who are the following Terim inhabitants

- The Alkaffs: Syed Abdulrahman bin-Sjech Alkaff (connections in Singapore and Batavia), Syed Abdulrahman bin-Abdullah Alkaff (relative of late Syed Sjech Alkaff).
- The Al Junaid: Syed Abdulrahman bin-Ah al-Junaid (Singapore connections), Syed Alwan bin-Sagoff al-Junaid.
- The Bd Fagis: Syed Sjech bin-Mohammed bin-Fagi (connections in Batavia), Syed Omar bin-Ahmed Ash Shatri (Singapore property).

And since it is of possible value, and certainly of practical utility, to know whence, geographically, the main families may note further the Kathiri

1. Abi Aidat. Leaders: Sjech Omar, Omar bin-Omar al-Aidat live at Bab Aker and Gol, near Seyyun and are strongly anti-British, connected with Singapore.
2. Abi Aidat. Leader, Abdulah bin-Lahman bin-Abdullah; come from Al-Aidat, near Shidam, with Java connections.
3. Abi al-Houtah. Leader, Syed Omar bin-Abdullah bin-Zaid with Java connections.
4. Abi Fakhravard. Leader, Mohammed Amar bin-Soud, come from Dakkah, Java.
5. Abi bin-Lahib. Leader, Syed Sjech, come from Karue near Seyyun.
6. Abi bin-Talib. Leaders, Salim bin-Jalal bin-Salim bin-Talib, live at Karue, connected with Sourabaya. Talib bin-Abdullah bin-Muhammad bin-Yamani live at Tabakul, all are prominent with Singapore and Java.
7. Abi bin-Lahib. Leader, Syed Mohammed, come from Minabari and are connected with Singapore and Java.
8. Abi Sayyid. Leaders, Abi al-Jafar and Abi bin-Muhammad, come from Madwarah and have Java connections.
9. Abi Tammam. Leader, Abi bin-Ahmad bin-Jamam al-Tammam, live at Karue, and have connections at Batavia and Bogor.

Finally, $\mathcal{F}_\infty = \bigcap_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \mathcal{F}_n$ is the σ -algebra of events that are determined by the infinite sequence $(X_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of random variables. The σ -algebra \mathcal{F}_∞ is called the *tail σ -algebra* of the sequence $(X_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$.

The ordinary middle-class householder has to pay annuities to Maria Theresa dollars, women often being taxed at 10 d in collect but a

Each Terun and Seyyon treeowner (date) pays annually 1 dollar per ...

Since Irish visits into the hinterland of Hallowston are as unlikely as

The last named presents few difficulties; the first five many. To these five a

1. Majesty's representative at Aden addressed Imam Yahya, of Sanaa, to

Do such remarks, does such an enumeration apply to the remaining sphere, the

The writer maintains that it does not apply, and that it should not apply

Cost 91, 100, 111, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935

The Kaffirs are already our Allies; we have subdued them. And, an

... as I have endeavoured to show, is not despotic.

(c) Mokalla is a float shanty town, roads are being made inland and along

(4.) The one danger is from the Kathurs and the Hanumans (see sketch map (B

The former are in a state of readiness and ready for a change. Were they to come under direct Kuaiti rule the following results would occur:—

- The wild tribes north of Wadi Hadhrumaut (which have no cohesion) would remain as at present in their mountains between "the Hamra Quarter" and the cliffs of Wadi Hadhrumaut; but all chance of irruption into their part could easily be prevented by a permanent prominent throughout Wadi Hadhrumaut.
- A road would shortly be run from Makalla through the Howairah route right up to and then down Wadi Hadhrumaut to Terim.
- Equal duties and taxation for Kuaitis and Kathiris would be assured—there is no possible adequate guarantee for such under present conditions.
- His Majesty's Government could at once espouse the cause of any would-be emigrants with much greater power than is at present possible. For not only could it, if necessary, emphasize to the would-be emigrant the need for proper behavior in e.g., the Dutch East Indies, but it could also, as active and not merely nominal protector or suzerain of the Kathiris, emphasize to the Dutch Colonial Government its desire that Kathiri emigrants be treated justly.
- Wadi Hadhrumaut, under a single Government, could be irrigated, provided with road communication, and brought into such a manner that a vast increase in cultivation and resultant universal prosperity for the country would occur.

These arguments tend to show that the present position as an Arab sphere, differs from all other such spheres; that the policy to be applied to them does not and should not apply to the same sphere so far that once the whole track was under one Government we could and should adopt the motto "Our aims are entirely based on the desire to see an Arabian province governed by its own people."

At present we are committed to the following; the Kuaiti is our ally and we must support him; he always obeys our advice; we cannot desert him.

If we bolster up the Kathiri, and address the Dutch Government on behalf of their emigrants, we must be consistent and take off the embargo on their money remittances.

If we do this they may very likely attack the Kuaiti. Even if they do not attack, they will still be a thorn to impede progress.

If they attack we must always support the Kuaiti—such support means expenditure on each and every occasion.

Sultan Ghadh's policy has been based on British lines. He is annually extending his control over cultivation. His successor will in all probability be, if possible, more Anglophile than he himself.

The policy is already being followed by the prosperity of his subjects. It is such that they must either increase their dependence on the Kuaitis as a financial power or else we must see that the Kuaiti is placed, or is committed to place himself, in a position of a financial power over the whole Hadramaut.

The present position is unsound. By artificial means (money remittances) we are checking the Kathiris, i.e., many of the remitters being persons wholly well-disposed towards us and towards the Kuaiti (even were he to be presented as their new ruler); and at the same time we are creating the need for establishing a friendly relation with the Arabs (practically all of whom are Kathiris); we are, in effect, trying to throw our money in to help them in what manner can this be done? The present position further has given rise to a feeling of jealousy towards the Kuaitis.

The two lines of action above are mutually antagonistic, and our present position might turn, in the end, into a position approximating hypocrisy.

The position of Hadhrumaut and its people is unique. Did they not depend on emigrants' remittances their whole material existence they could be dealt with or left alone as any other "Arabian" sphere. But being what they are and with their Java connections...

...emigrants as well as those who remain at home.

Most of the emigrants are on our side now, but they expect some prompt assistance in the matter of the money remittances.

Once the embargo is raised it must not be left in the power of the Kathiri Sultans to levy their usual toll, but by (a) providing sinews of possible trouble among their own subjects inside the country.

On these grounds I am therefore to urge either that the Kathiri be informed that a much more definite and much more public treaty must be made at once with the Kuaiti, whereby proper government and proper methods of trade be instituted in the Kathiri country; that a better road, travelling, and irrigation...

...shall be entered into with the Kuaiti.

...would finally scotch the only remaining robber tribe then left between...

...Kathiris be informed that His Majesty's Government has no objection to the Kathiris taking them if he so desires, and assuming the direct government of all Wadi Hadhrumaut.

II.—Action in Java and the Netherlands East Indies

...decided what course to pursue as regards the Kuaiti and Kathiri...

...touch with the Arabs has already been formed (vide my despatches to Mr. S. Gaselwe, save that the three gentlemen already working with their Arab links to that end will need an official link with His Britannic Majesty's Consulate-General).

In Mr. F. Robertson, Acting Vice-Consul in Batavia, that link is provided. This officer speaks Dutch and Malay, and is already acquainted, to a certain extent, with the Hadhrumaut.

...has been locally arrived at between Kuaiti and Kathiri in the Kathiri in Netherlands East Indies can be given for—

...sponsored by His Majesty's Government.

A post office can be established at Makalla with money-order branch (no impossibility at present with the natural distrust of the hinterland dweller at the thought of his money passing through Kuaiti hands), and

An excellent prospect could be held out for an Arab-English school in Makalla, where intending emigrants could learn a language of great value to the merchants in Singapore, Java, and the East.

And we could establish on mutual firm foundations of helping interests our main object, which is to lead the intellectual side of Islam in Java to a strong pro-British bias. Once the Arabs are won the Javanese will follow.

Section 4.—WADI HADRUMAUT AND ITS NEIGHBOURING AREAS

ADMINISTRATION &c.

See Sketch Map (C) facing p. 81.

Owing to the conflicts between Kuaiti and Kathiri, and to the hostility of the Hamudis against the Kuaiti, it became necessary for the latter to secure a safe transit route between their base Makalla and their forts of Hajurem, Haurah, Qatan, and, chief of all, Sidi.

The Serbatus had remained their allies since the period (some twenty years ago) when...

...at that time Umar...

...d. Rusem...

Sultan Ghadh from Makalla...

men (Serbatus)...

to aid. The Dem tribe opposed this force. At Agrom, some 2 miles south east of Wadi Hadr, the Dems were defeated with a loss of sixty men and the Kuaiti force advanced and relieved Basorah in Rasheed.

Some seven years later the Amudis, with a force of about 1,100 men, advanced and occupied Qurain and Owrab. The Kaati collected men from Khorebhab and Rashid, and these, reinforced from Makalla, broke the power of the Amudis once for all. The latter fled to the mountains and treated for peace. They were permitted to return to Sif and Bithah, and though wretchedly poor their numbers are now increasing (400-500), and they are in possession of a considerable area of fertile land in Wadi Doan and Wadi-el-Aisar. Their head chief (a Manqib named Sjech Salih-bin-Abdullah) died in February 1919, and has been succeeded by his son (Abdullah-bin-Salih). The whole tribe is peaceable, centres mainly in Bithah, and acknowledges the family of Motalihar as its leader. But for practical and political purposes the Amudis are under the actual control of the head of the Seibans, Omar-bin-Ahmed (Bassorah), to whom reference has been made above. He lives at Owrab.

Between Meshed and Qatan roamed the Nahdis, an unfriendly tribe of robbers. When Theodore Bent travelled through in 1893. This tribe under Mubarrak-bin-Mohamed ("Ibn Minif") has been reduced by the Kaati mainly through largesses paid in the past, and later by effective military occupation of Hourah and the valley to Qatan. They are now perforce allies of the Kaati, and remain, as before, bitter foes to the northern raiding nomads.

The past two decades had thus resulted in the three great tribes which dwell between Makalla and Wadi Doan and Wadi Hadhramaut—the Seibans, the Amudis, and the Nahdis—joining the Kaati as overlord.

Thus when the recent Kathiri attack was made in the vicinity of Shibam, a safe route connected Makalla with Hourah, Qatan, and Shibam, clear of the Hamumia.

Wadi Doan had also increased in importance (politically) from the fact that it shelters the great Syed families of Al Mihdar and Al Attas. The latter dwell at Meshed, the former at Howerah.

Originally the Mihdars came from Inat (where a branch of the family still remains), and the Al-Mihdar came and settled in Wadi Doan, where he and his family became the Syeds of the valley. The Al Attas came from the south, and settled in the vicinity of Makalla.

Hamid bin Ahmad-al-Mihdar-bin-Sjech Abutakar (Sjech of all Hadhramaut Syeds) was so appointed.

His family (his grandfather was the Syed Ahmad noted above) has now increased and owns Kawerah; his uncle, Syed Mustafa-al-Mihdar, is Manqib of the valley (Doan (North)), and his position as Wazir has caused the vicinity of Kawerah to have recently stationed himself for the Kathiri negotiations, to assume importance.

As regards Meshed, this was formerly a robber hold, tapping the mouths of Wadi el-Aisar, And, and Hadhramaut. About 175 years ago Syed Ali-bin-Hamad al-Attas determined to reform the place and established himself there. His descendants have increased, and Meshed is now an Al Attas village, free from crime. It is of importance because the Al Attas emigrants are great powers in Java, and their inclinations are usually pro-British. Syed Ahmad-bin-Muhammad bin-Hadood-al-Attas is a powerful man of enormous influence among the Amudi and Nahdi Bedouins. He is a man of great energy, intelligence, and power.

Wadi Doan is politically and strategically the ultimate key to Hadhramaut. At the south end lives the family of the Wazir of the Sultan, and by, in Owrab, lives Omar-bin-Ahmed (Bassorah), fighting head of the Seiban and Amud. Bedouins.

Sketch map (C) shows their clustered villages. Midway north, at Hajarain, is a strong town on the hill, garrisoned by a Yafa detachment.

North again lies Meshed, centre of the Al Attas Syeds, whose Manqib wields paramount power among the Amudis and Nahdis.

Finally, the garrisoned town and fort of Hourah hold the valley where it joins Wadi Hadhramaut proper, and thence an easy plain runs to the towns of Qatan and Shibam. A mile east of Shibam Kathiri territory is entered.

Section 5.—KAATI MILITARY RESOURCES AND GARRISONS

Sultan Ghaleb maintains some 400 men, Alula (or Somali slaves), and nearly 1,000 Yafa fighting men.

He thus has a slave and paid fighting force at permanent call of some 1,400 men.

He garrisons—

Makalla with 100 Somali slaves, also with four guns
Shahr with 80 Somalis and 150 Yafas
Ghail-ha Wazir and its vicinity with a mixed force of 250 men
Shibam with 80 Somalis and 150 Yafas
Qatan and neighbourhood with a mixed force of some 300 men

While at Harshiyat, Koweirah, Hajarain, Hourah, and other small places with detachments are stationed.

Note 1.—The Kathiris are reported to have between 750 and 1,000 slave soldiers, but no regular tribesmen soldiers such as the Kaatis' Yafa men.

Note 2.—At Shibam are a few antiquated guns, also two modern guns.

Note 3.—The policy of garrisoning Wadi Hadhramaut from Hourah to Shibam is to establish the Somali slaves mainly in the towns themselves, while the Yafas are stationed in the open country. The Yafas are reported to be very brave and hardy.

Note 4.—The above remarks refer only to what may be termed the "regular" forces of Kaati and Kathiri. Each side could count several thousands of Bedouin riders, but it is now doubtful whether the Kathiri Sultans would find their tribesmen—tired as these latter are of their rulers' misgovernment—inclined to put up a sustained effort.

Section 6.—THE HAMUMIA

(See "Handbook of Arabia," p. 542, vol. 1, item 7.)

A strong warlike tribe of robbers roaming the country of Makalla, Shahr, and Shibam.

Defeated some twenty years ago, when they attacked the Seibans at Rashid in Wadi Doan, by combined Kaati and Seiban forces, they soon recovered, and by systematic pillaging of travellers along the coast to Shahr they have become a by-word for murder and robbery.

Hating the Kaati, they formed a pact with the Kathiri, and, when recently the Kaati Wazir, Syed Hussein, succeeded in making a treaty with the Kathiri—travelling to Shibam for the purpose—a Hamumi deputation, headed by the then paramount chief Sjech Salim-bin-Ali Habreish, went to Terim and Sayyun, and endeavoured to foment trouble.

In 1918 Syed Hussein visited Shahr and summoned the Hamumi chiefs to a conference. Certain Syeds were used as middlemen, and the Hamumia met the Kaati Wazir at Shahr.

After warning them that they must no longer interfere with peaceful caravans, the Syed gave them largesse and the meeting ended.

Repeated and continued pillaging went on and the situation became serious again.

A further warning was sent out, and the Hamumia, reading this as a sign of weakness, boldly demanded more largesse. The Kaati summoned them to a discussion in Shahr. The Hamumia, professing readiness to apologise for recent pillagings, promised to appear in due course.

In January 1919 some 400 armed Hamumia appeared at Shahr, where the Kaati commander, hearing of their approach manned the forts, and secretly sent out an armed party to their rear.

He then sent a messenger to the Hamumia stating that in Shahr were certain individuals who could identify those who had recently pillaged their caravans, and he suggested that, to prove the truth of their repentance, the Hamumia meet their former victims in the town; a discussion could then take place.

Some 250 Hamumia came in being disarmed as they entered. They were all captured; twenty-seven were killed by the djendishah next day, including their paramount chief Sjech Salim-bin-Ali Habreish, and their leading moqaddams, Hamud bin-Amr, Mohammed-bin-Awadh-bin-Aman, Awadh Mardoob, and esb-Shmeent.

Over 200 of the remainder are now in prison in Shahr.
Their tribes, thus deprived of practically all their leaders, are now March 1919) suing for terms.

Hitherto very little has been known of this large confederation. But details, I with some few, are now known.

The Hamami are nomad Bedouins ranging from Shahr to Semut, and up to Manahils and Jabri tribes. Their chief sub-tribes, &c. are as follows:

Bert Ali. Chief village, Ghad-hu Jiman. Paramount chief, Salim-bin Ali Habreish (executed in Shahr mid January 1919).

Second chief, "ash-Shimani" (killed as above).

Bert Bahsan-el Maatrah. Chief, Mohamud bin-Awad-hu Aman (executed in Shahr, January 1919).

Bert Ba Ghazal. Village-as-Sid-el-Fagi (alive) Salim-bin-Ali mat-bin-Iman connected with Bert Ali.

Bert Ayed. Chief, "el-Effen" (alive).

Bert Garzat. Chief, Khamsa-bin Shadyan. Had a natural death in December 1915. Successor not yet appointed.

Bert J. meen. Chief, Sal meen-bin-Kaor (in prison in Shahr).

Bert Obeid. Chief, "es-Samali" (killed in Shahr).

Bert Sa'id. Late chief, Tawar bin Sa'id, died in 1918 and his suspected successor was killed in Shahr.

time, but whether they will be able to put 8,000 in a rough sketch map (D) is possible to such necessarily some what vague details as were given.

Section 7—ROUTE MAKALLA TO WADI DOAN (AND ON TO SUHRAH) (WADI HINNAM ROUTE)

Direction north-north-east, then north-east 8 miles to Hamam. Water springs; dhurra and tobacco, several towers. 50 soldiers, road to Hushim and road to Tulu here divide carriage road from Makalla to Harshiyat, well graded, has been completed in 1918.

Direction north-west from Harshiyat 14 miles to Tiffah; village; dates; tobacco; water supply. Continuing west-north-west for 8 miles to Lash (Bedouins of Beni Hassan, branch of Sudani tribe). Running water, extensive fringe of dates, dhurra and lucerne cultivated.

General line now between Wadi Hinmam and Wadi D. Lash. From Lash ascend to wadi of Beni Hassan Bedouins, 4 miles to Lash, their village, 300 inhabitants; flocks of goats; water; dates and lucerne. Hamam, Mohamed bin Hussein. Compact

into large wadi, Wadi Hinmam. First few miles rock and boulder strewn, difficult for camels. Path then rises along left side of wadi, gradually rising, 9 miles. Large village (in two parts) on right slope of wadi. Running water, concurrent chain of pools in places. Village called Zimon. Cucumbers, dates, bananas, dhurra, lucerne; large flocks of goats. Sahib Bedouins, prosperous. Many go hence to Java. Headman, Hassan-bi Umar.

Hamam (c. 30 miles). Near north-west, then west north-west up Wadi Hinmam many curves, but on west-north-west. Path high up on left side of wadi. Pass Ghayada, Bedouin hamlet, with two burial grounds (Syed Hussein-bi Mahomed-al Attas and Syed Saleh-bi-Abdullah buried here). After 2 miles (west north-west) Hamam village on crag with good running water below; palms and

* Map facing p. 81

Bas Hibri sub-tribe of Sahab. W. Hamam left side. Bear north. 1 mile path after leaving Hamam village in wadi. At end of wadi central plateau is panorama of sandy stone-strewn plains, with characteristic "table-mountains" preserved by caps of erupted matter. Water scarce unless after rain. Wells frequent.

El Ham.

Wadi Manter

hamlet, El Ham. Sharp rise (bear west-north-west as before); track leads to a pass between mountainous ridges forming on the through pass (Jebel-el Khar on left by Wadi Manter). Of pass is famous tomb of Wali-bi Matar (carefully tended). Annual pilgrimage, when more than 1,000 people assemble on the 14th and 15th of Rabi. Ascending from the pass the water

with west is seen a large mountain (? Jebel Ghazal). Wadi Hajar's high cliffs are visible in a clear atmosphere. Bear west-north-west across plateau (El Makad), past series of wells (often dry); barren country, nomad Bedouins.

Dahmah.

Wadi Doan

North-west to Dahmah, 16 wells (mostly dry), 2 miles from Dahmah, Bedouin inhabited hamlet Bararah (fields and flocks). Thence after two abrupt descents to Fardaha (wells sometimes dry). Thence west-north-west for some 20 miles, past T. Lash (wells dry, to extreme end of Wadi Doan, which commences as a slight crack or cleft, but becomes a deep precipitous ravine with a few hundred yards. Well-engineered path commences on left, crosses to right and keeps. Very precipitous descent, almost impossible for camels save in the driest weather. Wadi runs east for a few hundred yards, then veers to north-east, with an abrupt curve towards west, and finally turns almost north. At the turn the wadi widens, and is filled with date palms, and dhurra fields, and villages. The sketch map (C) shows the route on to Wadi Hushim.

map in detail of Wadi Doan see sketch map (C). For details of Wadi Doan see paragraph head "Wadi Doan." It will be seen that no estimates of distances from Makalla are given after this is because the route taken was no fixed route, several alternatives being possible. The distance from Makalla to Kowarah in Wadi Doan is between 70 and 80 miles. The route is one which would not be usually

Section 8. "HIMYAH" REMAINS AND RUINS IN WADI DOAN

(See Sketch Map (C) of Wadi Doan.)

From South to North.

(a) Rahab.—On right side of wadi, up the slope, stand the ruins of at walls, the stones being small and unshaped by hand. Unfortunately the landscape but fragments of marble have been picked up. The whole site could easily be excavated.

(b) Between Qatdan and Sif.—On left side of wadi the ruins called "Qarn-al-"

* *Mutatis mutandis*, Wadi Doan presents a close parallel to the famous formation of the Kertanungat at Fort de Kik, Padanggache (Siam), Sumatra.

up, standing on a platter or plate; the material was brass(?) The wings and body bear clear evidence of colouring (red). The platter was thrown away and has not been recovered. Chipped pottery and marble fragments are often unearthed.

(c.) *Mashed*.—These famous ruins are extensive, and on their site must once have stood a considerable city. In the north-western corner three groups. About a mile and a half south of Mashed, in the centre of the broad wadi, are three mounds rising from the stony sand of the wadi. The centre mound still shows a well-made and compact square building, of which the stones, much larger than any others observed in other localities, are squared and laid carefully on each, fitting well. In spite of the effects of flood torrents which have scattered thousands of stones over the wadi, these mounds still keep their shape, and countless pieces of marble, sun-baked clay, and stone utensils lie around. Many of these reveal rough pattern work, and several of them were seen into which two cup-shapes had been cut, thus (O). Inscribed stones (so-called *ḥunyarikh*) are to be found, but none were seen unimpaired.

The second group lies immediately west of the present village of Mashed. The wadi here has suffered more from the torrents, as rifts of sand and loose stones have been tossed over the valley surface. The site of the ruins, however, rises from 20 to 30 feet in places, and it is clear that a considerable mass of buildings, probably the central city, once stood here. Fragments of inscribed stones are numerous, and the site would doubtless repay investigation. A magnificent circular well (now dry) is fully exposed and is in perfect preservation. Formed of unworked stones, mainly oval in shape it has kept its formation and is 60 feet in diameter. There are two other partly choked wells close by. Marble and clay fragments lie around on all sides, and several unimpaired inscribed stones have been unearthed. A small axe-head, beautifully shaped, of green stone was recently picked up, as well as several pieces of worked marble, which gave evidence of careful decoration.

Quite close to the village of Mashed there rises a species of stone gateway, which local tradition names as the entrance to an ancient temple.

Trained excavators could easily deal with these ruins.

The last (third) portion of the ruins lies to the immediate north of Mashed, but all that here remains is a series of sand-covered mounds, on which lie scattered stones which once went to form a town. The wadi is covered for a considerable way with these ruins of old stones.

(d.) *Near Haurah, at Qanuthah and Aylaniyah*, are similar ruins, whence inscribed stones are occasionally uncovered. A (brass?) figurine of a camel, and another of a naked man, were recently found.

Section 9.—CORRECTIONS AND/OR ADDITIONS FOR HANDBOOK OF ARABIA

VOLUME I

Page 227, last line but 12.

From Makalla to Haurah "a well-made road for 8 miles has been made (1918), while another road, flanked in parts by a low wall, runs through Makalla town along the coast for 10 miles. Thus it is possible now for a motor-car to travel by this road, and then along the beach to Shiheir, and even inland to the Wazir. A car has also travelled to Shiheir."

Page 228. "C"

"In the Kathiri towns a local currency is in use, struck in Sourabaya (Java), in the Mohammedan year 1315 through the agency of the Alkali family, at the request of the two Kathiri Sultans.

"The three silver coins so struck are as follows:

1. A silver coin, 1/2 inch in diameter, 5 Khamsi, reported worth

1/2 anna (Khamisi, worth 5 annas)

2. A silver coin, 1/2 inch in diameter, 10 Khamsi, worth 10 annas

3. A silver coin, 1/2 inch in diameter, 20 Khamsi, worth 20 annas. The use of these coins during the war has resulted in British Indian money readily gaining currency and although Indian paper money is not accepted in Wadi Hachramant (even in Makalla it suffers 5 per cent. discount when changed) rupees and the smaller British Indian coins are readily accepted."

Page 229 "Government," last line but 1.

"These two tribes have now signed a treaty, whereby, while Kathiri independence is acknowledged, all communications between the Kathiris and Aden shall pass through the Sultan of Makalla."

Page 230. "The Sultan of Makalla has a 'professional' army of something

10,000, composed of 400 Somali slaves (Abid), and some 900-1,000 Yafa mercenaries. These garrison Makalla, Shiheir, Haurah, Qatan, and Shubam. The Sultans of the Kathiri are reported to have some 750 Somali slave soldiers. Both sides could, of course, muster several thousand irregular Bedouin rifles, once hostilities commenced."

Page 233: "Towns."—I suggest as follows:

"Makalla, next to Aden the principal port on the southern coast of Arabia, is situated about 2 1/2 miles north-west of Ras Makalla, to which and past which point a well-made road runs out. It is built partly " (here continue last line of page 232 and first five lines of page 233). "The Sultan has several houses or palaces, but his permanent residence is at the western end of the town, where he has a large palace, a large European furnished guest house, and a nearly completed barracks. The wall of the palace enclosure runs from the cliffs to the ground level of the town and thence to the shore. Eastward from the palace enclosure the road runs past a medley of substantial and miserable dwellings to the eastern gate, just before reaching which rise the imposing buildings, not yet completed, of a very large mosque. Passing the eastern gate, Makalla town proper is entered; the houses are compact, prosperous, and in many cases well built and many storeyed. The bazaar is well stocked with the needs of Arab life, and the fish and vegetable markets are well filled. Passing the landing stage, a large enclosure marks the cemetery, and, proceeding still eastwards, the poorer portion of the town gives place in turn to numerous linealities between the cliffs and the shore, through which runs the road to Ras Makalla. One mile or so inland, to the north, is an oasis of gardens, with a large house belonging to the Wazir (Syed H.) and a large new palace and garden belonging to the Sultan. A carriage road leads to these and is continued as far as Haurahyat, 8 miles north-north-east

in this direction, affording a clean and ample supply of water for drinking and washing. The climate is delightful in the winter months, but in summer the heat is often excessive. The sea breezes in winter make the days cool and the nights cold. The population is mixed. Somalis of both sexes abound; British and other Europeans. The total number of persons in Makalla exceeds 12,000."

(Then continue as on page 233, lines 22 to 36 inclusive.)

Qatan or Hautah.—(As on page 233 and page 234). Corrections (line 13):—

"Palace of the 'Sultan.' Hautah is strongly garrisoned not only by resident soldiers, but the adjoining villages, which are rapidly springing up, are peopled by Yafa mercenaries, whose womenfolk and whose followers increase every year. The Sultan's nephew, Sultan Ab-din-Salah, governs as his deputy, and controls Haurah, Hautah, and Shubam."

(Then continue as in book.)

Page 234: Shubam.—Substitute "Sultan" for "Jemadar" in line 12. Delete the last five lines of the page, and read:—

"The town has been much improved since Hirsch's visit; the population is not less than, and probably exceeds, 6,000, and the number of substantial houses (stated to be 500), of which not more than five or six are in disrepair, bears witness to the prosperity of the town. A row of rich houses, each in its garden, is a proof of security and prosperity. Along the south side of the town, outside the walls, are several small houses, which are of a more substantial and less brackish in taste. There are eight mosques (Al Kabir, Bin Ahmad, Ba Deep, Al Kioja, Ba Yara, &c.), one boys' school, and one girls school. West of the town

a large area is planted methodically with thousands of young date palms, while a recently constructed substantial cemented masonry wall, about 2 miles from the town, forces the 'wadi' water to the northern side of the wadi. Due north of the wadi edge lies El Karb bin-Abdul Aziz, a Kathiri hamlet. A mile to the east lies the Syed village of Huzm, and running north from this village is the boundary line between Kaati and Kathiri territory. Shibam town comprises a small khol in the centre of the wadi, and forms a walled parallelogram some 350 by 275 yards.

number 400, 500 under Syed Abdullah bin Salih. The tribe, however, looks up to Umar bin-Ahmed (Bassorah), who lives at Ovrab as paramount ruler, and to him important questions are referred. He is the head of the tribe.

441. *Awamir* — Arab

Their chief is Saleh bin Yahar

442. *Humam*

See special paragraph "Humam"

443. *Hem Hamam* — Arab

Chief village Lataih, and headman Mohamed bin-Hussein

444. *Kathiri*, line 8, de — Read —

The Kathiri are the brothers Mansur and Moham bin Ghalib bin Mansur, who live in Seyyan, leaving the government of Terim to their brother's Wakil, Salim bin-Ahmed. The brothers are unpopular with the Kaati and Syeda, and since their defeat in 1918 at the hands of the Kaati their influence is on the wane. It is only by largesses that they can obtain any respect from the independent tribesmen. The latter may number 10,000 fighting men, and with their allies, the Awamir and Jahiri, might form a powerful confederation, had not their unity been undermined by Kaati diplomacy. The Tamimi and Manahil no longer are Kathiri allies.

Page 543: *Manahil*

The "Handbook" information is now incorrect. See under "Tamimi"

Page 545: *Seiban* — Arab

Many of them now live in Ovrab and Qarim in Wadi Doan, villages of their paramount Sheikh Umar bin Ahmad (called Bassorah). (Bassorah is incorrect)

445. *Tamimi* —

"A nomad tribe to the east of Terim (near Imat). Formerly the allies of the Kathiri they have recently entered into a pact with the Kaati." The Manahil (immediately north), with the Tamimi, both acknowledge the leadership of Ali bin-Ahmad bin Janani, who lives at Kaati. The Tamimi represent the settled, the Manahil the nomad, element of the coalition. These tribesmen are sturdy fighters, and can put a combined force of perhaps 1,500 men in the field.

Page 541: *Awabthah* — Read

"Independent nomad tribe of Hinyar running from Wadi Ain (south-east of Hantah) to the neighbourhood of Ghad bin-Wakar. Chief sheikhs are bin-Karim bin Wadi Ain. Maqab at Ghad bin-Syeda Abdurrahman bin-Karim, the Kaati and inveterate foes to the Hamam. Their number between 2,000 and 3,000 persons, and the Awabthah fighting force amounts to some 700 rifles." (Van den Berg is incorrect in stating that the Awabthah form part of the Seiban Confederation. They are an independent tribe, who, like the Seibans, hate the Hamam.) "Awabthah fighting men

SKETCH MAP OF WADI DŌÂN.

(C)



(D)




(A)

Rube et al. (1981) (The Green Desert)



(B)

... (The Great Oceans)



Page 298 : Sif

Page 299 : *Hajjruin*.—Delete :—

"A small garrison of some twenty soldiers under a Somali headman is stationed here."

Delete "unfriendly" before Naland

Washed.—Read —

'Village of Syeda' houses of the Al Attan family. Two famous Al Attan Wallis tombs; mosque. Extensive 'Himyar' ruins, and remains of a large city 'Hourah'. Haulah is given as 18 miles, and Haulah to Shiham is given as

I would add (as regards the Indian Government map, registered No. 2388, 1. 10. 8.1) that Shahr and Shahr (east of Makalla, along the coast) appear incorrectly set out. Shahr is in the port half-way between Makalla and Shahr. The westernmost of the three is thus Shahr.

(58108)

No. 36

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 771.)

(Telegraphic) P

Foreign Office, April 18, 1918.

We have made proposals to settle dispute about position in Asia Minor and have been willing to adopt such a course. We preferred to send General Wilson specially to Paris, to endeavour to arrive at a settlement with M. Clemenceau, to the alternative of a commission, which we considered less desirable, and consequently we sent no one to Paris. We have not yet received any news from Paris. We will inform you as soon as we hear anything more.

representative, either civil or
Government here to discuss the matter, or that
representative to Paris for that purpose, but I have as yet received

We shall, however, be amicable solution

[60671]

Note respecting the Middle Eastern Question by Earl Curzon

My colleagues know how anxious I have been for some time as to the situation in
 India East and the fact that the situation is not likely to arise
 in a failure to arrive at a solution. I circulate a note on the subject which I have
 recently sent to Mr. Balfour

C. or K

April 22, 1919.

* These are over-estimated distances and 13 miles in each case would be more correct.

1356]

4

The Present Position of the Middle Eastern Question.

I AM reluctant to criticise in London a policy which is being pursued in Paris, as to the phases and reasons of which we are not fully informed, and for which there may be many justifications not easily visible here. At the same time, there is such an absolute concurrence of opinion from every authority whom I have consulted, or read, that the position is dangerous, and that the policy said to be favoured by the Peace Conference is likely to produce widespread disturbance, if not disaster, that I should not be doing my duty if I were to observe silence.

Moreover, the Foreign Office were may at any moment called upon to explain or defend the Paris decision, and to justify the consequences that seem likely to result from them.

Finally, it may still be possible, by prompt decision, to avert some of the worst evils, and to recover at least a part of what would appear to have been lost.

I have had a summary prepared in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office which reveals the existing position of affairs in the Middle East. It shows a situation of divided councils and conflicting ambitions among the Great Powers, of a general and increasing unrest in the regions affected, of military insecurity, and of a pending bloodshed and chaos, that may rob us of many of the fruits of victory and create a scandal in the Middle East, both to the peace of Europe and to the security of India.

When the Peace Conference assembled the situation in the Middle East was much

As Allied Powers were in possession of Constantinople, where the Turkish Government, if not cowed, was subservient. Our military power in the occupied Turkish regions of Asia was sufficient to enable us to enforce not merely the agreed terms of the Armistice but almost any supplementary terms that were found.

The British were in secure possession of Mesopotamia up to and including the Taurus, in which the virtual British Protectorate of those regions had practically been settled with the consent of the Turkish Government.

Our position in the Caucasus, both in a military and political sense, was very strong. We were still in Trans-Caspia, but were contemplating a withdrawal of our forces, since accomplished. The Caspian was in our hands and was being made the base of naval action against the Bolshevik forces. British divisions occupied the entire Caucasus, from the Black Sea to the Caspian, and provided the only guarantee for peace, on the one hand between the rival peoples—Georgians, Armenians, Tartars, Daghestanis, and Russians; and on the other hand between the nascent States and communities north and south of the main Caucasian range and the forces of Denikin on the north. We were quite as much in pursuing imperialistic ambitions and the recovery of the boundaries of Old Russia as in fighting and crushing the Bolsheviks in Russia itself. In Asia Minor (outside the region of British military occupation) no Allied forces had appeared. The fate of Armenia was undecided, the bulk of the Armenians being fugitives from their country. Apart from Armenia and possibly Cilicia, the partition of Asia Minor was not yet contemplated. In Syria a more critical condition existed, owing to the difficulty of reconciling the aspirations of the French with the hard facts of the Arab situation and the insistence of the French on the letter of the unfortunate Sykes-Picot Agreement. In Palestine the interests of the Arab population and the Zionists appeared to be capable of reconciliation, and everything pointed to an early mandate for Great Britain with the consent of both. Egypt was still quiet.

If the above survey be accepted as correct, it would seem that the first task to be undertaken in Paris would have been—

1. A final agreement of the Franco-Anglo-Arab dispute re Syria and Palestine, and a decision of, at any rate, the main outline of the future limits of the Turkish Empire in Europe and Asia.

2. The speedy assumption by the Powers concerned of their duties and responsibilities in the areas assigned to them in the new settlement.

Nearly four months have elapsed, and the situation, as depicted in the accompanying summary, is as follows:—

The fate of Turkey-in-Europe is not yet decided, though it is understood that the Turks are to lose Constantinople, which is to be handed over to the mandate of America.

or some International Power. Meanwhile, the city is the scene of acute, though petty, conflict of jurisdiction and policy between the French and British representatives. The Turks have recovered from the first dismay of defeat, and are intriguing with all their old spirit and skill. The Committee of Union and Progress are active in the provinces, and are the only vigorous force in Turkish politics. The decision as to Constantinople has been so long postponed that what might have been easy in January, may be found very difficult in May or June. Time is being given for Moslem sentiment throughout the world to consolidate and concentrate on a supreme effort for the rescue of Islam. In any case, events in Egypt, the Caucasus, Asia Minor, and India are not likely to render the Turks more amenable or subservient; and it is more than likely that the decision as to their expulsion from Europe will be followed by rebellions and massacres in Asia Minor, and by great commotions throughout the eastern Moslem world.

Given the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, the policy that seemed to be the most reasonable in January—that deprived of the larger provinces that had been wrested from him in the war, i.e., Mesopotamia, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Cilicia, and also Armenia (which he had shown his complete inability to govern) he should be set up in the Asiatic realm as of his former dominions under whatever conditions, military, financial, or otherwise, the Great Powers might think fit to impose.

In practice, it is understood that the Greek claim to Smyrna, and possibly to the whole of Asia Minor, is likely to be conceded, although believed to be violently opposed by the Americans. This, it is reported, is due, not to any urgent political or military necessity, but to the superior diplomatic ability of M. Venizelos. The Italians have already anticipated, and indeed precipitated, the ultimate decision by a military descent upon Adana (on a manifestly fabricated pretext) and the neighbouring coasts, and have also, with a reluctance to which it is difficult to find a parallel, accepted the mandate for the Caucasus and the Caspian, from which the British have been excluded. It is believed that the whole of the

One day we are told that the mandate is to be given to America, who, if she emerges from her present isolation, will consent to do so only on a large and dramatic scale. Another day it is to be given to France, to console her if she fails to obtain China. Meanwhile, the most fantastic of all the aspirations, is establishing a chain of claims

The fate of Armenia is still not decided, and there is a good chance that, when it is decided, it will be not to define Armenia, but to find the Armenians.

The dispute about Syria has not been composed, and the Peace Conference have fallen back upon the expedient of a Commission, to be appointed by the Great Powers.

The actions of the Zionists in Palestine have produced a new situation of unrest there.

Egypt has risen in revolt, and General Allenby's first solution has only led to a new situation of unrest there.

Finally, the intervention has reached India, and there has broken out the most serious anti-British demonstration since the Mutiny.

The situation, of which I have described both the facts and the probable consequences, is one to which I do not believe there is a single dissentient opinion among those who are entitled to be regarded as experts. It is a situation in which the only course of action is to take prompt and decisive steps to avert a disaster.

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6. If it is not too late, I would urge even now the abandonment of the Eastern Commission (even though our representatives upon it are the most admirable whom it

[illegible]

in Turkey, which has an admirable record and has suffered greatly during the war. In the event of the Italians succeeding in their aims, the Turkish Empire will be completely strangled.

Cilicia.—Cilicia is claimed by the Armenians as part of Armenia, by the Syrians as part of Syria, and by the French as part of their mandate. The French have required by the terms of the Anglo-French *modus vivendi*.

Alexandretta.—At Alexandretta the latent hostility between French and Italians has been shown by the fact that the French have refused to allow the Italian consular officials to enter the town. The French have also refused to allow the Italian consular officials to enter the town.

Beirut.—At Beirut friction between the French and ourselves continues, chiefly over the question of the port, which the French claim as a French naval base, and over the restrictions which General Allenby finds it necessary to impose on the landing of travellers.

Lebanon.—In the Lebanon the despatch to Paris of the parked delegation engineered by the French has aroused a storm of opposition from the anti-French parties.

Damascus and Emir Faisal's Area.—In Damascus and throughout the territory controlled by Emir Faisal disorder reigns.

The French have been accused by General Allenby in accordance with the terms of the *modus vivendi*, and the French accuse our military authorities of stimulating the Arab resistance.

Moslems and Armenians at Aleppo.

Here again the Italians are seeking to establish interests, and, since the announcement of the decision to send out a commission, have approached us with embarrassing requests for permission to open a consular office at Aleppo.

Palatine.—In Palestine the feeling of both Christians and Moslems against our policy has now reached fever heat, and is increasing with every week's delay of a settlement. The Zionist claims become more and more exorbitant, and the resolutions of the Zionist Congress recently held in London included such items as the supervision of all our official establishments, the use of Hebrew as the medium of instruction in the schools, a monopoly of all commerce and industry, and immigration to the Jews. The French are opposed to Zionism, and the Vatican has taken serious alarm at the activity of what it terms the extremist party of the Zionists.

Occupied Enemy Territory.—The administration of the territory occupied by the British troops is a task which our own British sailors regarded with considerable apprehension.

For political reasons and owing to the undesirability of allowing the French to administer the territory, it has been necessary to charge the expenditure as military expenditure, and His Majesty's Treasury are seriously bothered by this arrangement. It is only a temporary expedient, and it is hoped that a very early settlement would be reached by the Peace Conference, and that our liabilities in this respect would thus shortly cease.

Egypt.—The situation in Egypt only comes within the scope of this review in so far as the same forms an aspect of the situation in Turkey, and as the deplorable situation which exists there is bound to react on Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and indeed throughout the East. Moreover, the sending of a mission to ascertain the wishes of Syria and Palestine as to their future form of Government is scarcely likely to be over in silence by those who now control the current of political feeling in Egypt.

The same remark may perhaps also apply to the effect on India of the promised commission's visit to Mesopotamia.

Mesopotamia.—In Mesopotamia itself, the difficulties of administration caused by the situation, &c., will become more and more acute as the Peace Conference reaches as to the future of the country.

Mosul.—In the Mosul vilayet no satisfactory arrangements can be made until the rights conceded to the French under the Sykes-Picot Agreement have been definitely and entirely abandoned by them. It is not known here whether the commission proposes to visit this area, but if not it would seem that a recognition by the French of the *de facto* situation should be reached at the earliest possible moment.

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II.—Districts more particularly affected by the decision of the Peace Conference to hand over the Caucasus to the Italians.

We now leave behind the regions more directly affected by the despatch of the proposed commission and reach an area where the problems arise from another decision of the Peace Conference—the transfer of the Caucasus to Italian control.

Trans-Caspia.—Trans-Caspia is already being evacuated, and the danger of the Russian Revolution being only to be mentioned in passing.

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It will be remembered that our naval authorities regarded the numerical superiority of the Bolshevik fleet at Astrakhan with so much magnifying that they insisted upon measures being taken to destroy it while it was still frozen in. This was to be done from the air.

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whole of Turkey in Asia to be up. Such a sign may well be given by the arrival of the Italians in the Caucasus.

Black Sea.—Nor is our position in the Black Sea entirely comfortable. Odessa has fallen, and Sevastopol is in the occupation of the Bolsheviks. Our only line of supply—perhaps of retreat—lies through Constantinople, and at Constantinople we have few troops and none too many ships, as the Admiral himself has recently complained; while the forts of the Dardanelles stand undamaged behind us. It is true that the forts are occupied by allied troops, but we have nothing to show that any preparations have been made for their rapid destruction in case of an emergency.

The Balkan States to the north are threatened with Bolshevism, and the effect of our withdrawal from the Caucasus will probably be to accentuate this tendency and to spur the Bolshevik leaders to fresh efforts in every direction, including the far north.

III.—Anglo-French Relations at Constantinople.

Constantinople.—Meanwhile at Constantinople itself the situation between the French and ourselves shows no improvement. General Franchet d'Espèrey continues to assert himself and to dispute General Milne's claim that the whole of Turkey in Asia is an exclusive British military sphere, and that the French have no right to interfere there. French pretensions in this direction have, indeed, recently increased, and they were willing to acknowledge until recently that both Powers had equal military rights in the unoccupied parts of Asiatic Turkey, it appears from the despatches most recently received from Constantinople that General Franchet d'Espèrey is now advancing the theory that the whole of Turkey not in our actual occupation falls within the sphere of his military command as "Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East."

Question of the delimitation of the French and British military zones is of vital importance, and the Foreign Office and His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople have been urging for months past the necessity of reaching an early agreement with the French on the subject, but so far their efforts have proved unavailing, and the visit of the C.I.C.B. to Paris, made at the instigation of Lord Curzon, appears to have brought us no nearer to a solution. The question is primarily a military one, but it hinges on the interpretation to be placed on the Convention concluded at Paris on the 23rd December, 1917, and on the resolution reached at the meeting of the allied premiers in London on the 3rd December, 1918, and the framers of these resolutions can alone say what their intentions were, or modify or alter the terms of these resolutions to suit changed circumstances.

No political principle vital to us is involved, and there would appear to be no objection so far as the Foreign Office is concerned, to conceding to the French a sphere of military activity on the Asiatic side. The important thing is not the size or extension of the respective spheres, but the definite fixing of a line on either side of which the respective military forces can act in complete independence without risk of overlapping and consequent friction. With goodwill on both sides the solution of this problem ought to present no insuperable difficulty, and our military authorities will probably be the more inclined to make some concession to the French in the matter in that it appears from recent evidence that neither General Allenby nor General Marshall has sufficient forces at his disposal to meet his pressing requirements. At the present

touch the persons responsible for the murder of the British officer referred to above. We are unable to strike at such short range, whether from lack of men or transport, there is surely no good reason why we should persist in a policy of excluding the French rigidly from the whole of Turkey in Asia.

Relations between General Franchet d'Espèrey and the High Commissioners at Constantinople.

Closely connected with this question, and of scarcely less importance, is that of the relations between the French military command at Constantinople and the Allied High Commissioners.

Since the arrival of General Franchet d'Espèrey there has been constant trouble on this score, and it appears that the French contend that the functions of the High Commissioners are restricted to matters connected with the fulfilment of the Armistice conditions, and that on other matters the military commander is supreme, and at

liberty to make any arrangements he chooses in direct negotiation with the Turkish Government.

This again is a question which cannot be settled by exchange of notes, and appears to require the personal attention of the supreme authorities of the Allied States now in Paris.

IV.—Future of Turkey and of Constantinople.

Discussions between the Allies as to the future of Turkey, in Palestine and in Mosul, and bide their time. These rivalries are being bridged over by a host of new parties and associations. Nationalism and Islamism are forming new combinations, and working in with the Bolsheviks on the one side and with the relics of the old Hamidian régime on the other. Time is on their side and they know it. Each week that passes reveals fresh intrigues in every quarter. In Switzerland, where there is coming and going between Enver and the other C.U.P. leaders in Germany and the agents of the party in Geneva, and grave suspicions are being formed as to their intrigues with the C.U.P. before the war, are working with the Turks against the Greeks and French: In Kurdistan, where the agents of the C.U.P. are at work, since we are quite unable to establish any military authority there; in India, and throughout the Islamic world and even in London itself, where time is being given for the consolidation of a formidable movement of the kind which is attractive to all the usual elements of unrest, and where agitation is being actively carried on by the Turks from Constantinople, the conversion of the Moslems to Christianity and Christian interests with the Kaofas.

of Union and Progress, who have during the war kept in close touch with the Bolsheviks through Germany and Copenhagen by means of such notorious agents as Ahmed Agasi and Parvus (alias Holphand), watch the westward march of the Bolshevik wave and look forward to the moment when they too will be carried forward with it.

What has the Turk to hope from an immediate peace? His material position is not likely to be greatly improved; the hated Greeks and Armenians are to supplant him, perhaps even to become his masters; he is told that he is to lose Constantinople and Smyrna as well as Syria, Palestine, Armenia, and all the Arab countries, and now a rumour goes forth that even the small patrimony that is to be left to him is not to be under his absolute control, but to be managed for him by a Christian Power; and that

wondered that he counts every moment of delay as so much gain, and watches with increasing satisfaction how the failure to reach any settlement in Paris, and the growing jealousies and dissensions of the Allies, are placing him every day in a better position to resist the conditions to be imposed upon him, and may even enable him in the end to take his revenge.

(88816)

No. 38

Mr. Balfour to Lord Curzon.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 628)

Mr. BALFOUR presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of correspondence between M. Clemenceau and Emir Feisal before the latter's departure for the East.

British Delegation, Paris,
April 30, 1919

Enclosure 1 in No. 38

Mr. Kerr to Sir L. Mallet.

Sir Louis Mallet,

British Delegation, Paris, April 28, 1919

1 ENCLOSURE for your information copies of correspondence which passed between M. Clemenceau and the Emir Feisal before the latter's departure for the East.

F. H. KERR

Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

M. Clemenceau to Emir Faisal.

Altesse,

Paris, le 17 avril 1919.

JE suis heureux, au moment de votre retour en Orient, de confirmer ce que je vous ai dit dans la conversation que j'ai eue avec vous le dimanche, 13 avril.

Le Gouvernement français, désireux d'assurer à la Syrie comme à l'Arménie, à la Mésopotamie et aux autres pays d'Orient délivrés par la victoire de l'Entente, le régime de liberté et de progrès conforme aux principes dont il s'est toujours inspiré et qui sont la base des délibérations de la Conférence de la Paix, déclare reconnaître le droit de la Syrie à l'indépendance sous la forme d'une fédération d'autonomies locales répondant aux traditions et aux vœux des populations.

La France est toute prête à donner son aide matérielle et morale à cette émancipation de la Syrie.

Elle veut aux besoins de ce pays, à l'intérêt de ses populations, que la France, que votre Altesse a reconnu que la France pour restaurer l'ordre et réaliser les progrès que réclame.

Lorsque l'heure sera venue d'élaborer des arrangements pour assurer la collaboration de la France avec la Syrie, ils devront être formés à l'égard de nos intérêts. J'ai grand plaisir à vous le confirmer par écrit et à constater que vous le représentez de la France en Syrie. Je prie votre Altesse d'agréer, de

Enclosure 3 in No. 38.

Emir Faisal to M. Clemenceau.

I AM happy to have an opportunity, as I leave Paris for the East, to say to you for the great kindness you showed me in our conversation of Sunday. I told you I am a warm friend of France and of your administration. The deep sympathy that exists between the people of France and the people of Syria is founded on a tradition which you may rest assured I will do my best to maintain.

I was deeply impressed by the disinterested friendliness of your administration while I was in Paris, and must thank you for having been the first to suggest the despatch of the Inter-allied Commission, which is to leave shortly for the East to ascertain the wishes of the local peoples as to the future organization of the country. I am sure that the people of Syria will know how to show you their gratitude.

Our conversations, to which I have referred, have convinced me of the need there is for us to come to a complete understanding on the points that interest us. As, however, it is impossible for me to put off longer my return home, I must ask you to accredit me to continue the arrangements we have begun. Their completion will foster the relations of the two countries.

Let me assure you that on my arrival in Syria, I will do my best to assure you of your kindly feelings towards us and will work to increase the friendly relations between the French and the Arabs.

FAISAL.

[Letter sent on 20th April to M. Clemenceau. The previous draft, a translation of what the Syrians wanted from the Powers and were willing to offer France, was rejected by M. Robert de Caix (acting for M. Clemenceau) and, therefore, transmitted.]

Faisal saw M. House and M. Clemenceau for a few minutes on the 21st April, to say good-bye.]

68905

No. 39

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon. (Received May 6.)

Le Gouvernement français vient de faire savoir à M. Paul Cambon que les troupes françaises de la Mésopotamie sont en voie de démobilisation, tandis que les autorités britanniques se voyaient obligées de faire face à des situations nouvelles en Egypte et aux Indes.

D'autre part, les assurances données par M. Paul Cambon à M. Clemenceau en ce qui concerne le rôle de la France en Syrie, et les engagements que l'Emir Faisal ont amené le Gouvernement français à prévoir et à préparer des troupes françaises, afin d'assurer l'ordre dans ces régions et d'y organiser l'organisation des autonomies locales en tenant compte.

Le 415^e régiment mixte, à quatre escadrons, est en voie d'embarquement à Marseille. Un second régiment, le 412^e, pourra être embarqué dans le courant du mois de mai. Un bataillon de zouaves est formé et pourra s'embarquer le 12 mai à Bizerte; un troisième régiment, le 409^e, pourra être embarqué dans le courant de juin. Le Général Allenby, auquel il en a été référé, a déclaré, au dernier jour, s'en remettre à la décision que prendront à un commun accord les Gouvernements français et britannique.

Le Gouvernement français a chargé M. Paul Cambon de demander au Gouvernement britannique d'accepter le plan ci-dessus et de le notifier au Général Allenby.

(1) Le 415^e d'infanterie restera stationné dans la région de Beyrouth et Tripoli, permettant ainsi le rappel d'un ou deux des régiments britanniques occupant ces régions.

(2) Le deuxième régiment mixte sera envoyé en Cilicie (deux escadrons à Mersin) et le troisième (deux escadrons).

(3) Le 412^e régiment sera envoyé en Syrie et réparti dans la région syrienne.

(4) Le bataillon de zouaves sera envoyé à Beyrouth, où, réuni aux deux bataillons de zouaves sur place, il formera un régiment mixte, réparti dans la région du sud et Latâkieh au nord.

(5) Le 409^e sera sur la route de Beyrouth et employé là où il sera nécessaire pour permettre la relève des troupes britanniques.

Le transport momentané des troupes françaises serait reconnu au Gouvernement britannique d'urgence en ordre nécessaire dans le plus bref délai possible.

Le Général Allenby a été informé par le Commandant de Mersin, attaché militaire français, auprès de sa personne, qu'il s'en remettait à l'accord entre les deux Gouvernements de Paris et de Londres sur les troupes en Syrie et leur utilisation, le Général français Hamelin l'ordre (1) de

de d'envoyer en Cilicie les 412^e et 415^e régiments et les deux régiments de marche de cavalerie.

Il a été décidé de toutes troupes françaises les 10 et 11 mai. M. Clemenceau et les indications du Général Allenby à l'attaché militaire français.

Les troupes britanniques au Général français.

Ambassade de Paris.

le 5 mai 1919.

71025

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 749)
My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 8, 1919.

THE French Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon with reference to a note he had addressed to the Foreign Office on the 2nd May, containing the following:

(1356)

N 2

proposals for the introduction of French troops into Syria. These proposals had not previously been communicated to the War Office, and the latter were consequently not in a position, at such short notice, to give a final opinion upon them. They were a plan for the embarkation of considerable French troops in the East, and Africa, with a view to the occupation of the latter.

As well as of Cilicia. Relying upon some statement to the effect that the French Government

was agreed upon by the French and British Governments, the Ambassador appealed to me to give prompt attention and early effect to the proposals. Incidentally the Ambassador's note contained a complaint that the British Government had not been sent by the British Government.

He commanded the existing French forces in Syria, requiring him to disband the Armenian Legion, and to send some French infantry and cavalry regiments to Cilicia.

I said that neither I nor the War Office knew anything of the latter orders, which were probably required by military considerations. I did, however, know, although the Ambassador expressed considerable surprise at what I said, that the French Armenian troops had proved to be thoroughly unsatisfactory; that it seemed to me a bad thing that troops of that nationality should have been chosen for the work entrusted to them; and that I thought the sooner they disappeared from the scene the better. As regards the movements of the other French troops to Cilicia, I presumed they were to take the place of the disbanded Armenians.

In reply to the Ambassador, I said that the question appeared to me to be in the main not political, but military. Through the mouth of our Prime Minister in the House of Commons, I associated ourselves in a political sense from Syria.

The troops were in occupation was the result, not of any political design, but of the circumstances of the war. On the whole, we should be glad to have the responsibility of occupation, having much more to do with our forces elsewhere.

I said that I was quite prepared to submit the French proposals to General Allenby to be reported or acted upon by him from the military point of view, but that I made two reservations, which I wished to make quite clear to his Excellency. The first was that the movement of French troops, if it were sanctioned, should not be of such a character, either in point of numbers or in respect of the time of their arrival, as to suggest that the British forces were being hustled out of the country with a view to making way for the French.

To this his Excellency replied that his Government did not contemplate anything more than a gradual and progressive augmentation of the French military strength in that part of the world.

My second reservation was that the appearance and action of the French troops should not be such as to prejudice the decisions of the Peace Conference with regard to the future of Syria. France, I believed, expected to receive that mandate. Very likely she would, though even this was not quite certain. For our part, we neither expected nor desired to have it. But viewing the frequent warnings that had been issued in Paris to the Poles, the Greeks, the Serbians, and other nations not to compromise their case by mixing in advance territories which they might or might not

get in the end, I thought it was not unreasonable to suppose that the Italians had already been

and that if they were permitted to appear with Italian regiments at al Kona, which were a part of the true Ottoman Empire.

any reason why the French should not be allowed to stake out their portion of the Turkish dominions which was Arab and not Turkish in character, which the Ottoman Government would in any circumstances be deprived.

I said that a bad example was not the same thing as a good precedent, and that I hoped his Excellency would bear in mind my warning.

In the course of our conversation, M. Cambon revealed to me what appeared to be the result of his part of the final stages of the communications between the Amir Feisal and M. Clemenceau. He assured me that there had been thoroughly satisfactory that the protecting and civilising mission which France had undertaken for herself in Syria, was thoroughly understood and loyally accepted by the Amir, and consequently that the appearance of the French troops upon the scene would be welcomed by him more heartily than by him.

I said that I had always hoped that the Paris conversations would result in such an understanding, but that was not exactly my reading of the documents recording the

final interviews. I had seen the letter from M. Clemenceau to Amir Feisal, in which he had asked his assent to certain general propositions defining the French attitude and claims. To this the Amir had returned a reply, which I had also seen, of a very cordial character, which was in accordance with the French point of view to which his Excellency had referred. I

acceptance of the French point of view to which his Excellency had referred. I

Finally, M. Cambon pressed upon me the plea that, upon the withdrawal of the British forces from Syria, the French troops would be urgently required for the elementary task of preserving order in the territories concerned.

I refrained from observing that there was a likelihood that their presence might have a precisely opposite effect.

The conversation on this subject ended by my undertaking to refer the French proposals to General Allenby.

M. Cambon then

Paris, or rather Versailles. He said that his own reading of the German proposals had been important in tone, but his own reading of the German proposals was that, after a more or less theatrical display, the Germans would in due season accept the terms that were offered to them. He derived this impression, however, not from a study of German mentality, but from the reports received from French officers in different parts of Germany, who described the state of disorganisation and debility there as worse than anything we had hitherto believed.

I said that our own reports differed somewhat according to the parts of Germany from which they came, but that the majority of them certainly conveyed the impression

accepted. This was the view which I personally was inclined to hold, and I asked the Ambassador whether, if the French or the British were in the position of the Germans at this moment, he thought that either of us would accept the treaty that was proposed yesterday in Versailles.

armistice, and, although thoroughly vanquished, they had fought on for the with disabled forces until peace was signed. The British would have done the same. But German mentality was of an entirely different order, and groans and weans would, in his opinion, be followed by sulky submission.

M. Cambon spoke also of the proposed compromise about Fiume, which had been accepted by the Ambassador in Rome, but he did not see in it anything more

extemporised and provisional solution of an almost insoluble problem.

The conversation revealed his Excellency one of the very antipodes of optimism about the European situation.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDDERSHAW

70843

No. 41.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon. (Received May 9.)

Paris, May 7, 1919.

I have the honour to refer to your Lordship's despatch No. 2374 of the 11th inst., containing a memorandum from the Department of Overseas Trade and Commerce to General Clayton regarding Wagner's Engineering Works at Jaffa.

Concerns in Palestine are understood, but it is, nevertheless, important to bear in mind the wider aspects of the matter thus raised.

The Jewish Government, it was when they were a minority from the Conference for Palestine, now pledged to carry out the policy of a national home for the Jews, and in the face of the present hostility of the majority of the population

for the Jews, and in the face of the present hostility of the majority of the population (that M. Clemenceau in 1919 was always a Government of the Jews) their pledges of any form of political preference. An increase in the numbers and economic influence of the Jews and steady colonisation must precede political favour. By this means the Jewish Government of Palestine, at first the law primarily political and religious force may gradually come to welcome his presence, as they see

the full advantages from the influx of Jewish money and the Jewish methods of developing the country.

This line of policy is reinforced by the following considerations: Palestine is a rich and fertile land, and it is the duty of the Government to ensure that the development of its natural resources does not take place at the expense of the inhabitants or primarily for the benefit of foreign capitalists. It is here that His Majesty's Government's adoption of the Zionist policy may be found to offer the best method of insurance. As your Lordship knows, it is the intention of the Government, if His Majesty's Government feel able to adopt their plans, to institute some form of public utility company under the control of the Zionist organisation who could perhaps be given preferential consideration for immigration and land development generally. The company would take, say, 5 per cent. of the profits. The remainder would go to relieve the taxpayer (Jew and non-Jew) in Palestine.

In the uncertainty of the present situation these possibilities can only be indicated but enough has been said to show how essential it is that as long as the Government are in military occupation, and whether British or foreign, to establish themselves in control over the land and the principal industries until the Government enables His Majesty's Government to work out the full implication of their acceptance of a mandate for Palestine and of the policy of the national home for the Jews.

I have no doubt that in the present instance some such considerations as these influenced the military authorities in substituting a shorter lease for the outright purchase of the Jaffa Engineering Works desired by the British firm.

I have, &c

(For Mr. Balfour)

LOUIS MAJLET

[70513]

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, May 14, 1919.

IN pursuance of my note of the 24th March, I have the honour to inform you that I have now received a report from the military authorities which enables me to reply to the notes which your Excellency was so good as to address to me under the date of the 11th January, the 5th and 18th March, respectively, on the subject of the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway.

They will readily recognise that so long as the military occupation of Palestine and the state of war continue, control of the railways in that country must be retained by the military authorities, who must necessarily administer them primarily with a view to military needs. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government this consideration is especially valid in the case of a railway which, as is generally admitted, no longer exists in its pre-war form, but which owes its present being entirely to the work of the army of occupation.

His Majesty's Government therefore regret that they cannot regard as practicable the suggestion put forward in the memorandum by M. Pavis, copy of which was enclosed in your Excellency's note of the 30th January, that the railway should be returned to the company's control. Nor, with regard to M. Pavis's further suggestion, that the section Ludd-Jaffa should be relaid on a broader gauge, do His Majesty's Government consider that they can reasonably be expected to order the undertaking of a new and considerable work of construction on the chance of recovering the expenditure involved from the Turkish Government.

Turning to the two special points raised in your Excellency's note of the 18th March, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the military personnel of the line should be reduced to the minimum, and that the export of goods should be restricted to the necessities of the military and the export within limits of the necessities of the civil population.

the military personnel of the line should be reduced to the minimum, and that the export of goods should be restricted to the necessities of the military and the export within limits of the necessities of the civil population.

His Majesty's Government are reluctant to believe that serious exception can be taken to these regulations which appear to be both natural and necessary.

I trust that the above information will enable your Excellency to convince your Government that the company are not being subjected in any way to unfair treatment by the British military administration.

Yours faithfully,
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[75892]

No. 43

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 695.)

Sir,

Constantinople, May 6, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith report of an interview which took place between my military attaché and Saad Mollah Bey.

2. This individual is the editor of a newspaper, the "Serbest," which is markedly pro-British in tone.

He is a non-in-law of the late Sheikh ul-Islam, Jamal-ed-din Effendi and an influential figure in religious circles.

I desire especially to call your attention to his remarks on the relations of the British with certain undesirable elements here.

There is an impression that they alone amongst the Entente Powers are standing out for the hands of the Turks and for the non-partition of the Ottoman Empire.

6. This attitude is necessarily pleasing to members of the Committee of Union and Progress and the more pronounced Nationalists, through whom the French hope to secure themselves a privileged position in the capital and throughout Turkey.

A member of the French High Commission recently informed the Assistant Commissioner, in all sincerity, that he believed that his nation alone was fit to assume the task of reconstruction in Turkey, and that their co-operation was essential.

These remarks have raised them to a plane which suggests the true facts of the situation.

to Great Britain a mandate for the whole country.

10. Especially in this the opinion of Moslems, who insist that the political advantages which would thus accrue to Great Britain are so less than the material advantages which would be derived therefrom for themselves.

11. It is seriously maintained by those who claim to speak with authority that the British, by the exercise of a mandate, would assure to her the loyalty of her Indian and Egyptian Moslem subjects, both in the spiritual and secular spheres.

12. The importance of apprehending the leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress requires, I think, no emphasis, and is the more important if the certain material advantages conferred by membership than from any inherent virtue in the doctrines preached.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Right Honourable A. J. Balfour, M.P., O.M. in Paris.

I have, &c

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

Report by Military Attaché of Interview with Said Mollah Bey.

Said Mollah Bey commenced by asking me why the attitude of the British High Commission towards the Turks was so markedly cold. I replied that there were various reasons. In the first place, the conditions in which we found ourselves here during the armistice period necessitated it; in the second place, our attitude to our Allies precluded our attempting to establish relations with any individuals or parties without their knowledge and concurrence; in the third place, we did not wish to leave any doubt in the mind of any Turk but that the punishment which would be meted out to Turkey at the Paris Conference would be a severe one, and that in consequence to establish any official or semi-official relations with persons or parties was, until the declaration of that decision, impossible; lastly, I said that whatever his or any other friend's friendship for us might mean, the fact remained that there was a hostile to us in the country, and, for all I knew, attempting to stir other portions of our

... of friction and discord amongst the ... which our ... Committee, derived every advantage from the ... greater courage to ... had tended more to revive, the Committee ... Union and Progress than the attitude taken up by ... of our Allies who, consciously or unconsciously, was in communication with the Committee with very disastrous results.

With regard to the last point men thought that some of the ideas entertained by us and in Europe were not sound. He said that there was no real "spirit" in the party, it was simply and solely a matter of "interest." He did not deny that the party at to-day existing was most active in stirring up trouble against us, and said that he had little doubt that it was, at all events, in part responsible for the recent events in Egypt and India. He said that it was not so difficult as we thought to destroy the party and all that it stood for was not so difficult as we thought. He said that it could be done by the taking of certain vigorous measures; the arrest and conviction of certain leading members, the closing of certain papers, clubs, and other centres of activity. By these steps the party would be, to a large extent, scotched, and all those who derived benefit from it would cease to adhere to what remained of it.

He then went on to say that he thought a great mistake had been made in the attitude we had taken up regarding the punishment of offenders. He was inferring, from the late Grand Vizier, Tewfik Pasha, that we had at first demanded the punishment

Again, referring to the Committee of Union and Progress he said that we had made no real attempt to destroy it. He ventured to think that if the Germans had been in our place, very little of the Committee would have remained at the end of five months; that when we first arrived here the whole of their organization was on the point of being broken up, but that our subsequent attitude of leniency had given it courage, and enabled it to recommence its activities.

to enter on the apprehension and trial of leading C. section members only through the Turkish Government. It was essential that we should make the Turkish Government do the work, and if they chose to do so they were perfectly capable of carrying it out. Then, having cleared the country of the leading members of this party, which would immediately be followed by the results mentioned above, the British Government, assuming control in the country should we be allowed to do so by the Conference in Paris.

May 1, 1919

[75061]

No. 765.)

Foreign Office, May 19, 1919

W 111 _____ London _____ No. _____
_____ 14, May 1919
the difficulties and differences which have arisen at Constantinople between the French
and British authorities, and now Sir R. Graham.

question of French posts in Turkey in Asia, but as a definition of the British and French military spheres on the lines proposed would *ipso facto* settle these questions Sir R. Graham did not labour the point.

As regards the respective powers and functions of the High Commissioner and the Military Commander in the Sudan, the Commission considered that the High Commissioner should deal solely with administrative matters, and that all questions of military command should deal solely with military matters, and that all questions of

administration ought to be referred to the High Commissioners. Civil matters, such as the Ottoman Debt, &c., should be left to civilian control.

His Excellency informed Sir R. Curzon that he was leaving for Paris at the end of the week, and would suggest to the French Government that an arrangement in the above lines might be arrived at.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[76397]

No. 45.

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 20.)

LE Gouvernement français est désireux de voir préciser les attributions du Payeur principal Mouha délégué à Damas pour le paiement des dépenses effectuées et des rentes encaissées.

Le Général Allenby a, du reste, reconnu lui-même la nécessité de voir spécifier ces attributions, lorsqu'il s'est rendu à Damas en compagnie du Haut-Commissaire français.

Toutefois, il y a lieu de remarquer que l'accord du 30 septembre 1918 dit dans son paragraphe 30 (b)

"Sous réserve de l'assentiment du Commandant en Chef, le Conseiller politique choisira

(a) . . .

(b) Le personnel de Conseillers et le personnel subalterne européens qui pourrera être recruté par le Gouvernement arabe ou les Gouvernements arabes institués dans la zone (A) selon la Clause I de l'Accord anglo-français de 1916."

Il n'y est donc pas fait mention du contrôle de l'administration confiée aux Gouvernements arabes.

Il semble, par suite, à M. Pichon qu'il serait tout à fait nécessaire de compléter et de préciser à cet égard l'accord intervenu à Londres le 10 septembre 1918, et de l'administrer provisoire des territoires sous mandat.

L'Ambassadeur de France serait heureux de connaître les vues de sa Seigneurie le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat à ce sujet. Il saisi cette occasion, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 18 mai 1919.

[66816]

No. 46

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

Foreign Office, May 26, 1919.

(No. 3475.)

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 628 of the 30th ultimo, the French Ambassador who has just returned from Paris, advised to-day to the effect that there have been exchanges between the Emir Faisal and M. Clemenceau.

M. Cambon said that he had noticed that when he had cast doubt, some ten days ago, on the existence of any such correspondence, his statement had been received with polite impudence. He had taken the opportunity of his visit to Paris to clear the matter up. I understand that the French Ambassador has made an exchange of letters with M. Clemenceau and that the latter was only willing to write in the affirmative, but that Faisal was not satisfied with this and would like a satisfactory character. A letter from M. Clemenceau was sent to Faisal on the 17th April with a request to communicate the answer which it was proposed to return. When Faisal's draft reply was received, it was not considered satisfactory, and therefore M. Clemenceau's letter was never sent to him.

It would therefore appear that the note from Faisal transmitted to me in your despatch No. 628 as well as the earlier letter referred to in a footnote, both proved unacceptable to M. Clemenceau.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[80101]

No. 47.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 760)

My Lord

Constantinople, May 16, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 144 of yesterday, I have pleasure to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of the note with the Grand Vizier brought to me last evening in reply to that which I had handed to him on the previous day in regard to the occupation of the Syrian forts by the Allied forces.

2. It appears from this communication, as well as from the official statement in the vizier's paper of which also I enclose a copy that Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe informed the Grand Vizier of the decision of the Supreme Council at Paris to proceed to the occupation of the town by Hellenic troops.

3. His Highness had but little to say in addition to the contents of the note: he stated, however, that he was anxious to maintain the peace and to prevent any part of the country against the action which he had taken and he brought a great number of examples with him; he had, in reply, sent telegrams in every direction exhorting the people to remain tranquil.

4. But it appeared a very hopeless task for whereas he had crushed the Greek and other committees were now springing up and doing every effort to stir up the people, and he had to send out British officers and troops scattered in small parties or singly over a great expanse of territory.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47

David Ferid to Rear-Admiral Webb

May 14, 1919.

Constantinople, le 16 mai 1919.

PAR la note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de me remettre au nom des Puissances alliées, en date du 14 mai 1919, elle a bien voulu me faire connaître la décision de la Conférence de Paris concernant l'occupation des forts de Smyrne par les troupes des Puissances alliées.

Votre Excellence a été informé par le 7 mai 1919 que

D'après plusieurs dépêches qui me sont parvenues depuis hier de la part du Gouvernement grec, je remarque que la forme d'occupation annoncée dans la note a été acceptée, en tout, son Excellence le Vice-Amiral Calthorpe vient de l'informé de l'entrée des troupes grecques dans la ville.

La situation est donc très satisfaisante de ce point de vue. Il n'y a pas de justification une pareille mesure dans l'état actuel de la province méditerranéenne de l'Empire.

Sans doute, les conditions de haute administration et d'équité dont je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement grec s'efforcera de maintenir, et la tranquillité dans cette province déjà plus complète.

Bien que nous devions avoir, d'après notre proposition, qui jusqu'ici est restée sans effet, 20 000 hommes sous les armes, il n'y en a en réalité qu'à peine 40 000, éparpillés sur un territoire assez vaste.

Le Gouvernement ottoman ne s'oppose pas à la décision de la Conférence de Paris.

Il n'a aucun rapport avec la Grèce européenne. Si les souvenirs historiques nous rappellent que la Grèce a été un pays de montagnes et de bédouins, il est évident qu'il qu'augmenter la confusion, sans pouvoir assurer aucune solution.

[1356]

O 2

Le peuple ottoman ne se fait aucune illusion sur l'étendue du malheur qui le frappe par suite d'une guerre désastreuse où il fut entraîné malgré lui. Mais ce qui le pousse au désespoir, c'est de n'être nulle part traité par ses anciens conationaux avec les mêmes sentiments de générosité qu'il a mis à traiter ceux-ci. Au moment où la violence luttait avec avantage contre le droit, le peuple turc a respecté tous les sentiments chers à l'humanité. Il a vu, dans la guerre, la destruction de son pays, la perte de son indépendance, la perte de son honneur, la perte de son avenir, là, où il perd son autonomie, disparaissent toutes ses institutions, ses propriétés, ses mosquées, ses écoles, enfin jusqu'à son existence nationale. Un grand nombre de ses habitants ont été tués, d'autres ont été déportés, d'autres encore ont été réduits à l'état de réfugiés. Il sera donc plus juste de juger la nation ottomane par l'ensemble de son histoire et non pas par une période des plus désavantageuses.

Smyrne étant une ville moderne essentiellement turque, avec une majorité turque de 83 pour cent, d'une confession, d'une pensée, d'un idéal et de coutumes absolument différents de ceux de la minorité qui y vit, il serait tout aussi difficile que peu équitable de ne pas prendre en considération les droits de la nation turque dans cette localité. Aussi, ni le Gouvernement, ni le peuple ottomans ne peuvent concevoir un instant que l'occupation de l'une des plus importantes villes de l'Empire ait un caractère définitif.

Le Gouvernement Impérial, dans sa déférence envers les grandes Puissances, a accepté l'Entente, s'inclinant devant leur volonté, sans donner nullement à cette décision le caractère d'une renonciation à son droit.

Veuillez agréer, &c
DAMAD FERID

Inclosure 2 in No. 47

Extract from the "Entente" of May 16, 1919.

HIER matin à 11 heures, l'Amiral Welb s'est rendu au conseil de son Altesse le Grand-Vézir, Damad Ferid Pacha, à Nischantahe, et a remis à son Altesse une note portant que les forces alliées occuperaient les forts de Smyrne selon les décisions prises à la Conférence de Paris.

D'autre part, le commandant en chef des forces navales anglaises, l'Amiral Sir Arthur Calthorpe, a fait savoir par une note communiquée hier matin au Gouverneur général du vilayet de Smyrne que, se basant sur les décisions de la Conférence de Paris et selon l'article 7 de la Convention d'Armistice, les fortifications de Smyrne seraient occupées par les forces alliées.

De même, par une seconde note remise dans l'après-midi, l'Amiral, se basant encore sur la Convention d'Armistice, faisait savoir au Gouverneur général que les Puissances alliées avaient décidé de faire occuper à l'entrée de la baie de Smyrne les troupes hellènes.

Le Gouvernement a pris toutes les mesures que lui dicte son devoir pour la sauvegarde des droits de la nation et de l'Etat.

En même temps, son Excellence le Ministre de l'Intérieur, a transmis à tous les vilayets une communication recommandant à la population de garder le calme et de ne point se départir de la modération.

[76397]

No. 48.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, May 27, 1919

WITH reference to the note which your Excellency was so good as to address to me on the 18th May, relative to the functions of Colonel Moulin, financial adviser to the Arab administration at Damascus, I have the honour to state that in view of the early departure of the Inter-Allied Commission to the East, and the prospect that the whole arrangement for the temporary administration of these regions will, in any case, have to be altered shortly, His Majesty's Government consider that it would be unwise to make any change in the *modus vivendi* now in force. They are convinced in the view by the fact that in the agreements referred to it was expressly

laid down that the French advisers or functionaries should be appointed at the request of the Arab State, a condition as to the fulfilment of which, in this case, I have at present no information.

I have, &c
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[82836]

No. 49.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 812.)

Foreign Office, May 27, 1919.

My Lord,

M. CAMBON paid me his weekly call to-day. He had just returned from a visit to Paris, which indeed we had taken in common at the same time. I had had consultations with his Government and their accounts of what was passing at Paris did not inspire him with any different view from that which he had frequently expressed to me, of the degree of wisdom with which the future fortunes of the world are being determined, or of the nature of the solutions, particularly in the Eastern world, which seem to find favour among the arbiters of Europe. I found some difficulty in reconciling his account of what had happened at Paris in the preceding week with what I knew of the facts; but I record his statements as made to me.

He represented that on a Monday the British representative had practically offered to France the undisputed mandate for Constantinople, the whole of Anatolia, Armenia (if it were not given to the Americans), and Syria; and two days later had submitted the rival proposition that America should receive the mandate for the whole of Turkey.

This suggestion, the Ambassador told me, had excited the vehement wrath of M. Clemenceau, who had been inclined to attribute it to my pernicious influence at Paris. M. Cambon had assured him, from his numerous conversations with me, that this could not be the case, since I had never favoured any arrangement by which French claims to Syria were thus arbitrarily extinguished, and I confirmed his

statement that the suggestion, which he had made to me, had excited the vehement wrath of M. Clemenceau, who had been inclined to attribute it to my pernicious influence at Paris. M. Cambon had assured him, from his numerous conversations with me, that this could not be the case, since I had never favoured any arrangement by which French claims to Syria were thus arbitrarily extinguished, and I confirmed his statement that the suggestion, which he had made to me, had excited the vehement wrath of M. Clemenceau, who had been inclined to attribute it to my pernicious influence at Paris.

He then recapitulated the heads of the agreement or understanding which he had already proposed at the Foreign Office, of the two disputed subjects of: (a) The division of civil and military control at Constantinople during the military occupation; and (b) the division of military commands between Turkey-in-Europe and Turkey-in-Asia. As regards (b), Turkey-in-Europe was to be the sphere of the French, Turkey-in-Asia of the British commander-in-chief. But the French military control was to extend over the city, really a portion of Constantinople itself, separated by a broad channel, on the southern or Asiatic side of the straits, excluding however Haiaz Pasha which, as the starting point of the railway, was to remain in British military hands. This was the agreement which he had proposed, which we had accepted, and which had equally been accepted by his Government. He now sought to obtain one further concession, viz., that the French should be allowed to retain military control over the coal-mines and small port of Heraclea on the Black Sea, which had been developed and were worked by a French company, though in consequence of the war but little had lately been done.

I failed to ascertain from his Excellency for exactly what reason, whether amour-propre or the intention of making a future claim, the French were anxious for the concession: which indeed the Ambassador said that he only sought as a favour and would not press if we felt any strong disinclination to grant it. I promised to look into the matter, which was new to me.

The Ambassador then raised once more the question of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, now in British military occupation, and urged that, immediately upon the signature of peace, the French company which owned it should be indemnified for the seizure. His Excellency also pressed most strongly that M. Pavie, the director of the company now in Palestine, should be accorded an interview, which had hitherto been refused to him, either with General Allenby or with the Governor of Jerusalem, Colonel Storr.

In conclusion, the Ambassador reported to me a very frank conversation which he appeared to have had with M. Sazonof, in which, in reply to the appeals and petitions of that statesman, he had vigorously rejoined that Russia had only to thank herself for her misfortunes; while, as regards the Allies, she had "let them down" so badly that the war had been prolonged for two years.

A little later, M. Sazonof himself, when calling upon me, presented the reverse side of the same picture, by actually contending that, had it not been for the valiant efforts of the Russian armies in the opening stages of the war Paris would have fallen, the Channel ports been taken, and the war ended in less than six months.

If these are the rival angles of vision of contemporaneous authorities, what will not be the perplexities of the historian of the future?

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[76653]

No. 50.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 3482.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 31, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that General Stewart, the Resident at Aden, called recently at the Foreign Office, and in the course of a discussion on the various points which have lately arisen in South West Arabia, expressed the following opinions:—

1. *Proposed Treaty with the Imam.*—General Stewart said that the Imam was expecting to hear from us. The last communication we had sent him was that in which he was told that the question of his representation at the Peace Conference had been finally disposed of. General Stewart considered it highly desirable that something should be done at once, not only to show that we recognised the Imam's position, but also that we intended to enter into negotiations with him. On the suggestion that Colonel Jacobs should visit the Imam forthwith to open preliminary discussions with him, he agreed that this ought to be done. He was of opinion that informal discussion of this nature would not be likely to suffer from Hamazan.

2. *Boundary of the Aden Protectorate.*—General Stewart agreed that the maintenance of a buffer between ourselves and the Imam was no more likely to work in the future than it had in the past. He was inclined to favour extending the protectorate up to the existing boundary on the understanding that the railway was extended. He personally had some doubt as to the advisability of a sanatorium either at Dala or at Darsjan and considered that Aden was more healthy than either, but from the political point of view he deprecated our handing over any of the chiefs in our protectorate to the Imam. He did not think that the Imam had any real expectation of extending his boundary in the direction of Aden.

3. *Future Administration of Aden.*—General Stewart considered that Aden would be too small an area, even if the protectorate were consolidated, to form an administrative unit, as the centre would necessarily be a very small one. He was of opinion that Aden should not be under the Government of India, but that it should be under Egypt unless Egypt were to exercise a central control over all Arabian affairs. If there were any idea of a department being formed to deal with all British administrations in Arab-speaking countries, he favoured a combined service in which at least the senior posts should be interchangeable. The spheres of the Imam, the Sultan of Shehr and Mukalla should remain, as at present, under the control of Aden.

4. *Political Resident at Aden.*—So long as our effective occupation of Aden was confined to the fortress and its immediate neighbourhood, General Stewart considered that the functions of General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and Resident should be combined in one person. If, however, the protectorate was to be consolidated up to the existing boundary, he thought that there would be

1. from the military. He mentioned that from a military point of view it was desirable that Aden and Somaliland should be not only under the same military command, but also under the same central civil administration. The alternatives were in his opinion (a) to include Somaliland in the event of a central department being formed in London to deal with the various administrations in the Middle East,

central department were to be formed, or (b) to include Aden and Somaliland under one military command.

The General Stewart said that the Imam was also expecting to hear from us. The Imam's agent—Sayed Mustapha—had recently had an interview with him in the course of which he expressed some apprehension that the Peace Conference did not know enough about local conditions to be able to effect a satisfactory settlement of Western Arabia. Sayed Mustapha—and indeed all the Arabs in Western Arabia—were in his opinion strongly anti-Italian. At the time of the severe defeat of the Italians, General Stewart had had some difficulty in suppressing universal rejoicings. He had been appealed to by the Italian Consul to tone down the communications, and had done what he could to save the face of the Italians. He did not think that there was any fear that either the Imam or the Imam would turn to the Italians for support rather than to ourselves, so long as they had reason to hope for our support.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[82967]

No. 51.

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 2.)

A LA suite des notes adressées les 3 et 18 mars dernier par l'Ambassadeur de France au Foreign Office au sujet du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem, Sa Seigneurie l'Excellence Curzon of Kedleston a bien voulu faire connaître, le 13 mai dernier, les vues du Gouvernement britannique sur cette question.

Le Gouvernement français, en réponse à cette communication, a chargé l'Ambassadeur de France de signaler à l'attention du Gouvernement britannique les droits acquis par la Compagnie du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem à des indemnités, du fait de la mise de la ligne. Le versement de ces indemnités devrait s'effectuer aussitôt après la signature de la paix; d'autre part, le paiement de semblables indemnités incombe à l'occupant, en conformité de l'article 53 de l'Annexe à la Convention de La Haye de 1907 sur les lois et coutumes de la guerre terrestre, et non pas à l'Etat souverain. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement français s'adresse au Gouvernement britannique en cette occurrence.

D'autre part, indispensable, en vue tant de la fixation des indemnités que du règlement des diverses questions d'ordre pratique posées par la mise de la ligne, que des entretiens aient lieu sur place entre M. Pavie, directeur de la Société, actuellement en Palestine, et les autorités militaires britanniques. Tous les efforts faits par M. Pavie en vue d'entrer en conversation soit avec le Général Allenby, soit avec le Colonel Storms, sont demeurés sans résultats; cette attitude des autorités militaires britanniques ne saurait se prolonger sans inconvénient.

Aussi le Gouvernement français insiste-t-il pour que le directeur de la Société du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem soit reçu en audience, le plus tôt possible, soit par le Général Commandant en Chef les forces alliées dans le Levant, soit par le Gouverneur des territoires occupés de Palestine.

M. Paul Cambon enjoint, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 mai, 1919

[87743]

No. 52.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 3482.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 11, 1919.

At the request of the Earl of Derby, the French Ambassador, who has again been to London, has been in conversation with me this afternoon.

He has been in conversation with me about the differences that had arisen between the French and British Governments in regard to the future of Syria, which had produced such strong feeling between the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain. He now came to explain to me that an even more regrettable situation had arisen out of the proposal of the British representatives to mount at the eleventh

For his own part, he was quite convinced, and so were the French Government, that the Allies had only to stand together in order to compel Germany to sign. He did not attach the least importance to her bluff or bravado. She was only attempting to profit by the alleged disagreement between the Allies. She had nothing to sustain her in resistance, nothing to fall back upon in retreat; and, if only a firm front were exhibited to her, she would without a shadow of doubt give way. That, at any rate, was his forecast of the future. Further, his Excellency remarked that, while it was the general impression in Paris that the British Prime Minister and the American President had hitherto acted for the most part in combination, and had promoted each

I replied that, so far from the British Prime Minister having yielded to any pressure of the sort to which the Ambassador referred, an allegation of this description had been expressly denied in Parliament, and I could testify to the fact that the decisions were taken by the British Government not of himself alone, but of the British War Cabinet and Empire Delegation, specially convened in Paris for the purpose. I had myself been prevented by indisposition from attending those meetings; but, having read a full account of

The Ambassador did not know whether anything had been done to ease the strained situation which had arisen in consequence, nor had I any information which could give him relief on this point.

Passing from these subjects, I said it was my duty to call the attention of M. Cambon to a number of points of minor interest which, however, were not without their effect upon the relations of our two Governments and peoples. For some time

The first of these incidents had arisen in Persia. It was now some months since the Ambassador him-self had come to me to explain that the French Government had been approached with a view to appointing a Financial Adviser in Persia and to interesting themselves generally in the affairs of that country. He had, upon instructions from Paris, committed me as to the advisability of the French acting in this sense, and I

fore, was not my surprise to learn that the new French Minister in Tehran, M. Bonin, had signalled his arrival there by a display of quite exceptional activity in the interests of his country, culminating in an attempt to extract from the Persian Government permission to appoint not less than fourteen officials to the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice in the Persian capital. I said that such an influx of Frenchmen into Tehran, however excellent they might be, and however useful in their professional spheres, could not fail to mean the practical absorption of those two departments by the French, while it ran the risk of reproducing in Tehran once again that unfortunate competition and rivalry between European Powers, upon which the East has so much international trouble. If France desired to disinterest herself in Persia, why should she wish to have Frenchmen in the service of the Persian Government at all? It was perfectly clear that, when the war was over, whatever might happen at the Paris Conference, Persia would require both financial and administrative assistance from outside. To whom, in such circumstances, could she turn but to Great Britain? What other Power would have the real interest or would be able find the money? Persia had always been an Indian interest of considerable importance; but now that her territories lay between those of India on the one hand and of Mesopotamia on the other, both regions under British administration, it would really be making gratuitous mischief to introduce any other European competitor on to the scene. I felt sure that the French Government if appealed to, would desert from an attempt, not only inconsistent with their previous utterances, but likely to breed the very quarrels they deplored.

I pointed out to him, before leaving the subject, that it was a matter on which I felt seriously, that I regarded the action of M. Bonin as distinctly provocative, and that he must understand my reference to the matter to be in the nature of a formal

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{for } t \in [0, \infty) \text{ and } x \in \mathbb{R}^n, \\ & \text{for } t \in [0, \infty) \text{ and } x \in \mathbb{R}^n, \\ & \text{for } t \in [0, \infty) \text{ and } x \in \mathbb{R}^n, \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, the Turkish delegation desired to be heard, irrespective of peace, I could not conceive why such a request should have been granted by anyone of all the belligerents, and it seemed to me that, if this were the

A further incident has happened which revealed a similar disposition on the part of the French. The Turkish Crown Prince, or Heir Apparent, had sent a telegram appealing for sympathy and support to the rulers of Great Britain, France, and Italy. This Prince was in exactly the same position as the Crown Prince of Germany, that

to say, he was the eldest son of a monarch who had been, and still was, at war with the Allied Powers. Was it conceivable that such a telegram, coming from the German Crown Prince, would have received any reply? In this spirit, no answer had been returned by the King and the same attitude had been taken up, after consultation with us, by the King of Italy. What was not, therefore, our surprise when we learnt that the President of the French Republic had actually, through the medium of the French Foreign Office, sent a telegram of thanks to the Turkish Crown Prince, and, in a message signed by M. Pichon himself, had assured him that France would not neglect the vital interests of Turkey. Mr. Lloyd George had already protested to M. Clemenceau against this proceeding, the impropriety of which had been frankly recognised by the French Prime Minister. But I could not help drawing the attention of the French Ambassador to it, because it was an additional illustration of the spirit of international rivalry and intrigue which the French representatives appeared once more to be manifesting in the East. Great Britain had, I reminded M. Cambon, declared her reluctance to assume the mandate for Constantinople or Turkey even should it be offered to her. France, after some hesitation, had taken the same line, as reported to me by the Ambassador himself. In these circumstances, what excuse was there for these backstairs attempts on the part of French representatives to depict themselves as the particular friends of the Oriental States or Governments whose fate could be determined only by common agreement in Paris?

I then gave M. Cambon a third illustration of the same spirit. If there was any region, I said, in which France had good cause to be grateful for our support, it was in Syria itself. Not only had Mr. Lloyd George in the Councils of Paris openly declared that Great Britain neither desired nor would accept, if it were offered to her, a mandate for Syria, but we had actually telegraphed an intimation to the same effect to the Emir Faisal. Our policy, therefore, was aboveboard and known. If difficulties remained, they were not so much between the French and ourselves as between the French and the Arabs, who, according to my information, appeared exceedingly reluctant to accept France as a mandatory. Of all the French representatives in those regions, the one who had received most encouragement and assistance from us was M. Picot, the joint author of the unfortunate Sykes-Picot Agreement. This gentleman had on many occasions turned to us for aid. He had been taken, under the protection of the late Sir Mark Sykes, to Aleppo and Damascus. Every effort had been made by our representatives to secure him a good reception and a friendly hearing from the Arab and Syrian population. M. Picot had, however, used his own position as a representative, I was therefore very much surprised when I read that he had, on the 13th May, in a speech to the school teachers of Beirut, expressed himself as follows:—

"A people once asked the French to help them to gain their independence. The French responded and within a year the liberation was achieved. The people of the Americas and the country from which they were freed was Great Britain. Having appreciated the help given, the Americans asked what reward they could give. 'Have your independence, that is the only reward we seek,' said the French. The same attitude is now held towards Syria. To see you independent is what we long for. You have my assurance that France will help you to this end."

Having read this extract to the Ambassador, I said that I thought the Syrians would be greatly surprised to learn that it was to the French that they must look for their independence. But, putting that aside, the suggestion that it was from Great Britain that this independence was in danger, and that the French were appearing upon the scene as the emancipators of Syria from the British yoke, appeared to me to be an astonishing travesty of the facts.

The Ambassador sought to make little of the American analogy, and enlarged upon the French desire to secure and protect the independence of Syria. But neither in this case nor in those that I had mentioned previously did he seriously contest my proposition that these incidents were much to be regretted, and, in concluding our conversation he promised to take an early opportunity of bringing them to the attention of the French Government.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[89010]

No. 53.

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 16.)

EN répondant, le 27 mai dernier, à l'Ambassadeur de France au sujet du Paysant Principal M. le conseiller financier auprès de l'Administrateur de la zone est, à Damas, sa Seigneurie le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Étrangères a bien voulu s'occuper aux termes de l'accord de septembre 1918 l'engagement de l'Etat arabe condition qui n'a pas été en respect, tel que

le Gouvernement français a chargé l'Ambassadeur de France de faire remarquer à sa Seigneurie le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Étrangères que l'Etat arabe n'a pas tenu ses engagements et que les conditions de l'accord de septembre 1918 n'ont pas été respectées. Ainsi le Gouvernement français ne peut pas accepter la situation actuelle, et désire-t-il, ainsi que l'a fait connaître le note de M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, voir les conditions de l'accord de septembre 1918 se réaliser dans les conditions présentes.

M. Paul Cambon amb., &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres.

le 13 juin 1919.

[89850]

No. 54

Brigadier-General Clayton to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 17.)

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
June 5, 1919.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward copies of reports rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwallis, Deputy Chief Political Officer at Damascus.

These reports give a clear appreciation of the political situation and they may be taken to be accurate, as Lieutenant Colonel Cornwallis is to an exceptional degree conversant with the situation in the Levant.

I have, &c.

G. E. CLAYTON, Chief Political Officer,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force

Enclosure in No. 54

Report by British Liaison Officer on Political Situation in Arabia

(No. 24 Secret.)

THE visit of the Commander-in-chief on the 12th instant was given a political significance, and even if it was not a success, it was a failure.

The visit was a success in so far as it showed that the two main parties, the British and the Arabs, were not yet at the point of no return. It was a failure in so far as it showed that the British were not yet at the point of no return.

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The little opposition that I experienced at first was caused partly by misunderstanding and partly by ignorance of what the Arabs wanted. The Europeans thought that the troubles that commonly took place in the country were the fault of the Arabs, and expressed their apprehension of our renewing such troubles, but when it was explained to them that the Turks were the cause of all the troubles in Syria, they agreed to do so. In fact, to all that you asked and the Inter Allied Commission will soon arrive and will ask you to express freely your wishes with regard to the future of your country. In the League of Nations, which was formed to guarantee the peace of the world, the Arab nation will have one delegate. After its return to Europe, the Inter Allied Commission will give a report of the demands of each of the nations liberated from the Turks, and it is according to these reports that the Peace Conference will decide the future of these countries. Thanks to our Allies, our foreign duty has already been accomplished, and it now remains to you to choose to be either slaves or masters of your destiny.

"Do you approve of all that we have done?"
 "Yes, good" (Great applause.)
 "Are these deeds satisfactory to the people?"
 "Quite satisfactory" (Great acclamations.)
 "Is what we have done in conformity with the wishes of the nation?"
 "Exactly." (Great applause.)
 "Now these are our past deeds, and as you are present I have to ask your personal opinion whether you want us to go on with our work or not?"
 "We shall go on, we shall go on." (Strong applause.)
 "Does the nation depend upon the one that is pleading her cause?"
 "With all good-will and confidence."
 "Now listen to what I have to say. Does the nation permit me to handle her internal and foreign affairs, or not?"
 "Yes, yes." ("Long live")
 "I thank you, Gentlemen, for your confidence in me and for your satisfaction with my deeds. You know that a lawyer cannot defend the rights of people unless he has official documents which he can present to the authorities, proving him to be a true representative of the defendant, so it is with politicians. They have to be appointed by those they represent, and should be given power in all the matters where discussion is necessary."

... these are the essential points that are needed by the man or men who are authorised to deal with the political problems till the time when the Syrian Congress is held. To be able to work I wanted to have this authorisation; I asked it from you and you gave it to me, so now I ask God to lend His helping hand to me in my struggle for the welfare of this country.

"I say that because of the great welcome of the nation for me, which will make me expect from her very strong backing to action whenever I ask that from her

Nad-ed-Din El-Khshl, one of the representatives of the Hauran, said: "The Hauran offers to his Highness all that he asks."

A delegate of the Amriyans (Arabs) said: 'We are equipped for war, we and all the Arabs, are under your orders. The one who is killed let him die.'

Then the delegates of the different districts began to rise in turn and show their approval of his work, and give him the authorisation to work as he sees fit for the welfare of Syria.

The Hauran delegate said: "The Hauran offers to his Highness all that he asks."

Nasib Bey Atraah (Druse chief from the Hauran): "All the tribes in Syria whether Arabs, or Druses, sacrifice their lives in your service and the service of the Arab, and the one who does not do this has no honour, and is a traitor to the Arab."

ask the people of Damascus, and then the other districts of Syria.

Catholic Patriarch: "Just as your Highness orders—so please order what you want."

The Catholic Patriarch said I am just as my colleague, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch has just intimated."

Umar Bey-el-Azaz of Lema. I only said farewell to the people of Lema, for they had entrusted me with the power to represent them. They hand to you their blood and lives."

blood and lives." Lebanon (Southern Lebanon): "We choose you as our Sultan." From this, it is clear that Lebanon is at present a complete Syria and would not be separated from it.

Abd-el-Kadir Effendi Kham el Hama: "We agree with you with our lives and
property, and lay all confidence in you."

Saukeh Riza Refai of Aleppo: "All the inhabitants of Aleppo, citizens, and nomads lay confidence in your Highness."

Shawkal Effendi-el-Hirabi of Ma'ama: "60,000 of the district of Ma'ama lay confidence in you."

Shrekh Abu-el-Medj El-Mograbl of Tripoli: "The nation sacrifices her life and

"I am glad you are so well," said the young man, "and I am glad to hear that you are so well." He then turned to the other two men and said, "I am glad to hear that you are so well."

A Jordan young man from Amman "We sacrifice our children and possessions for the good of the Arab nation."

M. Effendi Haroun of Sathikiya: "A friend of mine and myself were sent from Sathikiya with presents to our master at Amman to speak for their quality and to ask for their pardon. He has been so kind to do what you think good for the country."

A Life of Woe and Sorrow "The inhabitants of Es Salt are the servants of your Highness. They sacrifice their lives and blood for you."

your Highness. They sacrifice their lives and blood for you.
Emir Asad-el Azzam of Lebanon We gave your Highness full authority to work
for absolute independence."

Mustapha Bey Awad, on behalf of the Druses of Lebanon: "Everything that you see good is good and we give you our full confidence."

Abd-el-Kazala Effendi, El-Daudashly of Husn-el-Akrad: "The inhabitants of Husn-el-Akrad, who form one-fifth of the inhabitants of El-Eutassarfyah of Tripoli, authorize your Highness to represent them, and they pour their blood for you."

The Religious Head of the Jews: "Our possessions and souls are in your hands."

Emir Feisal: "I have got what I wanted."

Then the Mutran of the Armenian refugees spoke in Turkish thanking the Arabs for their good treatment to the Armenian refugees during the four years of war, and said that in their history the name of the Arabs shall be written in letters of gold, so now I thank and congratulate you.

After hearing what the delegates said Emir Feisal continued his speech, saying —

"There is no doubt that after I have received this authorisation from this honourable assembly I shall continue my work as before till the meeting of the Syrian Congress, which will formulate the laws for all Syria."

"I shall tell you now my personal opinion as regards the Government of this country, aiming by this at an explanation of the situation to the people, and a tranquillization of their minds without regard to religion or creed. I think that more attention should be paid to the votes of the minority, thus to efface the hatred and religious faction created by the Turks, and to sow in its place the seeds of love and of fraternity amongst the members of the different religions. I also think of dividing the country into parts according to its geographical location and to its attainments and habits, so that the southern part of Syria will not be governed like the northern part, and the Hauran and Jebel Druse will have special laws, which will be in conformity with the wishes of the people. So also we shall have for the coast and for the interior of the country. Thus, as I have said, is my personal opinion, but without regard to the public, and we will do according to it."

"I have shed independence please depend on God first, my humble person, and be sure that I will have no difference between the different religious sects."

I have no distinction between the members of the different sects, and I only look to degrees of education and promote the one who is fit only, never asking what he is or to what religious sect he belongs. In private affairs we should treat people of noted families, but we should not give them responsible posts unless they are worthy of them, and then it is their education and character that gives them the post. We should not play with the Government posts because they are not ours, but the nation's property, and the holders thereof are the trustees of the rights of the nation."

"I beseech you, sons of the nation, to depend and trust in our Allies who helped us, and who wish us good success and have no ambitions but to help us to progress. So we ought to prove to them that we are an energetic nation that wants her independence."

"Show them that we protect neighbours and refugees, that we help our old and young, and that we respect those of their number who come to us and work for us in this dear country of ours."

"I beg this especially from you because this is the only foundation on which we can build our future work, and I also beg from you to unite for the common cause, a thing which it is as much your duty as it is mine and to work towards it. I tell you that you will have no independence unless you keep the peace and do exactly as I tell you."

A few words as an excuse for the long speech and the faults made therein ended his address.

(For Lieutenant-Colonel, D.C.P.O.)

G. R. HUNTER, Captain

May 12, 1919.

[91521]

No. 55.

Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 269.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 11, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 950 of the 10th June, I have the honour to refer to the Khurma Dispute between King Hussein and Ibn Saud.

I have &c

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 55

Note by Captain Garland, of the Arab Bureau, on the Khurma Dispute between King Hussein and Ibn Saud

Ibn Saud.

IN 1915 a treaty was arranged between Emir Ibn Saud and His Britannic Majesty's Government, which, in return for the independence of the Kingdom of Nejd, La Hasa, Qatif, and Bahariya, it was a temporary agreement, and no definite boundaries of the territory were specified.

Ikhwan.

Although generally regarded as a new creation, the Ikhwan or Brotherhood movement is really a revival of an old-fashioned form of Wahabism, the great puritanical revolt against orthodox Mohammedanism in the 18th century, which was ultimately suppressed by the British in 1917 and which, since then, has existed in a merely moribund state chiefly within the confines of Nejd.

The tenets of the Ikhwan creed are very similar to those of Wahabism, though its methods are without doubt more fanatical. The Ikhwan are very strict in the brutal methods of effecting conversions and of punishing sinners, rather than the peaceful methods of Wahabism, that appear hypocritical. There is no doubt whatever that the Bedouins are systematically terrorised into conversion, and that those who refuse are done to death. In war, the Ikhwan are said to take no prisoners, but to cut the throats of all who fall into their hands.

The Ikhwan are a very fanatical sect, and it is not surprising that they have been able to gain a large following in the present purposes to know, firstly, that the sect originated close by his own capital, at a time when he was a young man, and secondly, that it is merely a desperately fanatical edition of Wahabism, of which he is the head, and will certainly not fail to use it for furthering his own ends.

For the present, the Ikhwan are a very fanatical sect, and it is not surprising that they have been able to gain a large following in the present purposes to know, firstly, that the sect originated close by his own capital, at a time when he was a young man, and secondly, that it is merely a desperately fanatical edition of Wahabism, of which he is the head, and will certainly not fail to use it for furthering his own ends.

Since the first appearance of the Ikhwan, about ten years ago, in the vicinity of the Nejd, it has been practically certain that the whole of Nejd is Ikhwan, and its missionaries have penetrated to all the corners of Arabia.

But its doctrines are detested by all orthodox Moslems, and the rulers of the Arab States surrounding Nejd (especially King Hussein) live in constant dread of its spread to their people.

Khurma Dispute.

The present Khurma crisis has two causes, one religious, the other political. The religious cause is the King's determination to stop Ikhwan sectarian propaganda in the Kingdom of Nejd, and the political cause is the King's determination to stop Ikhwan sectarian propaganda in the Kingdom of Nejd.

King Hussein has put forward a very good case in proof of his ownership of

[1356]

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Khurma, and thus, after much delay, has received the support of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The population of the Khurma district than on ownership of the actual ground, agreed that the quarrel should be submitted to our arbitration.

The territorial dispute has its origin in the conversion to Wahabism, in 1914, of Khurma, a Sherif named Khalid, whom the King had appointed Khurma before the war. By embracing Wahabism, Khalid became a foe of the King. For four years the King appears to have taken no steps to rectify the situation at Khurma or to collect his taxes there. In 1918, however, he sent tax gatherers, but they were arrested by Khalid, who, realising that his action meant war, collected a small Bedouin force with which he ejected all loyal elements from Khurma.

In May 1918, the King drew our attention to Ibn Saud's attitude towards Khurma, and that, in consequence, he had ordered a force of about 1,000 men to be sent to Khurma, brother of Emir Shakir, and to collect his taxes there. In 1918, however, he sent tax gatherers, but they were arrested by Khalid, who, realising that his action meant war, collected a small Bedouin force with which he ejected all loyal elements from Khurma. In May 1918, the King drew our attention to Ibn Saud's attitude towards Khurma, and that, in consequence, he had ordered a force of about 1,000 men to be sent to Khurma, brother of Emir Shakir, and to collect his taxes there. In 1918, however, he sent tax gatherers, but they were arrested by Khalid, who, realising that his action meant war, collected a small Bedouin force with which he ejected all loyal elements from Khurma.

Military Incidents.

Emir Sh. kir was despatched by the King to the Khurma district with 4 guns and 4 machine guns. The King stated that the force ultimately arrived at Marran.

The next military incident was an attack by a loyal Attribah sub-tribe (the Mupatati) under their Sheikh, Shukri, against the Ikhwan in Khurma, but they were utterly routed. This attack was probably, though not necessarily, instigated by Shakir.

In August, Shakir moved from Marran and met the Ikhwan at Hannu Wells, 16 miles east of Khurma, where his force was annihilated. It was reported that during the conflict one of the Attribah tribal sections (the Riqat) deserted en masse to the Ikhwan. Each side was blamed by the other as the aggressor in this action, but it was the result of Shakir's advance from Marran, which may not, however, have been intended aggressively by him.

Up to this time Ibn Saud, pronouncing the King the aggressor in every incident, declared to be responsible for his men at Khurma, though he affirmed that he himself would not intervene. In spite, however, of Ibn Saud's repeated denials of lending support to Khalid and the Ikhwan, he cannot be absolved. Khalid, undoubtedly, was acting as his agent, and looked to him for guidance and help. In fact, a letter written to Ibn Saud by Khalid, after the Hannu Wells fight, and which was seen by Mr. Philby, contained a full report of the action, and stated that the captured guns were being kept pending the orders of Ibn Saud as to disposal.

This defeat necessitated the despatch of further reinforcements to Emir Shakir, and accordingly more guns and machine guns were sent from Abdullah's camp, but, except for minor raids by the Ikhwan, on caravans taking supplies from Taif to Shakir's base, there were no military incidents for some time. The King and Abdullah continually repeated their promises to keep to defensive measures only and denied all aggressive intentions.

In one of the raids Abdullah's son had a narrow escape, and the Ikhwan captured all his belongings. This increased Abdullah's determination to take revenge. He made up his mind at that time to take a large force to Khurma and to destroy the Ikhwan.

But although the King and Abdullah had been warned consistently by us to avoid aggressive acts or even an advance on Khurma, it must be emphasized that this policy of ours was dictated purely by military expediency, and was decided upon in spite of our strong sympathy with the King's claim to Khurma. It was realized that the Sherifians could spare neither commanders, troops, nor guns from the forces which were besieging Medina, and further, that a big defeat at Khurma at that time would probably result in a disastrous reaction on the siege operations by heartening Fakhr-i-Pasha and enabling him to come to some arrangement with Ibn Saud for the further defence of the city or for surrendering it to the Ikhwan.

Little was done, however, by India to call off Ibn Saud or to order him to cease his anti-Sherifian propaganda amongst Hejaz tribes. The Indian view at that time was

that it would be wrong for us to support the King in military action against our treaty ally, Ibn Saud. The British Government, however, advised him to modify his attitude and to persuade his followers from further opposition to the administrative measures of King Hussein at Khurma.

The fall of Medina, in January 1919, left Abdullah free to set out on his long-cherished expedition to Khurma, which, he had often prophesied, would be over, with the complete destruction of Ibn Saud's forces, within two days of his (Abdullah's) arrival on the scene.

It was feared by British advisers on both sides (Iraq and Egypt) that Abdullah's ill-considered move must inevitably result in a collision of the rival forces, and it is quite probable that the British Government in London the present crisis would not have arisen. Indeed, had we been aware of the Emir's actual warlike intentions, we should no doubt have strongly protested against the advance instead of merely suggesting the impropriety of it. Abdullah's regular force consisted of 60 officers, 770 other ranks, 10 guns, and 20 machine guns. It reached Asheirah early in April. As soon as he learned of Abdullah's move from Medina, Ibn Saud began counter preparations. He certainly warned His Majesty's Government of these and, expressing his wish for arbitration, stated that he was compelled by pressure of public opinion to take the field. "I will remain in mine," he said. "I will remain in mine." But although we looked upon Abdullah's advance as unwise and foolhardy, and advised him not to start, we do not, we cannot, deny his right to occupy Khurma.

The raiders were pursued by a detachment of 100 men to overtake them, but intercepted and defeated a second detachment of 100 men. On the same date, another detachment of Ikhwan was attacked at Radham by a patrol of 100 men. Of these raids we have not yet received reports from Ibn Saud's side.

On the 21st Abdullah reported that, after two and a half hours' fighting, he occupied Tarabiah, and that after consolidating it, he would advance to Khurma. In the night of the 21st May, Ibn Saud's force of 100 men, which was sent to Tarabiah, decided to take the Ikhwan raid on Daghbiyah as his excuse for an attack on Tarabiah.

Abdullah also reported the arrival in person of Ibn Saud at Sakphah (80 miles north-east of Khurma).

We may be sure that if Ibn Saud does not deny that the Ikhwan raid on Daghbiyah ever took place, he will certainly assert that it was not done at his instigation and was, therefore, an ordinary tribal raid for which he cannot be held responsible.

On the night of the 21st May, Ibn Saud's force of 100 men, which was sent to Tarabiah, decided to take the Ikhwan raid on Daghbiyah as his excuse for an attack on Tarabiah. Abdullah at Tarabiah, driving him out, and, according to several accounts, destroyed his regular force, capturing all its guns and machine guns. Emir Abdullah got away with 500 irregular mounted men only, and retired to Okhaidir. Later information shows that Sherif Sharaf (Abdullah's second in command) had a small force at Kelakh, which the Ikhwan attacked at dawn on the 26th May, but were repulsed, Sharaf decided to join Abdullah at Okhaidir. The retirement on this latter place was probably necessary to protect the Sherifian base at Asheirah.

With the destruction of Abdullah's army, the road from Khurma to Taif lies open to the enemy. Mecca and even Jeddah are at the mercy of the fanatical Ikhwan. From Medina, Emir Ali can only send reinforcements of the same fighting value as Abdullah's original force.

Results.

It is a sad fact that, in every conflict with the Ikhwan, the Sherifian forces have failed. Although the Sherifian forces have been equipped with modern arms and war service it has failed when put to its first crucial test and although heavily equipped, it has been defeated by an untrained enemy armed only with rifles.

Future Policy.

Although King Ibn Saud has now received the British offer of assistance, the question arises—what steps does he propose to take for the permanent defence of the Arabian Peninsula? The Ikhwan, who are now in the hands of the British, are a Harb Tribal Confederation, in whose territory they lie, but whether they would obey a call to arms is problematical because their allegiance to the King has been impaired by the considerable arrears of pay in which Emirs Ali and Abdullah kept them during and since the war. And, further, they are just as vulnerable to the proselytising methods of the Ikhwan as the other tribes, and at a critical moment might go over en masse to the opposite side.

The Ikhwan menace will not cease when the present crisis is over. Aeroplane defence of Taif and Mecca can be but temporary, even if its moral effects (combined with our political pressure on Ibn Saud) are great enough to stall Ikhwan aggression, but so long as our aeroplanes are withdrawn the pro-Nejd tribes on the frontier will recommence their raids and the safety of the Holy Places will depend on—

1. The maintenance of a regular force by the King. This, to be of any use must be trained and staffed by qualified officers, and must be of a very different type to the present Arab army.

2. Our hold on Ibn Saud from the east.

3. The King's alliance with Ibn Rashid.

The King should be able to maintain an army good enough to stop Ikhwan and other raids not organised or supported by Ibn Saud. Unfortunately, there seems to be little hope that the King's forces will ever be able to cope with Ibn Saud's army, and the task of keeping the latter in check will therefore devolve on His Britannic Majesty's Government.

And with regard to the means at our disposal of subjugating Ibn Saud, it is suggested that threats by our forces on his eastern districts, Ham, Hofuf, &c., from whence he draws his supplies and which are greatly prized at Riyadh, are much more likely to be effective than giving King Hussein military assistance which, as has been proved, is only an indirect method of ordnance supply for Ibn Saud.

It should not be forgotten that the King's dream of an Arab Empire, over which he or his successors will reign, is also Ibn Saud's dream, with himself in the leading rôle. But, whereas the King is dependent for his army upon mercenaries of the worst type, Ibn Saud's army is composed of tribesmen of a most desperate and self-sacrificing character.

The third factor likely to be of use in keeping Ibn Saud in check would be by our influence on Ibn Rashid. Ibn Rashid has always been a doughty opponent of Wahabism, and can collect large Bedouin forces from Central Arabia for threatening the Nejd lines of communication. But this will no doubt mean paying a subsidy to Ibn Rashid, probably through the King. It is indeed difficult to see how Ibn Rashid can be brought into line without the inevitable subsidy drawn by all the other leading chiefs of Arabia. He himself appears willing to be the first Arabian chief to accept Hussein's suzerainty (at a price).

For the further repression of the Wahabi and Ikhwan movements, it will be necessary to include in the treaties ultimately to be made with the individual independent Arab rulers, except Ibn Saud, a clause under which the latter is made responsible that Ikhwan missionaries are not sent out of his territory, and, further, giving power to the other rulers to expel such Ikhwan missionaries as may obtain entry into their countries. Such a clause would give the utmost satisfaction to all the orthodox Moslem rulers.

Ibn Saud has now been ordered to withdraw all his forces from Khurma, failing which his intentions will be regarded as hostile to His Britannic Majesty's Government, and his treaty rights and subsidy will be forthwith cancelled.

The geography of the Khurma district is practically unknown to us—even the distance of Taif from Mecca is not agreed upon by those who have visited both places. Mr. Philby passed through Khurma on a journey from Riyadh to Jeddah in 1917, but he has not yet issued any detailed map.

The position of the villages east of Taif, shown on the attached sketch map* are therefore only approximate.

H. GARLAND

Arab Bureau, June 4, 1919.

* Not reproduced.

[91491]

No. 56.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 1007.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 18, 1919

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship herewith copies of various reports received either direct or through the American Delegation of the atrocities perpetrated by the Greek troops in Smyrna. The reports are detailed, circumstantial, and trustworthy, and there can unfortunately be no doubt of the disgraceful conduct of the Greek troops or of the lack of control of the Greek authorities.

Owing to the nature of the sources from which these reports have been received, your Lordship will appreciate that the documents themselves cannot be communicated in original to the Greek Government. I would suggest, however, that your Lordship should bring the substance of these papers to the knowledge of the Greek Government in the manner that you may deem most fitting.

I am, &c.

(For Mr. Balfour),

LOUIS MALLET

Enclosure 1 in No. 56

M. A. van der Zee to United States Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople.

(Confidential.)

Swedish Consulate, Smyrna, May 20, 1919.

Sir,

THE military occupation of Smyrna by the Greek forces.

I have the honour to report as follows:—

1. Early in the morning of the 15th instant, sailors and marines landed from the Greek ships, occupied the city, and took possession of the town and the harbour on the lesser quay, and, together with British sailors, the telegraph and post office buildings.

2. At about 9:30 summer time, the disembarkation of forces from the Greek ships took place on the lesser quay, between the Government House and the railway pier of the Anilin Company at the point.

3. Forming up in companies, the troops moved on to the quay and the barracks situated at the extreme end thereof, opposite Government House, hemmed in by the cable of the town.

4. At about 10:30, just as the head of the column had debouched into the main street of the Kemur Ali quarter, just the barracks, a few shots were fired—it is said, from a hotel and coffee house.

5. The Greek troops, after taking possession of the town and harbour, moved on to the Government House and the barracks. The Government House induced a Greek sub-lieutenant to stop it.

6. According to the statement of British and French subjects, notwithstanding the performance, not a shot had been fired by the barracks during the whole time of the landing, and this testimony is supported by the fact that when firing commenced some very many persons leaving them when calm was restored.

7. Another proof that the barracks did not fire is the fact that no bullet marks are visible on the stores facing them, which would inevitably have been the case.

8. As soon as the danger of a stray bullet had passed the soldiery and the crowd moved on to the Government House and the barracks.

9. The Greek troops, after taking possession of the town and harbour, moved on to the Government House and the barracks. The Government House induced a Greek sub-lieutenant to stop it.

10. After being kept with hands up for about 30 minutes, the so-called prisoners (the Greek troops) were marched up the quay and handed up to the transports, where they were put in the holds.

11. The Governor-General, who had been made to walk a good half-mile in a like

state, was, with the Commodore of Smyrna, the only exception, a motor-car having been provided for them.

12. The brutality of the troops to their prisoners during this mile-and-a-half march, the cold blooded way in which they shot down defenceless men who were unable on account of their wounds and the treatment they had received, to walk as fast as they were ordered, the savage and cynical manner in which they treated the bodies of their victims, booting off the heads of the dead and leaving them to rot in the streets, and the manner in which they treated the wounded, all these things are so well known to the world that I need not repeat them.

13. I attach the statements of two British subjects, members of one of the oldest and most honourable families in this place, as their reports give fuller details of what occurred.

14. While these tragic scenes were being enacted on the quay a regular man-hunt had been organised in the side streets.

15. Led on by all the roughs of the town, the Greek soldiers, firing recklessly to the right and left at every head that protruded from window or balcony, forced open doors and stores, dragged out the wretched Turks who had sought shelter therein, and then, blinding them of all they possessed, marched them to the transports, leaving the promises broken open to the prey of their co-religionaries, who had assisted them in this gallant task.

16. The reports that have come in of what was done in the side streets exceed belief, and the conclusion that most Europeans have come to is that these arrests of the Turkish people, the manner in which these arrests were made, the brutality to which prisoners have been subjected, the spoliation of property, and the wanton destruction of property, have not been provoked by want of discipline on the part of the troops or the want of discipline on the part of the population, but are the results of a premeditated plan of action.

17. It is based, firstly, on the evident unwillingness of the Greek authorities to punish criminals who have been caught red-handed and brought before them; and, secondly, on the encouragement they had given to all the roughs of the place.

18. It is true to tell that the commander of the troops, Colonel Zaphiron, issued proclamations to the effect that marauders will be severely punished, and that the doors of the court-martial are open ready to hear any plaints.

19. It is also true that two men have been shot probably to throw dust in the eyes of the British naval and military authorities, who have bitterly complained of the murders of his men, but the many instances of absolute refusal to punish criminals, the expressions of opinion of all classes of the Greek community clearly prove that these persons and the executions above mentioned are but steps to Cerberus.

20. What the loss of life and property in the town has been, I will report thereon as soon as it is established.

21. It is stated, though without authority, that between 700 and 800 persons have lost their lives.

22. While this state of affairs was reigning in the town, the bad characters in the suburbs of Smyrna and the surrounding villages, encouraged by the immunity granted to them, promptly set to work to murder as many Turks as they could lay hold of, and to rob every place they could break into.

23. *Cucuk-Tepe and Cocuyali.*—In these two suburbs about twenty persons have been killed. The loss of property is very great; big sums of money kept by the Turks in their houses have been robbed.

24. *Burnabat.* In this village nine men were shot down and stranded, 1,000 sheep and about fifty horses, mares, and bullocks lifted. Loss of property, 8,000*l.*, and it goes to standing crop difficult to estimate.

25. *Boudjak.*—Seventeen persons killed, and loss of property not yet estimated.

26. *Yedigöller.*—Twenty-three persons killed in this place and adjacent villages. Loss of property great.

27. *Tahatli Villages.*—These two villages have been ransacked. Many of the houses have been burnt.

28. *Dym-Strasi.*—This place and all the villages around it (Jujukler, Keiser, Kuvay, Sami, Deyirmen Lere, Trutza, Palamut, Chikene, and Curusje) have been sacked. Turkish population is invading trains leaving for Smyrna. Loss of lives very heavy. Figures not yet at hand. Some women and children found dead in Kukur Dere buried by Baron van Heemstra.

29. *Vourla.*—Villages around have been partly destroyed. No details yet obtained as to loss of life or property.

Before closing this report, I cannot refrain from expressing my regret that steps were not taken to prevent the appearance of the Turkish population in the streets made or small detachments landed from the ships to give this occupation the appearance of an inter-Alied one, there is absolutely no doubt that perfect order would have reigned.

I am, &c.

ALFRED VAN DER ZEE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 56.

Memorandum.

ON the 15th instant, having got an order from Colonel Lallierow to send soldiers to guard our factory, which is situated at Hacha Boumar, I proceeded at 3.30 P.M. that same afternoon to the casarot of Hacha Boumar and found the sentry on duty, surrounded by two or three civilians. I asked the sentry where I could find the factory. He pointed out the factory and I proceeded to it. I found the factory surrounded by the Greek soldiers. I soon found out and saw about 10 or 12 soldiers thrown in the river. The return of the band of soldiers followed soon after. I went up to the first soldier and asked who was the man that had just been shot, and he informed me that he was one of the two Turks they were after; the other, he said, managed to escape, but he also will be found and shot. It so happened that a friend, at Hacha Boumar station was quite proudly relating this very same affair to her friend, adding that the Turk shot was the owner of the Oriental Café Mta, Ltd., factory, situated quite near the shot. I want to add that the unfortunate owner's body was still floating in the river on Saturday evening, the 17th instant, with only, as far as clothing consisted, a shirt on; the rest of the clothes had been stolen off this dead body.

H. E. S. SOLES.

Hacha Boumar, May 21, 1919.

Enclosure 3 in No. 56.

Statement of a most old and honourable Subject in Smyrna

When the Greek troops entered the town of Smyrna, they were met by the Turkish population, accompanied by cheering Greek civilians. Six companies marched past the town, and the Turkish population, who were in the streets, were very much surprised. At an immediate order the troops and civilians came running across the town, and the Turkish population, who were in the streets, were very much surprised. The troops then lined the edges of the square and commenced a terrible fusillade at the barracks, the coffee-house, and Government House. What they were firing at was difficult to say, as far as I could make out, not a shot was fired at the barracks, the coffee-house, and Government House. The first few shots I heard, as I went to the act of some patriotic hotheads. The fusillade was kept up by the Greeks for about half an hour, when a white flag, hoisted over the barracks, was at last seen by the Turkish population.

As soon as the firing ceased the Turks in the barracks began to come out, holding a token of surrender. They were made to go through an ordeal of knocking about. I now left the office and went to the barracks at the same time as the first batch of prisoners was taken out. The officers could with difficulty prevent their men from shooting the prisoners. As far as the custom-house I only saw one Turkish porter shot and then bayoneted. From there up to Kramer Palace Hotel I was the unwilling witness of the massacre of some thirty unarmed men, who were being marched with hands up. This butchery was committed by the Greek soldiery entirely.

At a point between the Corn Exchange and the Orient Bank I saw six being shot out of our batch within ten yards. At a point higher up I saw five others succumbing under the fire of Greek rifles. Close to the landing-place of the Cordelio boats I saw a

Smyrna, May 18, 1919

Again, late on Friday afternoon I visited the Turkish hospital. At the morgue

Smyrna, Turkey

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3. Reports of wanton brutality by Greek troops are very current, but the commanding officer can state none to which he was witness, due to the ship's anchorage and distance from the town. It is understood that several people of repute ashore have

1. The captain of the "Adventure" stated that the Greek troops surrounded the Turkish gunboat tied up to the quay and fired volley after volley into the ship, wounding two of the crew severely, and not desisting until the captain of the "Adventure" intervened and remonstrated with the troops. The Turkish gunboat bled the Greek troops was wantonly brutal and had machine guns turned on a larger Turkish gunboat.

on the other side of the "Adventure," and fired some shots into her, but the captain of the "Adventure" got her out of the port before any casualties to her personnel.

A Turk + civilian, said to have been the cause of the arrest and execution in Roumania of two Englishmen, and who was in prison in Roumania and later released by the Germans when they entered Roumania, returned to Smyrna and openly boasted of what he had done in Roumania. The Greeks entered his house, bayoneted and shot him, and five Greek troops ravished his sister. She sought aid at the American Commission hospital in Smyrna, and, on being examined by the surgeon, Dr. Englewood, confessed to him that five Greek soldiers had assaulted her.

A deal of looting took place in the Turkish quarter. Turkish troops in many attempts to safeguard the property of Turkish civilians, but the Greek troops pillaged and destroyed. One Turk tobacco dealer came to an American tobacco representative in Smyrna, and requested a loan of £T 10,000 (paper) to pay it to some Greeks who had stolen several hundred boxes of tobacco from him. He asked to have the matter taken up with the Greek authorities, stating that he would be killed by the Greeks, and stated that he would pay the money and avoid trouble. I am further told by an American tobacco representative in Smyrna that the Italians were secretly encouraging the Turks to resist the Greeks and probably supplying them with arms and ammunition. I cannot substantiate this statement, but I believe it to be founded upon fact and based on information received by him through Turks in his employ.

A Turkish merchant in Smyrna, in whose house I called on Friday, the 24th, stated that his house had been entered by Greek troops, on the pretext of searching for fire arms or something that might harm the Greek soldiery, and stated that the Greek troops were brutal in the treatment of his family including the women. Greek neighbours intervened and had two Greek troops stationed in the house to protect them. This Turk naturally feels very bitter, and states that the Turks have plenty of arms and ammunition, and are determined to resist to the last man. Many Turks are closing out their businesses and leaving Smyrna rather than to remain with the city and vicinity under Greek control.

L. S. "Manley," Constantinople, Turkey,
May 25, 1919

R. L. MERRY

Enclosure 8 in No. 56

Notes of a Conversation with Dr. Alexander MacLachlan, of the International College at Smyrna

DR. MACLACHLAN is a Canadian. During the war Modern refugees from Macedonia came to Smyrna, 90,000 of them. They were then sent to various parts of the coast. Practically all of them were sent to Smyrna. Most of them were sent to Smyrna. Only a few to the other parts.

After the armistice and before the Greek occupation in Smyrna, the Greeks of Asia Minor were teaching pupils vile songs about Turks in the schools. They said, "Now is coming our turn. We will show the Turks that we are the better men."

The former were comforted themselves with the view that no such foolish thing would be done to give this territory to Greece. They encouraged the Turks that they were doing themselves good.

The Turks represent three-quarters of the province of Aidin. In Smyrna Greeks are a majority over the Turks. But adding the Jews and Armenians, &c., the Greeks are a big minority in Smyrna itself. The suburb—Sevedekent, Boudjah, Kousloujah, Vourah—are preponderantly Greek. The whole peasantry, hundreds and thousands of villages, are purely Turk.

Within thirty-six hours before the landing of the foreign guards (twenty at each point), the Turks turned down the last Italian offer on ground that they would receive justice from the United States and England.

Admiral Calthorpe sent, on the 14th May, statement that Smyrna would be occupied solely by Allied troops, according to article 7 of armistice. Asked if Greek

troops would be included. Answer indecisive. They never thought that it would be a Greek occupation.

Colonel Smith, the British official in control, said that if Greek troops landed there would be no trouble.

At 2 o'clock on morning of the 15th May the news got out among the Turks that the Greeks were coming. The Turks fled to the hills. (Horton, the American consul, arrived the day Dr. MacLachlan left Smyrna.)

A few were killed by the Turkish soldiers when the Turkish populace rushed the Greeks. The next day the Greek populace were given these same arms.

It was expected that nothing toward would happen when the Greek troops landed. The quays of the Turkish quarters. The troops were blessed by the Bishop Chrysos in his intercession. Marched along the quays with tremendous demonstration.

Small number of Turkish cavalry came out of barracks to meet Turkish population. Greek troops fired upon the barracks, a regular fusillade. Instructions to Turkish troops were that they were to stay within the barracks.

Turkish officers surrendered, marched along the quay with arms up in air. They were forced to shout "Zeta Venizelos!" Turkish Governor-General was shot. Some Greek soldiers were killed, but probably chiefly by poisonous Greek firing.

by the Turks themselves. The bodies were thrown into the water from the quays. A message was sent to Constantinople the day before by three telegrams.

Dr. MacLachlan went to Captain Dayton, of the U.S.S. "Arizona," and asked for advice. He was frightened. Now Dr. MacLachlan puts it down as 300 to 500. Over 100 unclaimed bodies known to Dr. MacLachlan.

Looting began everywhere. Everything taken from Turkish houses. Looting still going on on the 29th or 30th May, when Dr. MacLachlan left Smyrna.

The Greek young men around the suburb where the American school is located attempted to take the Turkish men servants stationed outside. They were only saved by being taken within the buildings of the school. One was caught and murdered, and his body lay in a street for four or five days.

The Greek Metropolitan (Makris) was at a meeting just before he left that Greece could not handle the situation.

Enclosure 9 in No. 56

Commanding Officer U.S.S. "Arizona" to Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople.

U.S.S. "Arizona," Smyrna, Asia Minor
May 18, 1919

My dear Admiral,

YOU may be interested to hear, from one who has been at the scene of the events of the last three days connected with the Greek occupation of

that a note was sent to the Valt by Admiral Calthorpe, advising him that, in accordance with article 7 of the armistice, the Greek occupation of the city with the city itself would be a force.

Shortly after 12 o'clock a Greek force was landed out near the old fort and took possession of it. This is the fort that commands the entrance to the harbour. It appears that an English force was landed on Long Island, some 12 or 13 miles out, with French and Italians at other minor points. Later in the day, at 4 p.m., landings were made from the United States, British, French, Italian, and Greek warships, some twenty in each case, as guards for their respective consulates. The presence of the Greek troops in the old fort and their predominance in other places

aroused the suspicion among the Turks that the occupation was not to be by the Allied forces, except as a pretext for handing the city over to the Greeks.

About 10 o'clock P.M. a second note was handed to the Viceroy, the representative in English, the exact meaning of which did not appear to be understood by the Turks, though it shortly became clear to them that it was to be occupied by the Greeks alone, a fact which caused general dismay and excitement among the Turks, who at once congregated in large numbers in their quarter of the city, in their mosques, and on the slope of the hill to the south-west of the Government barracks.

The commander of the barracks was notified that he must retain the few troops that were in the city within the barracks enclosure, and be prepared to hand over the barracks at the pleasure of the Greek commander. By early morning there was great excitement among the Turkish population, and the crowd in large numbers went to the entrance of the barracks and demanded they be furnished with arms to protect themselves against the Greeks. The demand was refused, but in time the crowd succeeded in forcing an entrance. They were then fired upon by their own troops, and some were killed. The remainder fled back into the streets. No notification of the desire of the Greek commander having reached the commanding officer in barracks, and knowing that the barracks were in large numbers on the quay, less than a mile away, he sent over to the Governor to ask if the barracks were to be handed over. The reply that they were not to be at once handed over. Consequently, some ten minutes later when the Greek commander arrived, the Turks were still in possession. The Greek commander complained that the barracks had not been vacated in accordance

Greek troops, at the head of which were the Bishop of Ephesus and the Metropolitan of Smyrna, Chrysostom, were now passing along the water front from the landing stage amid great manifestations of patriotism and shouting "Long live Greece" and "Long live Venizelos." The landing also had been carried out with great ceremony, which frequently drew their whistles, and had come alongside the quay, a few paces away from the United States consulate, while across the end of the consulate street on the quay was a long banner stretched bearing a welcome greeting to the Greeks, while beside this was a very large picture of Venizelos. The troops after landing stacked arms on the quay and executed a dance round the stacked rifles. All this was calculated, whether intentionally or not, does not seem clear, to aggravate the Turks to the utmost limit.

As the Greek troops marched around to the other side of the barracks to enter them from another street, a small troop of Turkish cavalry was leaving to go to disturbances in the neighbourhood. At this critical moment a single shot was fired from the Turkish quarter in the street, close at hand. On this the Greek commander gave the order to fire, and the barracks were at once brought under a heavy and continued fire of Greek soldiers, who also fired promiscuously on the surrounding populace. This heavy firing continued for a considerable time, and resulted in killing from 50 to 100 persons, practically all civilians.

Two of our Red Cross relief workers who passed over the scene of this fighting shortly afterwards saw only two dead soldiers (they carried some of the wounded to the American relief hospital near by). Most of the Turkish soldiers who were in the barracks on the arrival of the Greek troops fled out by another door and occupied up to 100 yards by, those who remained or at least a portion of them, replied to the fire of the Greeks from the windows of the barracks, as did also some of the populace in the streets with their revolvers, and thus at least two Greek soldiers were killed and some fifteen or twenty wounded according to the statement of the Greeks. A hurried consultation of the officers in the barracks was held, and it was decided they should at once surrender, and a young officer stepped out on the balcony waving a white window curtain. He was at once slightly wounded and fell, but the heavy firing ceased almost immediately. Considerable fighting took place, if it may be called fighting, when the shooting was practically all done on one side by soldiers in the little park in front of the Governor's palace and on the water-front close by, where considerable numbers were killed and wounded, practically all of whom were Turkish civilians. Although there had been considerable excitement earlier in the day on the edge of the Turkish quarter, owing to the encouragement of some of their leaders to hold the Turks in check, it was not until about 11 A.M. that the fighting referred to above began, and it was not until a few minutes later that the heavy firing began right beside the United States consulate, said to be due to shots having been fired from windows close by. Very few,

however, were killed here, although the firing was promiscuous and very heavy for some time between the landing stage and the Governor's palace, and it was in some of these places where most of the deaths occurred. Of the city where the Turks were few in number very regrettable incidents took place.

A large quantity of arms and munition were taken to the Greek populace. Indeed, we had ample evidence of this the next morning at Paradise when we found all the Greeks in our neighbourhood able to bear arms fully equipped with rifles, and in some cases with bayonets also, which they told us had been given to them the day before by the Greek military officials.

The firing went on intermittently for some hours, and occasionally with great violence. As was natural under the circumstances, the Turks suffered almost exclusively. On Thursday evening one of our former students who was in touch with Greek headquarters told me in answer to my question that two Greek soldiers had been killed and some fifteen to twenty wounded, and also that some twenty to thirty Greek civilians had been killed and forty or fifty wounded. (I have since discovered only a very few Greek civilians were killed and wounded.) I have not had time or opportunity to verify these statements. As to the number of Turks killed and wounded, it is difficult to form an exact estimate. On Thursday evening I was inclined to believe the number killed was not much above 100 but since then I have been obliged to increase this estimation from time to time until by this evening, due to personal observation, I am bound to estimate the killed among the Turks at from 300 to 500 and the total casualties at from 700 to 1,000. Here is some of the evidence upon which I base this estimate. Up until this afternoon there were still about

hundred dead bodies of Turks in the morgue at the American relief hospital and in another place near the point. During the afternoon of Thursday and all day Friday, Turkish women in large numbers flocked to this morgue to try and identify their dead among these bodies. Besides the bodies lying here there were a number of arms and legs out belonging to them. The bodies of many of the killed were at once removed from the streets by their friends and relatives, while large numbers were immediately thrown from the quay into the sea, and many of these are still floating about the bay and harbour. Only this evening as I passed along the quay near the Governor's Palace four bodies, three of them stark naked, were lying on the quay and which had evidently just been drawn from the sea.

The killing of unarmed and undefended Turks continued throughout Friday in the suburbs, some of it at the entrance to the college camp in Paradise, where a Turkish official was taken by the young hoodlums of the neighbouring villages over to the edge of the road-side near by and foully murdered during the forenoon of that day. His body was left by the roadside for the rest of the day, and then in the evening thrown from the high bridge near by into the stream below, where it still lay the following Tuesday evening, and was photographed by officers from the U.S.S. "Arizona."

Some of the Incidents on the Quay

Some of the worst events of Thursday took place on the quay, where large numbers of Turks, chiefly civilians, were being marched along in line with uplifted hands, by the Greek soldiers who were in charge of them, and by the Greek populace, who were incited to inflict various kinds of inhuman treatment upon these unhappy

While from my position I could not command but a very small portion of the quay, some of my personal friends, Americans and Britons, who were eyewitnesses at different quarters have informed me of many of these untoward incidents. Old men, unarmed, and other unoffending civilian Turks were knocked down by Greeks, killed by stabbing with knives or bayonets, and then afterwards, having their valuables and clothing stripped off their bodies, were thrown into the sea. In one instance the man was again shot after being thrown into the sea by Greek soldiers. Many of the Turks, as they were marched along with hands up, were followed by a rabble who followed. Specific instances are cited by these same eyewitnesses where Turkish soldiers and soldiers were bayoneted from behind by their Greek guards, while the rabble rifled their pockets and then threw their bodies into the sea. Many of the worst instances of inhuman treatment of the Turks were while they were under arrest and on the open sea front at noonday. On

Thursday a report went out that the Turkish sailors on a small gun-boat (lying beside the British destroyer "Adventure" inside the breakwater) fired on the Greek troops as they passed along the quay on their way to the barracks. I have carefully looked into this report and find that it is absolutely without foundation. The Turkish officers who were taken prisoners at the barracks were put on board a Greek transport and placed in the quarters just vacated by horses. The Civil Government officials, who were all at once arrested, were thrown into a close warehouse room where there were no sanitary arrangements and left there for thirty-six hours without food. In the prison quarters where the civilians were placed to the number of 1,500 or 2,000, many schoolchildren, no food was provided from the time of their arrest on until it was provided by the British naval chaplain, Lieutenant-Embling, with funds furnished by our American Commission for Relief in the Near East. On Friday this chaplain distributed food in one prison to 1,100 persons. The Governor-General of the province, Ismet Bey,

he water-front with uplifted hands, and while thus under escort had his fox knocked off by the rabble and his gold watch and chain taken.

In practically all cases where prisoners, including officers, were thus marched along the quay they were con- pected to shout out every few steps "Long live Greece!" "Long

live Greece!" from behind, which seemed to have been prepared for the occasion. Occasionally those arrested were not Turks but Armenians or Jews, one of whom being our interpreter an Armenian, at the hospital, the occasion of his arrest being that he was wearing a fox. The quay especially but also the streets leading to it, were strewn with, I may say, literally thousands of torn tents. All day Friday a mob of men, women, and children for arrest, insult, or, in some cases, murder. A man, with his wife and daughter at his side, subjected to insult through wearing a fox. It was unsafe even to carry it in his hand as a sign of his submission to the demand of the mob that insulted him, and he had finally to thrust it inside his coat. All day Friday Turks, when they ventured in the streets, did so either without any head covering or under a hat.

Looting

In other quarters of the city, where looting of Turkish houses and establishments continued, Thursday afternoon, all day Friday, and up to this evening. The personal notice makes it clear that no adequate measures have up to this moment been taken to stop this plundering of Turkish houses and establishments of various kinds.

Much of it had better be classed as robbery (for it is frequently being done under the pretext of searching for arms on the part of the soldiers). Paper money, sometimes in very large amounts, watches, and all kinds of valuables, are secured and carried off.

Soldiers stop this looting, and in a few cases of which I know, taken steps and have succeeded in restoring plundered property. In other cases, I regret to say, the soldiers encouraged the plundering, while in others they shared in it. I will mention a single instance of the latter. Beside our American Consulate Institute for the Blind, the crowd rushed in, and thousands of pounds worth of books, &c. When a Greek patrol happened along they first of all told some of those carrying off the goods to put them down when they did. Almost at once, however, the patrol passed on, and the thieves again picked up their books and carried them off.

All the Turkish houses in the neighbourhood of our college campus at Paradise were plundered throughout Friday before our eyes by the hooligans in the neighbourhood, who were armed on Thursday by the Greek military authorities. They (the Turks) have all fled to our campus for protection. As I finish this report, Sunday morning, Turks from the neighbouring town of Dejenova come to me reporting that all their houses there have been looted in the last item, and that they are absolutely stranded. They were told by the Greeks that if they paid them 500 gold liras they would see that the town was not sacked. They paid the 500 liras, and shortly after were stripped of all their possessions.

In the neighbouring town of Boudjah, where there are many British and some American residents, and where only a few houses have been looted, the Turkish homes have been plundered. Efforts are now being made, and with success, to restore some of the plundered property, and I trust these efforts will be continued.

I should say, however, that not all of this plundering of Turkish homes and establishments is being done by the Greeks, for I know of special cases where those of the communities—of course, in every case by people of the baser sort—have followed the lead of the Greeks and joined in the plundering. I should also add that naturally the loss of life to the Turkish people is not all, deplore as that may be, which has happened during these past three days quite as much as we do, and wish as earnestly as we do to have it stopped. Strong representations have been made with the Greek Government, and to all these untoward events by the representatives of the Allies, but up to Saturday evening no efficient measures have been taken to stop the looting, and no restitution made.

Notes (added after coming into the city to hand this report to Captain Dayton).

As I drove along the water front dead bodies are being washed up on the quay, in addition to those that were reported as being there last evening. I have this moment seen a number of dead bodies, some of which were Turkish dead Turks who are also seven more dead who were thrown into the water, and one who was still lying there.

This morning news comes in that different towns and villages some few miles to the west of the city have been looted by bands of Greeks. There is also a report that the hooligans of Proprietary have been looting the houses of the Greeks in good news if true. I am also told, on what seems credible authority, that the town of Manisa, in the province of Smyrna, has been occupied by the Italians. If this is true it will prevent certain terrible reprisals by the Greeks by the Turks in these cities.

[89509]

No. 57.

Lord Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 4099.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 20, 1919.

ON grounds of public policy I have been a good deal disturbed at the continuous and increasing looting of Turkish property by Greek forces in the western parts of the country. I have been particularly concerned at the reports which have come to hand that advances have been made in the case of the Greeks with the sanction of the Allied Powers, to be continued in their later stages, so far as is known here, with no sign of any and in open disregard of the principle, laid down in the early days of the Conference, that its ultimate decisions should not be prejudiced by any of the aggressive action in respect of the occupation of territory by any of the belligerents. I am also concerned at the occurrence of this twofold penetration because it is apparently being prosecuted without interference or protest (save from the Turks) at a time when the importance of retaining at least some portion of the Turkish sovereignty and of the former Turkish dominions in Asia is reported to have received a somewhat tardy recognition at the hands of the Allied Powers, although it must be clear that the reversion of any such policy will be seriously compromised by the clear and constant encroachments upon what remains of Turkish territory. A further disquieting symptom is the constant and increasing loss of life and property to the Turkish people, and the consequent suffering and distress which is being caused. I must express my concern from these continued encroachments upon what remains of Turkish territory, and the consequent suffering and distress which is being caused.

As the more concerned at the occurrence of this twofold penetration because it is apparently being prosecuted without interference or protest (save from the Turks) at a time when the importance of retaining at least some portion of the Turkish sovereignty and of the former Turkish dominions in Asia is reported to have received a somewhat tardy recognition at the hands of the Allied Powers, although it must be clear that the reversion of any such policy will be seriously compromised by the clear and constant encroachments upon what remains of Turkish territory. A further disquieting symptom is the constant and increasing loss of life and property to the Turkish people, and the consequent suffering and distress which is being caused. I must express my concern from these continued encroachments upon what remains of Turkish territory, and the consequent suffering and distress which is being caused.

be plunged into a state of renewed and, in all probability, protracted violence and disorder.

The further the Greeks or of Italians, are pushed, the greater the danger of civil war, and the more inevitable the prospect of a future strife, if not of serious bloodshed.

In the various appreciations that reach the Foreign Office of the policy that is now being pursued, it is not possible to see any prospect of success in the immediate future. And yet the persistence of the Greek Government in its policy of aggression, and the persistence of the Turkish Government in its policy of resistance, are both factors which tend to make the situation more serious.

I have ventured to submit this representation, not as a protest, which I cannot but feel, but as a statement of the facts of the situation, and of the dangers which are likely to arise from the present policy. I shall be very grateful for any information that you may be able to give me on these points.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 57.

Italian and Greek Penetration in Asia Minor.

1. THE distribution of the Italian troops may be divided into two categories:—

(1.) The force at Konia, which the Director of Military Intelligence puts at two companies and a brigade headquarters, but which an earlier report from Constantinople estimates at 1,200 men, which is under General Milne's orders and is responsible for the patrol of the Anatolian Railway between Konia and Eskişehir.

(2.) A force distributed along the coast from Adalia in the south to Ephesus in the west, occupying as intermediate points between these two places Makri, Marmarice, Budrum, Sokia, and Scalanova. This force is based on the Island of Rhodes, where, according to the Director of Military Intelligence, a reserve force of at least five infantry battalions and one cavalry regiment exists.

Of these places Adalia was occupied on the 2nd April and is held by a force comprising a company. From Adalia the Italians have pushed inland to Budjak, which they have occupied, and to Budur where, if they have not established a permanent garrison, their political officers are extremely active in canvassing the project of a railway to Adalia.

Of the other coast positions, Budrum, Makri, Marmarice, and Scalanova are held by forces varying from 100 to 250 men with machine guns, except at the last-named place, where there is a force of 500 men with field guns. There are 250 men at Sokia and 100 at Ephesus.

At this western extremity of their area, the Italian Government has shown a disposition to dispute the Greek hold on the "Smyrna front" has already taken place at the village of Chios. The Greek Government's readiness to evacuate in favour of the Italians.

2. Turning to the Greek operations, the landing at Smyrna on the 15th May was effected in force, and Admiral Calthorpe reported that by the 23rd May 15,000 troops had been disembarked. After this landing the Greeks proceeded to push east along the railways as far as Alashehr and Nazli, which was occupied on or about the 3rd June. The country between these points has apparently been secured by the occupation of Eudemish, which the Greek troops were expected to enter on the 2nd June, and where their entry was being contested by the Turks. (We have had no confirmation of the place having been actually occupied.) A force of about 1,000 men was landed at Aivali on the 29th May.

West of Smyrna they have occupied Vourla and Cheeme with small detachments.

* The Italians have since declared their intention of making Marmarice a naval base.

while within the last ten days they have pushed north of Smyrna up to Menemen and Bergama.

In addition to the considerable forces already employed it is reported from Athens that the 13th Greek division, lately released from South Russia, will not improbably be sent to Smyrna.

The boundaries of the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Vilayet of Aidin are marked in the attached map, and it will be seen that the Greek occupation has been carried out in accordance with the authorisation given by the British Government. Mr. Palmer's telegram No. 414 of the 1st June, which authorised the Greek occupation of the Sandjak of Smyrna, was based on the fact that the Greek Government had been authorised by the British Government to occupy the Sandjak of Smyrna. The Greek occupation of the Sandjak of Smyrna was carried out without previous authorisation and was not justified by any of the circumstances.

That the Greeks do not regard their occupation as merely temporary appears from a report which the Greek Minister at Constantinople has made to us, that the survey study of the Meander River Valley made prior to the war by a British group may be used by the Greeks to justify their occupation of the valley. The fact that the representatives of the Sandjak of Smyrna, who are now in the hands of the Greek Government, with the knowledge of the British Peace Delegation, with a view to securing recognition of their company's rights.

The Turkish view of these rival movements seems to have been expressed by a recent deputation from the Council of Ministers at Constantinople, who contrasted the Greek behaviour at Smyrna with the "however regrettable, but nevertheless peaceful" Italian penetration.

June 18, 1919.

[92738]

No. 68.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon—(Received June 23.)

(No 970.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 6, 1919.

IN accordance with the instructions, both written and verbal, which the members of this High Commission have received, it has been our constant attitude to show no kind of favour whatsoever to any party, and to treat all parties on an equal footing. The treatment to be meted out to the Ottoman Empire as the result of the war is likely to be of great severity.

2. All interchange of hospitality and comity has been rigorously forbidden, and no opportunity has been lost to prevent any party from being in contact with the British or Allied Governments. I have been, indeed, most careful to prevent any indication, whether by deed or word, which might give rise to a situation where the Turks could once again begin the practice of spreading jealousy and dissensions among the Great Powers and of turning the results to their own advantage.

The same line of conduct has been observed with both the Grand Viziers who have been in office since the 1st of June. The British Government has been in the position of having to deal with the Turkish Government, although both of them are in a position to do so. The British Government has been in the position of having to deal with the Turkish Government, although both of them are in a position to do so. The British Government has been in the position of having to deal with the Turkish Government, although both of them are in a position to do so.

4. There have, however, been certain evidences that my French colleague was endeavouring to draw direct political profit from the subservient attitude of the Turks, evidences which I have reported to your Lordship from time to time as they occurred. It has not, however, been until these last few days that the French Government has been in a position to do so.

5. The French Government has been in a position to do so, although both of them are in a position to do so. The British Government has been in the position of having to deal with the Turkish Government, although both of them are in a position to do so. The British Government has been in the position of having to deal with the Turkish Government, although both of them are in a position to do so.

the American Commissioner, although the telegram specially referred to the Allied and Associated Governments.

5. I already reported to you in my telegram of 1193 the terms in which the invitation to the Conference were made public attributing it to the action taken by M. De France.

6. As nothing was so eagerly desired by the Government and the people here as the to be represented at the Conference, the effect produced by this announcement was great. It has been followed by a continuous flood of propaganda in the press, with some specimens. I should add that my delegate on the round the first indication for approval, but when the words "he taste par lui," i.e., by the French High Commissioner, came after applying for instructions insisted.

A further bid for favour was made in arranging that the Delegation should be to France in a French man-of-war, which was done by M. De France at his first interview with the Grand Vizier, much to the embarrassment of the latter, who has told a mutual friend that it was impossible for him to refuse, though he is jealous of his colleague, who will be carried in a British man-of-war.

8. Your Lordship will not fail to perceive that these actions, trifling as they themselves are, are an entire break with the of the armistice, and a reversion to the unfavourable in Turkey before the war.

I am quite aware of what the atmosphere in Paris at the present time whether it is one of regarding the Turks as a defeated enemy upon whom credit is naturally and deliberately decided on, are to be imposed without regard to their feelings or wishes, or whether competition for Turkish goodwill forms an element in the situation. However this may be, I believe it would be difficult to select a deputation which would, on the whole, be more favourable to Great Britain than the present, nor have I much faith that a more favourable deputation would be sent. The opinions professed through life by the two Grand Viziers. There has been a question of sending Ali Kemal Bey, Minister of the Interior, to the Delegation, but I am sure of his sentiments, and a hint from me was sufficient to procure his departure.

10. With regard to Fuzul Pasha, his views are that the Turkish Government are unable to carry on without assistance. The disorganisation of every branch of the Administration is hopeless. It is a financial chaos; not a financial position. The interior is a welter of refugees of all races and religions who have been driven in the course of the war from their homes. The most serious problems are presented by the occupation of Smyrna by Greeks, whilst the situation is complicated by the encroachment of the Italians further south. His Highness sees no possible hope save in the exercise of a mandatory Power, and he reasons from the signal success of Great Britain in governing their Mussulman countries that the remains of the Turkish Empire should be administered with the help of Great Britain; or the more so as the Sultan and Caliph will then be able to exercise Power as that which already controls the destinies of the great mass of the Mahomedan world. If the mandate does not fall to Great Britain he deems that it should then be taken by the United States, but he declares himself opposed to a French mandate.

11. Tawfik Pasha is a secret understand that the remains of the Turkish Empire, will bind it closely to a certain divergence in the aims of the two delegations.

12. Whilst it is true to say that in Turkey such a thing as public opinion does not exist, there can be no question but that the popular feeling here has been strongly pro-English. The people would prefer, of course, to be under no control whatever. If there is to be a mandate, they would prefer it to be English. There may be some kind of parity in this comparison as between a French and British mandate, all parties are unanimous in repudiating the idea that any considerable part of the Turkish Empire should fall under domination so contemptible in their eyes as that of the Italians, or, last of all, that of the Greeks.

13. But I wish to make it clear to your Lordship that an entirely new situation

has arisen since last Saturday the day on which the French High Commissioner made his request to the Grand Vizier of the permission for a Turkish announcement which was due to his own efforts. From the most marked French propaganda, without any attempt at concealment.

14. The French officer attached to the Allied police instructions to his Turkish subordinates to supply him daily with reports, although heretofore the orders of the Allied officer in command, Lieut. Colonel Sir Henry W. ... been of the ... to attend men.

15. That there was already a breach between French and British ... occurred in December last. Hopes of this nature were at that time disappointed, but they are now hiding their realisation, and I fear that already the many different factions in Turkish politics, such as the Committee of Union and Progress, the Entente Libérale of South-Smyrna, the so-called National Liberal Party, and others are already ranging themselves into French and British camps, partly on the chance of scoring one over the other, but mainly in the hope of getting the better of the foreigner.

16. A party is already springing up prepared to denounce any treaty or compact which is not approved by the Turkish Delegation on the ground of the delegation not being in accordance with the Constitution.

17. The Greeks in the vilayet of Aida, and their gradual occupation of towns and villages, whilst received with outward tranquillity by the people, are causing them deeper and deeper resentment and the very calm on the surface only increases my uneasiness.

18. I consider that an outbreak directed probably in the main against the ... Mr. Hurst, the officer in the Levant Consular Service, who is now at Samoun.

19. Mr. Hurst states that Mustafa Kemal who was sent there with the best ... making the advance of the Greeks further inland. Your Lordship

20. Greek authorities failed to secure the embarkation of the majority of the officers, retired inland. It cannot be expected that these will remain inactive.

21. The weakness of the Sultan and of his situation is enhanced by his fears for his own personal safety.

22. The weakness of the Government is augmented by the departure of the present and the past Grand Viziers, whose character and intelligence offered at least fairly good.

23. It is at the very moment when there is the greatest need for unity of action among the Allies that the French have openly commenced moving for Turkish favour, and that one ... discord between the Greeks and the Italians.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 58

Note.

To his Excellency Colonel Maxwell.

It is known by your Excellency that Captain Dépre has been complaining of the ... I tried to explain this over and over. M. Dépre replied, "I will

Bedouins at Okheidir, 250 semi-trained regulars have left Mecca under Sagh Kamoni to join the Emir, whilst Emir Ali at Medina is reported to be sending some machine guns and ammunition.

Cairo, June 10, 1919

N. GARLAND

[96973]

No. 61

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 1047.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 18, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to state that the following interim appointments have been made to posts in the Turkish Government during the absence of the Grand Vizier and the Ministers who have accompanied him to Paris.

Grand Vizier ad interim.—This post has been given, in accordance with practice, to Sabri Effendi, Sheikh-ul-Islam. He is a fair sample of the Ulema class. He has for many years been an outspoken opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress, and distinguished himself as a deputy by the vehemence of his speeches in the Chamber against the Committee of Government before the war. He spent a good part of the duration of the war in exile. He is honest, but probably not very firm. He still belongs to the *Entente libérale* Party.

Minister of Foreign Affairs ad interim.—This post has been given to Sefa Bey, a professional diplomat and formerly Minister at Bucharest. He has never played a conspicuous rôle in politics, but may be regarded as a person of moderate Union and Progress complexion.

Minister of Finance ad interim.—This post has been given to Shevket Torgout Pasha. The explanation given of this rather curious arrangement is that it was thought it would minimise friction, as the Ministry of War and the Department most apt to come into conflict with the Ministry of Finance. In certain circumstances it matters very little who is Minister of Finance, but it has been thought that the one Minister not to appoint as Acting-Minister was the Minister of War, as the cause of the friction between the two Departments is that the Ministry of Finance has not only to curb Military extravagance, but also to secure for general purposes, any liquid assets which may be available in the War Office.

President of the Council of State ad interim.—This post has been given to Edhem Pasha, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, one of the less conspicuous members of the Cabinet, but one of the few whom the *Entente libérale* regard as loyal.

2. The following is a complete list of the Cabinet as now constituted:—

Grand Vizier ad interim and *Sheikh-ul-Islam*, Sabri Effendi, strong *Entente libérale* up to date.

Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim, Sefa Bey.

Minister of War and Minister of Finance ad interim, Shevket Torgout Pasha.

Minister of Marine, Avni Pasha.

Minister of Interior, Ali Kemal Bey.

Minister of Justice, Wafik Effendi, strong *Entente libérale* up to date.

Minister of Commerce and President of Council of State ad interim, Edhem Bey.

Minister of Public Works, ...

Minister of Pious Foundations, Hamdi Effendi.

Ministers without Portfolio

Tewfik Pasha, ex Grand Vizier, Plenipotentiary to the Conference.

Ahmed Izzet Pasha, ex Grand Vizier, came into power to conclude the armistice.

Is regarded as Moderate Committee of Union and Progress.

Rehid Akif Pasha, Senator.

General Ali Riza Pasha, Senator.

Isa Pasha, Senator.

Ismail Hakkı Pasha, Senator.

Abdurrahman Sherif Bey, Senator. A historian who has taken part in national revival movements since the armistice.

Haularizade Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-ul-Islam, a pan-Islamist.

Ahmed Abouk Pasha, ex-Minister of War.

Colonel Sadik Bey, Titular leader of the *Entente libérale* Party. Strongly anti-Committee of Union and Progress and pro-English. In exile in Egypt during the war, and worked with British.

3. I have in a previous despatch mentioned the inclusion in the Government of ... to give the Government as a whole the character of a Coalition, while retaining in the main, anti-Committee elements.

4. It is generally considered that the inclusion of the new Ministers without Portfolio ... and other ... elements. Some of the Ministers, e.g., Izzet Pasha, ex Grand Vizier, and ... Churukoff and Mahmud Pasha, who was one of them, is thought to have these sympathies in an even more pronounced form. On the other hand, Sadik Bey, the latest addition to the Ministry, is the recognised leader of the *Entente libérale* Party, and has been an aspirant for the Grand Vizirate since that party became disaffected with Ferid Pasha because of his opportunism, and as they wrongly thought, pro-French character. Mahmud Shakir Pasha, ex Minister of War, who was also a Minister without portfolio, has just died.

5. From the above description you will see that the Turkish Government is of a mixed and nondescript character. The most important single figure in it is Ali Kemal Bey, a journalist of tortuous ways and great personal ambition. He is detested by the Committee and equally so by the Extreme *Entente libérale* Party, who regard him as a henchman of the French. There was probably some foundation for this accusation a short time ago, but Ali Kemal Bey seems rather to have shifted his ground quite recently. His one desire now appears to be to keep things together, to ensure his political and personal safety, and he displays perfect readiness to co-operate with this high commission. He claims, indeed, to share the general view that the only salvation of this country lies in English protection of some kind.

6. On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and still more the Ministry of War, must be regarded as strongholds of veiled anti-French and, perhaps, more particularly anti-British feeling. They are ... and that its blunders were its ... rather than its fault.

The incoherent character of the Government has been emphasised by the ... of Paris and Tewfik Pasha, both because it removes the two ... areas, and because the selection of Ferid Pasha to go to Paris is in itself a bond of contention. His appointment pleased neither the Committee of Union and Progress nor the *Entente libérale*. An impetus has been given to the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress ... with the situation because, though they had the cheering of a Government only a little more than three months ago, and though there has been no avowed changes in its orientation, they feel that they have to-day only four or at most five men in the Government on whom they can absolutely rely.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

96986

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 1060.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 22, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a memorandum by Mr. Ryan, of this High Commission, giving an account of ... and himself.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 62.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

THE Minister of the Interior asked to see General Deedes and myself last evening. We visited him at his house.

Ali Kemal Bey expressed fresh perturbation over the national defence movement in the Interior, especially in the direction of Karassi. There is no longer the slightest doubt, in his opinion, that this movement has the full approval of the Ministry of War, and is to some extent organised there, especially by Djavad Pasha.

Djavad Pasha went to the Council of Ministers the other day and openly criticised the policy of the Government in not defending the country against Greek aggression. The people organising the present movement all shared Djavad's views.

He began with a telegram sent to the Anti-Annexation Committee of Extradition. This was a brilliant victory over the Greeks. He said instructions had been given by the civil authorities to the telegraph offices to stop all such telegrams. His next document was a telegram sent by Mustafa Kemal Pasha from Amman to the Inspector-General of the First Army and to all army corps commanders. Mustafa Kemal said he understood that orders had been given to the army to stop such telegrams.

At the national defence meeting, he would obey these orders.

chief, but definitely joins issue with the civil authority.

Ali Kemal's next point was this. A number of students had applied for permission to enter the Interior on a sort of lecturing tour to enlighten their compatriots. By

since the Ministry of War had communicated to him officially a telegram commanding Officer, Eschiz, pointing out in connection with the expected advent of *Kilente* commissions of enquiry that the voicing of the people's wishes could not be left to persons in turbans and *caftans*, and intelligent young men should be turned on the job. Haid Bey had been the applicants here, and had reported that all of them were all right.

Ali Kemal Bey said that all this placed himself and his friends in a very embarrassing position. They had to choose between making way for the *Chavushs* and resigning their own places in the Government or trying to eliminate the *Chavushs* altogether. He seemed to think they could achieve the latter result, but what would be their own afterwards if the Greek aggression continued unchecked? He had in mind the North Western Asia Minor, but assumptions of authority

especially to the action of the Greeks in helping Turks into the country, and mistreating them. He showed us a long report on this subject.

The *Chavushs* with the

if that happened it would be the final catastrophe for Turkey. The limits of the Greek advances in Asia Minor had at first been uncertain; limits had since been prescribed, and steps had been taken to confine the Greeks within them. As for incidents in Constantinople, they were a matter for the Interior and authorities, and we had no doubt they would be dealt with manfully. Anyhow, though disagreeable, it would not affect the future, and afforded

I took the opportunity of again mentioning the question of elections. Ali Kemal Bey said the Sultan favoured them because he shrank from sole responsibility for the

The Unionist Ministers in the Council clamoured all the time for their own reasons. I said that the proposal seemed to

I knew the same view was held by my chiefs. The answer to prop the constitutional necessity for parliamentary sanction for the Peace quite brutal. It was that the peace was

That would be the Sultan's defence before his people and before history. Ali Kemal Bey fully agreed. He thought it would be possible to overcome the Sultan's difficulty when the time came by some sort of Crown Council.

There can be no doubt that a very definite conflict exists to-day between the military party and those who wish to continue Ferid Pasha's policy. It is quite clear that the former may force the issue in Constantinople very rapidly.

urgent decision whether we should help the Moderate

we should let things take their course. If we choose the

to possible that in a few days we may have in power a strongly Government capable of giving us a great deal of trouble. Its programme would not include massacres, but it would countenance every kind of passive resistance to Allied intervention in the affairs of this country, and it would put no check on irresponsible people prepared to go further. It would also be quite capable of disavowing Ferid Pasha, though on the whole I think it more likely that it would be content with relegating him to the second place in the Peace Conference.

of all would not appear to be that of replacing Haid Bey myself strongly in favour of accepting

that subordinate personnel will not be engaged except in consultation with General Fuller.

98129]

No. 63

Brigadier General Clayton to Earl Curzon. (Received July 4)

No. 311]

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force

My Lord,

June 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward a summary of the situation up to date in Syria. In spite of the impression which appears to prevail in French Government circles that some sort of agreement was arrived at in Paris between M. Clemenceau and

there seems little doubt that the Emir has in no way changed his attitude

remains opposition to any form of French intervention in Syria.

meeting between himself and the Commander in Chief in the middle of May he outlined the situation in France at the time of his departure, and, even at that time, so little was he affected by any discussions which may have taken place between himself and M. Clemenceau, that he put forward a proposition to assemble selected

declaration of the complete independence of Syria. The Commander-in-Chief forbade any such action, and the idea was therefore dropped.

Emir Faisal then observed that he was unable to ask for Great Britain alone as a Great Power, and at the same time forgo the demand for independence, for reasons that -

(a.) He feared that the French would hear of it and take steps to defeat his plans;

(b.) He was uncertain whether or not Great Britain would accept a mandate, even

independence that it was difficult to make any change at short notice.

He had therefore decided to instruct his people to ask for Syria, at the same time expressing the hope that it would be given to the country. By this move he would be able to reconcile those who were thinking only of Syria and those who favoured the idea of a great Pan-Arab State. At the same time he proposed to tell the Commission sent out by the Peace Conference that he had been forced into this course for fear of the French, and that he would at any time accept a British mandate.

Emir Faisal added that the French could only enter Syria by force of arms, and

gly on the subject that he would identify himself with

active opposition.

As regards Mesopotamia, the Emir felt that an agreement should be reached between Great Britain and the Arabs without recourse to the Peace Conference.

that the Arabs would have a semblance of independence in that at

that they must have some sort of control the details of which should be worked out between the two parties concerned. He was anxious that British officials in the Iraq should be answerable, not to India, but to London or, preferably, Egypt.

Towards the end of May Emir Faisal received a telegram from his delegate in Paris stating that the Commission appointed by the Peace Conference was not coming.

out to Syria. He was greatly distressed at this news, and the result of lengthy interviews between him and the political officers in Damascus are given in the attached Appendix (A). On receiving a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief stating that the American portion of the Commission had already left he was reassured, and the crisis passed off.

There was still some uncertainty in the minds of Emir Feisal and his followers as to the best course to take up before the impending Commission, and Emir Feisal continued to endeavour to obtain a mandate from as many of the local notables as possible, giving him a free hand in his dealings with the Commission. He has approached all communities in this sense, including the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and the leading chiefs of the Druses in the Hauran.

Indication of a tendency to look to America was given during the visit of two American journalists to Damascus. The Arab Club took the opportunity of a reception in honour of these representatives of the American press, and of a declaration for all that President Wilson and his country had done for the cause of Arab independence.

Lately some rumours seem to have spread abroad of agreement with the French during his visit to Europe, and there are reports of feeling against him owing to a suspicion that he has been entering into some sort of knowledge of the people. He is aware of this, and has been endeavouring to ask the people to ask the British for a mandate. This may be due to his realising that the French are of course to independence being granted.

Representations of Said Pasha Siouani and his trenchant criticisms of Arab governments have probably shown the necessity for European advice and aid. Pasha has suggested certain immediate reforms, including the cutting of the army and gendarmerie, and the reduction of Feisal's own Civil List. A committee has now been formed, consisting of Said Pasha himself and certain other Arab officials, to examine the various departmental budgets and see whether further economies can be made.

The defeat of Emir Abdullah's army in the Hedjaz has greatly disturbed him, and he and his chief advisers are anxious that a Mohammedan force should be sent to the Hedjaz to assist King Hussein. All agree, however, that it is not to mind any large reinforcements from Syria, and assistance is being continued in the shape of a few guns and machines, as, together with a small detachment of troops and other tasks.

In the middle of June Emir Feisal paid a visit to Aleppo district and was received with considerable enthusiasm throughout his tour of inspection. He had a long interview with the General Officer Commanding and the Political Officer at Aleppo, at which he gave a full statement of his views on the general situation. A detailed report of this interview is attached as Appendix (B).

There is no doubt that political questions are occupying the mind of the Arab leaders in Syria to the detriment of administrative reforms, which are needed. Until a decision is arrived at it is hopeless to expect any progress to be made, or his mind to be settled.

As a result the Government is not progressing to any marked degree and many urgent reforms are being postponed. Old feuds are beginning to revive, especially in the Hauran district where the Arabs of the Hauran are making inroads on the territory of the Sakh and other tribes with whom they have long standing enmities.

In the Lebanon there are two main parties, one in favour of an independent Lebanon and the other desirous of forming part of an Arab State with central government.

The Independence Party have recently been active and indulged in a demonstration at Baalbek, the headquarters of the Lebanon Government, at which the Lebanon flag was hoisted and the independence of the Lebanon declared. The incident did not cause any particular disturbance and was brought to an end by the Military Governor who ordered the flag to be pulled down and dispersed the assembly.

The Independence Party, of which the Maronite Church is a leading force, are showing signs of nervousness in view of the reports that the French are making an arrangement with Feisal which they think may lead to the inclusion of the Lebanon in a Syrian State, in opposition to the programme of independence which they are pressing.

On the other hand, the counter party are not idle. Meetings take place every day and Moslems are working harmoniously with some of the prominent Christians. The programme is an autonomous Lebanon comprised in the more extended boundaries

which they consider essential to economical prosperity, on condition that this autonomous Lebanon will recognise in principle the suzerainty of the future government of Syria. A considerable number of Greek Orthodox Christians and of Maronites are engaged in canvassing in opposition to the programme of the Lebanon Administrative Council, which is in favour of the complete and absolute independence of the Lebanon.

It is difficult to appreciate the lines which the policy of French officials in this complicated situation. It is a matter of having to conciliate Emir Feisal and the Arabs at Damascus without alienating the traditional support of the Maronite Christians, the majority of whom are members of the party which desires an independent Lebanon. Attached to this despatch, as Appendix (C), is a report rendered by the Chief Administrator (Colonel Capelle) on the subject.

I have, &c.
G. F. CLAYTON, Brigadier-General,
Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

APPENDIX (A)

At 1 o'clock on Thursday, the 29th May, Colonel Cornwallis and Colonel Joyce were sent for urgently to Emir Feisal. Arrived there they found him in a state of almost distress. He proceeded to read out a telegram which he had received from Rustum Hander the Hedjaz delegate at the Peace Conference. The gist of the telegram was that the Conference had decided that the British troops in Syria were going to be withdrawn, and that the Commission to Palestine and Syria had been stopped. This Feisal interpreted as meaning that we were going to abandon the country to the French without any attempt being made to ascertain the wishes of the people. This he said would inevitably cause bloodshed. It would mean war between the French and the Arabs. The Arabs would attack the French, and since in that case the British might be expected to come to the assistance of the French in the country, it would mean war with us as well. He made it fairly evident what part he himself would play in such a contingency. He did not even hint at trying to prevent trouble, and it is clear that he meant that he would identify himself with the movement, and place himself at the head of it. He stated that if our troops were withdrawn, and any French troops left, even if only in the coastal sector, it would be a hostile act. On being asked if he wanted all troops, British and French, to be withdrawn, he hedged, and hinted that he would consider it an act of war if the British troops were withdrawn under any circumstances. His point of view in this is rather hard to follow, as it is surely what would happen if the objects of his programme and was granted complete independence and mandatory power. He finally wrote a telegram for the Commander-in-Chief, requesting an answer in twenty-four hours, and demanding—

- 1 That no British troops should be withdrawn unless all French troops were withdrawn.
- 2 That the Commission should come out.

He was very insistent about the Commission coming out, and about the idea that any arrangements acceptable to him might possibly have been arrived at in Paris. He is still unwilling to accept any compromise as regards an independent Syria. Although at one time he said he did not mind about the Lebanon being French, he afterwards hedged, and said that by the Lebanon he meant the mountains only without any portion of the coast, not even Beirut. He also showed himself very mistrustful of our Zionist aims, although he declared that he was only presenting the point of view of the Arabs.

He announced his intention unless he received a satisfactory answer to his telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of executing a coup d'état by proclaiming the independence of Syria, including the coastal sector, and sending his troops to occupy the latter.

He asked what would be our attitude having in view the fact that the Arabs in Palestine would probably rise. He was informed that such an act would finally and irreparably destroy all friendship between us as it would probably entail the loss of British lives. He agreed that this would be the probable result, but asked what could be done.

so. I say did not join the Allies to be put under the infinitely stronger yoke of France, and until England shows her hand it is exceedingly hard for Syria to show hers. Those who prefer England, but will not actually fight France, do not want to ask for England and then find France in charge—they fear the very natural resentment of France, their own countrymen who spoke for France will naturally be preferred until they have lived down the mistake of asking for England.

Towards the end of April, after the arrival of Emir Faisal at Beirut, the Sherifian Party stirred themselves, organised wanderings, and started carrying out an active and an underground propaganda. The Moslems proclaimed that Syria, including the Lebanon, must return to 'H. Emir'. The Lebanese, surprised, deceived and uneasy, saw in these exaggerated manifestations a menace of Sherifian attempts at invasion. The consequence of this fear was a calm, pacific, and orderly, but firm and decided reaction. The great majority of the Lebanese, the municipalities, and the clergy undertook a campaign for independence.

At present the situation is clear. On one side, and these represent the great majority, the partisans for the autonomy of the Lebanon claim a large but are entirely firm and unanimous on the principle of the independence of the country, under the French Protectorate. On the other side, the partisans of Feinl, most of them are Druses, demand the attachment of the Lebanon to Syria.

The Sherifians, and more particularly those of Zahleh show themselves very active, trying to gather signatures in favour of El Emir, distributing money, and promising posts and employment in the future government. This propaganda is carried out in full daylight.

As a proof, I beg to draw your attention to the attached tract, of which I am sending the original and a translation, which has been distributed at Zahleh by Michel Bey Loutfallah, member of the Committee of "Société des Secours pour la Syrie". The latter has been authorized to circulate in Syria so as to control the distribution of money, on the express condition that he should not interfere in policy during his journey, it being well understood that the permit for travelling could be withdrawn from him on the 18th February, 1920. I cite also Iskandar Bey Ammoun, Inspector of Justice, Damascus, who has held numerous meetings in the Lebanon and has secured to recruit adherents to the Sherifian cause, thus breaking the neutrality.

It is, at present, the political situation: on one side an active propaganda on the other a very clear and a very calm reaction.

It is that it would be advisable to regulate, as soon as possible, the situation in order to avoid the uncertainty which is developing from day to day, and which may, in accentuating the disorder, disturb public order.

The situation does not offer any cause for anxiety. The general situation remains satisfactory.

Beirut, June 4, 1919

Enclosure in No. 64

Les Lois fondamentales

Parti du l'Union syrienne centrale—Egypte

(Translation)

1. La Syrie tout entière doit être une, depuis les monts Taurus jusqu'au Khabour et l'Euphrate à l'est, le désert arabe jusqu'aux villes de Salé au sud la mer Rouge jusqu'à la ligne El Acala, Rafge et la mer Méditerranée à l'ouest.

2. La Syrie doit être parfaitement indépendante: son indépendance doit être garantie par la Ligue des Nations, aussi bien que ses lois fondamentales. Cette garantie doit conserver les droits de l'indépendance.

3. Le Gouvernement du pays doit être élu par la Ligue des Nations, en collaboration avec les hautes fonctions de conseil les nécessaires.

4. Le Gouvernement doit avoir une forme démocratique: la base de ses lois et de ses codes doit être civile, sauf les lois régissant les statuts personnels, qui doivent rester telles qu'elles sont.

5. Les lois actuelles doivent être conservées jusqu'à la réunion du Parlement qui les corrigera ou les changera d'après les intérêts du pays et les lois.

6. Le pays doit se diviser en vilayets indépendants les uns des autres pour le bien commun. On doit garder les divisions géographiques, telles que les considérations locales particulières de Palestine et Houtan, de leur Ka-Zor, et les traditions du Liban, ses anciennes limites naturelles et ses anciens privilèges.

7. Chaque vilayet aura un Conseil administratif particulier élu par le suffrage universel une fois tous les quatre ans. C'est lui qui dirigera les affaires du vilayet, formant ses lois intérieures, selon les cas qui conviennent au vilayet, à condition qu'elles ne contrarient pas à celles du pays.

8. Le pays aura un Parlement général composé de membres élus par les Conseils administratifs; la proportion sera de un sur trois. Ce Parlement se réunira une fois par an, et pourra être convoqué plus souvent si les circonstances le requièrent et pour former les lois qui conviennent au pays.

9. Le pays aura pour capitale en été Damas, en hiver Beyrouth; il aura un Ministère responsable devant le Parlement.

10. Tout vilayet formera des agents de police pour sa propre sécurité, et le Gouvernement général élaborera une loi spéciale pour le recrutement des forces.

11. Les fonctions seront dans les mains des hommes capables du travail.

12. Le programme de l'enseignement doit être unique, commun à tout le pays et convenable à tous les enfants des divers rites et religions.

13. Les frais et dépenses de chaque vilayet seront payés de ses propres impôts. Mais les revenus des intérêts communs, tels que la douane, la poste, le télégraphe, les chemins de fer, les bateaux et les mines seront mis à la disposition du Gouvernement central, qui les utilisera pour les travaux communs.

14. Si la nation arabe formait une nation séparée, la condition que cela ne change rien de sa propre unité ni de la forme du Gouvernement.

97957]

No. 64

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon — (Received July 4.)

(No. 1148.)

MR. BALFOUR presents his compliments to Earl Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of two documents on the subject of the proposed Zionist activities in Palestine.

Paris, July 2, 1919.

Enclosure I in No. 64

Dr. Weizmann to Sir L. Mallet

Délégation syrienne au Congrès de la Paix,

10, Place Edouard VII, Paris, June 18, 1919

Dear Sir Louis Mallet,

I HAVE been thinking a great deal over the valuable suggestion you made when I last saw you a few days ago regarding the desirability of entering on practical work in Palestine as soon as possible. Since seeing you I have discussed the same subject with Lord Eustace Percy who, I understand, has mentioned it to Mr. Balfour. These two gentlemen, as well as others, seem to share your views in the matter, and after a further conversation with Mr. Vanvliet I have decided to approach your department formally and submit a programme of work in Palestine, which, to my mind, is already desirable and possible. Before doing so, however, I venture to submit to you one or two general considerations.

In the first place, the programme which may be given to us by His Majesty's Government would, in my opinion, be received by the whole of the Jewish world with deep relief and gratitude. Secondly, the development of certain of the undermentioned lines of action would introduce into the country additional men of character and of brains, and also capital, and would thereby improve the economic condition of the country, and thus contribute more than anything towards establishing good relations between the Jews and the Arabs. If the Arabs see that practical work, remunerative to them as to the other elements in the population, is being carried on in earnest, and that this work, far from affecting their conditions unfavourably, improves them, any artificial agitation that may still be prevalent will be quickly dispelled, and wild and unfounded rumours that may be circulating will be corrected.

I send you, for the information of the Majesty's Government, a list of the great financial responsibilities which will be assumed by the Jewish National Organization immediately after the signature of peace, and meet these responsibilities we have been endeavouring to create the necessary

[1336]

U

the greater number of our supporters in the east of Europe. However, in addition to balancing the Zionist budget for the current year at 500,000, we have established a company with a capital of 10,000,000 roubles for the erection of dwellings in Palestine, this company to be registered in England, and we are moreover establishing a development company with a capital of 4,000,000. The status of this latter company is being considered now in London by the committee of our Organisation, of which Mr. Herbert Samuel is chairman, and it is hoped that it will be possible to register it in the near future. In the meanwhile negotiations are in progress on behalf of this company for the purchase of a number of transportable houses, and the erection on its behalf of hotels in Palestine has already commenced.

The activities in Palestine which seem to us of an urgent character are as follows:-

1. The acquisition of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway
2. The acquisition of the German colonies and town settlements in Palestine
3. The acquisition of the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria Hospice on the Mount of Olives, which is German State property. We are specially anxious to erect this as the hospice adjoins the university site, and we could fit it out as a temporary university building. I need not point out the immense importance of such a building on the moral, intellectual, and political points of view, but the building for the University is very difficult at present on account of building material, which is itself a consequence of the war transport. The acquisition of the hospice building would relieve us of this responsibility.
4. Permission for Jews to enter and settle in the country. There would be no guarantee by the Zionist Organisation as economically sound and anxious to invest their capital in Palestine. There is a large number of Jews who are ready to proceed to Palestine to found small industries there, to open commercial undertakings, and to acquire and work land. Their entry into Palestine is at present rendered very difficult. The Zionist Organisation would be quite prepared to guarantee the bona fides financial position and suitability for the purpose of such immigrants. We are ourselves most anxious to stop all unsuitable immigration and have published warnings to that effect throughout the Jewish world. On the other hand, we are also anxious to introduce into the country in limited numbers people willing and capable of assisting the development of the country on sound

the purpose of the waste or unoccupied lands that could be brought almost immediately into cultivation. We are particularly anxious to settle the demobilised Jewish soldiers in Palestine as an encouragement not to leave the country. Means are available to do this, and, if only we had the land, we could set to work immediately.

Establishment of a shipping line principally for the transport of material from the Mediterranean ports and Palestine, but also possibly to England. This would enable us to import building material, of which the need is greatest at present and the meeting of which need is an inevitable preliminary to further activity.

The acquisition by the Zionist Organisation or other public body of certain small concessions to be developed for the purposes of public utility, e.g. telephone, radio-telegraph, and water-power of the Auda.

I should like to point out to you that all these concessions, with the single exception of that of the waste lands, would not affect the present agrarian policy of the administration and should not interfere with the susceptibilities of the Arabs. For us, however, they would mean a very important beginning. If, as I hope, the Secretary of State considers the immediate carrying out of the programme outlined above desirable I would be ready to proceed to Palestine in the near future, and in the company of Justice Brandeis and other friends discuss with the administration on the spot the best ways and means of putting the programme into effect. I would also propose to visit Feisal in Damascus, and, in co-operation with him, elaborate

conciliatory policy so far as the Arab population is concerned. For this purpose I shall be grateful to receive the necessary recommendation from His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
CH. WEIZMANN

Enclosure 2 in No. 64.

L. Mallet to Dr. Weizmann

July 1, 1919

Dear Dr. Weizmann,

I HAVE read and shown to Mr. Balfour your letter of the 18th ultimo, submitting a programme of work in Palestine which you would like his authority immediately to carry out.

I understand that you have already received a letter from him for presentation to General Allenby asking him to discuss with you in detail whether there are any immediate questions which could be quietly taken up and "pushed forward a little" without waiting for further developments.

You will no doubt raise with him the question of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, but, as you are aware, this railway is French property and the French Government have already addressed His Majesty's Government several times with regard to its immediate return to French control, so that it is not possible for the British authorities to dispose of it.

Mr. Balfour doubts therefore whether it would serve any useful purpose to open a discussion of this question with the French Government at the present stage and thinks that it might possibly provoke inconvenient opposition if broached before the mandate is given to the British.

As regards the acquisition of the German colonies and town settlements, so long as the country is only in the military occupation of the British, they are not in a legal position to expropriate the German possessions, so that we fear that little can be done in this direction for the present.

The same argument applies to the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria Hospice, but it occurs to me that possibly an arrangement might be made for its provisional use by the Zionists as a temporary university building. This, however, is a matter on which General Clayton's advice would be valuable, as there may be practical reasons against its adoption.

No. 4 is also a matter for discussion with the local authorities. I, personally, think that it is the most useful suggestion in your letter. If a few of the best sort of Jewish immigrants were allowed to enter Palestine and to purchase land at good prices from Arabs who were willing to sell, the effect might be good, but, in view of the accounts which we have been receiving of the hostility felt by the inhabitants for the Jews, the greatest care and tact would have to be exercised and the immigrants carefully chosen. If there were any waste lands available on which settlement of demobilised soldiers could be unostentatiously begun, it would be very desirable.

The establishment of a shipping line for the transport of materials to Palestine is not one upon which the views of His Majesty's Government or of the Palestine authorities is presumably required.

As regards your seventh suggestion, I fear the military authorities would not have legal power to grant permanent concessions to the Zionist Organisation.

Meanwhile, as you are aware, precautions have been adopted that no step shall be taken which will enable commercial interests, whether British or foreign, to establish themselves in Palestine or obtain control over land or industries until the decision of the conference enables His Majesty's Government to work out the full implication of their acceptance of a mandate for Palestine and of the policy of a national home for the Jews.

I have just heard that General Clayton is shortly due in London, so that you will have an opportunity of discussing these matters with him before going out.

Please understand that I am not raising these difficulties with a view to discouraging you from trying to make some small beginnings.

When I enquired of you the other day whether some small practical work could not be begun, it was with a view to make your own position rather easier with your fellow Zionists, and I was really thinking more of the necessary preparation in the way of providing houses or at any rate provisional shelter for the first arrivals, of settling beforehand in what regions the early immigrants would be placed, and of the

necessary organisation for the distribution of food than of concessions, but it is useful that these questions should all be discussed and I much hope that there will be some good result.

Believe me, &c
LOUIS MALLET

[102545]

No. 65.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 11)

(No. 1001.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 27, 1919

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1326 of the 24th June relative to the zone of the Greek occupation of Smyrna and disorder prevailing in the interior, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information

Mr. Ryan relative to a conversation which took place on the 24th June between my military attaché, and Sabri Effendi, the Grand Vizier ad interim, relative to the situation being conducted in Turkey to carry out armed resistance to the peace terms.

I have, &c

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 65

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

GENERAL DEEDS and I called on the Acting Grand Vizier instructed, while the Council of Ministers were sitting. I had heard through the Minister of the Interior that we were thinking of a *démarche* of the kind, and welcomed the idea.

Anyhow, we made it clear to his Highness at the start that, even if he had not asked us to call, we had intended to come with a very important communication. We asked him to tell us what he wanted first.

Sabri Effendi said that they were trying to get Mustafa Kemal back without driving him into revolt. He had countered a request for his return by a request for his return. He had also telegraphed (I think to the Sultan) to say that back he anticipated as possible the fate of Ali Ihsan Pasha. Sabri Effendi knew whether he (Mustafa Kemal) could be brought back on that point.

Nothing about this without taking into account the fact that we were closely connected with what we ourselves had come for, the best thing would be to make our communication straight away. We had prepared it before we came to Turkey and read it out, making it clear that it was a verbal communication of which no copy could be left, and which was read only as a matter of convenience. It was to the following effect:

The High Commissioner, we said, had sent us to speak about a matter which had much preoccupied him for some days and which had now acquired a character of urgency. He had spoken to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and would speak to him again, but the matter was so serious that he desired also to draw the attention of the head of the Government to what was passing.

There were many indications that a movement was being conducted in this country with a view to armed resistance to possible decisions of the Council of Ministers. It was even said that the movement was definitely directed against the constitution.

That it was because of their known policy of compliance with the wishes of the High Commissioner did not know how far the existence of an agitation admitted of no doubt. It was equally certain that certain military authorities were playing an active rôle in the agitation.

The not vice of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the district of Samsoun left no doubt on this subject. The High Commissioner had been compelled a few days before to address to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a written demand for this officer's recall, and he awaited impatiently information that effect had been given to his demand.

information from the district between Balikesir and Edromid, where certain military activities were taking place.

These activities constituted a further grave menace to the security of the country, which had long been seriously disturbed. The High Commissioner had not yet discussed them with his colleagues, but, speaking for himself, he wished the Acting Grand Vizier to take steps to prevent the situation from leading to dangerous results. It should obviously be the aim of everyone to maintain public tranquillity and the peace of the country. The Peace Conference were known. Anything in the nature of serious incidents or any attack on the constituted authorities of the country could not leave the British Government indifferent, and the High Commissioner did not think it could leave the British Government indifferent.

The authors of the agitation attempted to present the Greek occupation as a legitimate advance by the Greek forces in the Smyrna region. If this were a justification, it had ceased to exist, as the limits of the Greek occupation had been fixed by the Peace Conference. The High Commissioner hoped that it would be possible in the very near future to inform the Porte officially of the limits of the occupation.

The effect produced by constant Greek advance, and the lack of security in the zone to be occupied. He also dwelt on the insolence shown by the Greeks in many ways to the British. He admitted the existence of the agitation, however, and the maintenance of the Government to deal really strongly with Mustafa Kemal. Asked whether it was true that the Council were considering a proposal in that sense, he said the Council were considering a proposal in that sense. He was sure that the Council would take the necessary steps.

that Fevzi Pasha might be very like him. He was sure that the Council would take the necessary steps.

of the Minister of the Interior, as being unequal to the situation, and as being because of his irresponsibility. He seemed very much inclined to try to replace him. I reminded him that "le mieux est l'ennemi du bien."

A. RYAN

Constantinople, June 23, 1919

[104612]

No. 66

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 1132.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 3, 1919

I have the honour to inform you of your Lordship's

information in regard to the naval measures to be taken as a result of the Italian decree establishing a naval base in the Dodecanese.

I have, &c

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 to 5

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station, to the Commodore Commanding British Tigris Squadron.

(No. 5505. Secret.)

H M S. "Iron Duke," June 28, 1919.

HEREWITH is forwarded for your information a copy of an Italian decree establishing a naval base in the Dodecanese.

The terms of the decree would appear to be intended to inaugurate an exclusive Italian control in these waters, and on the shores of the mainland and it has already become apparent that they would, if they had the right, resent the presence of British ships in these parts.

The Government do not encourage this idea by refraining from visiting these waters, or by acquiescing in the exclusive use by the Italians.

in these ports, most of which, according to international agreement, still come within the limits of the British Aegean command.

1. They should therefore be visited as frequently as the resources of your command permit, and it would appear that the sloop which up to the present has been normally stationed at Suda or Syra would generally be available for this service.

5. In this connection, it should be noted that for the above purposes the limits of the Aegean command have been extended as far along the Karamanian coast as longitude 31° 50' E (see my communication of the 6th June, 1919, No. 5401).

A. CALTHORPE, Vice-Admiral.

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

Extract from the "Official Gazette" of April 16, 1919

The Collection Law and Decree of the Kingdom contains the following decree:

We, Thomas of Savoy, Duke of Genoa, Lieutenant General of His Majesty Manuel III, &c., in virtue of the authority delegated to us, in view of the Royal Decree of the 25th February, 1904, relative to the attributions and duties of commanders of naval stations abroad, in view of the regulation for military discipline for the naval forces of the 29th October, 1903, in view of the regulation on special duties abroad, approved by Royal Decree of the 16th May, 1907, and its successive modifications, recognising the necessity of uniting under a single command the ships scattered in the islands of Dodecanese and on the coast of Asia Minor from the Gulf of Scala Nova to the south of Smyrna as far as Adalia and beyond, as well as the services of the Royal Navy on shore in the above localities, have decreed and decree:

Single Article

From March 16, 1919, there is established in the Dodecanese a "Command" with coastal jurisdiction over the islands of the Dodecanese and coast of Asia Minor from the Gulf of Scala Nova to the south of Smyrna, Adalia and beyond, in for which are placed all the ships operating in these waters as well as the services of the Royal Navy on shore in the above localities. We order that the present Decree, to which the Seal of State is attached, be inserted in the collection of the Laws and Decrees of the Kingdom of Italy, enjoining on all whom it may concern to observe it and to use it to be observed.

Given at Rome this 3rd day of March 1919.

(Signed) THOMAS OF SAVOY

Dr. Bono

He Keeper of the Seal
(Signed) F. A.

105186

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon. — (Received July 21)

(No. 1330)

My Lord,

British Delegation, Paris, July 19, 1919

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 4163 of the 29th June enclosing a copy of a note from the French Ambassador relating to the issue.

2. It seems clear that no responsibility is to be placed on the Turkish Government for anything that occurred up to the date when British military forces occupied the territory in which the railway is situated, and any claim based by the French company upon proceedings before that date must be against the Turkish Government and not against His Majesty's Government.

3. The French company's case for compensation for any action taken by British military authorities after the date of occupation appears to rest on article 53, second paragraph, of the Land War Regulations, according to which the railway should be "restored and indemnities for it regulated at the peace."

In order to reply to the French Ambassador satisfactorily on this aspect of the matter your Lordship may consider it desirable to refer to the French authorities showing clearly what has been done to the line during the period of occupation. If, as seems probable, the railway has been improved during this period His Majesty's Government will have a complete answer to both parts of the French case.

5. As regards the French company's claim against the Turkish Government, the question is whether it is proposed to establish to deal with such reparation claims.

If the line has not been improved, the company will be presumably entitled to require that the future Government of Palestine should restore the line to the position in which it was when the British military authorities took it over. It seems, however, likely that if His Majesty's Government secure a mandate in Palestine they may desire to expropriate the railway and make it a State concern, in which case the problem of compensation might be simplified, as it would only be necessary to give the company fair compensation for the loss of their property without going into the question of what has been done to the line by His Majesty's Government during the occupation period. Such power to expropriate private interests in the line will probably be granted to the mandatory by a general clause dealing with concessions in territories placed under the mandate by the treaty with Turkey.

7. The reply to M. Caubon might await the result of the report from the military authorities. If the line has been improved, M. Caubon should be so informed, and details of the actual improvement. In any case it should be added that His Majesty's Government admit no claim whatever against the Turkish Government which would affect the present position of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(For Mr. Balfour)

ALFRED A. CROWE

105777

No. 68

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon. — (Received July 22)

No. 1127.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 30, 1919

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1338, of the 29th June 1919, and other recent correspondence relative to the general situation here, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a circular issued by the late Minister of the Interior on the 18th June and published a few days later in the local press.

2. Ali Kemal Bey's personality has never inspired great confidence, but it must be admitted that he was surrounded by a number of elements, who wish to organise physical resistance to any extension of Greek occupation, and possibly to unwelcome decisions generally of the Peace Conference.

3. The enclosed circular is one of the factors which finally compelled Ali Kemal Bey's retirement.

4. It was intimated to him definitely by the acting Grand Vizier (not himself a chauvinist, but anxious to hold on) that if he did not retire, the Cabinet as a whole would resign.

5. As his position was rapidly becoming untenable in any case, he complied with the strong hint and tendered his resignation with the results indicated in my telegram under reference.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 68

Circular issued by the Minister of the Interior.

LE CALME EN PROVINCE

APRÈS l'avoir fait approuver par le Conseil des Ministres, Ali Kemal Bey, Ministre de l'Intérieur, a envoyé la circulaire suivante à tous les vilayets.

Tout en étant vivement ému de l'occupation brutale et contraire à tous les droits, effectuée sur certaines parties de l'Empire, le Gouvernement ottoman, n'étant pas en état de faire la guerre présentement, a jugé que les moyens politiques sont sa seule défense. Grâce à Dieu, ces moyens réussissent complètement.

Notre espoir concernant l'assurance de l'intégrité de l'Empire, que nos délégués substantent de toute formation de milice ou de défense nationale, qui ne pourraient que compromettre les résultats.

Il faut donc prodiguer des conseils à tous ceux qui troublent la tranquillité publique, qui provoquent le mécontentement des représentants des Puissances alliées, en agissant à façon de semer la discorde entre éléments. Alors que nous sommes obligés de clore à jamais les périodes de brigandage, de pillage, et d'inégalité, nous ne pourrions tolérer en aucune façon la résurrection de cet état d'âme, qui, pouvant être jugé contraire, nous ferait perdre notre cause à la Conférence de la Paix.

Ne reculez donc devant aucun moyen pour réprimer avec la dernière énergie tout

à tous ceux qui, poussés par l'excès de zèle envers la patrie, se jettent dans des aventures pareilles. Agissez sans hésitation contre ceux qui persévèrent dans leurs ténés, guidés par une ligne de conduite et par intérêt qu'ils ont adopté dans le passé. Tâchez de faire comprendre à tous que nous possédons un Gouvernement énergique qui travaille de toutes ses forces à la restauration et au maintien du droit et de la concorde entre les éléments. Voilà le devoir sacré qui incombe aujourd'hui à tous.

devoir dont vous êtes conscients, et je vous fais savoir que, dans l'intérêt supérieur de la patrie, je n'hésiterai pas à frapper avec une rigueur extraordinaire tous ceux qui n'obtempèrent pas aux instructions précises que je vous mande.

ALI KEMAL,

Ministre de l'Intérieur.

Le 18 juin 1935

1057791

No. 69

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 22)

(No. 1129)

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of a report from the Greek section of this High Commission by the representative of the Patriarchate, which is a fair specimen of the reports received weekly during the last month or more.

2 While in several cases it is probable that the provincial representatives of the Patriarchate somewhat exaggerate the present state of affairs in the interior, there is no doubt that it is very far from satisfactory. Reports similar to the enclosed are being received by me almost daily from all sections of the Christian districts of the interior of Asia Minor and Thrace with occupation of the Allies.

Christian

I have, &c

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 69.

Report

Samsoun, May 27.

FIFTY Armenians deported from Samsoun, Tcharchamba, Bassra, Tokat, &c., have arrived at Samsoun from Sokhoun in a very poor and miserable condition. There is no means to feed them. The houses of most of them are being demolished by night. The tiles of such houses are carried off in open daylight even in a city like Samsoun.

In the vicinities of Samsoun, 400 out of the 500 Armenian houses are pulled down.

The number of Armenians, both those that have remained and those that have been deported but are now returned, are also 400-500 orphans detained in Turkish houses.

The Chairman of the Emigrants' Club, Mr. R. B. ... has even proposed to pay only half of the travelling expenses to be paid to emigrants.

The 600-700 and the Islamised young ladies of a considerable number, found in the diocese of Samsoun, have not yet been gathered on account of the lack of means to take care of them.

Malatia, May 28.

Great preparations for resistance are going on. The Kurdish chieftains of Arabkir, Maden, Potourig, and other sanjaks and kazas, are united with the Turks and grow

They declare that since they are to die anyway, it is better for them to die as bravely as possible.

More than 400 orphans and widows who have been gathered are thrust into great misery, and need immediate relief.

The orphans that are found in the sanjaks and villages are not being handed over, but made to labour gratis by the Turks.

Sams, May 2.

Meeting on the occasion of the ... Fiery speeches and orations. Threat to declare "djihad" threatening telegram of the Grand Vizier sent to the Council of Four has strongly excited the Turks and rendered them more

Fatsa (Samsoun), March 28.

An attempt is made to kill Hovhannès Bounian of Hovagar village of the Kaza ... who was neither excited nor Islamised. His house is burnt by night, and two members of his family die in fire, while others who try to escape are shot down. The man escapes and comes to Fatsa, where he remains with other poor Armenians in need of support and security.

Sams, May 23.

Means are lacking to support the 600-700 orphans now found in the diocese of Samsoun, and relief is asked with urgency. The Armenians do not wish to supply ... on condition that the Armenians supply the

... of the institution ... bearing the Islamised girls and women. Even the few gathered are escaping on account of the lack of proper care.

Malatia, May 25.

Appreciation of Governor Rahmi Bey, who tries to guarantee the general security

Yozgat, June 2.

The Government is prosecuting ten Armenians of Indjeli, who, after completing their military service with twenty-nine other compatriots, had returned to their houses, and have been now accused of murder.

Arab Ogilou Abdulrahman, a notorious lawyer, who had been instrumental in organizing disturbances, is running a political party named "Midetpervéran" (patriots), the aim of which is to excite provocation and prepare massacres. His dismissal from office is urgently asked.

1st June 4

Insecurity dominates. The returning Armenians are threatened by accusations have been made against Ghevont Seradarian and Yervant Apkarian as they had killed a Turk four years and a half ago in the neighbourhood of G. Gul village. Also Haroutune Malian, Khatcher Khatcherian, Nigou Nigoghossian (Mukhtar), Isahag Donigian, and Keropé Yemayan have been charged with the murder of a Turkish migrant at the place called Taab Olaght, half-an-hour distant from the city. Besides these, Garabet Tel-tchekian Arshalous Tschikian, Khosrov Sitrongian, Hagop Tschekivan, and H. Katchakian are also accused as having killed a Turk in the forests.

Orders have been issued for the arrest of all these innocent persons.

Since three months Hagop Kuby Medaid armin, of Satchle village, is being kept in prison accused of having killed a gendarme, while it is already verified by the military authorities that he was serving in the Turkish Army at the time when he is said to have committed the crime.

If the situation be not ameliorated, the returning young men will be obliged to go to Constantinople or somewhere else, and the orphans and widows will be left without any supporting hand.

Brussum, May 27.

It is complained that the attorney general Refik Bey and examining judge Mustafa Bey are defending the organisers of massacres, and obstructing their arrest. The former and members of the Turkish nobility, are instigating the attacks on the returning Armenians.

It is to this end, and also sent the notorious Ormandi Hassan to the purpose of supplying false witnesses against Ar.

If trying the case of the awful crimes perpetrated upon the Armenians, it is hindered with the examination of false accusations against them.

Brussum, June 7.

Locating the Union and Progress delegate of Brussum, and the ex mayor Mukhtar, the awful massacre on Mount Ararat, are still not arrested.

Paul Bey one of the employees of the "Regin" at Brussum and the father of Habib Edib Hanoum, the writer and orator, is continually coming to Constantinople in order to visit and consult the above named locatum and similar criminals, who are supposed to be connected with certain plots.

Brussum, June 5.

Lack of security continues. The ignorant population does not have any idea of the certain criminals who have, on the occasion of Smyrna, reappeared on the scene and begun their disastrous activity.

A captain from Bevolu village, Kalan Bey by name, who was a deserter, is now organising a band of 100 persons of whom are notorious with their criminal past. The local Government of these happenings, yet tolerates them with absolute indifference.

Nicomedia, June.

A 12-year old Samuel, of Arslanbey village, is found murdered on the 7th instant, at ten minutes' distance from the farm of Ali Koyu where he used to work.

Another Armenian from the same village is shot while labouring in the fields at Burdaz, but fortunately he is not wounded. It is becoming impossible to work in open air in these regions.

Korudjabey (Brussum), June 9.

Out of 180 families, only 40 have survived and returned. Tcherkes Ali Bey, of a neighbouring village, is very active in cultivating relations with

members of the Union and Progress. It is rumoured that he will gather 2,000 Circassians and declare Balakism. The Armenians run the danger of being the first victims of that movement. The Greeks have also grown anxious, and have sent a report to their Patriarchat.

Halukessir, June 1.

Insecurity is at a climax. Massacres are threatened every day. The Government has notified the Armenian and Greek "Mukhtars" to facilitate the conscription of soldiers whenever the need arises, threatening them with appearing before the court-martial.

The existing insecurity, along with this plan for conscription, has created a state of hopelessness.

The comparatively well-to-do class of returning Armenians has begun to migrate to Smyrna and Constantinople, while the poorer class, which was just beginning to earn a living, is being obliged to sell all belongings at even a lower price than that of the deportation period, and to depart as soon as possible.

The British military representative of Panderma has visited Halukessir but the request of the Armenians for the extension of protection over them has not been taken into account of the lack of forces to be sent there.

[102622]

No. 70

Earl Curzon to Mr. Warrington

Sir,

Foreign Office, 22, 1914

I HAVE to inform you that you are appointed to proceed on a special political mission to Transcaucasia, with the title of Chief British Commissioner.

Although the de facto authority of the Governments of Georgia, the Armenian Republic of Erevan, and of Azerbaijan has not as yet been formally recognised by His Majesty's Government, you will be required to keep in close touch with these Governments, and to report on the progress of your mission through their Delegations at the Paris Conference in Paris.

You will be accompanied by a staff composed of Mr Vice-Consul T. E. Milligan Grundy, Mr Vice-Consul J. A. White, and another secretary to be selected.

The objects of your mission, in addition to that already mentioned, will be

(a) To report on the political situation in Transcaucasia.

(b) To do your utmost to prevent friction between the volunteer army and the Transcaucasian Republics, and to ensure respect for the line to be drawn between the respective spheres.

Should this line at any time in the future be so defined as to leave the territory of the North Caucasus Republic, on its southern side, you will be required to maintain relations with its Government in the same way as with those of the three Transcaucasian Republics already mentioned, and in any case you should endeavour to obtain information as to the political situation in Daghestan and report from time to time to His Majesty's Government.

(c) So far as the personnel at your disposal and the circumstances permit, to advance the interests of British trade in Transcaucasia and to report on trade matters.

As regards matters in Transcaucasia, matters of a purely administrative character, you will be independent of the General Officer Commanding, but you should make a point of consulting the General Officer Commanding in the various questions which may arise. It will at the same time be the duty of the General Officer Commanding in so far as political questions may affect his work, to consult with you, and not to act without your advice and consent.

Office, with the exception that, in matters of supply and relief, your communications should be made direct to the Supreme Council in Paris, and in matters of trade to the Department of Overseas.

Copies of your communications with these bodies should be sent to the Foreign Office, in the case of relief and supply, to His Majesty's High Commissioner at

X.

instruées et aidées par certaines institutions ecclésiastiques, tâchent de provoquer des

terminer, je me permettrai de dire que le moyen le plus efficace de calmer les esprits et d'assurer le regne de la tranquillité serait de mettre les troupes hellènes en demeure d'évacuer les territoires qu'elles ont envahis en Asie-Mineure, au mépris des droits des peuples indomestables du Sultanat ottoman et de la nation turque, et qu'elles continuent à soulever les esprits avec l'assistance des troupes grecques.

173

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Cuthbert to Earl Curzon—(Received July 30.)

Conatapetunayda, July 17, 1911

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for the information of your Excellency a copy of a report dated the 27th June which I have received from my representative at Smyrna relative to recent events at Pergamon.

1. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have &

CALTHORPE, Hugh (Cont.) 1871-1872

Enclosure in No. 1.

Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, to British High Commissioner, Constantinople

(No. 50 11)

June 25, 1913

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on Pergams, supplied by various witnesses including Jews, Armenians, and Muslims:—

The town of Pergama contained some 30,000 inhabitants. Owing to the expulsion of Greeks just before the war there were no Greeks in the town, the inhabitants being Moslems, Jews, and Armenians. About the 12th June some 800 Greek soldiers entered the town and stayed there until the 16th, when the Greek Government learned that Turkish irregulars had collected outside the town.

and it happened that in case they made common action with the irregulars the town would be burned. In the evening of the 15th, the irregulars being now near the town, the Greek troops engaged with them, but in a short time they (the Greeks) were put to flight. A few escaped to Monemvasia. The irregulars entered the town, and for two

meritantly Jews, Armenians, and Turks. The total number of

The Turkish irregulars shot two Turks in front of the Government for having manifested sentiments of goodwill towards the Greeks. A third Turk was wounded and it is said that one Jewish woman and an Armenian were killed. The irregulars, who were about 3,000 in number, seemed to have come from Panderina, Banker, Soma, &c. After pillaging for two days, it was reported that Greek troops had landed at Dikali, and the irregulars went out to meet them. The people of the town seeing the Greek army coming, fled to the hills, leaving the town empty.

Pargana, began to get alarmed as to their fate at the hands of the Greeks, although they allege that they had taken no part in any action against the Greeks or their

leaving nothing to chance, the greater part of the Moslem population fled
the arrival of the Greeks, and are now scattered about Senna and

ing lost practically all their possessions and being without food or homes. These people are still in a state of alarm, as they have heard that the Greeks have occupied Kink, some three hours from Noma. In order to remedy this state of affairs, it would be necessary that all these people should be sent back to their homes, but they refuse to do without a guarantee of some *Entende Pou*.

1. 44

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 1246.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 20, 19

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report dated the 1st July from my representative at Smyrna, relative to a meeting held by the High Commissioners' delegates to discuss the Greek evacuation of Adria.

I have, &

A. CALDWELL High Commissioner.

Exposure at No. 74

Representatives of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet to
Commodore Commanding British Egean Squadron, Smyrna

(No. 142/11)

Figure 1

I HAVE the honour to inform you that at to-day's meeting of the delegation of the High Commissioners the Greek evacuation of Arden was discussed.

We were of opinion that the Turks are aware that the Greeks have only been authorized to occupy a part of the ranyak of Smyrna, and that they are likely to go on attacking the Greeks until the Greeks are driven within their proper limits.

In three circumstances fighting between Turks and Greeks is likely to go on until the Greeks are driven back if they are driven back to Ayasoluk. Such fighting will naturally be accompanied by massacre, pillage, and incendiarism on both sides, and by the flight from their houses of both Christian and Moslem inhabitants.

in those circumstances the delegation thought it might be best if the Greeks were to withdraw within the majak of Sinyra after due public warning of their intention to evacuate territory at present held by them had been given, and after some arrangements had been come to between a Commission of Allied Officers and the Turks that the latter should refrain from any further activity.

the latter should refrain from any further activity.

How far the Turkish attacks are actuated by a desire to push the Greeks back into the limits assigned to them remains to be seen.

furks, in the eventuality of their driving the Greeks back into the steppe at the sanjak frontier?

possibility of having to hold in readiness, from now on, Entente troops, guns and material to be landed in support of the Greeks may have to be taken into

The one by the Turks of Aidin of cannon against Greeks who, for the moment at least had been authorized by the Entente to stay in Aidin, raises the question as to whether Turks in now attacking Greeks are not making war on the Entente, and thus violating the Armistice.

I think the Turkish Government ought to be asked to define its attitude in connection with the Armistice of 1918.

JAMES MORGAN

.109763

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 30,

Constantinople, July 29, 1910

With reference to recent correspondence relative to the effects of the Chinese occupation of Sanyina, I have the honour to transmit herewith a message addressed to Mr. Ballour by the Shajah-ul-Islam, who was Acting Grand Vizier in the absence of Ford Prada, when he sent it to me, and, I understand, to the other High Commissioners also.

The message was enclosed in a short letter from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. The message should be transmitted by telegraph. The note was delivered by the private secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was charged with a personal message from Sefi Bey entreating me on his own behalf also to do something to put an end to the deplorable incidents which had arisen out of the occupation of Smyrna.

3. The member of my staff to whom the note was handed could only say so far as this High Commission was concerned, every endeavour was being put a stop to these incidents by obtaining a clear definition of the limits of the Greek occupation. I fear, however, that after so many weeks during which the question has made no progress this assurance has worn rather thin.

4. I have not thought it necessary to transmit the Sheikh ul Islam's message by telegraph, and it adds nothing to what is already fully known in Paris and London.

5. Copies of this despatch and of the message have been sent to the Peace Delegation.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 7.

Sheikh-ul-Islam's Message to Mr. Bulfour

8. Excellence.

APRÈS l'occupation de la ville de Smyrne, occupation que rien ne justifiait, les jours, les troupes hellènes se sont étendues graduellement sur les autres parties du vilayet. Elles y ont occupé différentes localités dont les populations sont en grande majorité ou en totalité musulmanes. L'entrée de troupes hellènes dans chacune de ces localités est suivie de toutes sortes de violences et d'atrocités contre l'élément musulman. Les maisons sont incendiées et leurs habitants mis à mort. Les femmes sont violées et les enfants enlevés. Ces faits sont si nombreux et si graves qu'ils ne peuvent être énumérés. Ceux-ci sont violents et terribles.

Il a été le sort de la ville d'Aidin, une des principales villes de la province, ainsi que d'autres localités où l'énorme majorité de la population est musulmane.

Des milliers de musulmans ont péri, et plus de 150,000 ont été obligés, pour échapper au massacre et aux horreurs, de quitter leurs foyers et de se réfugier à l'intérieur du pays où ils ne trouvent actuellement aucune sécurité et aucun repos.

Ces faits pourraient être constatés facilement par une commission d'enquête dont nous demandons l'envoi immédiat sur les lieux.

Il est évident que ces faits ont été commis dans la province de Smyrne, sans compter les indigènes qui s'en étaient éloignés.

Ce fait rapproché de ceux qui précèdent ne permet pas de douter que le but poursuivi est évidemment de faire disparaître les musulmans en les exterminant systématiquement ou en les obligeant à quitter leurs foyers sous l'influence de la terreur et de la répression par des Grecs.

Profondément ému par le danger qui menace les populations musulmanes du vilayet de Smyrne, l'Empire ottoman a son devoir de le signaler à la bienveillance de V. M.

Le Gouvernement Impérial est persuadé que ces Puissances ne manqueront pas, dans leur haute et juste appréciation, de prendre toutes les dispositions qui s'imposent pour mettre fin à une situation qui, il en a la ferme conviction, ne répond ni à leurs intentions ni aux sentiments de justice et d'équité dont elles sont animées.

La plus juste de ces dispositions est celle qui répondrait en même temps le mieux aux principes du Président Wilson, à savoir la prompt évacuation par les Hellènes des territoires qu'ils ont occupés en Asie Mineure et sur lesquels ils n'ont aucun droit valable.

(Grand Vexir ad. le Sheikh ul Islam)
MOUTARIF PASHA

[112576]

No. 76.

Colonel French to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 6.)

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
July 19, 1919

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have now received various accounts of the ideas formed and the conclusions reached by the American commissioners who are examining the conditions in Palestine and Syria.

The most important of these ideas and conclusions are as follows:

1. That the territory represented by occupied enemy territory (East), will not accept France peacefully as mandatory Power.
2. That the Zionist programme for Palestine can only be carried through against the wishes of the people and by force. The opposition of the non-Jewish portion of the population was not at all realised by the members of the Commission before they reached the country.
3. That Arab national aspirations to semi-independence under an Anglo-Saxon regime are worthy of encouragement.
4. That the general wish of the people is for a United Syria.

The commissioners have formed a high opinion of British officials in occupied enemy territory and of British systems of administration.

I have, &c.

C. FRENCH, Colonel,
Acting Chief Political Officer,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force

[108680]

No. 77

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame.

(No. 1041)

I HAVE received your despatch No. 738 of the 27th ultimo, enclosing a copy of an article by M. Robert de Caix, which appeared in a recent issue of the "Bulletin de l'Asie française," attacking the British administration and policy in Syria, and your subsequent telegram reporting similar attacks on the part of other French newspapers.

The recrudescence, after some weeks of silence, of these quite unjustifiable attacks upon His Majesty's Government in the French press causes me serious concern.

M. Cambon accordingly sent for M. de Flouriau, who was received by Sir Ronald Graham.

Sir Ronald Graham spoke very strongly, and pointed out that what amounted to a campaign against our administration had been going on. It had started in the "Bulletin de l'Asie française," and had been continued in the "Le Journal," the "Démocratie nouvelle," and the "Pays." The accusations were generally extravagant, and many of them had already been disproved. It was unnecessary to dwell on the true facts with regard to our British relations on the Syrian question, as they had already been set out in conversation with M. Cambon. It was perhaps possible that subordinate French agents in Syria had shown an anti-French bias, although this had not been proved.

The French Government. They were generally extravagant, and many of them had already been disproved. It was unnecessary to dwell on the true facts with regard to our British relations on the Syrian question, as they had already been set out in conversation with M. Cambon. It was perhaps possible that subordinate French agents in Syria had shown an anti-French bias, although this had not been proved.

Sir R. Graham went on to say that certain fresh allegations had been made locally by the French Embassy, such as the unwarranted arrest of eight Arab chiefs at Hama, and Field-Marshal Allenby had at once been called upon for a report, but it had been pointed out that previous allegations of a similar nature which had formed the subject of enquiry had been proved to be of the flimsiest nature. The French Government's support. Our attitude was in fact perfectly correct. We had categorically, repeatedly, and publicly disclaimed any

intention of accepting a mandate for Syria, and had, in so far as was possible, supported popularity and the want of confidence which they inspired. Field-Marshal Allenby acted with great discretion in order to avoid an explosion, and when he expressed fears that the decrease of British or the increase of French troops in those regions would produce a collision with the Arabs his fears were genuine. It was true that M. Cambon affected to disbelieve the possibility of any such danger, but the officer on the spot was presumably the better judge.

The Government were now faced with what might be described as an explosion in the French press. Its systematic continuance in a series of French newspapers made it appear that, if not organised, it must at least be by the French Government, although His Majesty's Government would have nothing of the kind was possible.

Sir Ronald Graham reminded M. de Fleury that a campaign of a somewhat nature had been conducted in the Italian press with the connivance of the Italian Government. It was directed against the aims of Italy, and had ended not only in exasperation, public feeling in that country to a dangerous extent, but had finally passed out of the control of the Italian Government, and had overwhelmed them. There was a danger of those French attacks envenoming French feeling against this country, and they would certainly lead to replies in the British press and to polemics fatal to our good relations with France. Moreover, an serious a

by His Majesty's Government that it would feel compelled to take steps, either by a public statement or otherwise, to bring the true facts of the situation to the public.

M. de Fleury accepted all that was said in extremely good part. He declared that he had no wish to discuss the rights or wrongs of the British attitude on the question of Syria or the grievances which the French Government entertained on the subject. He entirely agreed that press articles of the nature indicated were most undesirable. They could serve no useful purpose, and must lead to mutual hostility. He took careful note of the names of the papers in which they appeared, and promised to call the attention of the Government to them.

M. de Fleury said that he felt certain that neither M. Pichon nor the French Government were in any way responsible for the articles in question, and had given no

M. de Fleury added that there might be subordinate British agents who did not carry out the wishes and intentions of His Majesty's Government. There were certainly subordinate French agents in Paris who wrote in the press and could not be trusted to follow the lines which the French Government recommended. He enquired whether a representation in the same lines as that addressed to him by the French Government would be made to the British Government.

You should, therefore, take the earliest opportunity to make representation to the French Government in accordance with the terms of Sir Ronald Graham's statement.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to Mr. Balfour.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

115267

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lansdown

No. 4511

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 11, 1919

The American Ambassador called upon me at his own request this afternoon in order to enquire about the position in the Caucasus.

By a fortunate coincidence, there had arrived only twenty-four hours before a letter from Mr. Balfour, in Paris, in which, anticipating the massacres that were almost universally prophesied as certain to follow our contemplated evacuation of the Caucasus,

attempt should be made to interest the American Government as the possible future mandatory for Armenia, in the subject of the Caucasus, and that we might even

delay the concluding stages of our withdrawal if we could induce the American Government to send military forces to take the place of ours.

I accordingly explained the situation with complete frankness to Mr. Davis; told him the circumstances in which we had decided to withdraw our troops; explained the stage which arrangements for withdrawal had already reached, referred to the abortive attempt to introduce the Italians on to the scene, and confirmed Mr. Balfour's apprehensions as to the local consequences that might be expected to follow the departure of our troops.

I then asked the Ambassador these questions: Did he think that the American Government were at all likely to entertain such a request if it was made to them? Had they the troops available in Europe or elsewhere who could be used for such purpose? Was it likely that Congress would be willing to accept a mandate for Armenia or any other portion, larger or smaller, of the Turkish Empire? Was the earliest date at which such a decision might conceivably be reached?

A Government decided to assume responsibility for Armenia, was it probable that they would extend their interest to the Caucasus as well? The Ambassador was very careful to explain in reply that he could not speak authoritatively or officially for his Government on any of these matters. In so far, however, as he was entitled to express an *a priori* opinion, he had very little difficulty in doing so. In the first place, he said that the Americans now had only 180,000 troops remaining in Europe, the bulk of whom were under orders to return to their country, and any of whom it would be impossible, in existing conditions, to move to the Caucasus. Indeed, any despatch of troops to the Caucasus would be attempted without the knowledge and consent of Congress.

Secondly, although he was aware that, on humanitarian and philanthropic grounds, the American people were deeply interested in Armenia, yet he personally did not believe that these considerations would induce his country to depart from the twofold traditional basis of its foreign policy, namely, (a) the refusal to be entangled in foreign alliances or commitments, (b) a strict adherence to the Monroe Doctrine.

Thirdly, he said that, while they probably did not believe that, in the last resort, it would take effect, the Americans were very doubtful whether philanthropy would survive in the contest with expediency. As to any other portion of the Turkish Empire, while it was conceivable that the American nation might be attracted by such an idea, here again, expressing his personal opinion, he did not believe that, in the last resort, it would take effect.

Summing up the situation, therefore, the Ambassador said that, while he saw no reason why the request suggested by Mr. Balfour should not be made to the American Government if we wished to make it, he did not anticipate that it would be attended by any practical results.

In reply to further questions which I put to him, he informed me that he did not think it probable that the American decision on the mandatory question would be reached in a period of less than three months from now.

With this very uncertain and rather disquieting forecast of events, which promised little relief from our impending anxieties in respect of the situation in the Caucasus and of the position in Asiatic Turkey in general, the American Ambassador took his leave.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

115568

No. 79

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon. — (Received August 13.)

Constantinople, August 1, 1919.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 1521 and 1525 of the 23rd July, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum on a manifesto published by the representatives of a large number of Turkish parties on the 22nd July and a translation (as published in a local French paper) of a circular issued by Damad Ferid Pasha immediately on his resumption of office.

The universal hostility with which the new Government is regarded by the party leaders and the press augurs ill for the future of the Cabinet. It is specially

[1856]

Y 2

noteworthy that that larger fraction of the "Entente liberale" party which follows Sadik Bey and disavows the Sheikh ul-Islam have at last found common ground with parties whose advances the "Entente liberale" had hitherto rejected.

3 The fact is that this country has now quite definitely reached the point at which every Turkish element in active political life is dominated more by national sentiment and the desire to conserve at least the unoccupied remnant of the Empire as an undivided whole than by any other consideration. Broadly speaking, the various elements, all equally nationalist, are ranged in two camps according as they think that there is still something to be hoped from the Entente Powers, especially that the time has come for resistance, however desperate, to the humiliating decrees of the Peace Conference.

4 The distinction between these two schools of thought is blurred in Constantinople, where both sides are for the moment united in detestation of the Grand Vizier, and where even the most Chauvinistic think it still advisable to affect respect for the Entente Powers as a whole and love of England in particular. In the provinces the second school of thought is definitely in the ascendant. The present Government cannot afford to fight the movement in the interior. Its only strength lies in the support of the Sultan, himself a rather uncertain factor, and in the fact that few of the parties have much good backing, as the bulk of a Moslem population care nothing at all for politics, and demand only a quiet and well led life.

5 The issue of this confused situation is as difficult to foresee as ever. I see nothing, however, to make me alter the opinion which I have so often expressed that the combined result of adverse single decisions and the delay in settling must be to make all the active political elements converge and to make the centre of gravity of the growing coalition shift in direction of Chauvinism and resistance. If I were to hazard a definite prophecy, it would be that the Chauvinists will either gain a definite ascendancy here, as they already have in the provinces, or will set themselves up in some provincial open opposition to Constantinople.

6 Considerable uncertainty prevails as to what is going on in the more remote parts of the interior. The Grand Vizier himself remarked on the 25th July that he was in the presence of an enigma. Every sort of rumour was current, he said, of Chauvinist activities and provincial congresses, but a telegram just received from [redacted] said that the situation there had never been so calm. This telegram came from a military authority who would almost certainly be in sympathy with the Government, and on being asked what the civil authorities said the Grand Vizier said: "My latest information leads me to believe that the Congress is waiting, but I have not been able to obtain anything certain as to the date of its taking."

7 I do not think that I exaggerated the potentialities of the present situation when I stated in a recent telegram that the country was faced with the possibility of a disintegration of order and security on a large scale. The new Government inspires no confidence in its ability or in the character of the majority of its members. Ferid Pasha is perplexed and easily deceived. The presence of Towfik Pasha makes society, but, while less easily galled than the Grand Vizier, he is to some extent amenable to the suggestion of an entourage steeped in Chauvinism. The Sheikh-ul-Islam, an outcast from his party, had already, before the Grand Vizier's return, played with the idea of a rapprochement with the Chauvinists. There is no outstanding figure among the remainder of the Ministers, and as a whole they may be expected to do any time-serving that is required of them.

8 As against this inadequate Central Government we have the Congress at [redacted] know little except that it is dominated by dashing youths who are willing to stake everything on a gambler's throw, and who have purposely shifted the main scene of their activities east and north with the double purpose of securing a freer field and defending Armenia from the fate of Smyrna. The new Government has not dared, even if it wished, to remove from the Ministry of the "opposite numbers" of these provincial officers. It was rumoured on the morning of its advent to power that Djavad Pasha, Chief of the General Staff and another equally notorious sympathiser with the "national defence" movement, would be removed. There was a storm of protest, and nothing more has been heard of the proposal.

9 A further indication of the desire of the Government to be all things to all men is the decision definitely taken on the 27th July to proceed with the elections. There is an endeavour to placate its critics here and to steal the thunder of the Congress at

Erzeroum. If any serious attempt is made to give effect to the decision, it can only lead to fresh troubles, and the end may easily be to conjure into existence a Parliament representative of nothing but the unquiet ghost of the Committee of Union and Progress.

10. Taking it all round, the present outlook is more disquieting, from the point of view of tranquillity, than it has been at any time since the Supreme Council decided that Greek troops were to occupy Smyrna.

I have, A.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

Memorandum.

1. The [redacted] ("Socialist") published a manifesto adopted at a meeting of party representatives at the "Entente liberale" headquarters on Monday night, the 21st July.

The manifesto recites the names of the parties, &c., represented, as follows:

Entente Libera

M. Akar

Turkish S.

Frederick

Smyrna Defence of Ottoman Rights

National Congress

Kurdish C.

Turkish Press

The manifesto states that the representatives, considering the formation of a third Pasha Cabinet dangerous to the national interests, after he has by his performances at home and abroad lost the confidence of the nation, unanimously adopted the following resolutions after three hours' continuous deliberations for submission to Caliph and the nation generally:—

1. The third Ferid Pasha Cabinet formed yesterday is an unconstitutional Cabinet.
2. The said Cabinet has no qualification or capacity to direct the foreign policy or internal affairs of the Empire.
3. Damad Ferid Pasha is absolutely undeserving of confidence, as a result of the city displayed by him hitherto in defending and maintaining the [redacted] all the parties are united in seeing the necessity for the removal from power of a Cabinet of this kind and the formation in its place of a Cabinet enjoying general confidence and capable of defending the national interests.

July 23, 1919.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

Circular respecting the Situation in Anatolia

LE Grand-Vizir, Damad Ferid Pasha, a adressé aux vilayets d'Anatolie une importante circulaire dont voici le texte:

Nous avons pris connaissance du telegramme-circulaire du commandant [redacted] division de Karahissar dont un exemplaire nous a été transmis par le [redacted] [redacted] Cette circulaire porte à la connaissance des intéressés que la réunion d'un Congrès national, dans une région orientale de la Turquie convenablement choisie, le Congrès chargé de régler et de fixer les destinées du pays, ayant été décidée, trois délégués devaient être élus et envoyés à Angora. De même, nous avons pris connaissance de divers telegrammes parvenus de Roum et relatifs aux frais de route de

L'état de désordre et de trouble dans lequel j'ai trouvé l'Anatolie en l'absence de six semaines, motivée par mon séjour à Paris, à la Conférence, m'a causé une grande peine.

Dans la Constitution que nous sommes tous tenus de respecter, la capitale de l'Empire ottoman, il est clairement dit que l'Assemblée législative ne peut et ne doit être ouverte que par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Par conséquent, cette façon d'agir, qui est contraire à la Constitution, aux désirs et ordres de notre gracieux Souverain et aux intérêts supérieurs de la patrie, doit absolument cesser. Je vous demande donc tout particulièrement de faire des communications énergiques et réitérées dans ce sens, à tous les mutessarifis et caïmans dépendant de votre vilayet.

Quant à savoir s'il y a lieu ou non de payer les frais de route aux délégués, l'acte de les élire étant tout d'abord illégal et contraire à la Constitution, il est du devoir des autorités civiles et militaires non seulement de ne pas faciliter un acte aussi illégal, mais surtout d'empêcher de pareils agissements.

Je vous recommande tout particulièrement et de la façon la plus catégorique dans le sens que je vous indique.

Le 20 Juillet 1919.

[115591]

No. 80.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon. (Received August 13.)

(N. 1353)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 31, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Hühler, regarding a conversation which he had yesterday with the Grand Vizier.

2. Among the points touched upon in this interview, the first one which I wish to deal with is the question of the personal safety of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, in the event of the abdication of the one and the resignation of the other as both of them have, according to every indication which has reached me, done their utmost to carry out the terms of the Armistice and to conform to them. I consider it will be proper and in conformity with the views of His Majesty's Government that I should take any steps that might be necessary to ensure that these persons should be treated with all proper respect, and that they should not be molested in any way, nor their safety endangered.

3. With regard to the political issues involved, I find myself confronted by very serious difficulties. It is not many days past that I telegraphed to you that the situation here has gone beyond the application of any local remedy, and to this view I still strongly adhere, but no remedy is coming or appears to be in sight from outside, and it becomes therefore incumbent to consider what action, if any, should be taken in order to meet the present complications.

4. It is by no means an unimportant question which is to be attached to the importance which is to be attached to the situation which is being held at Erzerum, Sivas, and at times the Grand Vizier is disposed to make light of them, it is only natural that a man in his position should do so in order not to admit that the authority of his own Government was seriously shaken. At other times he contradicts himself, and confesses that the situation is very serious, and I was only yesterday he admitted to Mr. Hühler, in plain words, the possibility of the provinces shaking off their allegiance to the capital.

5. The precarious position of the present Government is sufficiently clearly shown by the memorandum which I enclose. It is a Government which shows good will, and is, I think, genuinely in favour of the Allies, understanding that the Turkish Empire can have no possible hope save in them. It is, however, little able to ensure that its orders shall be carried out in the provinces, and it appears to contain within itself certain disloyal elements. It seems certain that it can only be maintained in power by a very determined effort on the part of the Allies. But it has been our policy not to interfere more than appeared indispensable for the maintenance of public order in the internal affairs of the Empire, and whilst in a number of cases our interest on behalf of the Christian populations has carried us rather far in this respect, no interference has taken place which has been instigated with a view either to the political or the commercial advantage of His Majesty's Government. In other words, our interference has been purely altruistic, and on no occasion selfish. The results promised

well, and would have, I believe, been entirely satisfactory, had it not been for the unfortunate events attending the Greek occupation of Smyrna. It was these that threw the whole of the Turkish people into the orbit of the Committee of Union and Progress, a faction which, but for these events, was rapidly being broken up.

6. According to the Grand Vizier, the Sultan states that he will never accept His Majesty. It is true that it might perhaps, be possible to deter Izzet from seeking office on the lines mentioned by Mr. Hühler, but I am not certain that this is desirable. If Izzet, who of course used to be an adherent of the Government, is now into power with a Cabinet composed of Unionists, it is probable that they will be possessed of much greater authority in the provinces than the present Government, the "congresses" in the interior would be replaced by the "Parliament." Ferid Pasha has had to yield to the cry for parliamentary elections, though I understand that it is his intention to protract the proceedings as much as possible in the capital, where is exposed to the powerful influences of the Entente forces, much less service is rendered to the Allied High Commissioners, but a tacit and sulky opposition to any of the measures which they might desire in the interior for the protection of Christians would have to be anticipated. The all exchange

with the assistance of Mr. Ruffin's private letter of instructions to me on the

be so greatly prolonged, but the turn of events is again bringing us face to face with the situation which nine months ago, he was contemplating. There will be no satisfaction even if there should be more difficulty, in exacting hard terms from the Unionists rather than those who, one has reason to believe, are fundamentally well-

to be guided by the principles laid down in my of the 23rd instant, which, not having evoked any comment from you, has presumably met with your approval.

9. I should note that whilst I expressed to the Grand Vizier the opinion that it is desirable at the present time to hold elections, yet I have taken no further active steps to stop them, as it appeared to me to do so would be in with the liberal spirit of the age, and the principles of President Wilson, although opinions may differ as to how much or how little these ideals are to be considered as adaptable to the conditions prevailing in this Empire. This High Commission will continue to act in the closest accord with the French, and I propose to discuss at the earliest possible moment the considerations I am presenting to you in this despatch.

10. I have hoped that a material amelioration in the situation will be produced as soon as my French and Italian colleagues receive their instructions to sign the Note informing the Porte of the decision of the Supreme Council limiting the Italian and Greek spheres in the Asia vilayet, though the delay which still continues in making this pronouncement is every day more regrettable, and I fear that the Grand Vizier is correct when he states that now it will be insufficient to allay the agitation in Asia Minor, and that its effect will be far inferior to that which it would have had two months ago.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 80.

Memorandum.

THE Grand Vizier came to see me this morning. He said that the situation was fast becoming impossible. The Committee were "again raising their hydra heads," and the members of his Cabinet were continually receiving orders from them to resign. He was taking the most active steps in his power against its manifestations in the provinces, but he believed that the centre of the organisation was here. He said it had cost him five days' hard struggle before he

enough, Raouf Bey, an officer called Shukur, and a brigand chief near Ispah who he had forgotten. Opposition to him in this had come from the military party

but especially the Minister of War, whom he believed was a traitor to him. The orders sent before with this object had been of a general nature, not specific like those sent last night. He stated that at the head of the movement were Izzet Pasha, Ahmed Riza, and Mahmoud Churouk Selou, and they had got the Crown Prince entirely into their hands.

The Sultan yesterday, and had neglected all the forms of courtesy which are usually used by the members of the Imperial House in addressing the Sovereign, and had simply abused him for maintaining the present Government, and as being the ruin of the country, the Caliphate, and the Sultanate. At the same time he had not made any proposals which had the slightest practical bearing.

3. Seeing the extreme difficulty of the situation, the Grand Vizier had, in the week and asked him if he could form a Cabinet. Tewfik replied that it would be useless, because he could only make one exactly similar to the present, and it could not act. Also he referred to the insidious circumstances which had attended his last fall from power. The Sultan had expressed the firm decision not to summon Izzet Pasha to the throne.

He had suffered too much at the last time, and he was unshakably resolved not to do so again. He would resign the throne.

The Grand Vizier asked me, supposing this were to take place, would Great Britain ensure that the person of the Sultan in such circumstances would be protected? He also asked the same question in respect to his "magnificent self." I said that he broached a grave question, which it would be necessary to refer to London, but if such an event happened before it were possible to get an answer, I could only say that I felt certain that this High Commission would take a lively interest in their fate, and would make to any succeeding Government that interest. I did not go so far as to express my personal opinion, which is that we should take every possible step to ensure personal safety.

4. The Grand Vizier went on to say that the Sultan was fit to take on the Government except himself. Tewfik said it was for this reason that the situation was so extremely bad.

5. I asked the Grand Vizier whether it would produce a considerable effect for the better if it were known that the Peace Conference were taking steps, through British instrumentality, to define the zones of Greek and Italian activity in the Asian vilayet, and he replied that it most certainly would, although at the same time he doubted whether it would be altogether sufficient. I told him then that steps of this nature would be shortly be communicated to him, together with the question of certain regions by Greek and Italian troops in no way decisions of the Peace Conference as to the final disposal of those regions. He regretted that it could not be used for publication, but expressed very great satisfaction at the news; but still, he said, this will not be sufficient entirely to calm the agitation which is being provoked by the Committee. He affected to attach little importance, nevertheless, to the Congress which is being held at Erzeroum, and said that the gatherings at Amassia were not very important.

6. He again reverted with great insistence to the fact that the Sultan had suggested his visit to both the French and the British High Commissioners, but he had replied that it was useless to go to the French as no effective assistance would be forthcoming. He had throughout his tenure of office sought help and advice for the government of the country from the British, and this had been the result of his efforts and convictions for thirty years past. He said that no action on the grounds of his previous suggestion in this direction had been taken, though he quite understood the situation which was caused by the refusal of consulting the British.

7. It appears to me fairly certain that Izzet is at the root of the present trouble, and I do not see that it could do any harm, and on the other hand it might do much good, if an indication in polite terms could be made to him of the reasons why he would do well to abstain from causing trouble.

8. It appears to me that it would be most emphatically undesirable in the highest degree to have anything in the form of a Committee Government, and it looks as if we shall have to take perfectly firm action to stop such an eventuality. If therefore we had no more move in God and Great Britain.

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the warning were to prove insufficient, I am inclined to think that we should be prepared to face the necessity of arresting and deporting of Izzet, and perhaps of one or two of his fellow-workers as well.

Constantinople, July 30, 1919

[116385]

No. 81

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahams

I ASKED M. de Fleury to call upon me this afternoon in order to draw his attention to an announcement which had appeared in the French newspapers of the pending despatch of a French judicial mission to Tehran. I recapitulated to the French Minister the previous history of this question, and read to him *verbatim* my notes of the last conversation which I had on the subject with M. Cambon when he later visited me in the Foreign Office on the 4th July.

I had explained to M. Cambon on that occasion that, while I had no objection to the despatch to Tehran of French professors skilled in medicine, surgery, and mathematics, I was at a loss to understand why the institution of a Law School or the sending of French Professors of Law should be required. I had pointed out that, the frontier between law and politics being admittedly thin, there was some feeling tempted to take a hand in the local political game. I had also put to the French Minister an hypothetical question as to whether, if a similar move in some sphere of clearly French influence had been attempted, upon his approaching visit to Paris, he would discuss the question of the French legal professors; and he had left upon my mind the impression that it would not be necessary to persevere with that part of the French programme.

In these circumstances, I had been considerably surprised at reading in the "Temps" only a few days ago an announcement to the effect that a French Judicial Mission had been formed by the French Minister of Justice, with the consent of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was to leave for Persia next month to found a School of Law in Tehran. The names of the members of the mission were given, and it had been added in the "Temps" that the mission itself could not fail to benefit French influence in the East.

The ground which I had taken in my conversation with M. Cambon was, I now feel, at once a mistake, greatly strengthened by what has since taken place. The British Government had for some time been engaged in negotiations with the Persian Government, culminating in an agreement which I had just concluded and which was about to be published in both countries. I gave the French Minister a general sketch of the contents of this agreement, and I said that it seemed to me singularly inappropriate that—at a time when the Persian Government had themselves recognised the predominant political interest of Great Britain by inviting her assistance in the manner provided for in the agreement—the French Government should think it fit to appear upon the scene almost in the guise of rival competitors, suggesting to Persia and to the world that the old competition between European nations (in former times usually Russia and Great Britain) was about to be revived, and that France regarded with some jealousy the occupation of the field by England.

M. de Fleury undertook to verify what I had said to M. Cambon, and to communicate to Paris the substance of our conversation to-day.

I went on to say to the French Minister that indications had reached me lately of an inclination on the part, not, I hoped, of the French Government, but of certain advanced sections of it, to quarrel with this country, and to adopt an attitude towards Great Britain that was scarcely consistent with the close and friendly relations which have existed between the two countries for so long a time. I told him that I thought we had said good-bye to the policy of pin-pricks, which had done so much to exacerbate relations between our two countries in the past, and, when on the part of the two Governments there was still the firmest intention in the public interest to pursue a policy of close co-operation, it seemed to me little short of scandalous that

any encouragement should be given to those who sought to poison the wells. I reminded M. de Fleurian that, upon my instructions, Sir Ronald Graham had spoken to him with great frankness last week on the question of Syria, pointing out to him that, while we desired no mandate for that region, and would certainly refuse it if offered, the only reason for which a military occupation of Syria by the French had not been encouraged by our military authorities was that such an occupation would be absolutely certain to lead to collisions between the French and the native populations.

Upon the French Minister doubting whether this was the case, I informed him and this he had not previously heard—that on a recent occasion a French officer of the highest rank had actually been fired upon and wounded by the population of a district of the Lebanon in which the French claimed a long-standing political prebendance.

Further, I asked whether a stronger evidence of our disinterestedness could be brought than the fact that, though France had no legitimate claim to Cilicia, had received a mandate for that part of the Turkish Empire, and might indeed in the future not receive one at all, yet we had voluntarily invited French troops to that country, of which they were now in possession. Not a word of recognition was given to this fact, while, on the other hand, inspired writers in the leading newspapers endeavoured to make mischief as regards Syria by bringing wholly unfounded charges against this country.

M. Fleurian disputed the inspiration under which these writers penned their attacks, but I said that I could not doubt seriously that such had been the case.

I asked him to help to keep the relations between our two countries free from the sphere of suspicion and insinuation, of which there appeared to be too many propagators in the French press.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KIDLESTON

[116079]

No. 42.

Sir G. Grahame to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 14.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 12, 1919.

ON receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 8th instant on the subject of the anti-British campaign here in connection with Syria, I requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive me. His Excellency fixed this morning for my visit.

I began my conversation by saying that, as he was aware, the attacks of the French press had caused His Majesty's Government serious concern. In the person of M. Paul Cambon, Sir Ronald Graham had seen M. de Fleurian, and I was to report to his Excellency what Sir Ronald Graham had said to him. M. de Fleurian showed unusual warmth directly I informed him of the nature of the attack, before I could begin: "I will answer you." I then told him of the nature of what had been said to M. de Fleurian, a report of which had apparently already reached him. M. de Fleurian spoke at first hesitantly, but then, after a moment, full of reports of anti-French propaganda carried on by Anglo-Syrian agents, he said that the reports were so detailed and concordant that it was absolutely impossible for the French Government not to believe that they were well-founded. He did not for a moment wish to insinuate that His Majesty's Government were at the back of these proceedings.

He must tell me that he felt sure that neither Field-Marshal Allenby nor the British Government could be aware of what was being done. I interrupted his Excellency at this point to tell him that British officers, personal friends of mine, who had come back from the Near East and who had talked to me on the subject, had spontaneously assured me that the French were entirely mistaken in thinking that we were working against them there; that the sole idea of the British authorities was to prevent the French from carrying on premature propaganda calculated to stir up trouble. M. Pichon listened to me, but maintained his view that contrary information was reaching him from many quarters, which he could not possibly disregard.

His Excellency said that I must know that the press here could not be controlled by the French Government. In fact, the latter were attacked in many of their articles for not properly defending the French cause. Needless to say, M. Robert de Caix had

acted entirely independently of the French Government. I said to him at this point that these articles against England were of daily occurrence, and I showed him two.

"Figaro" (reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 783 of yesterday) and another written by M. Gauvain in the "Journal des Débats" (please see my despatch of the 10th inst.). Of which I pointed out, His Majesty's Government were not cognisant when issuing to me the instructions on which I was acting. In M. Gauvain's article the British Government were directly accused. M. Pichon had not seen them but he observed that in the "Figaro" article the French Government were directly accused. As regards M. Gauvain, he attacked the Government frequently, and paid no attention to their wishes. The same was true of the authors of the other articles brought to his notice.

M. Pichon said there was another aspect of the question which he would like to mention. He was convinced that His Majesty's Government were not fully aware of the situation in Syria in this country. It was not a thing of yesterday, but a thing which was continually increasing. It would be the greatest of our interests to have the almost passionate interest which the French took in this country. If we did not have this interest, they would be swept away. They would not get ten votes in the Chamber, and he told me that a strong

attack was coming when Parliament met towards the end of the month. He suggested that the French Government were neglecting the proper means of dealing with the situation. He said that the French Government were neglecting the proper means of dealing with the situation. He said that the French Government were neglecting the proper means of dealing with the situation. He said that the French Government were neglecting the proper means of dealing with the situation.

I said that it was a really deplorable situation. Up to the present I had not noticed that the British press had taken up the matter, but this might happen at any moment, with the result that the controversy would be still further aggravated. I said that it was a really deplorable situation. Up to the present I had not noticed that the British press had taken up the matter, but this might happen at any moment, with the result that the controversy would be still further aggravated. I said that it was a really deplorable situation. Up to the present I had not noticed that the British press had taken up the matter, but this might happen at any moment, with the result that the controversy would be still further aggravated.

In one part of our conversation M. Pichon mentioned the fact that Mr. Lloyd George had at an earlier date made an attempt with M. Clemenceau to find some settlement, but that it had been abandoned, and now M. Clemenceau would not take the

any attempts to shake his belief in the anti-French action of British agents. He seemed to be honestly convinced of this, and there does not appear to me to be any prospect of wavering. This was from his point of view. M. Paul Cambon was quite as convinced as he was himself that the French have the best reasons for complaint.

He said that it was a really deplorable situation. Up to the present I had not noticed that the British press had taken up the matter, but this might happen at any moment, with the result that the controversy would be still further aggravated. I said that it was a really deplorable situation. Up to the present I had not noticed that the British press had taken up the matter, but this might happen at any moment, with the result that the controversy would be still further aggravated. I said that it was a really deplorable situation. Up to the present I had not noticed that the British press had taken up the matter, but this might happen at any moment, with the result that the controversy would be still further aggravated.

ally in Syria.
(Communicated to Peace Delegation and Mr. Balfour)

I have, &c

GEORGE GRAHAME,

(No. 1000)
257

Foreign Office, August 14, 1913

Foreign Office, August 14, 1913

WITH reference to my despatch No. 322 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to inform you that M. de Fleuriau called at this Office on the 5th instant and saw Sir R. Graham.

te, of which a copy is enclosed, M. de Fleury took occasion to
was not satisfied with what Sir R. Graham had said to M. Cambon in the
we reported in my despatch under reference, and that he did not
tion of the division of military spheres in Turkey should be dropped,
trary, that the arrangements summarised in his note, which were based
structions from the French Government, should be carried into effect.

After reading the note, Sir R. Graham at once took serious exception to the first paragraph. This proposal, he pointed out, constituted an entirely fresh departure, the substitution of a French officer for General Milne at Constantinople under General Francel d'Esperey. In previous conversations M. Cambon had assured him that there was no intention on the part of the Government to bring about any change in control at Constantinople, and he informed our military authorities.

M de Flourin replied that the new functions allotted to her Paris Conference appeared to him to necessitate some readjustment at Constantinople. General M. de Flouin could scarcely exercise his new supreme command in Asiatic Turkey and at the same time in the Balkans. He was at Constantinople.

Sir R. Graham said that M. de Fleury's proposal would be communicated to the military authorities, but that he could hold out no prospect of its being accepted. The best course at the present moment seemed to him to be that the question of military spheres in Turkey should be allowed to sleep.

1000. *At*

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Enclosure in No. 88

Note.

LE général français commandant l'armée d'Orient à Constantinople actuellement le Général Franchet d'Espèrey) exercera le commandement des troupes alliées à Constantinople; il désignera l'officier qui exercera effectivement le commandement militaire de cette ville.

La zone du commandement confiée au général français est la zone antique de Constantinople jusqu'à la limite du Muteramlik de Scutari et de Beşiktaş. Dans cette zone, le contrôle du commandement britannique d'Asie Mineure s'exercera sur le chemin de fer d'Ismid à Haidar-Pacha, y compris la gare et le port de la gare de Haidar-Pacha.

Les mines de charbon d'Hénin continueront à être exploitées actuellement en vigueur, et le charbon extrait de ces mines sera utilisé pendant les mois de mars à juillet 1919, pour l'approvisionnement de Constantinople et de la région du Sud de Roumanie.

Man kann sich vorstellen, dass

Amélie de France, Londres,
le 5 août 1919.

118361)

No. 84.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 1358.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 5, 1919

I REPORTED in my dispatch No. 1359 (paragraph 9) of the 31st ultimo that I intended to discuss with my French colleague the serious problems presented by the

The acting Italian High Commissioner had not yet received instructions to sign the note to the Sublime Porte concerning the delimitation of the Greek and Italian zones in Asia Minor, and I arranged with M. Derance that he should call upon him to this effect.

6. Council of communication between the Supreme Council and the said G. M. Laidie accepted this interpretation, and agreed to sign the note (a copy of which is enclosed herewith*), which was handed to the Grand Visier on Sunday last, 18th August. His Excellency received it with great satisfaction, stating that it would

that the advent to power of a Government
 would be constantly underscored in the interests
 of maintaining order as well as for the reason that it
 was both to the Government of the armistice, and
 to the administration of the peace which would be imposed, we
 accepted, eventually, of the terms of the peace which would be imposed, we
 and by our compliance that it was necessary to give such support as we properly
 Government, although

Interference in internal political

visiter by our Deacons that he would do well to proceed with great caution against those whom he knew to be implicated in Unionist intrigues, or in any way we did have the result of placing obstructions in the way of the progress of the armistice.

5. This we did, and I again impressed this matter on his Highness's attention the morning, when he came to pay me a visit of farewell on the occasion of my approaching departure from Constantinople.

the Committee, to whom he is as entirely opposed as we are, but who will do every thing to support us, and he asked whether, in the event of a number of arrests being made, it would be better for us to arrange that the persons arrested should be conveyed to some place where they could be kept safe. Mr. [redacted] said that I was acquainted with a man who was very well known to the Government, and who had been in the country for many years, and who had been in the country for many years, and who had been in the country for many years.

unfortunate results which may attend such a connection.

unfortunate results which may attend such a connection.

not doubtful of the utility of occupying Trebizond. He has promised me to express
his views on the question at the earliest possible moment, with a view that we may
continue to work as hitherto in the closest agreement.

2 It was with no little regret that I parted with my French colleague, with whom my relations have always been most agreeable, and indeed, during the last few weeks extremely close.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner

[118406]

N 85

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 30.)

(N 111)
M. 1.

Constantinople, August 9, 1919.
WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 24th July received at 11.15 p.m. and to have been committed by Greek troops in the Aidin Valley by telegram No. 1, of the 31st July, I have the copy of a report dated the 1st August from a representative at Smyrna on this subject.

ROBERT WEBB
Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 85

Representative of British High Commissioner,
British High Commissioner, Constantinople

(No 104)

July 30, 1919.
WITH reference to your telegram No. 109 of the 25th July, I have the honour to submit the following report on the situation after its occupation by the Greeks.

Greek troops occupied Aidin on the 27th May 1919, without incident; and for three or four weeks nothing untoward appears to have occurred, although a memorandum presented to a British representative at Denizli on the 11th July alleges that Muslims were arrested and imprisoned and their fezzes torn off, and that at Fethiye and Carabunar, stations west of Aidin, forty-eight Moslems were killed by

On the 21st June, a skirmish took place near the Meander river between Turkish irregulars and Greek troops. The Turks were driven off. The Greeks then set fire to the two Turkish villages of Emir-Kuyu and Kudi-Kuyu between Aidin and the sea.

The Turks retaliated by burning various farms belonging to Greeks.

After this engagement relations between Turks and Greeks in Aidin town became worse.

South of the Meander bands of Turkish irregulars were gathering with the knowledge of Turkish regular officers, who were warned on the 21st June by Lieutenant Hodder that an attack on Aidin was not to be allowed.

On the 25th June, on returning from a tour as far as Denizli was in the east of Aidin, an ultimatum, signed by Yuruk Ali, head of the Turkish irregulars operating east of Aidin, and addressed to the inhabitants of Aidin, stating that if Greek troops did not evacuate Aidin in three days they would be driven out by force.

Fighting, however, had begun on the same day to the south of the town where Greeks appear to have attacked Turks, and continued till the 30th July, when the Greeks finally evacuated the town, and Colonel Chekri Bey, commander of the Turkish troops, entered it.

During the evacuation the Greeks set fire to the Turkish quarter, and shot down Turks who tried to escape.

The attached report, which was supplied to me by M. Diacono, manager of the Imperial Ottoman Bank at Aidin, gives an account of this killing of Turks by Greeks.

This killing seems to have been done entirely by Greek soldiers.

The Greek defence is that they were fired at from houses as they retreated through the Turkish quarter and had to reply.

The number of Moslems thus killed or burnt in their houses is unknown. Turks say 2,000, but it seems impossible to arrive at a correct estimate.

In entering the town the Turkish irregulars found that numbers of their men were being massacred, and began massacring Greeks. The Greek quarter was

seen in the streets were fired at. Those who took refuge in the French convent were respected, but all others found about were killed without distinction of age or sex.

A number of Greeks who had tried to follow the retreating Greek army and had been repulsed by the latter were found by the Turks on the hills and cruelly massacred.

Lieutenant Hodder saw the bodies of persons thus slain, and has sent photographs and a report to the British naval representative here.

Greeks estimate the number of Greeks killed at 1,500 to 2,000.

Some again occupied Aidin, but before their arrival a hundred, had fled over the Meander to

On the 10th July and subsequent British naval reports give more complete details of the Aidin incidents.

On the other hand reports come in from Turks in the Denizli and Chinar region and the Greeks of having begun the massacre in Aidin, and thus provoked

The Greek side of the matter is that they were first attacked by irregulars, and that subsequently the Moslem civilian population fired on Greek troops, who were obliged to take measures to protect themselves.

That both Turk and Greek have committed atrocities cannot be doubted. The British Government is concerned to maintain public opinion in Europe, and to punish the wrongdoers. In this respect I find M. Sterghianis very honest and able to carry them out.

On the Turkish side there seems no tendency to punish the wrongdoers. The irregular bands and the Turkish Government seem to have no orders from a regular authority to punish barbarism and massacre without any pretext.

The Italians south of the Meander, far from preventing Turks attacking Greeks, seem to encourage them.

Both Turk and Greek seem to be acquiring a British feeling, the former for our aiding Greece to occupy parts of Asia Minor, and the latter for our preventing him dealing with the Turk as he wishes.

Copy sent to

JAMES MORGAN

Enclosure 2 in No. 85.

Report of Events in Aidin

(Confidential.)

A LA suite d'une escarmouche qui eut lieu aux environs du Méandre, le 21 juin, les Grecs ont occupé la ville d'Aidin.

La population de 150 habitants environ, les Turcs, de leur côté, brûlèrent, à l'exception de quelques propriétés grecques non loin de ces deux villages.

Le 25 juin, le Colonel Chekri Bey, commandant de la division d'Aidin qui, à l'occupation grecque, s'était retiré avec un millier de soldats au delà du Méandre.

Les Grecs ont occupé les villages d'Emir-Kuyu et Kudi-Kuyu, situés à l'est de la ville d'Aidin.

Le 26 juin, les Grecs ont occupé la ville d'Aidin, l'autre rive du Méandre se trouvant à 10 kilom. de la ville (hinter de la rive grecque).

Le 27 juin, les Grecs ont occupé la ville d'Aidin, l'autre rive du Méandre se trouvant à 10 kilom. de la ville (hinter de la rive grecque).

Le 28 juin, les Grecs ont occupé la ville d'Aidin, l'autre rive du Méandre se trouvant à 10 kilom. de la ville (hinter de la rive grecque).

Le 29 juin, les Grecs ont occupé la ville d'Aidin, l'autre rive du Méandre se trouvant à 10 kilom. de la ville (hinter de la rive grecque).

Le 30 juin, les Grecs ont occupé la ville d'Aidin, l'autre rive du Méandre se trouvant à 10 kilom. de la ville (hinter de la rive grecque).

Le 1er juillet, les Grecs ont occupé la ville d'Aidin, l'autre rive du Méandre se trouvant à 10 kilom. de la ville (hinter de la rive grecque).

Le 2 juillet, les Grecs ont occupé la ville d'Aidin, l'autre rive du Méandre se trouvant à 10 kilom. de la ville (hinter de la rive grecque).

Le 3 juillet, les Grecs ont occupé la ville d'Aidin, l'autre rive du Méandre se trouvant à 10 kilom. de la ville (hinter de la rive grecque).

Dans l'entre temps, à notre arrivée à Milas, le jeudi, 3 courant, j'avais fait faire par M. Stolzenberg, le restant du personnel de l'agence et les quelques familles qui y vivaient.

Après notre départ de Aidin, le Colonel Cheik Bey, d'après ce qu'il m'a dit, les habitants, des hommes, des femmes, et jeunes filles ont été massacrés et mutilés. Suivant l'évaluation des données recueillies, il y a eu environ 1,400 victimes.

A l'heure qu'il est, le 80 pour cent des maisons et magasins d'Aidin ont brûlés, les quartiers chrétiens ayant complètement disparu. On ne retrouve plus les ordres de la ville.

En outre nous le disons. L'incertitude de la situation, d'une part, l'exode de la population et l'impossibilité de séjourner, en ce moment, dans la ville, d'autre part, nous empêchent de vouloir bien nous autoriser à nous mettre d'accord avec les autorités grecques.

1. Les renseignements que vous m'avez envoyés au sujet des troupes grecques, sur 45,000 habitants qui comptent Aidin il n'en reste plus que 3,500 non-musulmans et, par conséquent, la ville est presque entièrement grecque.

ont dû les laisser, pour sauver leur vie, aux mains des brigands. C'est vraiment terrible, car aucun de nous n'est parti. Seul notre magasinier, M. Hapdimo, a dû déplorer la perte de son père qui a été égorgé.

Je vous envoie des effets empruntés à des amis; je me permets de vous remettre, par lettre spéciale, un relevé des effets que j'ai perdus dans l'incendie et vous remettrai prochainement le relevé de ceux perdus par le personnel de l'agence, qui se trouve actuellement réfugié au complet à Smyrne.

Je suis à vous, MM. les directeurs.

Je vous prie de remplacer les effets que nous avons perdus.

Smyrne, le 10 juillet 1919.

P.S. - Writer wishes his identity kept dark lest he may be persecuted by Greeks in future.

118409

N 46

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon. (Received August 20.)

(No. 1417)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 9, 1919

WITH reference to Admiral Calthorpe's despatch of the 11th ultimo, and his despatch of the 5th August, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that after careful discussion my French colleague and I decided that we would each send a representative to converse with the Crown Prince to point out the dangers that would be attendant on any participation by His Royal Highness in the proceedings of the Unionist Party.

2. Prince Abdul Medjid on being sounded expressed his desire to see Mr. Hohler, but it was considered undesirable under the circumstances that any person of diplomatic rank should see him, and it was arranged that the first place should be given to Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan accordingly had his audience with the Prince yesterday morning and the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a very full account of the conversation which took place.

3. It is difficult to reconcile the great divergence between the Crown Prince's language and the reports of him which reach me from the Grand Vizier, as well as from other sources.

The Grand Vizier's utterances are doubt coloured by feelings of personal animosity. The Crown Prince is probably of a noble character and is under the sway of his own feelings.

6. I was glad to have an opportunity to refer to the reasons for which His Majesty the King did not answer the telegram which Abdul Medjid had addressed to His Majesty some three months ago, and it served as a useful introduction for the more personal matters which we had considered it advisable to convey to him.

7. I also referred to the despatches of myself and his French colleague to advise the Grand Vizier to proceed with greater severity against those who were connected with the Unionist Party. The result of this was that his Highness first communicated to me the names of some of those people whom he desired to see out of the way. It eventually appeared that his idea was not so much to remove them as to imprison them, which indeed would be difficult, as they have no fixed abode. They should be banished as political undesirable.

8. The list of five or six grew to almost fifty, and it then transpired that the Grand Vizier believed that the arrests would be carried out by the Allies. He has been thoroughly misled in this point, and the list is now narrowed down to one of inviting the persons originally named to go on a visit to Italy if the Italian Government have no objection.

9. At the same time whereas some ten days or a fortnight ago a considerable agitation was going on, at the present time there is a marked apparent suspension of it, but I think it will be a great mistake to assume that on that a way would be found.

10. It would be difficult to exaggerate the complexity of the present situation with a Government which is moderately satisfactory in its general character, but too weak to ensure the execution of its orders, and to which there appears to be no real opposition to the aims and interests of the Allies, and to the execution of the terms of the armistice.

RICHARD WEBB, Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in N 46

Account of Mr. Ryan's Conversation with Prince Abdul Medjid.

(Very Secret)

I SAW the Crown Prince this morning as arranged. He received me with courtesy and spoke freely. The audience lasted nearly two hours.

I spoke first to the Prince in the sense of the attached note (which I had prepared

[1356]

2 A 2

beforehand and had communicated to Mr. ... asking various politenesses and embellishments. The Prince listened carefully and without interruption. On my ... categorically that he had any hand in the movement or that he had the smallest idea of putting himself at the head of it.

I knew, he said, what the circumstances of the Imperial family had been. Under ... had been prisoners. After the Constitution they had enjoyed personal liberty, but had been kept remote from politics. Princes were without influence in the political life of the country. His own convictions were that the policy should be that of Reshid Pasha and Ali Pasha - steadfast by ... He had expressed his views freely before the war in ... thought them worth recording, but they had taken place. He had held the ... successively to Sultan Abdul Hamid, Izzet, and Valid.

His relations with the present Sultan, the Prince said, were based on a community of opinion and a friendship which had lasted forty-five years. There was no quarrel between them. The one question on which they differed profoundly was that of Ferid Pasha. When the Prince spoke with the utmost bitterness and contempt. The Sultan's insistence on keeping Ferid Pasha in power was a fatal mistake. Ferid had admitted himself guilty in the matter of Smyrna, and yet had been recalled to power. He had made a fiasco of the delegation to Paris, and had again been placed in power. The people did not want him. What was necessary was a strong Government maintaining the confidence of the people. Let the ... for Tewfik I ... a genius certainly, but a man of experience intimate with British statesmen, or let him call some other person, who would appeal to the people like Ismet Pasha, Tchoruk, or even Mahmoud Pasha, or Ahmed Riza Bey.

The people, he explained, did not want mud. They wanted not a fantastically extensive Empire, but a Turkish people, instead of which there was nothing but talk of partition. The tragedy of Smyrna was before their eyes. A foreign estimate, he was told, had put the butcheries committed by the Greeks in a short time at 20,000. The movement in the interior, of which I had spoken, was treacherous, seditious, but the people wanted something better than a Ferid Pasha Government, and if they responded to the urgings of people like Mustafa Kemal and Rauf, it was because their wishes were not respected. He gave his word of honour that he had no connection with the

I said that the views expressed by the Prince about the movement in the interior ... that could be held by a sane and reasonable person. His word of honour ... to prove that he held them, but, if it were given, it was the word of a Prince and a gentleman. As for the position of Princes in the political life of the country, it was true that they had no direct rule, but they could exercise great moral authority. That was why Abdul Hamid had ... them alongside. He was himself distinguished among the Princes by

I ... a group of affairs from every side upon it, including the ... I said, the unfortunate incidents which had followed the ... The figures which he had heard were I thought exaggerated. The incidents were tragic enough to need no exaggeration. They had been aggravated by the counter-movement, about which I had spoken to him. Anyhow, they were ... by an inter-Allied Commission. That could not ... but it would place them in their true light.

The most serious question which he had raised, I said, was that of Ferid Pasha. ... Tewfik was his Imperial Highness said, and might ... but he had tried three times, his third attempt had been a ... and he was old and worn out. All the other men he had met to deal with were more or less implicated in the movement in the interior. I was worried. Ferid ... was an endeavour to get the situation in hand, and the ... if the Sultan must count for a great deal. Everything I heard ... led me to believe that the real people desired only peace and quietness. ... were agitators everywhere who pretended to be the voice of the people. ... a lot, and when Mustafa Kemal passed through any given place the real people ... accustomed to see authority go hand-in-hand with ... When Mustafa Kemal had gone by the agitators continued their ... real people subsided into passivity.

The Prince said he really knew nothing of what was going on in the interior. He

had no sources of information. ... of any but a few intimates of his; not politicians. He was out of touch with the Government, because of Ferid Pasha's attitude towards him, which was incorrect and unmannerly. They had once been friends, and a cause of difference had arisen. It need not have prevented correct relations when Ferid came into power, but Ferid's conduct had been such that at last he himself had said he would not now respond to advances if they were made. These personal matters were too petty to influence his own views. He only mentioned them to explain how little he was in touch with official sources of information. He kept clear of politics. He lived remote, and amused himself with art and literature. When he

direct to the Sultan and to him alone. If his name was mentioned it was not for doing. One of his objects in remaining at Tebembidja, which I ... was being used to give colour to all rumours, was to ensure his aloofness.

I remarked that the only thing which seemed to agitate his Imperial Highness from the High Commission was the question of Ferid Pasha, unfortunately a very

He held it still. He had implored Sultan Reshid not to send Jemal Bey as viceroy, but ... Jemal's wild ideas about Egypt. He had known Jemal ... and had known him as a friend, no, not as a friend. The Prince added bitterly as an acquaintance, in short, a man good enough for Soudan, disastrous in Mesopotamia. He (the Prince) had ... stop the ...

... were his views. March with ... Palmerston's portrait hung on ... hanging there throughout the war. He met one day the Sultan, ... it did.

... of our diplomacy had then given Turkey into the hands of Germany, due to the wave of pro-English feeling which followed the Constitution. There were now in his view only two Great Powers left - England and America, two peaks rising side by side. He did not know how complete our unity of view might now be, but we should have our disagreements in future. Let us not hand Turkey over to America, but keep her useful neighbour on the north of the stretch of country towards India held

invoked Wilson's principles emphatically in the course of the ... expression, expressed no views about mandates, and incidentally as an appanage of the Sultanate. I did not enter into any discussion of ... on general policy beyond suggesting that the surrender of Turkey to Germany was ... constitutional episode as the fruition of Abdul Hamid's policy. ... Abdul Hamid had sown a seed, but it ... only a seed in a field ... might be had planted a tree in a field, and that in the future of time (i.e., after the Constitution) the tree ... shadowed the

... without open bitterness of ... episode of his telegram to the ... other heads of States, but he accepted the explanation that each country had its own way of looking at things, and that for one reason or another, including constitutional reasons, the King had found it impossible to answer him.

On my departure the Prince personally conducted me to another room to show me the picture of Lord Palmerston.

The Prince makes a favourable impression, speaks with at least an air of sincerity, shows considerable intelligence and reading; expresses himself well and easily in French, is obviously highly strung, and, I should say, impressionable.

M. Lecomte told me he intended to ask for an audience for Saturday, the 20. August.

Enclosure 2 in N 56

Note.

M. HÜLLER regrette de n'avoir pu se rendre au désir de votre Altesse Impériale pour tel ou tel motif.

2. Votre Altesse Impériale a témoigné de son intérêt direct et personnel pour la question de Smyrne par sa dépêche aux chefs des États ententistes. À cet égard, que les Gouvernements de ces États ont étudié la question des événements suivant l'occupation de Smyrne de la manière la plus sérieuse.

3. La décision prise dernièrement par la Conférence des Gouvernements ottomans à deux points de vue. Il y aura des limites formelles que tout cela ne préjuge en rien la solution éventuelle des questions territoriales.

4. Cette décision prive de toute ombre de justice quelque temps, à l'intérieur et même à Constantinople, la préparation d'une résistance aux décisions définitives de la Conférence. Mais, comme les Hauts-Commissaires de toutes les parties intéressées qui ont pour le maintien de l'ordre, ont suivi la même démarche versale pour attirer l'attention du Gouvernement encore une fois sur la

la responsabilité dont je viens de parler. Ils ont résolu à s'en acquiescer par le seul moyen possible, c'est à dire en soutenant l'autorité légitime du souverain et de son Gouvernement.

5. Les Hauts-Commissaires sont confiants que votre Altesse Impériale partage leurs idées et qu'elle se rend compte de l'effet dangereux qui produirait sur les relations de ce pays tout mouvement qui serait contraire à l'ordre ou qui mettrait en danger la vie des habitants. Ce serait compromettre la ruine d'un Empire déjà ébranlé jusqu'à ses fondements par la fureur des Gouvernements d'il y a cinq ou six ans.

6. Malheureusement des gens malveillants abusent du nom auguste de votre Altesse Impériale pour attirer vers ce mouvement les fautes anglaises. Les Hauts-Commissaires savent combien ces calomnies sont injurieuses pour votre Altesse Impériale et ne sauront vouloir s'opposer à l'autorité du Gouvernement ottoman. Ils ne peuvent cependant continuer aux intérêts de la famille Impériale.

7. Le peuple ignorant est d'autant plus facilement trompé par ces calomnies que la renommée de votre Altesse Impériale à une certaine distance de la capitale donne lieu à toutes sortes de bruits et à des mouvements actuels et futurs.

119986

No. 87

Colonel French to Earl Curzon. (Received August 23.)

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
August 11, 1919

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith for your information copy of a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary, War Office, London, in regard to Mr. Justice Brandeis and Zionism.

I have &c

(For Acting Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force
E. H. H. ALLENBY, Major, G

Enclosure in No. 87

General Sir H. Allenby to Mr. Churchill

General Headquarters, August 6, 1919

Mr. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, who sailed for Europe on the 26th July, doubt discuss at some length with you the impressions he has gained and the conclusions he has come to as the result of his visit to Palestine.

On his arrival in Egypt I pointed out to the Judge, in a lengthy interview between us, the peculiar local difficulties besetting the Zionist programme in Palestine, the opposition to it on the part of the non-Jewish elements of the population—which at present constitute a large majority—and the fact that my administration, being a purely military one, can only act in strict adherence to the laws and usages of war. I laid stress on the fact that scrupulous fairness characterised the dealings of my administration with all classes and creeds, and I pointed out that His Majesty's Government's policy, contained in the Balfour declaration, though fully appreciated by myself and my subordinates, did not entitle me as a military administrator to grant to the Zionists privileges and opportunities denied to other members of occupied enemy territory. Mr. Justice Brandeis, who appears to me to consider the future of Zionism in a statesmanlike and broad-minded manner, at first gained the impression, I believe, that I was unduly apprehensive, and consequently rigorous in my control of the actions of the Zionist Commission. On his return from his tour, however, he admitted that the position was in no wise exaggerated, and that he found the difficulties more serious than he had anticipated. At the same time his visits, which included twenty-two colonies and all the towns where important Jewish influence gathered his opinion as to the wisdom and practicability of the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine. He agreed with me that the only policy to be followed at present is one of great patience and moderation, and that every care should be taken to avoid exciting, by threats of expropriation and subjection to Jewish domination, the enmity and fear of the non-Jewish element.

that the same sane spirit and sane vision does not pervade the articles of Zionist publications in Europe, most of which find their centres of Palestine and are the primary cause of the bitter antagonism at present shown to the Zionist program.

Mr. Justice Brandeis was accompanied by the Zionist Commission during his tour, but Major Waley also travelled with him and ensured his coming into close contact with such sections of his community as cause a bad impression and represent the worst aspect of Zionism. His demeanour towards local leaders was exceptionally kind and on several occasions he administered rebuke to those who had caused trouble by unmoderate conduct and self advertisement, thus giving proof to Palestinian Jewry that the real leaders of the movement appreciate the pettiness and undesirability of local disputes and intrigues. The Zionist Commission, on the other hand, has not always been firm enough with the unruly spirits of the community, and has made promises of concessions impossible to be carried out. This has resulted in a loss of authority and prestige.

During his tour various grievances against my administration were laid before Mr. Justice Brandeis. It was alleged that there had been unfair restrictions on Jewish development, amounting to contravention of His Majesty's Government's policy, and that this was due to anti-Semitic prejudice on the part of Government officials.

I am satisfied that any such complaints are without foundation. I understand that Mr. Justice Brandeis on the conclusion of his visit held the same opinion. There have certainly been some misunderstandings between the administrators and the Jewish leaders, and it has been and will continue to be necessary for questions of security or military emergency to take precedence, a necessity which is naturally sometimes unable to appreciate. The chief administrator has, however, invariably been ready to receive the representatives of the Zionist Commission at any time, and if those grievances had always been brought before him they would have been carefully considered. The Zionist Commission has, however, not always adopted this policy, and has preferred complaints direct to its organisation in Europe. Such a course makes difficult the relations between the Chief Administrator and the Zionist

Mr. Justice Brandeis fully appreciated this and has explained to the present leaders of the Commission his views as to the correct method of procedure.

Mr. Justice Brandeis expressed his gratitude for his sympathetic reception and for all the facilities afforded him during his stay.

I have, &c

E. H. H. ALLENBY, General Commanding-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force

Colonel Wilson to Major Young.—(Received August 26)

Major Young, The Rect, Millington Road, Taplow, Bucks, August 23, 1919
 SENDING you the ownership of Khurma which I wrote on my way home.

I would be very much obliged if you would kindly bring them to the authorities concerned. I regard this question of Khurma as being of great importance.

E. WILSON

Enclosure in No. 88

Some Notes on the Ownership of Khurma

1. THE Emir Ibn Saud claims that Khurma is within the boundaries of his Emirate of Nejd. As far as I am aware, practically no evidence has been produced by Ibn Saud to substantiate his claim.

2. All the evidence obtained from notables in Jeddah and in Mecca (some of them Wahabis, from tax collectors of the Turkish Government, greybeards of the Buqum and Subai tribes, and others) is unanimous on the point that Khurma district for generations has been under the jurisdiction of the Emirs of Mecca, with the exception of the period during which the holy cities were occupied by the Wahabis early in the nineteenth century.

3. Assuming Ibn Saud's contention to be correct, it follows that the Emirs of Khurma are antipathetic of, and owe allegiance to, Ibn Saud alone, and it is relevant to consider how far the conduct of Emir Khalid bin Khawar has been consistent with such alleged allegiances.

4. Late in 1916 King Hussein hearing that Khalid was getting too enthusiastic about the recently formed Akhwan, sent him orders to come to Mecca. He was kept under "open arrest" as he was called.

At the request of Emir Abdulha he was allowed to go to the former's camp at Wadi As, where I met him in April 1917.

Emir Abdulha stated that he had long talks with Khalid about the Akhwan movement towards the end of 1917, being satisfied with the latter's professions of loyalty. The reluctant consent of King Hussein to the return of Khalid to resume his duties at Khurma.

5. With reference to the Cadi of Khurma, I offer the following remarks:

After the suppression of the Wahabi revolt early in the nineteenth century, a number of the inhabitants of several villages, amongst them Khurma, clung to the Wahabi faith.

According to the Hanbali division of the Moslem religion, the number of Wahabis in Khurma the Emirs of Mecca usually appointed a Hamil as the official cadi.

Emir Abdulha informs me that the present cadi is from Wadi Dawaair and was appointed in the ordinary course by the Emir of Mecca (King Hussein), who paid his salary and those of his assistants. It is not impossible that the cadi also received some money from Ibn Saud.

In 1917 it was reported to King Hussein that the cadi was preaching the Wahabi faith. He was ordered to Mecca, where he was given a serious lecture by King Hussein. He returned to his post at Khurma. As he still continued preaching the Wahabi faith, he was sent for to Mecca a second time, and appears to have returned to Khurma with his protestations of loyalty, &c.

However, on returning to Khurma the second time, the cadi threw off all pretence of loyalty.

At the time of the Akhwan movement, the cadi was a Hamil, who was officially discharged.

6. The Emir Khalid arrived at Khurma from the Emir Abdulha's camp about the

time the Cadi of Khurma had refused to obey the third summons to Mecca, thereby openly defying King Hussein's authority.

7. On the arrival at Khurma of the newly-appointed cadi, Khalid refused to allow him to take up his duties or to recognise his appointment, and openly raised the standard of revolt against King Hussein.

8. It is a fact that Khalid obeyed the King's summons to Mecca and spent the best part of a year (1917) at least in that town and Emir Abdullah's camp. Also in October 1917 Khalid, as Emir of Khurma, attended King Hussein's "coronation" and was present. It was during this visit that King Hussein ascertained that Khalid had joined the Akhwan.

9. If Khalid was an Emir under Ibn Saud and ruling a part of the latter's territory, would Ibn Saud have quietly acquiesced in an important official of his being kept a virtual prisoner for about a year?

If the cadi was an official of Ibn Saud's and appointed by him, would he have kept quiet knowing that King Hussein had sent for the cadi and severely lectured him?

Ibn Saud has lost no opportunity of making complaints to His Majesty's Government about alleged hostile actions of King Hussein, and if either of the above men was really an official of Ibn Saud's, I find considerable difficulty in believing that he would allow such flagrant encroachments on his sovereignty to pass unnoticed and in silence.

I understand that Mr. Philby largely bases his assertion that Khalid is one of Ibn Saud's governors on the statement that Khalid was in receipt of some salary from Ibn Saud before his revolt. This is by no means unlikely; indeed, it is probable that when Khalid joined the Akhwan, Ibn Saud paid him some sort of stipend for propaganda and political purposes, a financial investment which has proved highly profitable.

10. Soon after Khalid raised the standard of revolt, Mr. Philby passed through Khurma (December 1917), and it is interesting to note how the situation was reported to him on the spot. In the account of his journey from Riyadh to Taif (Arab bulletin No. 81, page 74, dated 26th March, 1919), Mr. Philby writes as follows:—

"Khurma is inhabited mainly by Subai tribesmen, who at the moment of our arrival were all out in the desert, leaving the village to their slaves and women, and to the few merchants, mainly representing Wahabism, who remain here in connection with the trade with the interior."

"The cause of the exodus of the tribesmen with the local Emir—a Sherref—appeared to be that the latter had incurred the displeasure of the Sherref of Mecca by embracing the Wahabi faith, or perhaps had embraced the Wahabi faith because he had incurred the Sherref's displeasure, and that the Sherref of Mecca has commissioned the Sherref of Luraba and the Buqum tribe to attack the rebels of Khurma as occasion offered."

"The place was therefore virtually in a state of siege in the sense that it was allowed to its people in the direction of the Hedjaz, while the warriors of the Buqum were trying to cut off intercourse each other in the vast plains between Qunayla and the Hadhu hills."

It will be noted that Mr. Philby writes of the "rebels of Khurma." Thus Khalid and those inhabitants of Khurma who revolted with him were described to Mr. Philby as being rebels against King Hussein.

Mr. Philby had been living in Riyadh for some time. His escort was composed of Nejdis supplied by Ibn Saud, and it is probable, though I have no information on the point, that Ibn Saud sent a responsible sheikh or a member of his entourage with him.

When passing through Khurma district Mr. Philby records the fact that he was given to him at the time, that the Emir and some of the inhabitants of Khurma were open rebellion against King Hussein.

It will be agreed that Khurma cannot correctly be described as being in a state of revolt against King Hussein if it forms an integral part of Ibn Saud's dominions.

Surely if Khurma belonged to Nejd some one member of the escort or some local sheikh or Arab would have informed Mr. Philby of the fact.

11. As I have frequently pointed out, the Khurma episode has its origin in Khalid joining the Akhwan movement and eventually openly revolting.

King Hussein was fully occupied at the time with the war against the Turks and, miscalculating the strength of the revolt, twice sent a hopelessly inadequate force to put the rebels on the defensive, and no further attacks were made by him.

Two had corresponded and arrived at an understanding, laid claim to Khurma; he

now as to come to Taif and should the Emir and a sufficient number of the inhabitants of Taif join the Akhwan movement, it is clear that the town would not be unexpected.

One of the big Sudan Sheikhs (Mishari-ibn-Nasir) came to Jeddah last month with Emir Abdulla. He states that his tribe has always belonged to the Hedjaz, and been under the Lawa of Mecca. He says that his tribe has become Akhwan by force of circumstances; an Arab strongly objects to leaving his own country, and as remaining entails sudden death or an outward profession of the Akhwan faith, it is not surprising that the latter course is usually taken.

I feel it my duty to again emphasize the fact that it is impossible for King Hussein to accept arbitration on the question of the ownership of Khurma. It did his prestige would suffer a very severe blow, while Ibn Saud's would be correspondingly increased.

Should His Majesty's Government insist on the ownership of Khurma being a subject for arbitration I have little doubt (Emir Abdulla and others have no objection) that King Hussein would abdicate, a course which would almost certainly be followed by general anarchy in the Hedjaz; Emir Abdulla, the Grand Cadi of Mecca, and all other persons consulted are conversant on this point.

I maintain that it is impossible for the Akhwan to be brought back to the Hedjaz, and if its ownership is arbitrated upon by His Majesty's Government Akhwan shams would certainly boom.

14. King Hussein has times innumerable warned us of the dangers of the Akhwan movement, and has been willing to co-operate with King Hussein in preventing further infiltration into their countries. Indications of a growing nervousness in Koweit and Iraq are also being (see recent reports circulated by Bagdad).

15. In our own view the only course open to His Majesty's Government is to adhere strictly to their frequently expressed decision that they regard Khurma as being within the dominion of King Hussein, any other course is fraught with grave danger to British interests.

With regard to the ownership of the Hedjaz, it is impossible for any Boundary Commission could work on the ground, and at any time any marks would be a useless expenditure.

A meeting between duly authorized representatives of each side should be arranged at Cairo, Kairo, or some suitable place; an impartial British official with a knowledge of Arabic, e.g., Commander Hogarth, C.M.G., would be appointed arbitrator by His Majesty's Government with or without assistants and decide on the future boundary.

If Ibn Saud and the Emir Abdulla were the representatives at such a meeting I am inclined to think there would be a good chance of an amicable agreement being arrived at.

17. The decision as to the line of action to be taken by His Majesty's Government should not be delayed.

C. E. WILSON, Colonel.

August 8, 1919

No. 89

Earl Curzon to Rear-Admiral Webb

(N 1416.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR despatch No. 1417 of August 9th.

I approve Mr. Ryan's language.

You should discourage project of sending Unionist undesirable to Italy

Foreign Office, August 27, 1919

[121950]

No. 90

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 1457.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 17, 1919.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 1327 of the 9th August, and to my telegram No. 1669 of the 17th August, I have the honour to state that I have already on many occasions impressed upon the Turkish Government its responsibility for taking all possible measures to prevent massacres of Christians. I have pointed out that such occurrences can only result in opinion in Europe becoming more averse to Turkey. The Grand Vizier and the Cabinet realize this, and also the fact that disorders or massacres are most prejudicial to Turkish interests and aspirations. I am continuing to make strong representations in this sense.

2. The difficulty is not due to failure on the part of the Turkish Government to realize the seriousness of such occurrences, but rather to its lack of authority, and to its powerlessness to enforce its will in many of the districts of Anatolia.

3. In this particular case (the reported killing of Christians at Oushak), the Turkish Government asked permission to send the 23rd Division, some 1500 strong, from Afion Karahissar to restore and maintain order. This could not be agreed to, as General Milne was of opinion (in which I fully concur) that there was a danger of those troops making a bad example with the irregulars who were occupying the Greek lands of Occupation. The Government has, however, no means of taking effective action to put down disorder except the army, and the feeling aroused in the army by the events following the Greek occupation of Smyrna is so bitter that it is most inadvisable to allow part of it to be employed near the area of occupation in order to put down Turkish risings directed against that occupation.

4. I am convinced that the present unsatisfactory situation in Anatolia (which tends to grow worse as time goes on) is the direct result of the presence of Greek troops in the Asia vilayet, and the regrettable excesses of which, there is unfortunately no doubt, they have on several occasions been guilty.

5. It is hoped that the delimitation of the respective spheres of military occupation will be effected in such a manner as to prevent the occurrence of guerilla fighting by bands of irreconcilables.

6. I would urge that more than local conditions in and around the Aidin vilayet, the continuance of the Greek and, in a lesser degree, the Italian occupation, is a serious factor in weakening the authority of the Turkish Government, to increase racial animosity and lawlessness in other districts than Aidin, and to give into the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress and National Defence leaders a weapon of which they are likely to use to work up Turkish opinion against the Allies.

7. The fact must not be lost sight of that every Turk, of no matter what party or political sympathies, is sincere in looking upon the Greek and Italian occupation as a violation of right and justice.

8. I consider that the difficult situation with which the Allies are now faced in Turkey would greatly improve if an agreement were come to by which both Greek and Italian troops were entirely withdrawn from Asia Minor. This withdrawal would, in the first place, remove the cause of the present state of affairs, and would thus largely assist to put an end to the present state of affairs which is the direct outcome of the landing of these troops.

9. The presence of a number of Allied officers in the districts evacuated by the Italian and Greek troops would, I consider, ensure that reprisals were not carried out, and the Turkish Government, in its measures to maintain order, would have the support of all elements except the professional brigands and the Committee of Union and Progress leaders.

10. The present situation is that neither the Allies nor the Turkish Government are in a position to suppress sedition or disorder in the provinces. Unless we are prepared to undertake a military occupation, it is essential that the authority of the Government of Turkey should be restored. The support of the moderate Turkish elements can be won back as long as the presence of the Greek and Italian troops remains a cause of irritation and unrest.

11. I am, of course, aware that the putting into effect of this proposal would mean the reversal of a decision already agreed upon by the Supreme Council, and that there

(Acting High Commissioner)

Sir R. Graham said that this reply meant, in effect, that the United States intended to do nothing, but requested His Majesty's Government to continue to bear the

Constantinople, August 29, 1914

G.RAND VIZIER has addressed to my colleagues and myself no telegram which he wishes us to send to President of Peace Conference pointing that delay in making peace is stopping working of the whole machinery of Government.

ment finances, justice, public safety owing to impossibility of reorganising gendarmerie, commercial industries are all suffering alike from prolonged uncertainty. Crowds of people of Maronite and Christian sects have been driven from their homes and are equally without resources, and winter is fast approaching. His Highness begs, therefore, that peace may be re-established at earliest possible moment.

After consultation with my colleagues it was decided that French High Commissioner should forward telegram to President of Conference, whilst Italian High Commissioner and myself should inform our Governments, recommending request to their respective attention.

First part of message has been sent to Foreign Office and Paris in despatch No. 1525 of 25th August.

(Repeated to Peace Conference, No. 179.)

[117353]

No. 93

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, September 1, 1919

I HAVE now received the necessary report to enable me to reply to the note which your Excellency was so good as to address to me under date of the 27th May on the subject of the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway.

I would point out in the first place that any claim preferred by the French Company in respect of the period prior to British occupation must be a claim against the Turkish Government and not against His Majesty's Government. From this point of view I presume that the company's claim will be dealt with by the appropriate authorities. I am, however, of the opinion that it is proposed to establish, so soon as the

As regards the period of British occupation, the railway has deteriorated during that period. In point of fact, the effect of British occupation has been the exact contrary, very extensive improvements having been carried out by the British military authorities. This is evidenced by the report which I have the honour to append.

Even had the company been in a position to prove that the railway had deteriorated under British occupation, their remedy would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government and in conformity with Article 13 of the annex to The Hague Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, have lain against the future Government of Palestine, which might clearly have been required to restore the line to the position in which it was when the British military authorities took it over.

I trust therefore that in the light of the facts set out above, your Excellency

His Majesty's Government can admit no claim whatsoever in respect of the railway, whether based on the above-mentioned Article

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Enclosure

Report on Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway.

Pre-War Position.—The line was 100 metre gauge. Workshops were situated at Jaffa, the port by which fuel, rolling-stock, &c., was imported. The main stations were—

	Kilometres
Jaffa	0.12
Ludd	19.00
Jerusalem .. .	80.6

In addition there were four smaller stations.

In July 1907, the French company possessed—

- 6 locomotives,
- 15 passenger carriages,
- 45 goods wagons.

The annual goods traffic was 45,000 tons.

During the war the sequence of events on this railway was as follows—

Jaffa-Ludd Section.—This was removed bodily by the Turks and re-laid elsewhere. The rolling-stock was also removed. During the subsequent British occupation of this territory a 60 cm. line was constructed from Jaffa to Ludd along the same alignment that the old French line had followed. This 60 cm. line is still in existence as a military line (August 1919).

Ludd-Jerusalem Section.—The Turks altered the gauge of the original line to 105 cm. and re-laid the line on a new alignment. The line was used as a military railway which they had built through Tul Keram and Ludd to Beersheba.

On their retreat the Turks seriously damaged this 105 metre gauge line and rolling-stock.

On occupation by British troops the Ludd-Jerusalem section was at first repaired and a 3 ft. 6 ins. gauge rolling-stock was provided from the Egyptian Government. The line was then converted to 4 ft. 8½ ins. gauge so as to give through communication from Egypt without change of gauge. This entailed considerable work, including the widening of rock cuttings. The line still exists in 4 ft. 8½ ins. gauge (August 1919).

Summary of Damage done by Turks during the War

The Jaffa-Ludd-Jerusalem railway was originally 100 metre gauge.

All stations were all badly damaged and the original 100 metre gauge rolling-stock was destroyed.

August 15, 1919

[124460]

No. 94

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 1525.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 25, 1919

THE GREAT VIZIR has several times lately spoken with great bitterness and indignation against the prolonged duration of the armistice, pointing out that every day of the administration was equally fettered and rendered incapable of action. He has been quite willing to admit that all naval and military activities were rightly and properly checked and suppressed, but he complained of the paralysis of the Ministry of the Interior and Finance in particular and also of the organisation of the gendarmerie.

3. I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram which I have just received from his Highness enclosing copy of a telegram which he desires

4. I shall at once consult my colleagues on the matter, but am forwarding to

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 94

Grand Vizier to Vice-Admiral Colthorpe.

Excellence,

Constantinople, le 24 août 1919

HISTOIRE de la guerre mondiale, de la guerre civile, de la guerre sociale, de la guerre économique, de la guerre politique, de la guerre morale, de la guerre spirituelle, de la guerre intellectuelle, de la guerre artistique, de la guerre scientifique, de la guerre humaine.

prier de bien vouloir autoriser de nouveau la Délégation ttonatere, se rendue à Paris dans le délai le plus rapproché pour le rétablissement des et de la paix état normal des nations.

[127181]

No. 95

Note communicated by French Embassy, September 10, 1919.

Des renseignements parvenus récemment à l'aris, il résulte que les autorités de la ville de Haïphong ont été en contact avec un nommé Coccaidi, agent dans cette ville de la Société des Phares (mer Rouge) avec un nommé Coccaidi, agent dans cette ville de la Société des Phares

Or, c'est cette dernière compagnie qui, seule, a qualité pour traiter de ces questions.

Aussi le Gouvernement français a-t-il voulu que l'attention du Gouvernement turc soit attirée sur l'importance de Moka et sur les avantages que sa situation géographique offre à la navigation de la mer Rouge. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement français a adressé au Gouvernement turc une lettre par laquelle il lui expose les avantages que la navigation de la mer Rouge offre à la France et à la Turquie, et lui propose de fonder une Société des Phares de la mer Rouge, conformément aux

M de Fleuryau saut, de

Ambassade de France, Londres
septembre 1949

(127757)

No. 946

Hear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 11)

No 1435.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, August 27, 1914

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1668 of the 17th August, relative to the
Minister of War, and Trewik Pasha, Minister without
Portfolio in the Turkish Cabinet, it may be of interest to summarize the development
of the internal political situation in Constantinople since the reconstruction of the
Cabinet after Ferid Pasha's return from Paris.

but the click with

agreeing on their attitude towards the
in the interior, Ismet Pasha resigned his
as Minister without portfolio rather than agree to drastic action. The struggle
in the movement, viz.: Mustafa Kamal Pasha and Reouf Bey, who are working
the Erzeroum district, and two less notorious individuals who are playing a leading rôle
in Southern Anatolia. The Government had, of course, no means of executing these
increased by the publication of eloquent circulars, and by a redistribution of posts in
the Ministry of War on lines rather unfavourable to Chauvinists. I enclose a French
of the principal circulars issued by the Minister of the Interior

* As the test will be run in a room be well-ventilated high

Le Gouvernement Impérial n'attache pas plus d'importance qu'il s'en convient aux troubles signalés en Asie Mineure. Ils sont provoqués par quelques jeunes exaltés ambitieux ou mécontents, qui trouvent un terrain facile à exploiter dans le sentiment national exaspéré par la question de Smyrne. Ce n'est aujourd'hui qu'un mouvement superficiel et restreint, mais qui, à la longue, pourrait n'être pas sans danger. Le Gouvernement Impérial déploie, pour le réprimer, la même énergie dont il fit preuve dès le commencement de la crise, mais, sûrement, il convient d'en supprimer la cause pour en prévenir les effets. En butte à des difficultés continuelles, inhérentes à l'état actuel du pays, préoccupé à déjouer d'incessantes intrigues, le Gouvernement Impérial perd un temps considérable à remédier à cette situation, alors qu'il aurait pu le consacrer entièrement aux intérêts généraux de l'Etat et à la prospérité de —

aucun progrès moral, aucune amélioration du sort du peuple n'est possible tant que cette incertitude. Ce n'est ni la guerre, ni la paix; et, cependant, tous les esprits de l'une continuent à œuvrer dans le pays, mais que celui-ci puisse profiter des

Aux considérations ordinaires exposées, il y a lieu d'ajouter les difficultés de toute nature qui entravent l'action gouvernementale, et les mouvements d'indiscipline, qui n'ont pu se dissimuler que parce que les conditions de l'armistice ont considérablement réduit les moyens militaires dont les autorités impériales peuvent disposer. D'autre part, la situation actuelle du pays prive, comme de juste, le Gouvernement impérial des ressources normales du budget qui n'est point en mesure de subvenir efficacement aux dépenses qu'exige la réorganisation de la gendarmerie et de la police, nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre public.

Par toutes ces raisons, je viens prier
à travers la Conférence de l'avis la vraie situation.

A l'effet, j'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-après à votre Excellence une dépêche adressée à son Excellence M. le Président du Conseil suprême de la Paix, avec prière de vouloir bien la faire parvenir à sa haute destination.

Vassilios Agreus, de

ADAM FRIP

Enclosure 2 in No. 24

Grand Vaisier to M. Clemenceau.

Constantinople, le 24

L'ARMISTICE dure depuis dix mois. Le retard apporté à la Communiqué, le 24
aux pendant si longtemps arrête le fonctionnement régulier de tout le rouage de l'Etat.
Gouvernement, privé des ressources normales de son budget, éprouve des difficultés
pour faire face aux dépenses qu'entraîne la réorganisation de la police et de la
gendarmerie d'ailleurs limitées par l'armistice bien au-dessus des chiffres nécessaires.

Les finances, la justice, enfin toutes les branches de l'administration, ainsi que l'industrie et le commerce souffrent de cette incertitude prolongée, et les efforts inlassables du Gouvernement tendant à une réforme générale restent stériles. Il s'ensuit un malaise général et une complication dans les affaires de l'Etat, dont les effets se manifestent à Smyrne et dans d'autres provinces de l'Empire.

Une foule de peuple musulman et non musulman, délogés de leurs foyers, pendant le cataclysme des cinq dernières années ont un mouvement d'émigration et de migration sans pouvoir se fixer sur leurs terres dévastées. L'approche de l'hiver aug-
mentant de leur triste existence. Exaspérés de leur misère, ils peuvent devenir un
élément de danger pour l'ordre et la sécurité en Orient.

Comme votre Excellence avait reconnu elle-même par sa note du 27 juin l'inconvénient qu'il y aurait à remettre les négociations à une époque ultérieure, je viens la

Commissioners on the 3rd August, announcing the decision to delimit the sphere of Greek military occupation in Southern Asia Minor, contributed to produce a temporary improvement in the *façade* of the Government. Unfortunately, however, no real goods have so far been delivered inside the shop. The Chauvinist movement in the interior has indeed not swept the country, but its organisers can be relied on to work steadily to increase its range. The political agitators and the brigands of every hue, from misguided patriots to simple robbers, who now infest the country, show the most painful indifference to the best circulars of the Minister of the Interior. The civil provincial authorities are still for the most part more amenable to local influences than to that of the Government. Even when they wish to obey the latter they are hindered by the military commanders, who stand in with the Chauvinists, and who therein reflect the policy of everyone of influence at the Ministry of War, or at any rate of everyone who held influence there until the recent change of Minister.

5. The subterranean power of the Chauvinists even in Constantinople is shown by such incidents as the escape of Hahî Pasha, reported in my telegram No. 1670 of the 18th August, and the sense of instability which prevails is increased by rumours from the interior, e.g., the report that the "National Defence" forces are about to establish themselves at Eskubehr and cut communications with Eastern Asia Minor.

6. Notwithstanding all this, Ferid Pasha's Government now appears to be gaining ground. The various "congresses" at Erzeroum and other places, which at one time looked like the prelude to an attempt to set up a separate Government in the

themselves, it is true, but, as has been hinted above, the attempts at a national movement have been a negative source of strength. Unless Ferid Pasha is swept away by some sort of coup d'état in Constantinople, by some sudden new development of the movement in the interior, or by a financial crash, he may succeed after all in weathering his difficulties. The Grand Vizier displays in his own person one of the most remarkable characteristics of the Turkish character as a whole, namely, a wonderful faculty of hanging on. It is the general tendency of his internal policy at present appears to be in the direction of a mild form of Hamidian despotism. It is possible that he and his Imperial master realise deeply that this is the only system on which it is at all possible to govern.

7. The Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior to get on their feet. Ismail Hakkî Pasha, the new Minister, is

drastic changes than
as far to justify suspicion of
it would naturally prefer to
whose souls no patriotic Turk can fail to have sympathy, howe
differ from them as to methods. The next development in the situat
compromise, which would mean that if Erzeroum submitted to C
Constantinople would have moved a little closer to Erzeroum.

8. Should Ferid Pasha throw up the sponge or be driven from office, the candidates most in view for the unenviable succession are Tewfik Pasha, Izzet Pasha, Ahmed Riza Bey, and Reuch Bey.

9. Tewfik Pasha appeals to a larger number of the diverse elements in Turkish political life than any other candidate. He has the reputation of being a man of peace, and is in reality worn out.

10. Izzet Pasha is a man of genuine
head of the Govern

11. Ahmed Riza Bey is a man of genuine
head of the Govern

12. Reuch Bey is a man of genuine
head of the Govern

could not, any more than any Turkish Grand Vizier, hope to defy the Entente Powers in the event of a time of any real crisis. The only way to save the country is by offering passive resistance here, while tolerating the growth of the movement in the interior, and by working for a peace settlement, but to eventual resistance to the practicable imposition of unfavourable peace terms.

13. Ahmed Riza Bey, Reuch Bey, and Izzet Pasha may be regarded as variants on Izzet Pasha. Each of them is favoured for particular reasons by his supporters, but if any of them came into power it would be at the head of the Government more or less in sympathy with the national defence movement.

12. The candidature of Reuch Bey derives its principal importance from the fact that the French authorities here appear to favour it and that, according to some accounts, the French Government have actually engineered his return from Switzerland to be the definite object of placing him in power. I cannot believe that he would have a large body of support in this country, or that he would have a large body of support in this country, unless, of course, his sponsors were prepared to do what the Entente have done for no Turkish Government since the Armistice, namely, to give him positive support by holding out some definite prospect of the maintenance of the integrity of a reduced Turkish Empire, and by helping to replenish the now almost empty exchequer.

13. Turkish public opinion is much exercised over the question of future mandates. The papers are full of controversies as to what, if any, mandate would best suit the country, and what powers should be vested in the mandatory. These discussions react on the internal political situation for the simple reason that, including myself, is baffled as to the intentions of the Conference, and nearly as much as to the real convictions of his neighbours. The masses of the people are apathetic on all political questions. The majority of the thinking classes would prefer no mandate at all.

14. Many of those who, while thinking this, consider a mandate inevitable, and most of those who consider a mandate desirable, would like to see it conferred on Great Britain, but are discouraged by the spine-like attitude of His Majesty's Government and their representatives.

15. French pretensions are very much less in evidence than they were two or three years ago, but the possibility of an American mandate is widely canvassed. It is generally regarded with apprehension because its advocacy is associated in the public mind with the American Committee elements, and because the Americans are generally regarded as the worst enemies of the Turkish Government and the conditions of the governance of dependencies or the conditions of the governance of dependencies.

I have, &c.
RICHARD WEBB,
Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 96.

Extract from the "Entente" of August 10, 1919.

Circulaire télégraphique du Ministère de l'Intérieur aux Vilayets et Layas indépendants ou non indépendants.

(Traduction.)

COMME suite aux démarches diplomatiques que le Gouvernement n'a jamais cessé de faire, la Conférence avait décidé, ainsi que je vous en donnais connaissance dernièrement, l'envoi d'une commission mixte à Smyrne. Cette commission, dont la mission consistait à fixer et restreindre la zone provisoirement occupée par les Hellènes, et à faire une enquête équitable sur place au sujet des atrocités sans nombre commises par ces derniers, est arrivée à Smyrne. Le Général Milne qui la préside, ayant manifesté l'intention d'envoyer de suite le Général et les officiers qui l'accompagnent sur les lieux où leur présence est nécessaire, a exigé avec insistance que des communications soient transmises sans retard aux fonctionnaires ottomans, afin de faciliter la tâche de ces derniers; que les bandes qui se trouvent dans les localités hors de la zone d'occupation hellénique soient dispersées, et que défense soit faite aux habitants de participer à

l'œuvre de ces bandes. Ces exigences du Général Milne démontrent l'urgente nécessité d'une "dispersion" que visent les instructions répétées du Gouvernement à ce sujet ; les exigences du Général Milne démontrent l'urgente nécessité d'une "dispersion" que visent les instructions répétées du Gouvernement à ce sujet ; au pays tout retard dans l'application des instructions gouvernementales. Le Gouvernement se doit de faire en sorte que les exigences politiques qui en découlent et y conformer notre politique intérieure et extérieure. Les exigences politiques qui en découlent et y conformer notre politique intérieure et extérieure ; ceux à qui sont confiées les fonctions les plus importantes, ne sont pas au courant de ces réalités, et ne peuvent, malgré la capacité et l'intelligence dont ils peuvent être doués, saisir et estimer les nécessités de notre politique intérieure et extérieure au pays. Malgré que le Cabinet, qui détient le pouvoir, est le seul responsable des destinées du pays, le Cabinet, qui détient le pouvoir, est le seul responsable des destinées nationales qui doit se réunir prochainement, il est par conséquent logique que les opin-

patriotique, ne sauraient être conformes aux exigences politiques et à l'intérêt général. Les formations nationales et le "Congrès" sont là pour démontrer la justice de la présente déclaration. Voilà pourquoi il incombe comme devoir principal à tous les fonctionnaires civils et militaires de prendre en due considération les instructions relatives à la dispersion des bandes réunies çà et là quel que soit leur but, et de poursuivre l'exécution de ces instructions avec la plus grande activité et la plus grande célérité.

Pour ce qui est de la garantie de l'existence et des droits de la population, la prime

Ministère de la Guerre a transmis à qui de droit des ordres sévères. C'est pourquoi

considérations d'après lesquelles le Techikintu-Milits et les groupements formés

d'autres noms seraient basés sur la défense du territoire ne sauraient être admis.

Procédant à la prompte divulgation de la chose au moyen des journaux, de proclamations imprimées et autres textes conçus dans un langage compréhensible pour tous, il est nécessaire d'insister à la réalité des faits ceux qui n'en ont pas connaissance, de

préciser à ces incitations et excitations essentiellement pernicieuses au point de vue des intérêts du pays et de la nation. Il convient de faire comprendre particulièrement à ceux qui, sous l'impulsion mauvaise, et croyant que ces initiatives pernicieuses ont l'avantage du pays, se livrent à des incitations, qu'ils seront aussi, de par leur patriotisme et leur dévouement, punis par les conséquences déplorables qui résulteront pour le pays de ces mauvaises initiatives.

Si l'on tenait compte, à l'encontre des indications circonstanciées et précises qui précèdent, que les incitations et exhortations, comme ils auront prouvé ainsi qu'il résulte des constatations de fait, ont été faites par de mauvaises intentions, dans un mouvement contraire à la loi et éminemment pernicieux pour le salut du pays, il est de toute évidence que les déclarations faites par le Général Malm au nom des États de l'Entente

Le Ministère de la Guerre a fait des notifications dans ce sens aux autorités

Le commandant à tous les fonctionnaires civils de se concerter avec les fonctionnaires militaires pour la mise à exécution intégrale de cette communication

[24999] N_{GA} 97

Karl Curson to Mr. Balfour.

592.4.1

Foreign Affairs, September 11, 1910

RECENT developments in the situation in the Caucasus arising out of the decision to withdraw the British troops from that region lead me to think that it would be well briefly to retrace the course of events, more especially in so far as the Armenians are concerned.

I need not recall to you the circumstances in which we found ourselves forced to occupy Transcaucasia, nor remind you that our original intention was merely to expel

the Turks and the Germans, to secure control of the Caspian Sea so as to prevent an enemy invasion of Transcaucasia, and to hold the railway from Baku to Batumi. As time went on, however, it became clear that the peoples of the several small States which, though formerly subject to Russia, had asserted their independence upon the collapse of that Power, were unfit to stand alone, and would lapse into fratricidal warfare if left to their own devices. They were further threatened with the danger of extinction at the hands of General Denikin's forces to the north of the Caucasus, that officer making no pretence of friendship for the newly-found liberties of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Owing to our efforts these calamities have been averted and a measure of law and order has been successfully maintained in the occupied regions.

In the early days of the British occupation our presence was regarded with various feelings by the local States and populations, being welcomed by some, but regarded with suspicion by others, notably by the Georgians and the Tartars, on account of our relations with General Denikin, whose supposed ambitions they regarded with genuine alarm. No sooner, however, had our intention to evacuate become generally known than the benefits of our occupation were swiftly and universally realized, and passionate appeals were addressed to us from every quarter to stay.

for War, and was finally decided upon, with your approval, on the 9th April, on which date you informed me that the Supreme Council at Paris had decided that our forts were to be replaced by Italian troops.

The news of our intended evacuation, and still more the proposed substitution of Italian troops, who had no experience of and no connection with those parts of the East, created a profound and unpleasant impression in the Caucasus. They were received by General Milne, Admiral Calthorpe, Mr. Stevens (His Majesty's consul at Baku) with un concealed dismay. They represented that this policy would be a betrayal of the Caucasian peoples, with whose aspirations towards independence we had shown no small sympathy; that the new States, if left unprotected in the early stages of their struggle for independence, would probably lapse into Bolshevism; that there would be much inter-ethnic strife, and probably massacres of Christians on a large scale; and finally, that our reputation in the Middle East would suffer a damaging if not a fatal blow. I confess that to a large extent I shared these apprehensions, all the more that I was quite unable to believe in the practicability or likelihood of the substitute of an Italian occupation.

In May rumours began to arrive that the Italians were disposed to reconsider their decision to make the first move. I therefore asked you to endeavour to hasten a decision on their part. Meanwhile it was decided on military grounds to postpone our withdrawal, originally fixed for the 15th June, until the 15th July, and subsequently again until the 15th August.

On the 20 July I was informed by the Director of Military Intelligence that he had learned from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, then in Paris, that the Italians had abandoned their intention to go to the Caucasus, and in your telegram No. 11 of the 6th July you informed me that you too understood this to be the case. I was not, however, until the 1st August that the Italian Ambassador was able to confirm it. No change was, however, made in our decision to withdraw.

... and into that the Supreme Council had appointed
... State army, to be High Commissioner for America of
... national Government. No provision, however, was made
for any material force for his support.

About the middle of July the reports from the military authorities began to show that the fears entertained as to the helpless position of the Armenian Christians were not unlikely to be fulfilled, and that fighting had already reached the Nakhitchevan district. Appeals for help from many and various sources reached me in large numbers, uniformly arguing that if our decision to withdraw were adhered to and no one were to take our place massacres might be expected to occur on an unprecedented scale.

I will acquaint with the country and the people, on a political mission (1) instructions to use his influence to prevent friction between General Denikin and the Georgian and the Azerbaijan Governments, to appoint subordinate officers as his representatives in the more important towns, and to endeavour by every means at his disposal to avert the anticipated massacre of the Armenians.

On the 9th August I received your suggestion that while our troops were being withdrawn an attempt should be made to interest the United States Government, as the possible future mandatory for Armenia, in the subject of the Caucasus, and that we might even delay the concluding stages of our withdrawal if we could induce them to send military forces to take the place of our troops. An enquiry from the War Office showed that any delay in the evacuation, which had indeed already begun, would present almost insuperable difficulties, owing in the main to the fact that the British troops were overdue for demobilisation and could not be pressed to remain in the Caucasus. I then saw the American Ambassador, and placed the whole matter before him (see my despatch No. 459 of the 11th August). Mr Davis did not, however, hold out much hope that his Government would intervene. On the 18th August I saw Mr Davis again and told him that the Powers in France, and we in London, were waiting for the Americans to decide upon the question of accepting a mandate. His Excellency again, however, expressed the opinion that it was improbable that his

On the 19th August I wrote to the American Ambassador explaining the statement made by Mr. Bonar Law in the House of Commons, to the effect that the Armenian problem was an American rather than a British one, that any assistance from the United States Government would be most welcome, and that if President Wilson were officially to say to His Majesty's Government that we would certainly do their best to meet him. I asked Mr Davis to find out whether his Government would either send troops themselves or would be willing to bear the financial burden of the continued retention of ours in the Caucasus.

Mr Davis replied on the 29th August that for various technical reasons connected with the sanction of the Congress the American Government could do neither of these things. His Excellency went on to say that his Government made an official appeal to His Majesty's Government not to withdraw the British forces in the Caucasus on the ground that massacres would inevitably result, and that the United States Government, while realising our difficulties in the matter, considered that we should be held responsible in the eyes of the civilized world.

All hope of practical assistance from America was therefore at an end.

On the 20th August, I had, through the medium of the War Office, called General Milne by telegram as to the possibility of mitigating the consequences of evacuation by all or any of the following steps:—

1. Postponement of the withdrawal of the Indian native troops.
2. The supply of fresh British troops, if these were imperatively required, from Constantinople.
3. The supply of military escorts to the political officers appointed to the principal cities in the Caucasus.
4. The leaving behind of tanks, armoured cars, and aeroplanes.

On the 21st August General Milne replied that a force of one Indian brigade, British battalion, and an Indian machine-gun company might be earmarked for this purpose. He was, however, adverse from employing white troops, but it would be possible to arrange that armoured cars and aeroplanes should be left.

About this time a request was received from the Armenian National Delegation that their own forces in the Erivan Republic should be furnished with arms and equipment by His Majesty's Government. I recommended this proposal to the War Office, but it was rejected on the ground that such action would aggravate an already dangerous situation.

On the 31st August I received a visit from Colonel Rawlinson, who stated that he had been sent by General Milne to lay the full facts before His Majesty's Government. He represented that the Moslem neighbours of the Armenian Republic were only waiting for the moment when the last of our troops should have left to invade that State and exterminate the entire Christian population, and that the Armenians were not in a position to offer any resistance. Colonel Rawlinson expressed the opinion that it was our moral duty not to abandon them to their fate, an opinion which, he stated, was shared by General Milne, and the troops under his command.

On the same date I received your telegram No. 1309, in the third paragraph of which you stated that at a meeting of the Supreme Council a telegram from Colonel Hoskell had been read to the effect that it was absolutely necessary to send troops to

Armenia in place of the British force in order to save the population from destruction, and that 12,000 French troops which, it subsequently transpired, would be landed at Alexandretta and Merana.

I am, &c

CURZON OF REDLESTON

130392

No. 9

Colonel French to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 17.)

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
August 30, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith a summary of the situation in Syria and Palestine as it appears to me at present.

The visit of the American Commission came to a conclusion on the 24th of July when the Commissioners embarked at Merana for Constantinople. While it is impossible to tell what may have been the conclusions they reached, there is good reason to believe that their report will be a document of considerable interest and material assistance, in that it was drawn up by men with keen and unprejudiced minds and opportunities of discussing the political situation and future of Syria with representative and intelligent men of every section of the community. They were accompanied by Colonel J. K. Watson, C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., who was specially selected by the Commander-in-Chief on account of his linguistic qualifications and also because he had been in Syria, and was therefore entirely without bias. His attention with the Commission were to make all the necessary arrangements as regards transport, &c. He had no political duties.

There is no doubt that a considerable proportion of the population hope and believe that the report of the Commission may avert the granting of a mandate.

Almost all classes are becoming as time goes on more and more convinced that the situation is being strengthened by the ill-timed and injudicious action of some of their officers, which gave the impression that they were anxious to prevent any Franco-Syrian natives from meeting the American Commissioners. I do not believe that any such actions were encouraged by heads of the administration; they were for the most part exhibitions of misplaced zeal on the part of inferior subordinates.

They have been encouraged by a propaganda campaign conducted by the French authorities and which has been almost as harmful to French prestige and popularity as these incidents.

For instances of political pressure and propaganda in O.E.F. (East), there are Arabs, but from the evidence available they were not as numerous as in O.E.F. (West).

The whole country is now quiet from a political point of view, but it is the quiet resulting partly from exhaustion which followed the political orgy during the visit of the Commission, and partly from the tension caused by the belief that the decision of the Commission will be known shortly.

The Emir has been informed of the visit of the Commission, and to inform him that in his opinion the political pressure practised by the French was with the deliberate intention of creating an artificial situation which would compel armed intervention. The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that it was almost impossible to prevent propaganda, that it usually resulted on the heads of those who carried it out and that the French had made somewhat similar accusations against the Arabs, and satisfied the Emir by promising to make enquiries.

The situation is exceedingly difficult for the Emir Feisal whom I believe to be making the most honest attempt to hold the balance between the moderate and extreme of the Arabs and who desires to fulfil his promises both to His Majesty's Government and to the Zionists; and this very honesty has to a certain extent diminished his influence which for the moment is probably decreasing rather than increasing.

On the other hand, if there were a crisis and he took the lead, as I believe he would, it is probable not only that the Arabs would join him in large numbers, but that he might be joined by considerable numbers of Turks and Kurds who would be

prepared to serve with him as a leader not only of prestige, but of great ideas, whom it might be possible to win the independence of large areas of the Ottoman Empire.

A long-standing feud between the Anzarah and Ismailien in the neighbourhood of Khadins led to the despatch of a small French column which appears to have been ambushed and suffered a certain number of casualties. A joint Anglo-French political mission is now visiting the chiefs of the disturbed area and the latest information is that the tribe concerned has accepted the conditions imposed by the Commander-in-Chief, and made submission.

The situation in Palestine has not changed. A report on the visit of Mr. Justice Brandeis has been sent to you vide my despatch of the 11th August. This visit has undoubtedly done a certain amount of good, especially among the more extreme Zionists, and it is to be hoped that Mr. Brandeis will be able to impress on the Zionist leaders in Europe the need for caution and moderation both in deed and in word in view of the genuine and deep-seated dislike of the non-Jewish population of Palestine not only for Zionists but to a certain extent for all Jews.

The relations between the administration and the Zionist Commission have not been entirely satisfactory, mainly in consequence of the fact that the personnel of the Commission has not been strengthened by the presence of men of outstanding ability in its original formation. These relations must to a large extent depend on good personal relations and perfect frankness on the part of both parties. Recently there have been instances where questions have either been referred direct to the Zionist Organisation in Europe without previous discussion with the administration, or where the organisation has approached your Lordship on information received from Jewish sources other than the Zionist Commission. Either procedure is likely to lead to inexactness and friction on the spot between the administration and the Zionists.

There are other signs that the Zionists in Europe are not kept fully informed regarding the situation in Palestine.

In a letter to Sir L. M. ...

... invariably refers in his ... non-Jewish ... He no doubt realises that these "Arabs" consider themselves as Syrians and form the greater part of the population, and that it is the Moslem and Christian Syrians that the idea of nationalism is strongest.

The proposed acquisition by the Zionists of the Kaiserin Victoria Augusta Hospice at Jerusalem presents certain practical difficulties which no doubt might be overcome, but it should be pointed out that ever since its construction it has been regarded as a Christian institution with a Christian chapel, which has always been used as a headquarters. To transfer it to the Zionists and to hand it over as a Zionist university would, in my opinion, earn for the Mandatory Government a certain amount of unpopularity, none of whom even now quite ... and I think it will be admitted that the prestige of the British Power is worthy of some consideration, most of all perhaps by the Zionists.

Finally, I will venture to suggest that there would be a ... the leading Zionists to complain of what the administration have not ... and the future. These difficulties are going to be very great, and will demand sympathy, tact, caution and absolute fairness to all sections of the population on the part of both administration and Zionists. Great ideals and enthusiasm are not enough to ensure success, and any ill-considered haste is likely to delay rather than expedite the realisation of a Jewish National Home.

I have, &c
C. FRENCH, Colonel,
Acting Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

1130700

N. 11

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 1601.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 3, 1919

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Captain Perring, the relief officer detached from this High Commission for duty at Samsoun, reporting a conversation which he had with Hamid Bey, the Mutesarrif of Samsoun, on the 24th August.

2. I would point out that Hamid Bey is rather a remarkable personality amongst Turkish Governors. Before the war he was associated with Colonel Graves and Brigadier-General Deedes in the organisation of the civil Inspectorate of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, and both these officers speak highly of his ability, energy, and honesty of purpose. In the autumn of 1914 he was appointed Vali of Diarbekir, where, on the outbreak of war, he did everything in his power to facilitate the journey of His Majesty's vice-consul and staff to the coast, in spite of instructions to the contrary from Constantinople.

In consequence of his opposition to the policy of deportation and massacre of Armenians, he was dismissed from the post of Vali of Diarbekir early in 1915, and returned to his post in the Inspectorate of the Ministry of the Interior. About three months ago at the urgent request of the Minister of the Interior, he accepted the inferior post of Mutesarrif of Samsoun, as it was felt that the situation there required the presence of an exceptionally capable Governor.

3. His recent declarations to Captain Perring are, in my opinion, quite sincere and of great interest as symptomatic of the effect produced upon Turkish provincial administration by the Greek occupation of Smyrna, and the consequent development of a Defence movement, which now embraces all classes of Moslems.

4. The growing agitation amongst the Turkish population makes it difficult, if possible, for local Governors to carry out some of the requests of our officers for the restitution of Christian property, or the arrest of notorious offenders, who are now fighting as Turkish patriots, and, in the absence of any power to enforce compliance, it may, to my great regret, become necessary to restrict our activities in this direction.

5. As regards Hamid Bey's remarks on the effect which would be produced by the restoration of Christian power, still they would now welcome such a mandate as a lesser evil than the alternative, which they all so greatly fear, namely, the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire under several foreign flags.

I have, &c

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 99

Captain Perring to Rear-Admiral Webb

(No. 251)

Sir,

Samsoun, August 24, 1919

I HAVE the honour to report that Hamid Bey, the Mutesarrif of Samsoun, called on me this morning.

2. He requested me not to push so hard for the restitution of certain properties the return of which I have insisted on, he explained that owing to my insistence the Turks were getting very agitated. I promised to leave these for several days, but insisted on his giving me a written guarantee for their not being tampered with, &c, which he gave me.

3. He then requested me to write to you about Emin Bey and to request you not to insist further on his arrest. This, I explained, was an impossibility for me to do; however, offered me a guarantee for this man's behaviour, and stated that he would personally see that for the future he would not take part in any political or committee proceedings.

4. He then spoke of the future of his country, and stated that it was obvious that the only country that they would accept; also that if they had the choice they were unanimous that Great Britain should take over control at once.

[1356]

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5. He complained bitterly of the way the French treated him, but this, of course, I refused to discuss.

6. He informed me that he was in communication with Mustapha Kemal Pasha and explained his motives, saying he would be most glad for me to meet Kemal, assured me that the whole movement would cease the very day we took over control of Turkey.

7. I promised to forward his expressions to Constantinople, and he stated that both General Deedes and Colonel Graves knew his honesty of purpose.

8. He also requested my help in removing two or three desperate characters who are in prison here, and requested me to put them on board Constantinople; knowing the records of these men, I promised that this should be done.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING, Captain

[130723]

No. 100.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon, (Received September 18.)

(No. 1624)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 11, 1914

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information a report by the Military Control Officer at Afion Kara Hisar, entitled "Events in Afion Kara Hisar since the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek Troops" and a second report from the Control Office at Eski Sholir on the subject of the movement in that town, which have been sent to me by the General of the Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

2. This first report, I consider, contains a very impartial and straightforward review of the different phases of the situation which has arisen in Anatolia since the landing of the Greek army at Smyrna, and, with reference to certain matters therein referred to, I have the honour to submit the following observations for your Lordship's consideration.

Up to the time of the Smyrna landing the situation was not only generally satisfactory but was, moreover, steadily improving, and armed conflicts between Christians and Moslems did not commence until the decision was taken by the Peace Conference to send Greek troops to Smyrna, the authority of the Central Government was, in fact, fairly well established.

3. Following on the events at Smyrna, a general change taking place in the attitude of the population, except in the areas into which Greek troops had penetrated. Towards the end of June began the organisation and gradual extension of the National Defence Movement, due to the efforts of the corps of officers and the partisans of the Union and Progress and strong Nationalist groups, working on the feelings of a population which, if not actively in sympathy with its objects, passively approved the organisation of measures to ward off the threatened danger of the partition of the country.

4. A later development, which tends to become more pronounced as time goes on, is the antagonism to the present Government of the leaders of the movement. The present Cabinet is looked upon as weak, unable to uphold Turkish rights, unrepresentative of Turkish sentiment, and under the influence of the Allies. Although no open and general disavowal of the authority of the Cabinet now in power has yet been manifested in the eastern vilayets from Mustafa Kemal's activities has yet been confined to the central and western provinces of Anatolia, still the opposition to the Central Government has, nevertheless, shown itself by the expulsion or suppression of the civil authorities at provincial centres such as Ushak and Afionkarahisar, and by certain other acts on the part of local military commanders clearly indicating that they look upon the Vahis and Mutasarrifs as in a position of merely nominal authority.

5. The present policy of the National Organisation appears to be to wait on events which is believed to have taken place as a consequence of Greek actions in the Afionkarahisar vilayet. It is noteworthy that, except at two or three places within or in close proximity to the zone of operations in the Afionkarahisar vilayet, where Christians were

massacred by irregular and uncontrolled bands in retaliation for Greek atrocities, there have been nowhere any instances of massacre of the Christian inhabitants by the Moslems.

7. Thus, the rumour of a massacre at Ushak (the subject of my telegram No. 100 of the 4th August and your Lordship's telegram No. 1327 of the 9th August) proves to have been without foundation, and though the town was occupied by troops belonging to the National Army, measures were taken that the Christian population should not be molested.

8. Though the situation in Anatolia is at present outwardly quiet, I foresee the probability of grave troubles arising should terms of peace be imposed upon this country which will comprise the establishment of Greek authority over any part of Asia Minor, or the division of Anatolia into spheres to be administered by different powers.

9. I am of opinion that any such decision would be followed by the repudiation by the provinces of the authority of Constantinople, and the setting up of one or a number of Nationalist and largely military congresses to control the country. If such a situation arises the Allies will be faced with a far more serious problem than that which exists already in the Eastern vilayets, and the execution of such terms imposed upon Turkey will necessitate the undertaking of military measures on a very considerable scale.

10. I feel most strongly that the establishment in the future of normal peaceful relations between the Turkish and Greek peoples, being given, the reasonable claims of the Turks that they should not be subjected to the rule of an alien and hostile race like the Greeks, and that that part of the Empire which the Peace Conference decides to leave to them should not be divided up amongst various nations, is the sentiment against any such conditions is universal and very strong. It is, to my mind, essential that the general Turkish population should not be left with the conviction that it has been harshly and unjustly treated by the Allies in respect of these two points.

11. It has become more and more clear to me that the only solution of the problem of the future status of Anatolia which will provide an acceptable and stable settlement is one in which the Turkish population will be welcomed by the great nations of Europe. There is no arrangement except that of a mandate under which Britain or, failing her, the United States which the Turks will willingly accept although in practice it is not likely to be so. I am aware of the many and great difficulties which are connected with this subject, but I do not appear to me to be unduly pessimistic or desirous to close one's eyes to the real facts of the situation.

12. In connection with this subject, I would refer your Lordship to my despatch No. 1601 of the 3rd September, on the subject of the Mutasarrif of Samouni.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 100

Summary of Events in Afion Kara Hisar since the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek Troops

Issued by the General Staff "Intelligence" Army of the Black Sea, Constantinople.

1. Before Occupation.—Previous to the occupation of Smyrna, the situation in Afion Kara Hisar was practically all that could be desired. There were, of course, a number of officials still in the sanjak who had taken an active part in the Committee of Union and Progress programme.

2. After Occupation.—The occupation of Smyrna was the cause of a certain amount of unrest. Owing to representations made by the people to the Minister of the Interior, he was sent away on the 9th June 1914, his place being taken by a Turk named Mahmoud Mahir.

3. Djemal Pasha.—On the 12th June General Kutubuk Djemal Pasha arrived in Afion Kara Hisar ostensibly to inspect the 23rd Division. It was discovered later, however, that during his visit he had made a tour through many neighbouring villages and had asked the population to offer themselves to fight for Turkey when called upon.

[1356]

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entirely incorrect, but he would certainly not have given the interview innocently. He must have known that it was given by the Extremist Party.

3. The conclusions of the British Control Officer stationed at Aden are as follows:—

- a.) The present movement is showing itself to be as much the Committee of Union and Progress as military; and is directed as much against the present Government as against the Greeks. Ever since we have now gone too far for the Turks to listen to the Allies with regard to the Greek question, nothing will satisfy them but the entire removal of Greek troops. The Turks will no more accept a mandate of the Italians than they will of the British. The 2nd Divisional Commander has stated that if the Allies left the Italians any part of Asia Minor the Turks would not do so; and that the people of Balıkcı, Sparta, &c., were only allowing the Italians to remain owing to force majeure, i.e., their greater hatred of the Greeks.
- (b.) The more intelligent Turks are also decidedly opposed to a dividing up of Asia Minor, in which a different Power will have a mandate. As they point out, when the mandates are withdrawn, each zone will be found to have different laws and methods of administration, which would be fatal to the country as a whole. Neither do they want the French in the country, as French customs are so opposed to Moslem religion.
- (c.) What the Turks would willingly accept in America or Great Britain as the mandatory Power for the whole of Asia Minor; the Power that accepts the place technical advisers, such as experts in administration, health, education &c. in each sanjak. "The simple Turkish people have been for years anxious for one of the two above Powers to take over the country and save him from his own corrupt officials." Any delay in settling the future of Asia Minor encourages the Turk in his movement against the Allies. They seem now to be quite convinced that all the Allies except the Greeks side with the Turks, and they prove the fact that the British have never put British troops to guard the Aden railway, thus tacitly allowing the Turks to use it as well as the Greeks.
- (d.) The Turkish military leaders seem to wish to show that areas taken over by the National Army, such as Ouchak are far more tranquil than they were before. They are thought to be succeeding in this, and are quite anxious for British or French officers to visit such areas to judge for themselves.

August 25, 1919

Enclosure 2 in No. 100

Report on the National Movement in Eski Shehir

THE local situation has reached a climax which can best be described in the words of a pro-British Turkish officer, when he said "We must do one thing or the other." There are two strong parties here:—

1. Those who are content to passively wait and see what the future has in store for them, who place their confidence in the British, and who are endeavouring to restore the welfare of their country along industrial lines. This party comprises the majority of the rich Turkish merchants, their employers, the middle class, in fact, a large percentage of the lower classes.
2. The other party are those who call themselves the National Army. These are the troops lately arrived from Angora, headed by Atıf Bey. They were immediately joined by all the local Committee of Union and Progress and many of their old followers, who had declared themselves "Pacifists" until an armed force appeared on the scene. The attached translation of a declaration, published in the local newspaper, will help to show to what state of independence this National Army has reached. The former party, the Pacifists, although in the majority, are the weaker party, and are terrorised by the National Army, whom they call brigands.

Atıf Bey literally rules Eski Shehir. The Mutessarif shifts from one party to the other, but he does not recognise the British. He refuses to give information, but at the same time is in no way openly hostile, except that it is a generally discussed topic that, if the British attempted to take over further control of the interior, or to send more troops than they have there at present, the National Army would destroy the railway line, thus cutting off all communication. The spot selected for this is between Balıkcı and Vezirhan.

There are thirty-five tents in all, but I do not estimate that there are more than 100 men there. However, there are another 100 men (possibly more) in Eski Shehir. Atıf Bey with his staff lives in the town.

Extracts from the "Imad" of August 14, 1919

What the National Army claims.—The blood shed by the murdering Greek army has brought about the formation of a group of national brigands who will always defend themselves honourably. "National Army" means an army that will never be miserably before the Greek army; an army which punishes the wild Greek, who dishonoured our mothers and sisters, and killed the helpless fathers and grandfathers; an army which breaks the destroying hands of the vagabond Greek who has burnt out the houses and villages; an army which, after protesting to the world, will drive out the Greek troops; an army which announces to the world that on Turkish lands only Turks may live. Knowing of the formation of such a divine army, you ought to give up all respect for the Greeks.

After the signing of the armistice for the destruction of our country, a terrible propaganda started. Greeks and Armenians, helping each other, wrote and published against us. By their own wish the Turkish mouths, which wished to defend themselves, were shut. The Greeks occupied Smyrna undefended, murdered its population

and in our press and by meetings, but the rights of the Turks were not heard. The Turks have claimed in a proper way the rights of a free nation from their victors but received no answer. They received instead

illegal actions, and protested against a Government, too weak to protect its rights. The Turkish National Army can never be defeated, but will always work in the Aden vilayet. As they worked, Europe and America were obliged to take into consideration the action of the Turks, and to declare that the occupation of Aden should

The Government announces that the occupation of Smyrna is to be prevented. The National Army must not defend our country. If in this good something patriotic, something towards the delivery of our nation then will be forced to obey. But such prevention means that the Greeks will stay in the Aden vilayet.

The National Army is to drive the Greeks from Smyrna and not to hunt their occupation.

Our rights were made known to the Greeks, and still they stay in our country. If the following claims of the National Army are performed, then we are satisfied:—

1. The Turks must rule over the Aden vilayet. The Greeks themselves are witnesses of the anarchy which has driven people from their business.
2. Prevention of the spread of the occupied area will not satisfy us. Not a Greek must remain in Smyrna. They must pay indemnity for the damage they have done. Otherwise in Anatolia bloody battles will take place.
3. The Government is pleased to prevent the spread of the occupation, but should be pleased to see all Greeks driven out. Also they must not give the national soldier such titles as homeless vagabond, or brigand.

August 19, 1919. N.B.—The translation of the document referred to in the following report* has already been forwarded to the High Commissioner in a letter from the Commander-in-Chief.

* Not printed

The attached is the translation of a document handed to me this afternoon (19th), bearing the signatures of the 37 leading Turks of Eski Shehir* (The Director of the Municipality, the chief religious head, a lawyer, 16 leading merchants, 3 budjas, 16 heads of quarters in the town and villages.) I have retained the original. It is addressed; is dated the 12th August, 1919, and was handed to me with some secrecy and fear. I stated it would not leave British hands.

I have also just received information that the Director of the Post Office, Eski Shehir, has received orders from the Minister of War that he is not to allow Atif Bey to communicate with Afion Kara Hissar, Angora, or Kutahia. Atif Bey has met the situation by force, and had obliged the Post Office to forward his telegram.

Information also just received, but not confirmed, states that Kutahia has been held up by a band from the National Army and forced to pay the sum of 80,000 liras under threat.

Lieutenant,
Control Officer, Eski Shehir.

[130728]

No. 101

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon. — (Received September 18.

(No. 1629.

At

Constantinople, September 8, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1412 of the 9th August, relative to atrocities committed by the Greek troops in the Aidin Vilayet, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's consideration copy of a report dated the 30th August which I have received from my representative at Smyrna, enclosing an account of the proceedings of the trial by court-martial of Lieutenant-Colonel Alex Selina, who commanded the garrison of Aidin at the time of its capture by the Turks.

2. M. Athinoyanis, the Greek lawyer who wrote the account of the court-martial, was the leading Pan-Hellenist propagandist and intriguer in Smyrna before the landing. His statements, therefore, are far from impartial.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB

Acting High Commissioner

Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, to
British High Commissioner, Constantinople

(No. 158)

August 30, 1919

WITH reference to my despatch No. 104 of the 30th July concerning events at Aidin, I have the honour to enclose herewith an account of the proceedings of the trial by court-martial in Smyrna of Lieutenant-Colonel Alex Selina, who commanded the garrison of Aidin at the time of its capture by the Turks.

This account has been supplied by M. Athinoyanis, a Greek lawyer, retained for the defence. It will be seen that the point of view set forth in the proceedings is entirely Greek one.

JAMES MORGAN

Enclosure 2 in No. 101

Report of the Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Selina, Commander of the Greek Garrison of Aidin, accused of having deserted his Post in presence of the Enemy

THE trial began on the 18th July, 1919, and lasted three days; twenty-two witnesses were heard. The following facts were brought out in the course of the trial:

1. The strength of the garrison at the time of the attack against the town (15th, 16th, and 17th June) consisted of 1,200 men. There were also eight machine guns and two mountain guns.

2. At the time of the occupation defendant had posted guns for the safety of his

small garrison by the Meander passes and bridges to prevent invasion from Tchana. Subsequently, however, he was ordered from Paris, through the chief of the army of occupation, to recall these guards; he was also prevented from sending out patrolling detachments and guarding the railway line between the Meander and Aidin, which was absolutely necessary for his communications, it being signified to him that the line would be guarded by diplomatic men.

Many restrictions had been imposed by him as regards the disarmament of the population, whereas it was known that the Musulman population of the town disposed of 6,000 Mauser rifles, 4,000,000 cartridges, and many machine guns.

When such restrictions were imposed on him a local rising was being prepared. The Turkish army had transferred its headquarters from Aidin to Tchana, was mobilising four classes in the districts of Niali, Tchana, Bachtarasi and the other four classes already under arms. The whole strength of the division was 10,000 men.

By irregular volunteer bodies in the districts of T. Italian occupation.

4. The attack on the garrison of the town commenced on the 15th (28th) June (Saturday). Both the regular and irregular army crossed the Meander easily, and with their heavy and other guns began the attack.

The next day, the 16th (29th) June, the guns began to fire into the town when revolution broke out. Big red flags were hoisted on the mosques, and posted on them attracted the Greek soldiers from behind. Strong Turkish forces, on the other hand, arriving from Tchana attacked the town from the south, while over 4,000 fighting Turkish inhabitants organised centres of resistance in the town and harrowed the fighting garrison from behind.

On Sunday another Turkish force was noticed coming up from the east, while the inhabitants of about forty Turkish villages north of Aidin came up to attack from the north. Thus the attack came from four directions. The attacking force numbered to be 15,000. The garrison struggled until late in the night, occupying the forts in the town and expecting the reinforcement repeatedly asked for, escape which had begun to run short.

Meanwhile a fire broke out which assumed serious dimensions. In consequence defendant concentrated his men on Sunday night on the heights of

of the Greek army on the heights of the army, and the use of it had been prohibited to the civil population, who were fit to leave the town by of

This incident gave rise to a misunderstanding in consequence of which part of the population remained in the town against their wish, while many others remained it thinking that owing to the protective attitude of the Greek army towards the Turkish population of the town there was no reason for fear in the event of the Turkish

Unfortunately the provisions of the city were not sufficient to last long after the occupation of the town by the Turks the whole body of young boys and 1,500 of the population were slain, among whom, I Gommara, representative of the Bishop of Heliopolis (Aidin), while 800 more have been carried away to Demnli whom they are still detained. Such a catastrophe of the civil population weighed on the conscience of the judges of the court-martial, and seriously compromised the trial.

17th (30th) June continued prisoner had received on 17th

On 17th (30th) June continued but will not arrive

However that even on Monday the reinforcements that the encircling of the town was being completed, the

communications with Smyrna had been interrupted, and half an hour previous to

demands, he thought and commenced the

The sortie had been carried out in order, the sick, wounded, and even the them. On the 18th June

the counter attack from Erbeik entered Adin the Turks
 during the three days of the population a
 instruction of the Christian
 The survivors assert that at
 involving Turkish army and
 there was the commandant of the

are known

unanimated since three days after the same forces, n
 urged to their posts, and asked for the acquittal of A. Schina. The
 but the desertion had been commuted, but admitted
 extenuating circumstances, and, instead of sentence of death, delivered sentence
 of life.

130729*

real Webb to Earl Curzon — (Received September 18)

Richard Webb,
 High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 102

The Truth about Adin.

the Greeks and who now commands both the regular and irregular troops of that
 District, sent an ultimatum to the
 the town of Adin by the 2nd July in
 14th June, a detachment of 150 men up to the bridge of the Menderes, four or five miles
 them. On the morning of the 28th another detachment was sent, but fared likewise.
 In the afternoon of the same day shots were heard close to the town, and the Greek
 troops, who had occupied an elevated position, were firing with rifles and machine
 guns from three different sides on the Turkish quarters, sending that some shots had
 been fired, but having plundered and

shot with machine guns and rifles by the Greek soldiers and civilians to
 decreased a great deal, still it continued right through the night
 the firing commenced

the proportions and had spread on one side towards the Bazaar, and
 order towards the Greek quarter of Nazli Keupru. The firing, the screams, and the
 were unable to hold out any longer and were preparing to retreat. Whereupon the

heavily, the more so as he was at the head of a well equipped force
 with guns and ammunition. The excuse Colonel Skinas gave was that he was short
 of ammunition. It cannot be said for sure to what extent this was true, but the fact is
 that such waste in that line has rarely been seen, for the result of all the firing was
 forty-seven Turks in all, between killed and wounded.

As soon as the shameful retreat of the army was realized, and the consequences
 clearly foreseen, several hundred of the inhabitants took refuge in the convent. The
 Superior, Sister Marie Kuechin, as well as all the other sisters, in a most
 manner, and did all they possibly could for the people. Seeing that the Turks were
 advancing, a delegation was sent from the convent to tell them that it was under French

church close by. Fifteen or twenty were allowed to pass, but after that the rest were
 prevented from doing so, except only being made for the Muslim women and
 children. Unfortunately a small door in the convent yard was broken in by several
 Turkish irregulars, and six or eight persons killed by them before the Turkish
 governor was able to interfere. Eventually the remainder of those who had taken
 refuge in the convent were allowed to escape, but not before they handed over as
 many possessions in the shape of money and jewellery, &c. What the last refugees
 were leaving the convent, eight or ten were killed by the irregulars before it was

the Turkish Colonel Cheekat Bey. On Monday the 1st July, Mr. Haddar, a British

Guerrilla fighting is still going on, and will continue so long as there is
 Turkish or Greek soldier left. The Turks openly say they will welcome any one
 gladly accept its administration, but on no account will they remain under
 Greek control.

Some days ago, forty Turkish troops were summoned four times to surrender, but they fought like lions
 until everyone of them was killed. Wounded Greek soldiers are being daily brought
 down to Sivrihisar.

One cannot help remarking that the Greeks are doing their level best to make
 the Turkish Government. Their continual

A few days ago fresh Greek troops just landed, whilst marching through the town of Smyrna were singing as follows "Nabunt she mustanella (Greek kids) have come to Smyrna, the fez will disappear, and the blood of the Turk will flow Now we have taken Smyrna let us go to Athens." The Greeks are very good natured, and their behaviour towards the Turks is very kind.

Rebels to Party?

Constantinople, September 5

With reference to my despatch No. 1525 of the 23rd August, I have the honor to inform your Lordship that the Grand Vizier has expressed his regret at the difficulties which were being created for the Turkish Government by the exigencies of the war, and said the only way by which it seemed to him it might be possible to meet them was quite out of the question, except in conjunction with our Allies, and he expressed his regret that he was not in a position to judge in any other manner.

if they found that H. M. S. "Hermes" was
judged in any emergency.

2. The Highness somewhat different. Great divergences of opinion had come to the sur-
face in Germany, where the negotiations were fairly plain sailing, and
international relations were not brought into question. I must admit, he
was not another according to the tradition and policy of the Porte (and this was certainly
not Britain that had fought with and had conquered Turkey and its
Minister just said so, stating in his speech of the 18th August that vital British
interests were at stake in the Turkish settlement with which Great Britain was
intimately concerned? That expression of opinion had appeared to him most strongly
for in his opinion, Turkish interests were absolutely dependent upon Great Britain and
upon no other Power.

... he had made on the 30th March last year
... and said incidentally that, so far
... and, they had never heard of that
... that no one had but ...
... I reasoned that he must
... the ...

He requested the
limitation of distrust
anything that could lead to
He was perfectly certain that
His object was to show the
Britain, so that when the Turkish
for discussion a large part of the
Turkish delegation would know approximately what ground they had to stand on. He
estimated the conclusion of the treaty with Persia, which could not but result to
happiness and prosperity of that land.

I refrained from expressing to Ferid Pasha my conviction that this would be nothing less than a matter of dictation, even if the duty in arriving at the exact wording which they will dictate were I with pointing out that Persia during the war had a friendly neutrality, that the conclusion of so burdensome a treaty had provoked much criticism in Western Europe, and that the slightest suspicion, even my ostensible negotiation, could not possibly fail to create exactly that suspicion of mistrust and rivalry which His Highness so clearly and wisely understood it was imperative to avoid. Therefore, whilst appreciating the advantages that were

I have, y

Letting High Command

No. 104

1212

British and French Governments, not only as between themselves
them and it.

Today the garrison in Syria west of the Sykes line has been replaced by a French force and the garrison of Aleppo will be replaced by an Arab force.

but should have any responsibility within the zone from which

ed by British troops will then be Pisbaine destroyed

1. Dan to Hovvshen and M...

Mr. 1918 between Mr. Clements and Mr. Lloyd George.

The British Government are prepared at any time to discuss the boundaries of Palestine and Syria, and between Mesopotamia and Syria. In the event of a reference, the British Government are prepared to accept the decision of a referee appointed by President Wilson.

as well as the railway line. The British Government shall, as a perpetual right at all times to improve the facilities of these railway lines, to transport troops along the railway, and these rights shall be without infringement of the sovereignty of the Federal Arab State. In the event of disagreement as to the traces of the oil pipe lines, the British Government are prepared to submit the matter to the arbitration of a referee appointed by President W.

immediately to carry out a survey with the object of finding, if possible, the railway line and pipe lines entirely within the British limits, so as to avoid the necessity of exercising the rights of construction.

boundaries of Palestine and Mesopotamia are determined, the British commander-in-chief shall have the right to occupy outposts, in accordance with the authority claimed by the British Government.

11. The French Government having accepted responsibility for the protection of Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate despatch of French troops via Alexandretta and Mersina for this purpose.

Paris, September 13, 191

[132276]

No. 105.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Recd. 8/1/1919)

(No. 1615)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship
relative to the condition of Turkish prisons
the Allied High Commission

Constantinople

Proposition au sujet des prisons turques de Constantinople
Note from the Armistice Commission
Note from the Sublime Porte to the Armistice Commission

2. As your Lordship is aware, the unsatisfactory conditions which have, since the beginning of the Armistice, seriously occupied the attention of the High Commission, and attempts have repeatedly been made to induce the Turkish Government to improve the prison administration and to improve the lot of the prisoners. Much of what had been done previous to June last is noted in "Reports on Conditions in Turkish Prisons" ("Miscellaneous, No. 6") since that date further strong representations have been made to the Turkish Government on the subject, which the Allied Sanitary Commission has carried out in action and reported on conditions. Improvements effected by these measures have, however, been only temporary, and the continued unsatisfactory and overcrowded state of the prisons has been a matter of grave concern to myself and my French and Italian colleagues.

3. The security of the prisons is also highly unsatisfactory, and the Turkish Government is apparently incapable, on account of the prevalence of corruption among the prison officials and wardens, of preventing continued escapes. The escape of Hâdî Paşa and Talât Bey is the most glaring example. The six weeks previous to their escape over forty of the worst prisoners escaped in a single night from the central prisons by tunnelling.

4. On account of this unsatisfactory state of affairs both as regards sanitary conditions and security, the Allied High Commissioners instructed the Armistice Commission (consisting of the three military attachés) to investigate and report what measures it was desirable to take in order to effect an improvement. The report of the Commission ("Proposition au sujet des prisons turques de Constantinople"), and the recommendations therein made were approved, and the Inter Allied Commission on Prisons has now been set up.

5. It is hoped that the activities of this Commission will effect a general improvement in conditions, but the chief obstacle to any real reforms being carried out is the I have already had the pleasure of pointing out to your Lordship with reference to the present inefficient state of the gendarmerie, the inability of the Turkish Government to provide

I have &

RICHARD WEBB

Acting

Proposals respecting Turkish Prisons in Constantinople

The liberation, les membres alliés de la Commission de l'Armistice ont été

Qu'il faille laisser au Gouvernement turc l'entière responsabilité

et de l'hygiène de toutes les prisons

Qu'en ce qui concerne les détenus politiques, il était indispensable de n'intervenir qu'à la mesure où les intérêts

Les ont l'honneur de soumettre à la réunion des Hauts-Commissaires :

Detenus de

Désigner une Commission des Prisons comprenant un officier de chaque
Puissances alliées qui sera chargé de l'inspection de toutes les prisons

propres à améliorer la situation actuelle; elle sera accréditée, d'une part

le l'Armistice, qui

serait imposée à
les Prisons aura

ser une prison spéciale susceptible d'être facilement gardée et d'être
dans des conditions hygiéniques acceptables, dans cette prison seraient
plus dangereux, les gardiens devraient être choisis
parmi les meilleurs les plus consciencieux, et la Commission tiendrait
qu'ils soient payés régulièrement par le Gouvernement ottoman

(b) Cette prison ainsi que toutes les autres, serait fréquemment inspectée par la
Commission, et elle serait visitée par des roques et par

(c) Les améliorations de toute nature seraient demandées
ottoman et leur exécution suivra de très près, mais en observant un
d'hygiène strict et en ne faisant que des réalisations progressives, afin
qu'à chaque instant la tâche ne dépasse pas les moyens humains dont

La Commission des Prisons fournira chaque semaine un compte rendu détaillé
aux membres alliés de la Commission de l'Armistice, qui tiendront au
cours de la réunion des Hauts-Commissaires

Les détenus politiques

La Commission des Prisons tiendra la Commission de l'Armistice au courant
des détenus politiques incarcérés, tous ceux d'entre eux auxquels les Alliés peuvent reprocher
un crime à l'égard de leurs nationaux ou de leurs prisonniers seront
immédiatement proposés pour la déportation, soit à M. de la Soudan, soit à M. de

BARTHELEMY
VITALI
J. M. SMITH

are 2 in No. 105

Note from the Armistice Commission to the Sublime

DANS leur réunion de jeudi, 21 août 1919, les Hauts-Commissaires
alliés ont

Armistice

Délégués militaires

ont désigné

Commissaire M. de

Commissaire M. de

R.

Ils demandent à la Sublime Porte de vouloir bien les accréditer, ainsi qu'il
ajoute, auprès de la Direction de la Police turque de Constantinople et adresser à quiconque
du droit des ordres pour que toutes les autorités turques leur donnent toutes facilités
tous renseignements et accèdent à toutes les demandes; en particulier, des cartes
personnelles leur permettant d'entrer dans toutes les prisons à toutes heures et de les
visiter, devront être remises

Il y aurait tout avantage à ce que la Sublime Porte veuille bien mettre à leur
disposition un officier ou fonctionnaire turc bien au courant des prisons de Constantinople
et de

BARTHELEMY
VITALI
J. M. SMITH.

31

gave it our blessing, and did not at all intend to supply it with every assistance. But this obviously involved, as an inevitable corollary, that the whole future of these regions was still in the balance, and that their destiny depended chiefly on the wishes of their inhabitants. No British officer could possibly think otherwise; yet, if he thus spoke and acted, there is not a Frenchman in Syria—or elsewhere—who would not regard him as anti-French in feeling, and as an intriguer against France in practice.

II.

This brings into clear relief what I have said, namely, that France, England, and America have got themselves into a Syrian problem so inextricably confused that no really satisfactory issue is now possible for any of them.

The situation is affected by five documents, beginning with our promise to the Allies in 1915, going on to the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France of September 1916; followed by the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918, and the League of Nations Mandate for Syria and Lebanon of 1920.

It is to be noted in connection with the Arab problem on the spot—directions which, it must be observed, were accepted by France, Britain, and America, though the Commission itself was, in the end, purely American in composition. These documents are not consistent with each other. They represent no clear-cut policy, the policy which they confusedly adumbrate is really the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers, and yet, so far as I can see, they have wholly lost their validity or can be valid in all respects as of merely historic interest. Each can be quoted by Frenchmen, Americans, and Arabs when it happens to suit their purpose.

Such will be no quoted but the fact is that the arrangement about the Middle East.

These difficulties are well illustrated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. What it envisaged was the creation of two clearly defined areas, one carved out of French, the other English, as Egypt is English. Between them was a strip occupied in part by nominal British rule, in part by a secular administration, up to and including what was to be independent in the end.

Each in their own way, but who and for certain purposes under the control, either of France or of Britain, they belonged to what in the agreement was termed the "Mandatory Powers."

Such a system of government it might really have proved a disaster, such an overlordship is not a new one to the commercial customs and port of the Levant.

and peace. The promise on the assumption that, if we supply an aggregate of low homogeneity in language and religion, with a little assistance, good deal of advice, if we protect them from violence they will readily and peacefully transform themselves into a democratic state on modern lines. They will, in language borrowed from the declaration, establish "a national government, at least a government deriving its authority from the nation."

It is meant, as I think it is, that when the Turkish tyranny is wholly past and a will to democracy is born, they shall have freedom to set up a government of their own.

the long run. It will probably get us into trouble, unless, indeed, we can agree to treat it with a very wide latitude of interpretation.

Now, indeed, when dealing with this series of documents, is later interpretation to be avoided? Consider the following analysis.

In 1915 we promised the Arabs independence, and the promise was unqualified, except in respect of certain territorial reservations. In 1916 the promise was by implication repeated. In 1918 the interpretation can, I think, be placed in unambiguous terms on the phrase in the declaration about a "National Government."

Administration for the future and liberty from the initiative and free choice of the native population.

Administration for the future and liberty from the initiative and free choice of the native population.

Administration for the future and liberty from the initiative and free choice of the native population.

In 1916 (Sykes-Picot) the Arab State (i.e., areas A and B) was qualified by the fact that it was under the mandatory system, as, indeed, it is under the mandatory system now. These documents undoubtedly mean that the adviser whose advice must be followed; and assuredly not a really independent which has habitually and normally supported, if the worst comes to the worst, by troops, aeroplanes, and tanks.

In our promises with regard to the frontiers of the new Arab States we seem to have been more fortunate than in our promises about their independence. In 1915 it was the Sherif of Mecca to whom the task of delimitation was to have been committed, nor were any restrictions placed upon his discretion in this matter. Certain reservations intended to protect French interests in Western Syria and Lebanon seem to have been forgotten. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, however, has been heard of since. A wholly new method was adopted by France and England, who made with each other in the Sykes-Picot Agreement the ready territorial arrangements already described—arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers have so far neither explicitly accepted nor explicitly replaced.

Implication, indeed, they have rejected them. The language of the League of Nations or asserts that in the regions we are discussing, as in other portions of the world, the peoples are "undeveloped" to demand "provisional recognition," each of which is to be supplied by the Powers with a mandatory till it is able to stand alone. When what are these "independent nations"? Are they by chance identical with Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine? If so, the coincidence with the Sykes-Picot arrangement is truly amazing, for no such idea was present to the minds of those who framed it. They started from the view that France had ancient interests and aspirations in Syria, that Britain had obvious claims in Mesopotamia and Southern Persia, that Palestine had a unique historic position; and that if these three areas were to be separately controlled, it was obviously expedient that none of them should be under any other foreign influence. In other words, when they began to report to arrangement they never supposed themselves to be dealing with three nations already in existence, ready for "provisional recognition," only requiring the removal of the Turk, the advice of a mandatory, and a little time to enable them to "stand alone." It never occurred to them that they had to deal at all with nations in the modern and Western sense of the term. With the Arab race, Arab culture, and Arab social and religious organization (to say nothing of Jews, Maronites, Druses, and Kurds) they knew they had to deal. But this is a very different thing.

The League of Nations in 1919 is in contradiction with the Agreement of 1916, and which must be held to represent our policy. We are now faced with the fact that the whole of the Arab world is now under the control of the League of Nations.

having got rid of the Turk, is a more than one national but distinct.

When further consideration is given to the subject, it is clear that the League of Nations is not a body with anything to be said in the matter of the Arab world.

On this point the Covenant speaks clearly.

The wishes of these minorities (i.e., the independent nations) must be a principal consideration in the determination of a mandatory.

It is unimpeachable, but how is it to be carried into effect? To carry out the argument, let us assume that two of the "independent nations" for which mandates have to be provided are Syria and Palestine. Take Syria first. Do we mean, in the case of Syria, to consult principally the wishes of the inhabitants? We mean nothing of the kind. According to the universally accepted view there are only three powers—England, America, and France. Are we going to consult the wishes of the inhabitants? In dealing with one of them it is to be assumed that the other two will refuse. America will refuse, so that, whatever the inhabitants may wish, it is France they will certainly have. They will have to do as France wishes.

So that, whatever the inhabitants may wish, it is France they will certainly have. They will have to do as France wishes.

So that, whatever the inhabitants may wish, it is France they will certainly have. They will have to do as France wishes.

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So that, whatever the inhabitants may wish, it is France they will certainly have. They will have to do as France wishes.

it has prof. a
 opinion that is right. What I have
 harmonized with the declaration of the Covenant, or the instructions to the
 of Egypt.
 ink that Zionism will hurt the Arabs but they
 want it. Whatever be the future of Palestine it is not now a
 r as it yet on the way to become one. Whatever differences
 views of those who live there, the I

no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have
 not to violate.

III

Since the literal fulfillment of
 is incompatible with each other
 ought, I presume, to do the next best thing. And the next best thing may, per se,
 obtained if we can frame a scheme which shall, as far as possible, further not merely
 interests but the and habits of the native population, which shall
 account the legitimate aspirations of other peoples and races, in particular of
 the French, the British, and the Jews, and which
 fit of the various international pronouncements, whose literal
 provisions it seems impossible in all cases.

I venture to lay down the following propositions:

1. The Sykes-Picot Agreement should be
 French sphere extending to the Syria, a British
 Euphrates and the Tigris, and a home for the
 Jews in the valley of the Jordan.
2. The Sykes-Picot Agreement should, however, be brought into closer
 with the but by the abandonment of the special privilege in the
 not readily distinguishable from complete sovereignty. These should be
 absorbed in the general body of areas A and B, as ultimately defined.
3. The Agreement to
 France and Britain respectively shall be abandoned. France and Britain
 and the fundamental principles laid down by the
 the Government under mandate of territories out-
 li Empire shall as far as possible, be maintained.
4. French zone of Syria shall extend in the direction of An-
 thiently far to include Alexandretta and its hinterland.
 France shall have more of Syria than this must depend on the
 of Armenian population and the claims of Italy under the Treaty of 1917.
5. The British zone in Syria shall extend as far as Mosul. Even
 if this general scheme be provisionally
 evidently remains a large number of difficult questions of demarcation which
 at least a solution. In solving them I
 be borne in mind.

the first place, I would lay it down that frontiers should be determined by
 and ethnographic considerations rather than strictly by the
 her the facts are equal, by all means choose a good military frontier rather than
 a bad one. But do not let us further impale the already difficult question of
 of area.
 never take place, if it does take place, it will probably
 character and we cannot foresee, in any case it will

Palestine, and Mesopotamia

Their frontiers may be doubtful, but the great central core of each is disputed by no
 with the adjacent coast and plains. Mesopotamia is
 the Tigris and

not to be impossible, but it will require to be worked at by experts who have far
 I possess of an

Palestine

to influence the Jewish problem throughout the world Palestine
 is available for the large number of Jewish immigrants. It is
 able that it should be the command of the water power
 which naturally belongs to it, whether by extending its borders to the north or by
 (Syria to whom the southward flowing waters of Euphrates
 could not in

For the same reason Palestine should extend into the lands lying east of the
 Jordan. It should not, however, be allowed to include the Hedjaz Railway, which is
 too distinctly bound up with exclusively Arab interests.

as far as I know the needs of Mesopotamia which are likely to
 cause trouble with the are rights of water and rights of
 On these subjects I am ignorant, and on neither is there much ex-
 available in Paris. Nevertheless, I venture the following observations:

to irrigation. If, therefore, for
 taken as a frontier elaborate provisions will have
 the water between the cultivated waters on its two banks
 supposition) are under different administrations. Such a scheme might be
 difficult to devise and yet more difficult to enforce. It would therefore be best, when
 possible, to avoid using rivers as

question of access to Mesopotamia is a more complicated affair. By
 are also, (1) the distance from European markets, (2) the unhealth-

are not likely to modify greatly the second and
 preoccupied with schemes for
 by pipe and railways to a Mediterranean port
 I can learn, the subject as a whole has so far been very important.
 I am not sure that as regards pipe lines, it has been studied at all. A
 is known and has been done with the Bagdad Railway.
 if it were connected with Alexandretta, and the port of Alexandretta
 d and modernized - would provide the natural outlet to the

But, it will be objected, Alexandretta is going to be French, and we know the
 of French methods. how successfully the most "open door" can be built
 closed by the ingenious zeal of local officials.

I do not deny that it is an argument of some substance; and if the sea route is
 tly to protect us from this species of blackmail, we must consider the possibility
 wholly within our own control. On this point I

something in a
 In the free of this criticism is easily
 is felt not in the case of through traffic
 out in such cases as Morocco, where the local officials control the whole machinery
 railway distribution.

and their malpractices, aided by official methods, are
 difficult to check.
 we are quite otherwise when we are dealing with through traffic and with

1957, de 1

On the other hand, a direct line south of Palmyra and wholly in the British Empire would have a longer continuous stretch of desert to cross before reaching the coast, and in Palestine itself the succession of mountain ridges running parallel to the coast render the construction of a transverse railway line difficult and costly.

No. 107

Yours Excuse me,

London September 21, 1919

1. The proposed arrangement is detrimental to the rights of the Arabs and in direct opposition to what they expected from the British and French Governments in

3. The Arabs, at whose expense the agreement had been concluded without their knowledge, can never recognize such an engagement or take any responsibility of effecting what would be detrimental to their rights, and what would be dismemberment of their country for no fault or crime on their part.

Bustievata found in Petrograd Foreign Office record of old conversations and understanding not formal treaty) between Britain France, and Russia vent difficulties between Powers in prosecuting war with

the joint proclamation of Great Britain and France of November 1916 also
Covenant of the League of Nations, of which the ink is not yet dry, and by

responsible to the Commander in chief of the Allied forces

is quo managed until the final decision? I should like to give a reasonable statement who manage the affairs of nations that the

7. The third clause of the attached side-memoirs says

As I have no copies of these engagements and declarations, particularly between

8. Although this agreement is said to be of a temporary nature, I strongly protest what the *ordnance* says with reference to the boundaries and the position of the boundaries, and the fact that Great Britain is prepared to discuss their intentions, is an admission of the intention to discuss with the Arab provinces, and is an unjustified interference to thus determine the future of the country before the final decision by the Peace Conference.

10. Should it be found necessary to withdraw the British forces from Syria, will not withdraw all European troops and leave the responsibility to the Arab Government?

132731

... may be said in defence of this cha
... that this arrangement
... They will not accept any argument or excuse. I cannot understand
... the country has liberated to internal disorder. It would surely be much more advisable
... have the status quo as it is, or withdraw all European troops.
... I have submitted these observations to your Excellency.

132731

... and on Lord Harding
... alluded to Syria
... British officers in the
... towards the French Government in regard to Syria than we
... every complaint which had been shown to have any justification
... not right, but that nevertheless in spite of the
... of calumny had been in the French press, and app
... was making a very
... and His Majesty's Government
... towards France by which we considered ourselves bound, and
... ity not in conflict with our engagements with King Hussein. For
... the disinterestedness of
... not take contro
... such papers as t
... two very in
... justified, and he related certain facts, such as the taking
... trusted by French
... the abomination of all French
... now repairs to be carried out on these lines. Another instan
... actions should at B
... ch had put an end to al
... stated that this had now be
... that this was a
... affirm what he, Lord Harding

... on the spot, and that being the case
... arrangement being practically settled
... British policy in Syria in
... Lord Hardinge's view, this was not the
... in which a campaign of hostile propaganda was being carried

... progress, headed by the French and American Ministers, against the Anglo-I
... ment. Lord Hardinge reminded M. Cambon that on two occasions his Excellency
... had declared to me the complete political disinterestedness of the French Government
... in Persia, and that I had taken note of these declarations. Consequently it was all the
... more astonishing to me that the French Minister should be assuming a hostile attitude
... towards His Majesty's Government in the Persian capital at this moment. Lord
... Hardinge added that he trusted that M. Cambon would bring these facts to the
... of his Government, and that M. Bonin would receive a severe reprimand.
... M. Cambon admitted that my statement, that he had twice de
... disinterestedness of France in Persia was absolutely correct and that th

... was in prospect, and that the absence
... warning to an Aoy had been wounding to their susceptibilities, but th
... believe that there was any serious opposition in the French press to the
... or what he was doing but he would
... activities to the notice of his Government in the hope that a stop
... might immediately be put to them. He added that he had been pro
... Consular Service and was apparently suffering from Morbus consularis
... I am &
... CURZON OF KEDLESTON

133506

No. 109

His Highness Sherif Faisal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.-(Communicated
to Foreign Office)

Your Excellency.
I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency the following additional
to my reply submitted yesterday and dated the 21st September, 1914.
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in Syria arrived in
yesterday to discuss with him the question of carrying out the evacuation of th
country by the British forces. I brought to the notice of his Excellency that I would
decline to discuss the subject and gave my reasons for it.
I beg now to remind your Excellency that when the British General,
at Beirut obliged the Arab troops to evacuate the sea-coast, he wrote
Pasha, the Arab General, that this change was simply of a military and
character until the future of the country was settled at the P
It was the British forces that lowered the Arab flag
honour of the British Army, and the statement of his Excellency
chief in a telegram he sent to me in which he assured me of the nature of the
arrangement, and the fact that it was understood that the wh
remain under the Commander-in-Chief until the final settlement induced
tion of the sea coast by our troops, and the removal of th
on Government buildings and elsewhere by the inhabitants
we thought either the return of the Arab
on the sea coast, in which case I take the
public security and peace until the final decision, or
the status quo until the final settlement
I have &

135233

No. 110

Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.-(Received September 30)

Constantinople, September 11, 1914
I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of an interesting
report from one of the relief officers, Lieutenant Seade, R.N.V.R., who has recently
tour along the south coast of the Black Sea
This report touches on many important points
13526

... completely
... supposed to be maintained by gentlemen with
... profession of brigandage. Favour appears to
... and in the second to Moslem
... treated to the full rig

Christian people
December last the
... whether the Armenians
... the new Armenians
... and for people
... as best they
... at means at the

6. American assistance has done some good, but it must be remembered that this
... machinery at least price
... that even this act
... for has it penetrated far into the interior
... standing village

... is still as vague an expression as ever, and I think it
... possible in the way of containing Armenians in their new country

8. With regard to the Greeks, I think
... of the Armenians. They appear better
... treated by the fact that they merely live in
... profit by the army and state of the Helles
... the occupation of Smyrna, the object of which
... the Armenians

9. The third point
... when the
... of the

and the con-
... exposed

10. It frequently happens that orphaned women and children are as a matter of
... well being, better off in their present condition than if they were by
... or compulsion restored to the care of their communities, for in the way
... their families no longer exist.
... in such cases and especially when orphaned women have borne children to
... husbands and declare themselves contented with their lots, I am driven to the
... I have only as distinct from that of relief

... attentive to the slightest call for assistance or relief.
12. The fourth point is the restoration of property. A few days ago I called
... for the officials in this High Commission was also assisted by their experience
... give an opinion on this question, together with several of the relief officers who
... happened at the moment to be in Constantinople

13. Your Excellency is aware that the action of the relief officers in obtaining
... restitution of Armenian and Greek property is based on a verbal understanding with
... the Turkish Government, who undertook to pass a law which should regularize their
... deeds. Unfortunately this law has not yet been passed.

14. The restitution is effected by the decision of small mixed commissions formed
... locally under the direction of the British and
... Turkish Minister of the Interior who are supposed to be on tour. There are com-
... of one Moslem and one Christian member with a subordinate for each

15. The members of the commissions are appointed by the local authorities from
... among the Moslem and the Christian notables of the locality, and the role of the re-
... officer and his Turkish coadjutor is confined to starting the work and receiving from and
... supervising its progress during their periodical visits.

16. It has been noticeable throughout that the measure of success attained by
... each commission depended directly upon the personality and experience of the relief
... officer. But whereas at first there was quite a ready acquiescence on the part of the

... now even the most competent of the relief
... I attribute this to two causes
... the Turks imagined that they were coming under a British
... reply with the orders of a relief officer, and perhaps
... at the outset they had slight pricks of conscience that they were occupying property
... to which they had no real right, and they believed also that there was some law which
... cancelled the provisions enacted by the infamous "Enayah Metrike," (Abandonment
... Property Law) and which had the full sanction of the Turkish Constitution and
... Parliament. They are now coming to perceive that neither of these are, in fact, the case.
18. The second cause is the movement headed by Mustafa Kemal, which is
... generally known as the "Mela Mustafa Boukoul" (Mullah)

... be stated that it
... of Smyrna and to the subject
... already reported in sufficient fullness on this party
... our action in Anatolia as an interference
... in and thus as an anti-Moslem
... of the methods of a fair settlement
... movement is consequently to be seen in the semi-
... among the unrepentant Moslems of Anatolia, and in
... all our efforts on behalf of suffering Christians

... at the meeting I have referred to in paragraph 12
... I was impudent to press, in present circumstances
... decided, therefore, that henceforth, until the
... inspection should be observed
... that the relief officers should mainly limit themselves to reporting on the facts came to
... their knowledge. Lieutenant Slade's remarks furnish fresh proofs of the wisdom of
... this decision

... my power to hasten the passage of this law, but
... the punishment of Turkish offenders. I have
... months ago, and I can only adhere to the
... men in this country who deserve to be treated with the most extreme penalties
... of the law, but to my everlasting regret, it appears impossible to do this; Tur-
... criminals, those who

deportations, when, as a matter of practical politics, it is possible and desirable to
... punish in their persons. At the same time I feel the keenest sympathy with the
... disgust and indignation of Lieutenant Slade that so infamous a creature as for example
... escape the penalty of his crimes unscathed. But once one departs from the prin-
... I have announced it becomes immediately impossible to draw the line. Un-
... undoubtedly, many are quite as guilty as this brigand, if not
... On the prison I have had the occasion to report
... shall endeavour to obtain some remedy for the state of the
... I be inadequate and purely temporary. No proper investigation is to be
... single mandatory Government is appointed with the full and com-
... approval of the League of Nations and backed by the fullest and most com-

... ty of the ministry in his in-
... Moslem also with an administration beneficent, firm, but, above all, just

I have, Sir,
RICHARD WELCH
Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 110

Lieutenant Slade to Rear-Admiral Welch

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with your instructions, I left
Constantinople on the 10th August in H.M.S. "Gardania" for tour along the south
... of the Black Sea.
1356

very bad east of Guernsey. Nearly a
but an permanent (assess)

1,000,000 per

I found that something will be
population had already

The population

at the time

It
more or with the winter dead and who live in villages

return from exile. To distribute a
100 kil. metres from rail or sea will be im-
lation (Armenians) could
I predicted by

I have at 200 Armenians
either 20 or 100 in Karsaunde, Ordu, etc.
ore, which would, or could, hold near 1,000

if they are

they can supply 100,000 cubic metres of pine per annum
and would make a splendid Armenian camp

in the hope that a better one will be made
is to be populated with Armenians, something will
and coal have are to be

Islamized Women

It is known to be in the vilayet
of Samak and many in the vilayet of Trebizond. This latter vilayet
being in such a bad I think it better to make no attempt to relax
the strict and drastic measures be taken against those who will not surrender
them.

It is quite useless to employ the police or gendarmes as they are naturally in
the line of
they executed and massacred the Armenians on their way to exile.

Education of I

and except in Samakou, where there is a
to clear up a few big cases, but only by losing a great deal of temper

has not been restored east of Urmia, the reason being that the
orders in his telegram of the 21st July P. M. to the Van
property.

I consider that nothing more can be done

Fortitude and Necessity on Traus

Statistics

Turkish Offenders

The lieutenant who drowned the head of small fry
children in Trebizond has
later, murderers, robbers &
justice they

Prisoners

it was until for until

My impression was that it was
worthy. These towns are full of
I cannot to find

I suppose that
an extraordinary quantity of Turks
that many of these officers are
E. zeroun. I personally saw the "Vite" A
and civilians who had to say the

are thirty two which were in Trebizond have gone to Erzerum

I personally saw
it by the Russian
and magazines or cartridges, but this appeared to me to be a "blind",
the Turks have all the

if men were at work on the horses
and nothing can be done in it
until the day

137378

BALFOUR presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and trans-
mits the subject of the

Branch of Wiener

Paris, October 3, 1911

No. 111

Wiener Bankverein an Contrôleur financier international, Constantinople

Messieurs,
Nous avons examiné, avec la plus grande attention, les rapports de
vous informant des mesures prises par le Contrôleur financier international de

le mois de janvier au sujet de Constantinople, et venant par la présente attester votre attention.

Les mesures prises par les Puissances n'ont sur aucune des stipulations de la Convention d'Armenie ne peuvent pas

présence du fait indépendant, ni ordonnance, ni sur le notre succursale ne p...

procéder à la fin définitive

Nous avons l'honneur d'attester l'absence par l'entremise de l'intermédiaire

il nous avec regret qu'il y a de mal

qui pouvait par le fait de la situation de l'armée et que la situation de l'armée est telle que nous ont de la situation de l'armée

continuer le travail de la situation de l'armée de nos intérêts, d'indiquer la situation de l'armée

ce extrêmement sensible que nous ont de la situation de l'armée de nos intérêts, d'indiquer la situation de l'armée

de la situation de l'armée de nos intérêts, d'indiquer la situation de l'armée

de la situation de l'armée de nos intérêts, d'indiquer la situation de l'armée

de la situation de l'armée de nos intérêts, d'indiquer la situation de l'armée

132930

Your Highness

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of the preliminary of which you have been so good as to offer on the aide-memoire presented by Meister to M. Clemenceau and yourself on the subject of the military occupation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, pending the decision of the Peace Conference, regard to immediate copies of which have also been communicated to

As your Highness would appear to be under a misapprehension as to the character of the order, I make it clear that the said order

French and British Governments. It contains proposals put forward by the British

pending a final settlement as to their future by the Peace Conference. These proposals—to which they had worked out by the British Government as soon as they had decided that it was impossible for them to continue the occupation of Syria by British troops. It

Government of the Ottoman Empire at the time you arrived.

I the proposed are in the relief of the way contrary to the

negotiations entered into by His Majesty's Government with your illustrious father, I

Highness Sherif Hussein, King of the Hedjaz. In order that there may be a

between your illustrious father and the Ottoman Empire, which entered the war against Turkey. It

the subject in the possession of His Majesty's Government, which your Highness handed in the French

is only a summary of conditions at one time

King Hussein, but never at

It has then fore no bearing on the question under discussion

From the annexed correspondence it will be apparent to your Highness that His Majesty's Government made it clear from the outset that, in their opinion, "the

districts of Marash and Aleppo and portions of Syria lying to the west of the

districts of Damascus, Hama, Hama, and Aleppo cannot be purely Arab and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries with which they

prepared to recognize the independence of the Arabs, and in which Great Britain

free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally France. The

questions are from a letter dated the 25th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon to his Highness Sherif Hussein. On the 5th November his Highness Sherif Hussein

this letter stating that he renounced his insistence on the inclusion of the

of Mr. McMahon in the Arab kingdom, but declared that the provinces of

the Arab provinces were purely Arab provinces. To this letter

High Commissioner in Cairo replied on the 14th December with a view to exclude the vilayets of Mosul and Aleppo from the

of the Arab territories. He went on, however, to say that

with regard to the provinces of Aleppo and Mosul, the Government of Great Britain have taken careful notice of your observations. The interests of our Ally, France, are involved. The question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you

The necessity for this further communication, however, was obviated by a reply from his Highness Sherif Hussein, dated the 1st January

It stated in part that it was on

I refer to the letter which was the result of the negotiations whose attainment was desired by the will

of the blessed and supreme God. It was this same feeling and desire which impels

Wiener Bankverein
ADLE

to avoid what might possibly injure the Alliance between Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the peace.
I find it our duty that the eminent Minister should
opportunity after this war is finished
from to-day for what we now leave

His Highness went on to express the opinion that:-

"The people of Beirut would decidedly never accept a
they may oblige us to undertake now measures which
certainly not less than our present troubles, because of our belief and uncertainty
in the reciprocity of our interests, which was the only cause that caused us never
into with any other Power but you. Consequently
allow any derogation which gives France or any other Power a span of land in
these regions.

On the 26th of January, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo replied that:-

... as regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire
to avoid anything which might seriously injure the Alliance of Great Britain and
France. It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be
war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the
friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more in and on a
cemented by the blood of English. Frenchmen who had died side by side
fighting for the cause of right.

This was the last communication which passed on this subject before the combined
operations began, which terminated in November 1918 in the total defeat of the
Turkish forces.

From this correspondence two things are clear. First, that the British Government
are bound by their undertakings to King Hussein to recognise the establishment
of an independent Arab State comprising within its borders the
Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, and second, that they made it at
your illustrious father before the entry of the Arabs into the war that it
France as having special rights in the area west of these four towns. His Majesty's
Government would further point out that in 1916 when, for the purposes of the
common campaign, it became necessary to arrive at an agreement with France and
Russia as to the occupation of Turkish territories in the event of the downfall of
Turkey, His Majesty's Government insisted on reserving the independence of the Arabs
in the districts which they had promised to reserve to them in their correspondence
with King Hussein. They did not communicate this agreement to King Hussein
because it was in complete conformity with the undertakings they had already entered
into with him.

The attitude of His Majesty's Government, therefore, throughout these negotiations
has been entirely consistent and clear. They have entered into obligations to both
their Allies, to the French and to the Arabs. These obligations do not conflict but are
complementary to one another. His Majesty's Government attach the greatest
importance to the friendship and co-operation of both their Allies, and it is their
intention to live up to their undertakings to each.

I come now to your Highness's query as to why it is necessary for the British
occupation of Syria to be to an end immediately instead of
at the conclusion of peace with Turkey. The reason is to be found
first put forward by the British Empire in the war in Turkey and

gave gladly and fully the indispensable assistance rendered
by King Hussein and yourself, and by the valiant Arab troops,
our command. The courage and activity of your Highness's troops were an essential
element in the campaign which led to the overthrow of Turkish
Majesty's Government cannot forget that infinitely the largest

the defeat of Turkey was carried by the British. From first to last they sent
to the Eastern theatre of war a total of over 1,000,000 troops, at a cost exceeding
£50,000,000. These burdens were additional to the far greater sacrifices which they
were compelled to make in Europe in order to secure the overthrow of the German
or which lay behind the Turkish Empire. The peoples of the British Empire
lost over 250,000 lives, and they have incurred a debt of £2,000,000,000, in

Europe and of the peoples who formerly
the Arab peoples, and the oppressed nations of Europe, to a new
of the oppressor and to make a start on the highroad to prosperity
independence, and influence in the world.

In addition, however, to its efforts made during the war the British Empire
maintained garrisons throughout the occupied territories for a year from the
signature of the Armistice. It has sustained the onerous and expensive burden of
the Peace Conference would come to a rapid and peaceful solution of the
problems connected with the future of the Middle East. But it is unfair to the British
taxpayer to ask him to bear any longer the burden of occupying the country for which
permanent responsibility. In 1918 and 1919

of the Middle East, no prospect of any final peace being made with Turkey
until well on into next year. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government have
decided that it is impossible for them to maintain their troops any longer in Syria
they have notified the Conference accordingly that they propose to withdraw them
the 1st November, 1919.

In an additional note dated the 25th September, your Highness raised the question
of the conditions upon which the coast towns were evacuated by the Arab forces.
His Majesty's Government is glad to think that your Highness
at once coincided with the orders of the

at your Highness understood that the British occupation was
of peace I can readily understand, since that view was
at that time. His Majesty's Government have pro-
tion far longer than they or anyone else ever contemplated
le, but in view of the overwhelming burden which rests upon them it is
ly within their rights to insist that that occupation must be brought to an end
Peace Conference of their
Government also submitted

the proposal for the interim occupation of the ex-Turkish territories contained in the
aide-memoire. They do not see that any other proposal is practicable for the interim
period. There is no authority of weight who believes that the people of Syria can
at once undertake the administration which you suggest, would

first-class European Power should hold the territory to the south-east of
the ex-Turkish territories as set forth in the aide-memoire. His Majesty's
have scrupulously regarded the obligations they have incurred to both
were made clear to King Hussein before ever he entered the war. They have, not
without difficulty, secured to your Highness the establishment of an independent Arab
State in that part of Syria including Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, promised to
make in the correspondence with King Hussein.

As the occupation by France of the rest of Syria is concerned, they
would ask your Highness to remember that the Arabs owe their freedom in a large
measure to the supreme sacrifices made by the French people in the late war. It is
true that the French contribution in Syria itself was not great, for France was
in those greater and vital
battles of Europe they lost 1,400,000 in dead, and incurred a debt not far short of
that incurred by Great Britain in overthrowing the power which sustained the Turkish
tyranny and without whose support the Turkish military power could not have
continued the war more than a few weeks.

His Majesty's Government therefore earnestly trust that you will agree to the
proposals for the occupation of Syria made in the aide-memoire for the interim period
at the conclusion of peace with Turkey. The considerations you raise as to the
the Syrian and Arab people will properly be urged at the Peace Conference
well, of which you are yourself a distinguished member and which will have complete
power to deal with the whole Arab question, and which will have to take into account

of declarations of the Great

Arab people is to accept the temporary
arrangements for its ex

As previously suggested the

agreement at once with the

only too glad to do all in the

standing between their two A

period. They would, however, I

no policy more fatal to Ar

letter will help to render profitable the further conversations with your Highness to
which I look forward in which I trust a means will be found to
effect a complete re relations between this country and its French
and Arab Allies.

I beg your Highness to believe that the British Government are actuated by the
sympathy with and admiration for the Arab which prompted them to
support his Highness Sharif Hussein in his revolt against the Turks, and which
their relations with your Highness

long been engaged

I have &

CULZON OF REDLESTON

1393261

No 10

His Highness Sherif Ferid to the Prime Minister of Great Britain
to Foreign Office, October 10.)

Your Excellency,

YOU were kind enough to tell me when I saw you at the Guildhall two days

lay in reply to my note of the 21st September 1919, had been due

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

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to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

to me I your answer

139473

Sir M. Chestham to Earl Curzon. - (Received October 10.)

(No. 457)

My Lord,

Ramleh, September 22, 1919

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a report by Major H
Garland, M.B.E. M.C., acting director of the Arab Bureau, dealing with the capture at
Bajil of Lieutenant Colonel H. F. Jacob's mission to the Imam Y.

11

M. C. H. L. A. M.

Enclosure in No. 112*

Note on the Seizure of Colonel Jacob's Mission at Hajj

(Compiled from Reports from Hodeidah and Aden by Arab Bureau.)

IN August last Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob was sent by His Majesty's Government
130 miles by road north-east of the Red Sea port of Hodeidah. The first part of the
route passes through the coastal lowlands known as the Tihama, a region inhabited by
tribes who have always had strong religious and political differences with the Imam
and who, since the departure of the Turkish troops from the Yemen, have remained the

Imam because he has
his patrimony, and that for religious reasons they are inclined to turn for a
am Yahya

The particular tribe through whose territory Colonel Jacob had first to
travel on leaving Hodeidah is the Qubrah, a turbulent and in highway
by the active propaganda of Mahmud Nashur, the ex-Turkish agent of the Yemen
provinces who remained in the employment of the Imam after the evacuation of the

place and, in spite of their hatred of the Imam, the tribesmen appear to have been at
place and, in spite of their hatred of the Imam, the tribesmen appear to have been at

place and, in spite of their hatred of the Imam, the tribesmen appear to have been at

place and, in spite of their hatred of the Imam, the tribesmen appear to have been at

The Qubrah do not appear to have finally sided with the Imam
refused to proceed to Uthai to meet Mohammed Ahmed Mashur, of Hujailah, who
had been to Sanaa to discuss their relations with the Imam and had returned with
the latter's reply. The Qubrah have protested against the collection of taxes
the Imam's agent at Hujailah

The political officer, Hodeidah, further reported that on the 15th August a
conference was held at Bajil (a Qubrah town on the Sanaa route) between Sheikh Al
Imam's lieutenant, who had arrived from Sanaa, and the Qubrah chiefs
conference was presumably convened by Ali Salama in order to arrange for the
passage of the British mission. A temporary settlement of the dispute was said to have

2 H*

A letter from the
 Mahdists to the British
 appears to be the first
 one received from A
 But in fact of half starved people
 and then they will
 at night at once
 Arab force
 other at night
 it was reasonably made by the Abu tribe,
 must have been
 of the Arab tribes in the
 by son of the
 at night of the
 Jacob's name
 and they consider to be the furtherance of the law
 at a hour of the
 the law of the
 24th September from Hajl as before

* Qulrahk Shulak 40-1km strongly object to

Unless this was done, he must return to Syria at once, and the future alone would show the effect of so high-handed a decision.

The Four admitted that there was some truth in this. But insisting that he was not being treated as an Ally and insisted that the discussion of the Paris arrangement must precede that of the final settlement.

The Emir thanked him and said that he too was only too anxious to approach this question in a spirit of friendliness.

I would suggest a meeting, preferably in London, between British and French military representatives and Feisal to discuss the question of the withdrawal and

The meeting of military experts would in a sense be chiefly useful as a step to Fozzal's *amorce propria*, but it would also facilitate the carrying out of the withdrawal in detail and would materially increase the possibility of discussing the final settlement in a spirit of friendliness.

London, October 11, 1919

1401721

No. 1 -

No. 1150.) D

FOLLOWING from Prime Minister for M. Clemenceau

But in two or three days. I would therefore strongly urge you to send General Marshall Lord Alarby are in London, but both are leaving for the West

T. Bourgeois is very anxious that an A. [redacted] representative should be
[redacted] French Ambassador or, if the French Government la-
[redacted] P. [redacted] on this subject.

14113.

Form 9 Officer, October 11, 1919

No 487, at the request of Lord Hardinge of
a letter on the 7th October. Lord Harding
25th August Sir H. Curzon had pointed out
we could not understand the Italian attitude in regard to Egypt nor why the
Government was the only one of the Allied and Associated Powers who had not
renounced the British protectorate over Egypt. Lord Hardinge told the Marquis
that he was a very strong supporter of the British position in Egypt.

King of Italy to assist the British authorities in every way, and that Italy would shortly recognize the protectorate of the British Empire.

pt by Italy should no longer be delayed, in order to be united
n by the Allies as regards the affairs of Egypt. Lord Harland
instructed by me to ask his Excellency why his Government were
which France and the United States had already given, especially
what was the object of the Italian Government in delaying
action of those Italians in Egypt who had given support to the
it, and wondered therefore that the Italian Government do not
ion of recognizing the protectorate and thus show their disapproval

in Excellence that Great Britain and France had by
quitting compensation to Italy in Africa in the event of their
their preponderance in that continent. Lord Hastings wished, however
out to him that Italy was just as much bound to carry

I was very sorry to make good our offer of Jubilee, your money and that of the Italian Government, a momentary delay in recognizing our Egyptian protectorate, we could not be in any hurry to hand over to her as large a share of British

were but analogous. He said that
compensation on our part to great compensation in Africa, but then

to that Lord Hardinge replied that, in view of the fact that the invasion of
 India was not a British protectorate over Egypt
 Powers to recognize the British protectorate over Egypt
 question that the Powers should make this a condition of the peace should
 do what they were doing Germany and Austria to perform. The
 Ambassador admitted that this was a difficult question to meet, and he said that

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

141637]

No. 119

M. Clemenceau to the Earl of Derby.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 13.)

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 14 octobre 1919.

VOUS avez bien voulu me communiquer deux telegrammes de Mr Lloyd George

Conférence sur la Syrie qui se tient aujourd'hui, en présence d'un représentant américain

En fait, le Général Gouraud est à Strasbourg, et ne pourrait intérieurement à Louvain.

Je n'aurais pu, d'ailleurs, l'autoriser à participer à cette réunion. Le Gouvernement français qu'il appartient de négocier avec le Gouvernement anglais, et le Général Gouraud n'aurait pu délibérer que sur les modalités d'exécution de décisions prises par le Gouvernement français relatives à la décision prise le 13 septembre par le Conseil des Alliés de retirer les troupes britanniques par les troupes françaises en Cilicie et Syrie (zone bleue).

Quant à la demande de l'Emir Faysal de voir participer un délégué arabe à ces négociations avec le Gouvernement anglais, je ne lui reconnais aucun droit de participation initiative. Si le Gouvernement anglais exprimait de lui-même une telle intention, je n'y ferais pas opposition. Toutefois, il ne pourrait être question de Syrie ou même dans des réunions officielles de ce genre.

Il appartient de prendre une décision définitive sur la question de la Syrie sur le sort de l'Empire ottoman. Je continue à regretter que l'Emir Faysal ait été appelé par le Gouvernement anglais sans consultation préalable avec le Gouvernement français, car cela a contribué à la situation actuelle.

Je suis,

plus que les forces arables recueillies

par les Anglais de financer les forces arables.

réussite à occuper la Syrie en deux zones impériales.

bon nous. Je comprends fort bien l'indignation.

produits et qui ne peuvent servir que contre nous.

Il n'y a, en réalité, qu'une seule issue du grand pays loyal et allié.

Report de nos accords (dont l'article 1^{er} dit que les deux

zones A et B) et il pourra abandonner sans crainte la responsabilité de la France qui aura bien entendu avec l'Emir arabe et sortir de

C'est sur ces données que je suis prêt à m'entretenir avec l'Emir Faysal à Paris, s'il exprime le désir de me voir et d'arriver à un arrangement.

C. CLEMENCEAU

142982

No. 120

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby

PLEASE inform M. Clemenceau that Emir Faysal accepts the invitation of the French Government to the Peace Conference in Paris and to the future of the East.

142627

Emir Faysal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.—(Received October 18.)

London, October 11, 1919.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 10th inst. and to have also received a communication from the Foreign Office, to which I have already referred.

I have also received a communication from the Foreign Office, to which I have already referred, to submit a formal protest in the name of the Arab people against any change that may be decided to introduce into the present form of government in Syria. As I have already stated, I consider that no change should be allowed before the final decision of the Peace Conference as to the future of the East.

My pi

the coast, and at the

ing their provinces by our troops and forming a province directly on him acting on behalf of the Allies, which will exist until a final decision is given by the Peace Conference. This pledge must not be thrown aside without our knowledge, and for which we are not responsible. If it is absolutely necessary that the British troops should be withdrawn from the coast, it is not the fault of which they reserve the punishment of repudiating. If it is absolutely necessary that the British troops should be withdrawn from the coast, it is not the fault of which they reserve the punishment of repudiating. If it is absolutely necessary that the British troops should be withdrawn from the coast, it is not the fault of which they reserve the punishment of repudiating.

In addition to the engagement referred to in the preceding paragraph, I have drawn all attention to the telegram addressed by the High Commissioner in Damascus to the King at Mecca, which runs as follows:—

and in Petrograd Foreign Office record of all conversations and agreements (not formal treaty) between Britain, France, and Russia in order to prevent difficulties between Powers in prosecuting war with Jamal, either from ignorance or malice, has distorted its original purpose and its stipulations regarding the future of the Arab people and the withdrawal of Russia had for long time past created wholly different relations.

telegram was sent to the King in reply to his protest against the secret treaty between Great Britain and France which Jamal Pasha divulged in Damascus for the first time. It was quoted in my letter to you dated the 21st September, 1919.

The stipulation regarding the consent of the Arab people was confirmed in November 1918 by the formal declaration made jointly by Great Britain and France, whether the occupation is temporary or otherwise.

[1358]

The over-excited feeling now prevailing in the Arab provinces, as well as all Moslem provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, and caused by unwise interference, is no longer a secret. Any person having the slightest knowledge of the situation in the Syrian provinces is undoubtedly convinced that the different quarters, if the status

I therefore beg you, in the name of human Arab nation, in the multitude of interests of Great Britain, world as I have already asked previously, that no new armed for further troubles and to leave the present I beg also that hasty measures be taken to assist the Powers and brethren means to consider the interests of each nation, according to the principles of justice, for the aim of which we are working. If however, the British Government remains unchangeable, after due consideration of this exposed of my race, I shall be glad to accept kind offer for me to meet representatives from Great Britain, America, and France for the problem involved in the impending withdrawal of British troops from Syria. I to give a final decision regarding the same so that those problems may be solved in a way which will keep the peace and safeguard the interests of all, and that this conference may be assembled with the least possible delay.

143008

No. 1

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon — (Received October 19)

No. 1, 1919

(Telegraphic)

PLEASE inform Emir Faisal that M. Clemenceau will be in at 10 o'clock Tuesday, 21st October, at Ministry of War

Paris October 19, 1919
pleased to receive

143923

No. 12

The Honorable Emir Faisal The Prime Minister of Great Britain
October 19, 1919

Your Excellency

Carlton Hotel, London, October 19, 1919

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency that, while I was awaiting the arrival of representatives of the French and United States Governments at the Hotel de Ville, and myself the question of the withdrawal of British troops from Syria until such

have taken a final decision on the Syrian question. I was contacted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Earl Curzon of Kedleston, who informed me that the French Premier wished to see me before any decision was taken. I accepted with greater pleasure in that I am desirous of establishing cordial relations between all the Powers concerned in the Near East and I am proceeding to Paris to-morrow. My endeavour will be to persuade the French Government to maintain the status quo and to agree to the

Excellency. My object is to prevent the withdrawal of the British forces from Syria, on the basis of the 1916 Agreement, which the Syrians have never acknowledged. I will continue to protest. If I succeed I shall be much gratified. I feel I shall communicate with your Excellency with a view to the holding of a conference of representatives of the British and Arab Governments. I believe that American will

Excellency allow me to urge once more that the Syrian question should not be postponed from the Turkish question and be discussed on its own merits. Such a postponement might easily, in my opinion, lead to highly undesirable consequences. President Wilson's illness has assuredly caused us all great regret but

I feel sure that the United States Government, in spite of this unfortunate mischance will approve of my proposal, because the state of affairs in the Near East is such as to render a speedy settlement imperative.

I have a
FEISAL

143567

No. 1

Mr. Kerr to Foreign Office. — (Received October 21.)

ENCLOSE for your information and for purposes of record a copy of the letter which the Prime Minister sent to M. Clemenceau on Saturday

10, Downing Street, Whitehall
October 20, 1919

Enclosure in No. 1

The Prime Minister of Great Britain to M. Clemenceau

October 18, 1919

M. le Président du Conseil.
I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 14th October in reply to my telegram of the preceding day, and also of the memorandum you have submitted in reply to my aide memoir of the 13th September which has just reached me. I must state at the outset that the tone of your telegram took me entirely by surprise. It presents, so far as I can judge, a complete change from the friendly tone you adopted in our discussions on this subject in Paris. I must in particular resent your statement that you —

thoroughly understand the difficulty in which English negotiators find themselves after being driven by political necessities to enter into engagements both with the King of the Hedjaz and with France which, if not in opposition to the one to the other, are at any rate difficult to adjust.

I can hardly conceive of a more offensive imputation made by one Ally to another after five years of comradeship in arms, considering that the engagements were entered into with the King of the Hedjaz with the sole object of making possible the revolt of the Arabs against the Turks at a critical stage of the war. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 was not concluded by the present Government but by its predecessor, and was entered into by Sir Edward Grey, whose scrupulous integrity is known by the whole world. Your statement implies a charge of duplicity against the British Government in its conduct of the war against Germany by the side of the steadfast friend of France during those critical days.

He is the last man against whom a French Prime Minister could make such a charge. It is all the more singular that you should have the fact that, so far from the engagements entered into with the Arabs and the French Government having been broken, the British Government is itself explicitly bound by the terms of the Agreement of 1916 to accord to the Arabs the very rights guaranteed by that Agreement to King Hussein.

French Government appears to be under a complete moral prohibition as to the policy of His Majesty's Government in this matter in connection with the Syrian question. In order that that history may

I append the correspondence in full which passed between the British Government and King Hussein in 1915 and 1916. From this correspondence you will see that, while the authority of the Turks over their whole Empire was still intact, the British Government scrupulously protected the interests of its Ally in Syria. It was only after the Turkish Government had been defeated and the Turkish Empire had been broken down, that the British Government was able to carry out its promise of aid to the Arabs in order to help break down the Turkish wall, which prevented effective communication between the Allies of the West and the Russian armies. The British Government was thus enabled to throw in their lot with the

[1856]

212

... agreement that there should be ...
... of States including the whole Arab pop ...

proposal. They stated, on the 25th October, 1915, that they did not consider that that portion of Syria lying west of Hama and Hama ... Aleppo could be said

of Great Britain have taken careful notice of your observations; but interests of our Ally (France) are involved, the question will require careful consideration, and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.

our previous letter what were the utmost poss ...
only done so as to fulfil those aspirations which ...

our eyes from today for what we now leave to France

... would decidedly never accept ... isolation, and they ...
... new measures which might ...
... than our present troubles, because of our belief and uncertainty ...
... in the reciprocity of our interests, which was ... only cause that caused us never ...
... with any other Power but you ... it is impossible to allow ...
... on which given France or any other ... of land in these

between the British and the Arabs and the British and the French were carried on

... was arrived at at that meeting but at a later meeting on the 21st December ...
... from his Government to ...

... He said, further, that his Government realised the importance of the

boundaries was concluded. These records, a summary of which I handed you before but which I attach for convenience of reference, are purely British records. But that

merely from these records, but still more from the fact that the limits laid down in the

... which was to be an independent Arab State or confederation of Arab States, are identical with those laid down in the

4. I come now to the text of the agreement itself. Article 1 reads as follows:

"France and Great Britain

I observe that, both in your telegram and in your memorandum, you state that ... Anglo-French Agreement France and Great Britain were to protect ("protector") an independent Arab State. This is not correct. The word used in the

letter from M. Caubon to Viscount Grey on the 25th August, in which he says

"Il me semble que
exactement notre position,"

and was agreed to in a reply of Lord Curzon's of the 30th August, 1916. According to the correct text, there are, the French Government and Great Britain to uphold

5. I would further direct your attention to the previous paragraph of Sir ...
... he accepted the ...

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the project as it now stands will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His Majesty's Government recognise the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more favourable internal

You will observe that it

6. The ...

... from the ...

... in the ...

...

It is from wishing to impose on the peoples of these regions this or that institution, they have no other care than to assure, by their support and practical aid, the normal workings of such Governments and administrations as the peoples shall themselves have adopted; to guarantee impartial and even justice for all to facilitate the economic development of the country by arousing and encouraging local initiative, to foster the spread of education, to put an end to those long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the part which the Powers have set themselves to play in liberated territories.

clause relating to the Turkish Empire in the Covenant of the League of Nations reads as follows:—

"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The interests of these communities must be a principal consideration."

7. The only other historical data which I think it necessary to record as affecting the problem under discussion are the understandings arrived at between yourself and myself in December last year in regard to Palestine and Mesopotamia.

Understandings made by the British Government in March of this year in regard to the mandate for Syria. The understanding of last December was that the Government would agree to the inclusion of the Mosul area in Mesopotamia and to relinquishing the idea of an international state in Palestine as they were concerned, would agree to a British mandate over both.

This arrangement, as I understand them, were threefold: (a) that Mosul was geographically and economically part of Mesopotamia; (b) that international

inhabitants of Palestine, whether Arab or Zionist, appeared to favour a British mandate; (c) that in view of the fact that the British Empire had practically

thrown Turkey, and had employed a total of 1,400,000 troops and incurred expenditure of 750 million in a campaign which led to the conquest of Syria. The French Government which, owing to the concentration of its forces, had been unable to participate in the Turkish campaign, and whose army had even opposed its prosecution, was prepared to accept, in the 1916 Agreement, to meet British desires without attaching any conditions thereto.

8. The declaration of Great Britain's disinterestedness in Syria was made by Lord Curzon at a meeting held in March last. Lord Allenby, the Commander-in-Chief in these parts, was present at the meeting and went back to Egypt immediately afterwards to inform his superior. Instructed by the Committee at later dates from Paris and London instructing him to state that circumstances could lead Great Britain to accept the mandate for Syria. Similar statements were made at the time of the Paris meeting and later. To the effect that the British Government was not

It was in the light of these facts, that I undertook to forward the proposals set forth in the note of the 13th September. The British Government had hoped that the Peace Conference would be able to deal quickly with the Turkish problem, and in the earlier half the year they had thought the best road to a peaceful settlement would be the continuance of the military occupation of Syria by British troops, assisted by French and Arab troops, under the command of Lord Allenby until the Turkish peace was made. Under a proposal for substituting French for British troops in West Syria, made partly through disagreement about boundaries, and partly through doubt as to the consequences on local peace and order. Despite their strong opposition to a Franco-Arab understanding it has been brought home to the British Government at every turn that there was a

to the exercise by France of a mandate over that country. The long-standing opposition of the British Government did their best to discourage. The long-standing opposition is clearly indicated in the correspondence with King Hussein in the report of the American Commissioners who have recently traversed the country. Taking evidence, proved that it is still formidable. It has throughout, however, been the policy of the British Government to make it clear that no government should be

arrived at between the French, British, and the Arabs, the three peoples concerned and they did all in their power, as you will remember, to promote that understanding as long as the Emir Faisal was in Paris. Unfortunately, though they had entirely no interests of their own.

In the early autumn, however, of this year it became known that the United States as to whether she would assume a mandate over any part of Turkey would be long delayed, and it became necessary for Great Britain, which had borne almost the whole brunt of the war against Turkey, to make itself responsible for the occupation of Syria. It was essential that she should withdraw her troops and limit her responsibilities. Pressure both of public opinion and of financial necessity left no other course open to the British Government. Accordingly they brought forward their proposals for the replacement of British troops in Syria by French and Arab troops in the following terms:—

Extract from Aide-memoire of the 13th September, 1919

3. In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for various districts in the evacuated area regard will be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves but also as between them and the Arabs.

In pursuance of this policy the garrisons in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia will be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Hama, Hama, and Aleppo, will be replaced by an

The British Government further declared its willingness to accept the arbitration of the President of the United States on the question of the boundaries between Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine. This last, and certain other matters, I agreed at your request to adjourn until the next meeting of the Committee. The proposals for the future of the Turkish territories were referred to the Conference on the 13th September and no objection was made. Those proposals were in all respects in complete accord with the Anglo-French understanding of 1916 as modified by the Prime Ministers in 1918. The future of these territories was agreed to the Arabs the control in the area in the event of a new Arab State both by British engagements and by the 1916 Agreement. Further, in area (A), excluding the zone of the future of these territories, France will alone have the right of supplying advisers at the request of the

France will alone have the right of supplying advisers at the request of the

At the same time I notified you and the other members of the Committee that you did not see the purpose of the proposal, and when he arrived you stated that you had

In reply, you stated that you did not see the purpose of the proposal, and when he arrived you stated that you had

very great difficulties, the British Government put the strongest pressure on the French Government and to come to terms with the British. The objections and now legally the British Government will be responsible which passed between the Emir and the British in the last few weeks, copies of which I append hereto. That the British is not forgetful of France's rights and claims is shown from the

"In so far as the occupation by France of the rest of Syria is concerned they would ask your Highness to remember that the Arabs owe their freedom in a large

15 They must further state that inasmuch as the Emir Feisal is one of the
 Allies they cannot disinterested themselves in the question of whether or not

[1356] Field-Marshal Allenby contradicts categorically the statement which

arisen in the provinces, but they were obviously perturbed by what they heard, and by the increasingly menacing telegrams with which the organisers of the national movement bombarded Constantinople. Their dismay was increased when the rebels seized telegraph offices and cut off communication between the Government here and all important provincial centres, except Eskishehr and Broussa. The Grand Vizier began to urge with ever-growing insistence that the Allies owed it to him either themselves to arrest the growth of the national movement, or in the alternative, to allow the Government to use what small forces it could dispose of to resist the rebels.

5. In the light of the fuller information now available, it is easy to sum up broadly what was really happening in the interior. The Congress at Sivas was a gathering of representatives of the national movement in the Eastern vilayets only, but the Congress at Sivas, which assembled on the 4th September, claimed to represent the whole of Turkey in Europe. It adopted various resolutions, issued various manifestos, assumed the functions of Government in the areas controlled by the "national forces".

6. The Congress declared all Ottoman territory within the boundaries fixed by the Armistice to be one indivisible whole. That territory, it said, was everywhere inhabited by a vast preponderance of Moslems, and all the Moslems in it were brethren. The national forces and the national will would be directed to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman dominions, and to uphold

Greek or Armenian State in Ottoman territory would be tolerated, and while the equal rights of non Moslems would be respected, they would be allowed to enjoy no special privileges. Measures had been taken, it was stated, to uphold the national rights in case the Turkish Government were constrained by outside pressure to cede territory. The *Entente* Powers were called on to abandon any idea of partitioning the territory within the Armistice boundary. Foreign economic aid would be welcomed, so long as there was no encroachment on independence. A speedy peace based on these equitable principles was earnestly desired. The Central Government must rest on the national will and the National Assembly must be elected. A single Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, of which all the declarants' Moslem countrymen were natural members. The association was independent of party. A representative committee of the association would direct the general organisation of the national movement, which had everywhere been unified and strengthened.

7. Such was the main "programme" of the Congress issued on or about the 11th September. In other utterances of one sort or another the Congress or its executive declared that Ferid Pasha's Government was anti-national, unconstitutional and a barrier between the people and the Sultan. It was to get rid of that Government which would in the meanwhile be ignored and have no effect. The safety of the Moslems was guaranteed and that they would be respected and treated as guests so long as they refrained from any action contrary to the national interests. An oath was taken by those present to the effect that they would persevere in the Congress until they had achieved the independence of the country, that they would not work for the revival of the Committee of Union and Progress, and that they would not seek to serve the ends of any political party.

8. Meanwhile the national forces extended their operations westward and southward. It can hardly be doubted that attempts were made to establish some sort of liaison with the anti-Greek movement in the country between the Smyrna area and the Ismid area. These manifold physical activities continued after the Congress definitely declared war on the Central Government. By the end of September latter exercised no effective authority in Asia outside a circle of the circumference of which lay Ada Bazar, Eski-Shehr, Kutahia and, say Panderma.

9. Ferid Pasha's position was more desperate than he would admit. It was perhaps even more desperate than he realised, but he was determined to save the situation if he could. He seized eagerly on a hint given by me, in consultation with the British High Commissioner, General Milne, to the effect that the British Government would be prepared to consider a proposal for a truce with the national forces. In order to prepare the way, he obtained from the Sultan, on the 20th September,

rescript, designed to rebut the suggestion that the Government were concealing from His Majesty the wishes of the people and to impress on the country the need for co-operation in the Government, and for presenting an united front to Europe. I enclosed a translation of this document. It created a certain impression here, and it was not long before the national forces began to appear in the provinces. The representative bodies, including one association of retired military officers, were too late, to rally to the Government.

10. Events moved so rapidly that the Grand Vizier lost all confidence in the idea of a settlement by negotiation alone, and reverted with insistence to the necessity for making some display of force. An attempt to strike at the heart of the national movement by sending a force of 2,000 men to Eski-Shehr to hold the Nationalists in check and at least to prevent

Constantinople from being threatened. The new military scheme was to send a force of 2,000 men to Eski-Shehr to hold the Nationalists in check and at least to prevent Constantinople from being threatened. The new military scheme was to send a force of 2,000 men to Eski-Shehr to hold the Nationalists in check and at least to prevent Constantinople from being threatened.

11. This would have been a purely military operation, it lay principally with Milne to say whether it should be allowed or not. He was at first definitely to it, as he had been opposed to similar proposals made earlier and the Grand Vizier was so informed on the 21st September. A few days later, however, it appeared that the British Government was prepared to give the Government a free hand rather than leave them absolutely at the mercy of the National movement, and it was forward a concrete proposal, it would be considered in consultation with General Milne and the French and Italian High Commissioners. Ferid Pasha's hopes were not entirely raised too high. Further examination of the proposal convinced us we could not countenance the proposal to send troops, and Ferid Pasha was so informed on the 29th September, as reported in my telegram No. 1889.

12. This communication was the *coup de grâce* to Ferid Pasha's Government. There was no improvement in the situation in the interior had already been vigorous opponent in Asia Minor, had been compelled to fly on the 29th September. The allegiance of Broussa had also become more than shaky. A faint hope remained, not any longer of subduing the movement, but of holding it back by a display of force. It was destroyed by the communication made by me on behalf of my colleagues on the 29th September. Ferid Pasha resigned on the 1st October.

On the 3rd October, the military authorities at Broussa surrounded the Government House and delivered to the Vali, whom Ferid Pasha had sent there in five days earlier, an ultimatum ordering him to leave the Government House and to leave Broussa the next day.

13. Thus was effected another of those minor revolutions which have occurred at intervals in Constantinople since 1908. Power has passed from a party which however anxious to save as much as possible of the Empire, saw salvation in submission to, and collaboration with, the *Entente* authorities, to a party whose avowed object is to contest any attempt on the part of the *Entente* to impair the integrity and independence of Turkey, and who in their programme have made it quite clear that their "Turkey" comprises as a minimum all territory not occupied at the time of the Armistice, while leaving it vague in how much more of the old Turkish Empire they hope to uphold the rights of the Caliphate and the Sultanate.

14. The pretensions of the new rulers of Turkey might well have seemed ludicrous nine, or even six, months ago. They are sufficiently reasonable to-day to Turkish minds the hope that the Peace Conference will let Turkey off rather than try to establish a new National movement. There can be no doubt that an army of occupation would now be needed to impose terms which would have been regarded as merciful in the hours of ruin and defection following the Armistice. The hopes of the organisers of the national movement are strengthened by the feeling that there is no real union among the Allies that neither France nor Italy desire to be hard on Turkey, that the British Government have come round to the same point of view, and that the American people, represented by the American journalist named Brown who attended the Sivas Congress and acclaimed its ideals, represent the judgment of the American people.

16. It must not be assumed that the party now in power will necessarily take up an aggressive attitude towards the Allies in Constantinople itself. In defining the character of the new Cabinet in my telegram No. 1908, I have probably if anything over-emphasised its nationalist complexion. The new Grand Vizier is regarded by some as being to-day more of a palace *persona grata* than anything else. Resad Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is a person of the greatest flexibility. The Minister of the Interior is rather a dark horse. He is a brother-in-law of Heir Apparent, whose chauvinist sentiments are well known, but he was formerly a League of Kiamil Pasha, and he has the name of being sober and rather conservative. The Minister of Finance has been retained, and will doubtless impress on his colleagues that the only possible financial policy is to try to cajole the *Katants* Powers into making advances or a loan. In these circumstances, it seems probable that the Cabinet will do its best to keep the *Katants* sweet.

17. On the other hand, the Government will certainly remain in power only so long as in internal affairs and in the main tendency of their foreign policy they dance to the piping of the authors of the national movement. The Minister of War, though he has a clean record as a soldier, has been in that movement from the start. From the 4th October onward the press has been allowed to advertise and glorify the Boy adorn the local Turkish papers. It is confidentially anticipated that they will be restored to their military ranks. It is also announced in the Nationalist papers that the movement until he was removed from his post, and the officers of the same kidney will also be reinstated.

18. Numerous changes in the civil administration are to be expected, and it can hardly be hoped that the same readiness to comply with the wishes of the Allied authorities will be shown in the future as in the past. It will have to be very carefully considered, in the light of the events of the next couple of weeks, how far the policy hitherto followed by this High Commission of practically dictating the removal of undesirable officials and advising the Government in a more limited number of cases as to appointments can be adhered to without challenging issues which His Majesty's Government might be unwilling to see through.

19. It is impossible not to regret that the brewing of these, the most considerable events which have happened in Constantinople during the Armistice, should have coincided with a period during which His Majesty's Government have presented the appearance of wishing to disinterest themselves in the affairs of the non-Arab parts of the pre-war Turkish Empire. The recent withdrawal of the British force from the Samsoun area, however easily explained to ourselves, appears in native eyes in the light of the surrender of a British position under the menace of

they are sufficiently important on the little local stage to impress the various native elements, all unanimous in imagining that every act of His Majesty's Government contributes to some deep unvarying central purpose.

20. The native Christians are much alarmed by the course of events. They are in the Mustafa Kemal movement a regeneration of the spirit which triumphed in 1908 under the motto "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice," only to the Adana massacres of the year 1909, and which again triumphing in January 1913, worked steadily up to the "boycott," deportations, and massacres of the 1914 to 1916. They had hoped that the Allies, and more particularly Great Britain, were determined that the Turkish element would be deprived for ever of the power to work their will on the non Moslem population. The more sober and less timorous admit the indisputable fact that for the moment the Nationalist movement has

out with unerring logic that they are left at the mercy of a party who stand for the perpetuation of the conditions in which all their previous miseries arose. Armenians may be safe to-day between Samsoun and Erzeroum, but they are safe by the good will and pleasure of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his associates.

21. The disillusionment of the Christians is the greater because of the brave show which His Majesty's Government especially has made since last November of to-day, they are filled with apprehension not only for the near future, but for the by the Nationalist movement and anxious to avoid further trouble with it, will, at all that the Allies, and especially Great Britain, have done for the Christians in the

last ten months will only expose them to the greater wrath of their rulers in the time to come.

22. Those Moslem elements which really disapprove of the policy which brought Turkey into the war against the Entente, are also puzzled and depressed by the attitude of the Allies. They had never been able to get it out of their heads that the war was fought on our side, not against the Turkish people but against the Committee of Union and Progress a view for which I believe they find some authority in the utterances of at least one *Katant* statesman. They refuse (and in this they are at one with the Christians), to regard the organisers of the national movement as anything but a new manifestation of the Committee. It completely baffles them to see that we have not at all the same attitude towards them as they have towards us. They are checked every proposed move of the Central Government to combat them. These phenomena are again easy to explain to our own satisfaction, but our arguments carry no conviction with Orientals.

23. Great Britain has played the leading rôle in the war against Turkey, and Great Britain is still the cynosure of all eyes in this country. It is instructive to consider how our attitude is viewed, not by Christians and well-affected Moslems, but by the *Katants*. They are better in touch with the situation as a whole than any other element.

24. These people cannot conceive of a British lion too simple to mistrust them, too indifferent to care what they do, too economical to fight. They are conscious that they see us preparing to disinterest ourselves in Cilicia and Syria. To the west, they see a more hopeful situation in the Smyrna area, for the occupation of which they still hold Great Britain responsible. To the north-west, they see British forces motionless before their own advance, and British officers ready to enter into negotiations with them.

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with the present anomalous position with whatever Turkish Government might be in power, that the constitution of the Government was a matter of complete indifference to me, but that there were two points which we shall insist on, and those were the observance of the terms of the armistice and the maintenance of public order; the latter especially applied to the Christian populations, but also to the absence of political strife or the employment in political affairs of methods of violence.

1. His Excellency assured me that I need feel no uneasiness on these points, as the new Government were fully alive to the importance of them. He said that the situation presented by the indefinite prolongation of the armistice posed extraordinary difficulties in the

the Allies, but above all to Great Britain, for assistance and advice. He said that above all, the financial situation was most critical. I informed him of the steps which had been taken by the ex-Grand Vizier in this matter, and that I and my colleagues were still awaiting the reply of our Governments to the telegrams which we had sent setting forth the facts of the situation.

5. I enquired what was the position of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who, from being a rebel appeared now, according to the press, to be one of the pillars of the present Government. His Excellency replied that the Pasha could hardly be described in these terms, but that his feelings of patriotism had driven him into open opposition to the last Government, which he had believed not to be acting in the best interests of the country, especially over the matter of the occupation of Smyrna. I replied that I

could hardly imagine that any human being could do more than had been done by Ferid Pasha. Reshid Pasha said that the whole of the present difficulties sprang from the Smyrna incident. The great duration of the armistice would have mattered but little had it not been for that untoward occurrence. He did not think that his Government would have any serious trouble in arranging matters with Mustafa Kemal.

6. In this connection, however, I hear from independent sources that the relations between Mustafa Kemal and the new Government are still a matter of negotiation.

I have, &c.

For High Commissioner,
RICHARD WEBB.

[144381]

No. 128.

Vice Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. (Received October 22 (No. 1885)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 10, 1919

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the summary telegram sent by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the Government here, which was given to me by the French High Commissioner.

2. There is every reason to believe that it is authentic, and it is of considerable interest, as showing the lines which Mustafa Kemal intends to follow. He is still a great lion of an egoist and though he states, with a certain amount of hesitancy, that he has nothing to do with the Committee of Union and Progress, yet it is probable that many members of the Committee have enrolled themselves in his party and, if events are allowed to pursue their present course, I believe it will not be long before the one will be indistinguishable from the other.

vengeance upon his political enemies and, as I have reported in my telegram No. 1 of the 10th October, I arranged with my colleagues that when we returned the day after tomorrow to Constantinople, we should inform the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, that the Allies would view with entire disfavour any attempt upon the liberty of the late Government or the employment of any methods of violence.

kind, but when I observed that I could expect no other answer from a man of education, yet could he give me that answer in the name of the Government as a whole, he was very much less positive, and said that if anything of this kind were done he himself would at once retire.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, we should inform him that the Allies would view with entire disfavour any attempt upon the liberty of the late Government or the employment of any methods of violence.

Interior, have requested authorisation to leave the country, and, in concert with my colleagues, I am arranging to accord them facilities.

Mr. L. de Robeck saw a copy of the telegram which I sent you, and in this copy he noticed a reference to the withdrawal of the British troops from Samsoun. Damad Ferid had not been able, Mustafa Kemal said, to prevent these troops from landing on Turkish soil, while he, by his competent agents, had succeeded in preventing them from doing so.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),

RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Summary of Telegram

REUNION immédiate de la Chambre

Avant que la Chambre ne soit réunie, ne prendre aucun engagement concernant le sort de l'Empire et de la nation turque vis-à-vis de n'importe qui.

Envoyer à la Conférence des hommes capables de comprendre la volonté de la nation et de défendre les droits et les intérêts nationaux.

Cela est l'essentiel.

Nous avons d'autres demandes accessoires, par exemple:

Prendre dès maintenant toutes mesures pour que Damad Ferid Pasha, d'origine turque, soit réintégré dans la Chambre, devant la Haute-Cour.

Les Gouverneurs généraux de Karpouth, de Konia, le Gouverneur de Malatya et le Directeur général des Postes doivent être immédiatement traduits devant la cour martiale.

Les fonctionnaires civils et militaires, qui ont été destitués ou emprisonnés à cause du mouvement national, doivent être libérés et réintégrés dans leur poste, de même les chefs du peuple qui ont été incarcérés doivent être relâchés.

Les Gouverneurs généraux de Castamouni, d'Angora et de Trébizonde, qui ont été destitués à cause du mouvement national, doivent être réintégrés et exclus à tout jamais des fonctions publiques.

Les étrangers nous sont complètement acquis. Nous sommes en mesure de maintenir les amitiés avec les Français et avec les Anglais.

Attendez votre réponse.

14437

No. 129

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 1286.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 22, 1919.

IN the course of my conversation with the French Ambassador last week he mentioned, in tones of pure regret, a very insulting message which M. de Fauriol, after an interview of an entirely different character, had been instructed to leave in the hands of the French Ambassador.

Our refusal. This note I had declined to receive, and it had been returned to M. de Fauriol. The Ambassador, however, expressed no surprise at its rejection; but he informed me incidentally that it had the distinction of having been composed by M. Clemenceau himself.

This afforded me an opportunity of entering at some length into the successive notes of a sort which have been exchanged between the French and the Turkish Governments during the last six months, culminating in the recent exchange of high notes.

The Ambassador, speaking from the standpoint of the old diplomacy, deeply deplored that these matters should be taken out of the hands of the respective Foreign Offices and that language should be employed which did not strictly conform to the old traditions. He greatly disliked this form of fusillade, which, he thought, excited tempers and rendered settlement difficult.

[1336]

2 L 2

1771-1772
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[144898]

No. 180.

Karl Carson to Mr. Kennard.

(No. 658.)
SIR,

DIE.

The Italian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and raised points.

He was very much concerned at the opposition of Sir Eyre Crowe, in the Supreme Council in Paris, to the proposal to include Italian troops amongst those occupying the Asian district, and advised the Government to send a mission to Italy to discuss the matter. He sent with him a French representative, and the mission returned, finding that the wishes of the other Allied representatives were in favour of the proposal.

the Greeks on the other. The Greek troops had been invited to Smyrna with knowledge and by the act of the Supreme Council. I myself thought that this the greatest mistake that had been made in Paris, and that it was the starting of most of the troubles which had since ensued. But, whether the step was right or wrong, the Greek troops had appeared upon the scene with sanction from

241

Powers and they could justify their presence by that authority. On the other hand
 the Indians by the descent upon the Santa Anna and other places with mil-
 lions of men and the loss of the forts and the capture of the people and
 the taking of the property. It was a great misfortune that our representa-
 tives could not meet in Congress and as a consequence the war which of
 late years has not only

The Ambassador had written to the Admiralty to the effect that the policy of British Sea Forces was to be directed against the German High Seas Fleet, and that the British Navy was to be directed against the German High Seas Fleet. The Ambassador had also written to the Admiralty to the effect that the British Navy was to be directed against the German High Seas Fleet, and that the British Navy was to be directed against the German High Seas Fleet.

express any opinion.

The next letter to the Advertiser was with regard to the proposed water supply to the local area, mainly to the Smeeth (and other) waterworks.

So, $\text{cod } \psi \cap \psi^{-1}(\text{ker } \psi) = \psi^{-1}(\text{ker } \psi)$ and ψ is surjective. \square

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[illegible]

the weathering of the soil. The weathering of the soil is a process which is controlled by the rate of the weathering of the soil. The weathering of the soil is a process which is controlled by the rate of the weathering of the soil.

Pass 1 - I would like to see if a second or even male take up the position at an early date to handle Sugar Lake with first any of heavy in coming here

He answered in the negative, and seemed thoroughly to realize the importance of an early solution.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

144817 No 13

[illegible]

July to despatch to Smyrna a Commission, which was to investigate the

5) $\{ \dots \}$ — множество элементов, принадлежащих множеству $\{ \dots \}$.

[illegible]

... ..

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation

[illegible]

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action of the Commission of Inquiry in question, as also the instructions given to it.

In spite of the fact that the resolution under date of the 21st July of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference only satisfied in a very limited degree the wishes of the Greek army, M. Venizelos, who was the first to insist upon the institution of such a commission, desiring, above all others, that an impartial enquiry should completely elucidate the occurrences in Asia Minor since the landing of the Greek forces, accordingly designated Colonel Alexander Mazarakis, of the Greek General Staff, for the purpose of participating in the work of the Commission of Inquiry on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Council.

The commission was constituted at Constantinople in the month of April, with at the presence of the Greek delegate, and set to work there. Later on it decided that the presence of the Greek delegate at the examination of witnesses should not be allowed, on the ground that the presence of the latter might have an influence on certain of the witnesses.

This decision, diametrically opposed to the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, constituted a violation of its decisions, under which only the work of the commission could be effectuated, and it was the cause of a protest on the part of M. Venizelos to the President of the Peace Conference under date of the 22nd April (Annexe E).

Since that occasion, M. Venizelos has repeatedly solicited, without success, a decision of the Supreme Council of the Conference in respect of the unfair procedure followed by the Commission of Inquiry in disallowing the presence of the Greek delegate at the examination of witnesses, and, in general, at the work of the commission, from which he ought not to be excluded except when the conclusions were to be drawn up, at the end of its work.

This violation of the decisions of the Supreme Council was the cause of a protest addressed by M. Venizelos to the President of the Peace Conference under date of the 14th September, and as the result of which the latter forwarded copies of the evidence given by the various witnesses, M. Venizelos, through a letter of protest addressed to the President of the Peace Conference, asked that a proposal should be laid before the Supreme Council for a new inquiry to be effected with the assistance of the Greek delegate.

At the moment when the Commission of Inquiry is concluding its work the Greek Government can only formulate a solemn protest against the procedure followed by the Commission of Inquiry in entirely unjustified. It is both contrary to the decisions of the Council of the Peace Conference and to the principles of justice to refuse to consider a representative of that party to disallow it. This procedure applied even to the Greek army would be considered unfair. It is something more than that applied to an Allied army.

The Greek Government cannot admit the results of an inquiry conducted in such a manner. They feel sure that the Allied and Associated Governments represented in the Commission will not fail to consider as null and void the outcome of such a commission and to order a new inquiry conducted in accordance with the general principle of equity and in conformity with the resolutions of the Supreme Council under date of the 21st July, which, as a matter of fact, only conceded to the Greek Government the minimum of rights, securing themselves against a one-sided investigation.

Only the invalidation of such an investigation could restore things to their normal position, and, with a view to the repetition of this inquiry, under guarantees and safeguards, will secure to the Greek Government the full exercise of their rights, at least as were recognised by the Supreme Council.

5, Knightsbridge, London, S.W. 1,
October 16, 1919

Annexe (A).

M. Venizelos to M. Clemenceau.

Paris, le 19 juillet 1919.

M. le Président,
Le Conseil suprême de la Conférence a décidé, dans sa séance d'hier, l'établissement d'une commission chargée de faire une enquête sur les faits qui se sont passés depuis deux mois en Asie Mineure.

Cette commission sera composée de quatre représentants des principales Puissances alliées et associées.

Je prie votre Excellence de me permettre de lui exposer les raisons pour lesquelles il me paraît, à mon sens, si juste et conforme aux usages jusqu'ici suivis dans des cas de ce genre, que la partie de l'enquête ayant trait à la conduite de l'armée d'occupation pût se poursuivre sans la participation d'un représentant de la Turquie.

Une enquête impartiale, qui se sont déroulées dans ces dernières semaines en Asie Mineure, en espérant que, si certains excès regrettables pouvaient être commis, ils seraient punis d'une manière exemplaire, ne peut être menée à bien que si la partie de l'enquête ayant trait à la conduite de l'armée d'occupation pût se poursuivre sans la participation d'un représentant de la Turquie.

La Turquie, qui a été représentée dans l'enquête, ne peut être représentée dans l'enquête, car elle n'a pas le droit de participer à l'enquête. Elle n'a pas le droit de participer à l'enquête, car elle n'a pas le droit de participer à l'enquête.

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La Turquie, qui a été représentée dans l'enquête, ne peut être représentée dans l'enquête, car elle n'a pas le droit de participer à l'enquête. Elle n'a pas le droit de participer à l'enquête, car elle n'a pas le droit de participer à l'enquête.

Annexe (B)

Résolution du 21 juillet 1919

Il est décidé de faire connaître à M. Venizelos qu'il est libre de désigner un officier qui sera autorisé à suivre les travaux de la Commission d'enquête en Asie Mineure. Cet officier n'aura pas droit de vote dans la commission et ne pourra pas prendre part à la rédaction de ses conclusions.

(Annexe C)

Résolution du 22 juillet 1919

La Commission internationale d'Enquête en Asie Mineure sera composée comme suit :

Empire britannique	Un officier général à désigner par le Général Milne
France	Un officier général à désigner par le Général Duhaut
Italie	Un officier général à désigner par le Général Duhaut
Etats-Unis d'Amérique	Un officier ne pourra être désigné qu'après réception de la réponse de Washington.

Il est décidé que cette commission devra commencer sans délai ses travaux ; elle se réunira aussi rapidement que possible à Constantinople.

Annexe (D).

Résolution du 25 juillet 1919.

IL est décidé d'accepter le texte suivant des directives destinées à la Commission d'Enquête interalliée se rendant en Asie Mineure.

L'enquête sera conduite par la Commission d'Enquête interalliée, sous la présidence de M. le Président, et suivra l'occupation par les troupes grecques des régions de Smyrne, de la région de la mer Égée, et des régions qui ont été rapportées notamment dans la lettre de Cheik-ul-Islam, adressée à la Conférence.

L'enquête devra porter sur tous faits se rapportant à ces événements depuis la date de l'occupation jusqu'à ce jour.

La commission définira les responsabilités et soumettra, le plus rapidement possible, son rapport au Conseil suprême des Puissances alliées et associées avec les conclusions qu'elle croira devoir formuler.

Annex (E).

M. Venizelos to M. Clemenceau.

Paris, le 22 août 1919.

M. le Président,
DANS sa séance du 18 juillet, le Conseil suprême de la Conférence a décidé de constituer une Commission d'Enquête de quatre membres représentant les Puissances alliées et associées.

Aussitôt informé de cette décision, je m'empressai d'exposer à votre Excellence, par lettre du 19 juillet, les raisons pour lesquelles il ne me paraissait ni juste ni conforme que la partie de l'enquête ayant trait à la conduite de l'armée grecque ne fût poursuivie sans la participation d'un représentant de la Grèce.

Le lendemain, 21 juillet, le Conseil suprême me faisait connaître de désigner un officier grec qui serait autorisé à suivre les travaux de l'enquête, sans qu'il eût, toutefois, ni droit de vote ni la faculté de prendre part à la rédaction de la conclusion de la commission.

Bien que cette mesure ne donnât que très partiellement satisfaction au légitime amour-propre de l'armée hellénique, je l'acceptai, n'ayant pas l'habitude de créer des difficultés aux grandes Puissances. Je décidai, en conséquence, de désigner, pour suivre les travaux de la Commission d'Enquête, le Colonel d'État-Major, M. Alexandre Mavrocordato, et, par lettre du 31 juillet, je portai cette décision à la connaissance du Secrétaire général de la Conférence, en le priant de bien vouloir la porter aux

à Constantinople la semaine dernière et y convoquer de certains témoins. Le représentant de la Grèce s'empressa de demander que le Colonel Mavrocordato fût désigné pour suivre les travaux de la Commission d'Enquête à Constantinople pour suivre ses travaux. La Commission, toutefois, qu'il était préférable de ne pas faire assister de délégués grecs aux interrogatoires, car sa présence pourrait intimider certains témoins. On se bornait à lui communiquer après coup les dépositions et à le tenir au courant des travaux de la commission.

C'était déjà donner l'interprétation la plus restrictive à la résolution du Conseil suprême en date du 27 juillet et diminuer encore le rôle assigné au délégué hellène qui, privé du droit de vote, ne voyait, en outre, enlever la faculté d'assister au moins aux travaux de la commission.

Malheureusement, une nouvelle diminution l'attendait. Le représentant du Gouvernement hellénique à Constantinople vient en effet de l'informer que la Commission d'Enquête lui a fait savoir mercredi dernier, 20 août, qu'à la suite des nouvelles instructions reçues de Paris, un officier turc sera admis au même titre que l'officier grec et avec exactement les mêmes privilèges à suivre ses travaux.

Je ne puis, M. le Président, que vous exprimer la très vive surprise que j'ai ressentie à l'annonce de ces nouvelles mesures et faire appel à votre sentiment de justice pour en obtenir le redressement.

Placer l'officier grec sur un pied d'égalité avec un officier turc dans une enquête se poursuivant en pays occupé par l'armée hellénique, ce n'est pas seulement indiger à cette armée une injuste humiliation et oublier qu'elle s'y trouve comme mandataire des Puissances alliées et associées, c'est perdre de vue l'état de guerre existant encore entre

la Grèce et la Turquie ; c'est méconnaître les services rendus par la Grèce à la cause commune, les torts graves de la Turquie à l'égard de l'Entente et ses crimes contre les populations chrétiennes, c'est, enfin, supprimer toute distinction entre vainqueurs et vaincus.

Je dois, en outre, M. le Président, insister sur la nécessité de modifier la mesure adoptée par la commission de procéder à l'audition de témoins en l'absence de l'officier grec. L'enquête déjà commencée à Constantinople et qui va se poursuivre à Smyrne, n'a été que réclamée tout d'abord, mais vainement, par le Gouvernement hellénique, n'a été que par le Conseil suprême qu'à la suite d'une plainte adressée à la Conférence par le Cheik-ul-Islam. Il a plu au Conseil suprême, en y faisant droit, de placer l'armée grecque d'occupation en posture d'accusée. L'officier grec admis à suivre les travaux de la commission apparaît, dès lors, comme son légitime défenseur. Il est inconcevable qu'il ne soit pas autorisé à assister aux interrogatoires des témoins. La commission craint que sa présence n'intimide certains témoins. Je demande ce qu'on penserait du juge qui, dans un procès, écarterait le procureur ou le défenseur. Dans les pays civilisés, loin d'écarter le défenseur de l'instruction, les lois en imposent la présence comme une garantie essentielle pour l'accusé, car elle lui permet de contrôler les dires des témoins, de leur poser des questions complémentaires, de leur présenter ses objections, de leur poser de nouvelles questions, de contribuer à la vérité et à prévenir les erreurs auxquelles le juge instructeur pourrait être induit.

Vous ne trouvez pas exagéré, M. le Président, que je réclame l'application de ce droit ? Les lois de la justice sont les mêmes partout. Le Conseil suprême, reconnaissant l'absolue justice de cette demande, s'empressera d'y faire droit.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

VENIZELON

144535

No. 132

Mr Kerr to Mr. Kidston. (Received October 23.)

Mr. Kidston.

10, Downing Street, October 21, 1919.

I ENCLOSE copies of messages which passed between the Prime Minister and M. Clemenceau, preceding the Prime Minister's aide-memoire of the 13th September.

P. H. KERR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 132

Message from Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau

[It looks to me as if the question of mandates for Turkey would take longer to settle than we had anticipated, in view of the delay in American decision. The British Government, however, cannot any longer undertake to maintain an army of over 40,000 men to garrison the Turkish Empire. This involves the question of what will happen in the parts of the Turkish Empire we withdraw from. When the Syrian question is discussed, the British Government wish to lay certain proposals before the Supreme Council in regard to it. With this object, I propose to come to Paris on Friday next to discuss this and the Armenian question and could see you at any time on Saturday or Sunday, but I shall have to leave on Tuesday in order to keep an appointment in London on Wednesday. As the British and French Governments are pledged to the Emir Feisal that he shall be present when the settlement of the Syrian question is reached, I have taken the responsibility of inviting him to Paris. As he may not be able to reach Paris before next Tuesday, I hope that you will see no objection to his paying me a visit in London.]

September 11, 1919

[1336]

I AGREE with you that the settlement of the mandates in Turkey by the Allied and Associated Powers must be delayed until the American Government is in a position to acquaint us with its views on this subject. We have decided to wait until the Conference examines in its entirety and with full knowledge the settlement of the Eastern question.

The general difficulties which can result from the final settlement of the Ottoman questions, and, as regards the maintenance of order, from the retreat of the British troops from the territories of the Turkish Empire, are assuredly within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council. It is not possible to isolate the question of Syria from the other questions connected with the final liquidation of the Ottoman Empire, and to submit it to the Supreme Council independently from those connected with Cilicia, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia. The Supreme Council is only actually informed (and that by the Americans themselves) that imminent danger threatens the Armenians in addition to the fact of the retreat of the English troops from the Caucasus and the Turkish nationalist movement in Asia Minor. The American, British, and Italian Delegations have declared that they are not in a position to send troops to protect the Armenians. The French Government has, therefore, offered to send 12,000 men as from the 10th September through Cilicia to effect this purpose. The reply to our proposal awaits the British opinion. Mr. Balfour, who told me that he had consulted you and who is favourable to the proposal, has told me, that you also had

London and could not come to Paris to settle this question, and further asked me to send him an officer. I accordingly sent Colonel Fagilde, our second military attaché, to London. The question of the Syrian question only concerns the French and British Governments, because of their agreements in 1916, and ought to be settled directly between them without any intermediary. This question, which is a purely military question, does not prejudice the final settlement of the Syrian question, which will be determined at the same time as the general settlement of the Near East question. In these circumstances, the understanding between ourselves, would not appear to have

[146031]

No. 153.

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 27

(No. 674. (Part 2).)
(Telegraphical.) R.

Rome, October 26, 1919.

N. assuring his Excellency of your desire to maintain most cordial relations with Italian Government I said that I should personally always endeavour to smooth over any difficulties or misunderstandings that might arise between us. I would not, however, conceal from his Excellency fact that certain acts of Italian Government such as despatch of Italian troops to Adaha, had created bad impression in London. His Excellency at once admitted that this had been a mistake which he would never have committed had he been in Baron Sonnino's place. There was, I continued, no matter on which I would venture to give him word of friendly advice, namely, not to mix up question of Italy's recognition of our protectorate of Egypt with other questions in which Italy was interested in Africa. Apart from unfavourable interpretation which might be [group undecypherable] placed on such a procedure, Italy as signatory of Treaty of Versailles could not avoid recognition which that treaty had imposed on Germany. Signor Tittoni begged me to assure you that he proposed to attach any conditions to his recognition of our protectorate. There were certain questions touching status of Italian subjects in Egypt to which he would like to call attention, though not, he repeated, as conditions.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, on whom I called yesterday evening, went on to deplore the change which has come over Anglo-Italian relations of late, and remark

British Ambassador had ever on his arrival in Italy been faced with such a difficult situation as the present. One reason, he added, that had made Italian people so ready to forget the past was that she had done Italy was now treated with less sympathy and consideration than States who had no claim on our gratitude. She was apparently forgotten or not remembered. I reminded him of explanation which, as Signor [Name] Italian Ambassador about this omission, but it failed to satisfy him. I then did Sir E. Crowe's explanation about non-participation of troops in [Name] district.

(Repeated to Peace Conference.)

[142428]

No. 134.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Foreign Office, October 27, 1919.

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to refer to the communication which M. de Fleur au was good enough to make to me on the 2th ultimo, relative to the four lighthouses situated in the Red Sea, and to the question of their being handed over to the Administration of the Société des Phares de l'Empire ottoman.

As your Excellency is doubtless aware, the lighthouse at Mocha is not under the control of His Majesty's Government. The request made by M. de Fleury is assumed to be a war measure, and have to be controlled throughout the period of the war.

on remained inoperative for reasons which it will be unnecessary to enter into, but on the renewal of the general lighthouse concession in 1894, an exception was made in the case of the Red Sea lighthouse, and although various proposals were put forward by the Administration in 1897 for the construction of the lighthouse, nothing was

own account of the lights at Mocha, Abou Ail, Jebel Zubeir, and Jebel Tor.
It is to be observed that the convention concluded between the
Government and the Turkish Ministry of Marine, dated the 8th May, 189

- (a.) That the whole cost of the installations was to be borne by the Ottoman Government.
- (b.) That the administration is not responsible for any damage caused to the lighthouse and that all expenditure incurred for repairs, &c., had to be defrayed by the Ottoman Government.
- (c.) That the Convention excluded the Lighthouse Administration from any participation in the dues which may be levied on shipping making use of these lights, and states that the total sum of such dues shall be handed over to the Turkish Government.

It would thus appear that whatever may have been the rights which accrued to the Ottoman Government in the Red Sea lighthouses, these rights were not made by the subsequent arrangements made by the Turkish Government, and that the only interest of the Administration consisted in the provision of a staff to work the light.

In view of all these facts, His Majesty's Government cannot regard these lighthouses as other than the undoubted property of the Turkish Government, and it is in a

[1256]

circumstances they are of the opinion that the question of the ultimate disposal of the four lighthouses is one which will have to be settled by the terms of the Treaty of Peace to be concluded with Turkey.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[148620]

No. 135.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 29)

(No. 1610.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 18, 1919

WITH further reference to my letter No. 1643 dated the 7th September, on the subject of Turkish Prisons, I have the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship copies of the following documents:—

- (1) Report by the Inter-Allied Prisons Commission, dated the 20th September.
- (2) Note presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Military Attaches of France, Great Britain, and Italy, on the 27th September
- (3) Reports by the Inter-Allied Prisons Commission dated the 11th October and the 7th October

2. I am glad to be able to report that the appointment and activities of the Commission have been of great assistance in the conditions of the Turkish prisons in Constantinople. The members of this Commission frequently visit the various prisons, make recommendations as to improvements in accommodation and administration, and, by constantly keeping the prison authorities up to the mark ensure that effect is given to their recommendations.

3. Two new prisons are in course of construction, and, owing to Allied representation, the completion of these is now being hurried on by the Turkish Government. One should be ready very shortly, and the second should be sufficiently constructed in two months' time to be able to accommodate the majority of prisoners at present housed in unsuitable buildings. These buildings, when completed, will enable prisoners under sentence or detention to be housed or guarded under conditions approximating in a reasonable degree to that obtaining in more civilised countries.

4. The Turkish Director General of Prisons and the Prison Governors have on the whole accepted the appointment of the Commission in a good spirit, and have shown themselves willing to act on the advice of the Commission and to do their best to effect improvements.

5. Lieutenant A. J. Wilson, whom I have nominated as British Delegate, has been of the greatest possible assistance. He is, in particular well qualified for this mission, having had considerable experience in the Cyprus Military Police, and being acquainted with the local languages, and his zeal and energy have been commendable.

6. I would point out to your Lordship that the absolute lack of funds at the disposal of the Turkish Government, which has formed the subject of several reports by me (see my despatch No. 1775 of the 20th September), is a most serious handicap to the carrying out of improvements on a permanent and systematic scale. Moreover it is quite certain that, should the Prisons Commission cease its activities, conditions would immediately become as unsatisfactory as they were before its appointment.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner).

RICHARD WEBB

Enclosure 1 in No. 135

Report by the Inter-Allied Prison Commission.

(Translation)

Messieurs,

VOUS avons l'honneur de vous informer que nous avons visité les prisons ci-dessous mentionnées. Nous vous soumettons le rapport général suivant:

1. Prisons de Sultan Ahmed.—Stamboul.

2. Prisonniers.—Ces prisons contiennent au 10 septembre 174 prisonniers, dont 12 femmes, 37 juifs et 135 musulmans. Il n'y a pas moins de 58 prisonniers

hommes condamnés pour meurtre, et la rigueur des sentences varie entre la détention perpétuelle et neuf mois d'incarcération.

3. Personnel.—Cette section de la prison est gardée, à l'intérieur, par 27 gardiens civils, 45 50 gendarmes sont répartis à l'extérieur, comme sentinelles aux entrées et aux postes d'observations. La paye mensuelle de ces gardiens est de 400 à 500 piastres plus les rations de guerre avec la ration des prisonniers. Évidemment ce salaire est tout fait insuffisant et que ni ordre ni discipline ne peuvent être maintenus, à moins que les salaires ne soient considérablement augmentés, et que, de plus, le personnel soit, autant que possible, changé, car nous sommes convaincus que les gardiens actuels peuvent être facilement corrompus.

Avant que le mal ne soit déraciné on ne peut escompter de progrès réels.

L'officier attaché à la prison et des gardiens eux-mêmes déclarent naïvement qu'ils ont peur des prisonniers et que ces derniers ont la haute main et font ce qu'ils veulent.

4. Logement et Sécurité.—Le logement de la section prison des hommes consiste en une série de cellules, les cellules sont petites, les portes sont en fer et les cellules sont séparées par des murs en briques. Les cellules sont très étroites et les portes sont en fer.

Pour le moment, les doritoirs renferment un grand nombre de prisonniers et les cellules sont très étroites. Si ces treize chambres cubiques étaient transformées en cellules, elles pourraient contenir chacune quatre à six prisonniers qui seraient là en lieu sûr et ainsi les détenus les plus dangereux pourraient être isolés et les gardiens exercer leur autorité. Ces mesures réduiraient les chances d'évasions. Nous recommandons que les cellules soient plus grandes et que les portes soient en fer et que les prisonniers qui y seront les plus dangereux soient choisis parmi ceux ayant encouru des peines légères et qui sont bien notés.

5. La section prison des femmes semble bien entretenue et propre, comparée aux autres parties de la prison.

6. Il y a une section où sont confinés trente-sept jeunes détenus dans un quartier où l'espace manque, et où, autant que nous avons pu le remarquer, la discipline fait défaut.

7. La section où se trouve les prisonniers en prévention est entièrement inhabitable, à presque tous les points de vue.

(a) Les logements en très mauvais état sont très malsains.

(b) Il apparaît que la sécurité laisse à désirer, la prison étant contiguë à des maisons privées, et avec la surveillance actuelle, qui est presque nulle, rien n'empêche un prisonnier de s'enfuir et il semble que tout prisonnier décelé peut s'évader pour peu qu'il le veuille.

Nous recommandons le transfert à la Prison générale des condamnés de tous ceux des détenus en prévention qui peinent à supporter les conditions de la prison ci-dessus mentionnées au paragraphe 4.

Il y a 114 prévenus dont

2	en prévention depuis 7 à 8 mois pour meurtre	
2	" " " " " " " "	(1 est un chrétien)
2	" " " " " " " "	
11	" " " " " " " "	
1	" " " " " " " "	
11	" " " " " " " "	
28	" " " " " " " "	
14	" " " " " " " "	moins d'un mois.

Nous recommandons l'application des mesures préconisées au paragraphe 11 ci-dessus.

8. Hygiène.—L'état sanitaire des prisons est vraiment déplorable, les fosses et les latrines devront être comblées et de nouvelles latrines construites dans les cours des prisons.

En conséquence, les latrines sont toutes situées à l'intérieur des bâtiments, qui manquent d'air, et la puanteur qui s'en dégage se répand dans les prisons. Comme mesure immédiate, nous insistons pour la fourniture aux prisons d'un désinfectant et d'une abondante quantité d'eau s'il n'est pas possible d'en avoir plus. Rapport No. 1, 19 du 13 courant.

2. Galata-Sérai

9 Nous visitâmes la prison le 11 septembre 1919 et y trouvâmes quarante-dix détenus en prévention. La prison est antihygiénique à tous les points de vue, et notre seule recommandation est qu'elle soit immédiatement fermée et que les fosses d'aisances soient comblées dans l'intérêt des voisins, dont la santé est en danger par suite de la saleté de la prison.

En particulier, la Commission demande que les femmes, actuellement détenues à Galata-Sérai, soient transportées d'urgence à Sultan-Ahmed.

10. Aucun effort sérieux n'est fait pour juger ces détenus, et il y en a qui ont été incarcérés sans jugement depuis le 15 mai 1919. Il y a :

12	prisonniers arrêtés depuis 3 à 7 mois
10	" " " 2 à 3 mois
15	" " " 1 à 2 mois
22	" " " 2 semaines à 1 mois
5	" " " 1 semaine à 2 semaines
6	" " " 2 jours à 1 semaine

11 Nous portons à votre attention le cas de Nicargimoglon Nishan, arménien de Constantinople, et de sa femme, qui furent arrêtés le 23 mai 1919, accusés d'un vol de literie. Ils sont en prévention depuis quatre mois, sans avoir été appelés au tribunal.

12 Il est intéressant de noter que durant le mois d'août sur 33 prisonniers arrêtés en août pour diverses inculpations, détenus seulement quelques jours, puis jugés, douze furent acquittés. On en peut déduire que le tribunal ne fait pas comparaître les détenus par ordre de date d'arrestation qu'un prévenu sans jugement pendant quatre mois est détenu injustement et selon toute probabilité des soupçons, sans preuves évidentes, sont la cause de la détention prolongée, jugement, d'un homme puni ainsi injustement.

Nous pensons que cette difficulté peut être facilement écartée en recommandant que la détention d'un prévenu n'exécute pas une semaine en durée. A la fin de première semaine de détention le prévenu (homme ou femme) devrait comparaître devant le juge pour une première déposition. Un délai d'une semaine pourrait être accordé à la partie adverse pour la production de nouvelles charges, et l'arrestation au juge de décider si le prévenu doit être remis en prison ou sous caution.

3. Prison de Scutari

Nous visitâmes cette prison le 18 septembre 1919, et y trouvâmes neuf prévenus. La prison se compose de deux chambres excessivement malpropres et nous vous soumettons qu'il est impossible de rien faire pour assainir la prison qu'il faut la fermer. Il y a :

23	prévenus détenus depuis 3 à 4 mois
4	" " " 2 à 3 mois
3	" " " 1 à 2 mois
17	" " " moins d'un mois

14 Nouvelle Prison civile.—La nouvelle prison à Sultan Ahmed sera une belle bâtisse et à tous les points de vue propre à servir de prison. Elle est en construction depuis bientôt trois années, et d'après les travaux en cours elle ne sera pas achevée avant une année. Nous recommandons l'augmentation de la main d'œuvre qu'au moins une partie de la prison puisse être utilisée pour la détention des prévenus de Sultan-Ahmed et de Galata-Sérai qui devront être transférés plus tard.

15. Une autre nouvelle prison est en construction à Scutari et sera une belle bâtisse. Elle est presque achevée, à l'exception d'une aile renfermant une mosquée et les bains. Nous recommandons instamment qu'elle soit immédiatement et que les prisonniers de Scutari y soient transférés. Il semble rien n'empêche d'en retarder l'occupation plus de quelques jours.

En résumé, la Commission des Prisons présente les propositions suivantes :

1. La Prison de Scutari doit être fermée et les prisonniers transférés à Sultan-Ahmed.

2. Aménagement.

- Fermer par des grilles les treize cellules dont il est question au § 4—Logement et Sécurité.
- Placer dans ces cellules les condamnés et prévenus dangereux.
- Les autres condamnés et prévenus seront répartis dans la Prison centrale et au besoin à Galata-Sérai et Scutari.
- Nous demandons qu'aucun détenu âgé de plus de 16 ans ne soit joint aux enfants et que, de plus, les jeunes détenus soient répartis dans les chambres suivant leur âge.

3. Régime.—Les heures de promenade et les visites devront être réglementées.

4. Gardiens des cellules.—Il y a actuellement 10 gardiens des cellules et 10 gardiens des cellules. Ils devraient être payés et traités comme les autres employés de la prison.

5. Travail des Prisonniers.—Il serait désirable que les prisonniers, actuellement oisifs, soient occupés sur un travail selon leurs aptitudes.

MONTAZAU
A. J. WILSON
T. RAINONDI

Le 20 septembre 1919

Enclosure 2 in No. 135.

1. The Prison Commission, Scutari, has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter, by the Military Attachés of France, Great Britain, and Italy, September 27, 1919.

2. La construction de la nouvelle prison à Scutari doit être achevée instamment. Le travail nécessaire est une affaire d'une semaine au plus, et on donne les ordres pour le hâter.

Aussitôt que cette prison est en état d'être utilisée, autant que possible des détenus les plus dangereux y seront transférés.

3. Les constructions de la prison de Scutari doivent être achevées avant une année. Plus d'énergie doit être employée pour les achever.

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5. Les constructions de la prison de Scutari doivent être achevées avant une année. Plus d'énergie doit être employée pour les achever.

6. Les constructions de la prison de Scutari doivent être achevées avant une année. Plus d'énergie doit être employée pour les achever.

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10. Les constructions de la prison de Scutari doivent être achevées avant une année. Plus d'énergie doit être employée pour les achever.

7. Son Excellence le Ministre est prié de donner à qui de droit les ordres nécessaires pour donner suite aux recommandations de MM. les attachés militaires dans l'appendice ci-jointe.

8. Il est nécessaire de nommer douze nouveaux gardiens pour la prison de Sultan Ahmed, qui seront chargés de la surveillance générale et la garde des prisonniers les plus dangereux. Ces nouveaux gardiens recevront en guise de traitement douze livres par mois, ils seront nourris par l'Etat et porteront des armes.

Il serait à désirer que le Directeur général de la Police fût prié de choisir ces nouveaux gardiens parmi les recrues qui fréquentent actuellement l'Ecole de la Police.

Notes

1. Minister of Interior promises this would be done in a fortnight
2. Work will be pushed forward so as to get one part ready first
3. Prisons Commission will go into this question with Director General of Prisons.
4. Orders given.
5. Agreed
6. Reprimand this time. Next time he will be dismissed.
7. Minister of Interior promised to do this.
8. New warders have now been appointed. Wages amount to about Lit. 94 inclusive per month. Agreed to give them a trial

(Id.) I. M. S.

September 26, 1919

APPENDICE

MM. les attachés militaires ont fait savoir au Ministre que les prisonniers détenus, dont les noms, etc., sont indiqués plus bas, soient mis en liberté à moins que leurs procès ne soient pas terminés et les jugements rendus jusqu'au 7 octobre au plus tard.

La Commission interalliée des Prisons sera chargée de surveiller l'exécution, par les autorités compétentes, des ordres donnés par son Excellence le Ministre.

Dans les Prisons de la Cour martiale

1. *Yannaki* Arrêté le 2 juillet, étant en possession d'un revolver militaire. Transféré, le 10 août, à la prison de la Cour martiale. Aucune décision.
2. *Yannaki* Arrêté le 2 juillet, étant en possession d'un revolver, qu'il a braqué sur un individu. Transféré à la prison de la Cour martiale le 10 juillet. Rien n'a été fait pour le juger.
3. *Yannaki* Arrêté le 2 juillet, étant en possession d'un revolver, qu'il a braqué sur un individu. Transféré à la prison de la Cour martiale le 10 juillet. Rien n'a été fait pour le juger.
4. *Caralambo Marko Nikolaraki* Arrêté à Constantinople le 13 juillet, "ayant prononcé des paroles injurieuses à l'égard de la police." Aucun procès.
5. *Yanni Gregoire Constantinides* Arrêté à Constantinople le 24 juillet, "pour avoir insulté la police." Pas de procès.
6. *Yorghis Yonanon* Arrêté le 12 juillet à Constantinople, "s'étant servi des propos injurieux à l'égard de la police." Aucun jugement.
7. *Antoine Constantinides* Arrêté le 12 juillet à Constantinople, "pour s'être servi des propos injurieux à l'égard de la police." Pas de procès.
8. *Dimitri Oghlou Costi* Arrêté le 10 août, "pour avoir insulté la police et braqué un revolver." Aucun procès.
9. *Ohannos Veleli Artin* Arrêté le 7 août, "pour avoir braqué un revolver." Aucun procès.
10. *Triantafillo Oghlou Yanni* Arrêté le 7 août, "pour avoir braqué un revolver." Aucun procès.
11. *Yanni Oghlou Yorghis* Arrêté le 12 juillet, "s'étant servi des propos injurieux à l'égard de la police." Aucun procès.
12. *Spiro Oghlou Evaghelli* Arrêté le 24 août, "pour avoir facilité des communications." Pas de procès.
13. *Mirargis Oghlou Mishan* et sa femme (dans la prison de Galata Sera). Arrêté le 21 mai, "accusés d'un vol de literie." Pas encore appelés au tribunal.

Enclosure 3 in No 135.

Report by the Inter-Allied Prisons Commission.

(Traduction.)

Messieurs,

Constantinople, le 11 octobre 1919.

Nous avons l'honneur de vous informer que nous avons régulièrement visité les prisons de Constantinople la semaine dernière jusqu'au 11 octobre, et nous vous soumettons le rapport suivant.

2. *Prison de Sultan-Ahmed.*—La prison est tenue plus proprement et le mudir paraît faire son possible pour améliorer les conditions d'entretien. Nous avons de nouveau à nous plaindre des latrines, qui sont dans un état antihygiénique quoique un ordre ait été donné au Directeur général des Prisons à ce sujet, recommandant d'ordonner le nettoyage, la désinfection et l'usage des cabinets situés dans la cour, et de réserver à un usage nocturne ceux de l'intérieur, qui devront également être nettoyés et désinfectés. Il promet de faire exécuter nos recommandations.

Un essai est maintenant tenté de faire travailler les prisonniers, et un certain nombre d'entre eux sont employés à des réparations dans la prison. Le Gouvernement nous a promis d'occuper immédiatement quelques prisonniers à des travaux de taille d'ici trois semaines tous les détenus devant recevoir une tâche. Considérant le fait qu'un mois auparavant aucun prisonnier ne travaillait, la situation actuelle marque un grand progrès, quoique, sans doute, il y ait encore de la marge pour le progrès.

4. Les gardiens ont reçu un ceinturon qui les distingue des détenus. Nous sommes informés que prochainement ils auront un uniforme convenable.

5. La construction de la nouvelle prison derrière le Palais de Justice avance favorablement.

6. *Prison de Galata-Sera.*—Cette prison antihygiénique est à peu près dans les mêmes conditions, quoique le directeur fasse de son mieux pour les améliorer. Quelques prisonniers ont été transférés à Sultan-Ahmed.

7. *Prison de Scutari.*—La nouvelle prison sera prête pour l'occupation dans quelques jours et la prison actuelle sera fermée.

A. MONTAZAU

A. J. WILSON (Lieutenant)

RAIMONDI

Report by the Inter-Allied Prisons Commission respecting the Prison central (Sultan-Ahmed)

1.—Prison des Detenus condamnés

(a) *Discipline.*—Étant donnée la disposition des locaux et les gardiens actuels, la discipline est difficile à obtenir—aussi laisse-t-elle encore à désirer. Cependant, il y a une tendance à l'amélioration, ne serait-ce que dans la tenue des détenus, qui autrefois ne se distinguaient guère des prisonniers.

Il serait désirable que, conformément au règlement, les détenus les plus dangereux leur soient enlevés et qu'il leur soit remis un uniforme.

(b) *Hygiène.*—Le régime de la distribution de l'eau a été fortement amélioré. La prison est alimentée pendant à peu près toute la journée.

Il existe sur la prison une installation pour la distribution, faute d'une quantité suffisante d'eau. Il serait indispensable que cette installation soit en mesure de fonctionner un ou deux jours par semaine, et les détenus astreints à y aller.

Une autre question extrêmement importante est la désinfection des latrines, les employés se trouvent à l'intérieur des bâtiments occupés.

Si leur transfert à l'extérieur n'est pas décidé, il est indispensable de fournir en quantité suffisante un désinfectant qui devra y être chaque jour.

(c) *Travaux.*—Quelques travaux ont été réalisés dans cette partie de la prison (en particulier des écoulements d'eaux ont été réalisés).

[1956]

2.—Prison des Detenus en Prevention.

(a.) *Discipline*.—Elle semble encore plus relâchée que dans la prison des détenus condamnés. Cela tient d'ailleurs en grande partie aux locaux extrêmement défectueux servant de logement aux prisonniers.

Les préparatifs d'une tentative d'évasion (amorce de tunnel) avaient été découverts la veille de la visite, mais il semble que les gardiens n'ont été pour rien dans cette découverte. Les travaux auraient été indiqués par un autre détenu.

Le service de surveillance souffrait, cependant, être exécuté de façon car il est effectué par treize gardiens. Le service de jour est assuré par la même et celui de nuit (pendant huit heures) par quatre gardiens.

(c.) *Travaux*.—L'aménagement d'une nouvelle salle située à proximité des bagnes actuellement en cours. L'occupation d'un local, à l'intérieur du bâtiment, et améliorera les conditions d'hygiène actuellement déplorable.

3.—Prison des Femmes

Rien à signaler pour la discipline et la propreté.

La situation des quatre prisonnières de l'Union, qui ont été envoyées d'urgence avait été demandée, n'étaient pas encore arrivées à Sultan-Ahmed.
(Signé) MONTAZAU
RAIMONDI

[146626]

No. 135.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Karl Curzon — (Received October 29.)

No. 1915)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 16, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th October relative to recent developments in the general situation in this country, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of an intelligence report from Konia which has been communicated to me by General Headquarters, Army of the Black Sea, and which illustrates the situation in the interior in the eve of the fall of Ferid Pasha's Government.

2. I enclose also a cutting from the "Sтамбул" newspaper of the 6th October which gives a fairly accurate account of the development of the movement in the interior.

communications which have passed between Moustapha Kemal Pasha and Constantinople. It will be observed that the Sultan was induced to send a message of satisfaction to his loyal subjects in the provinces.

3. The present position may be described as one of unstable equilibrium between the Nationalists and the Government. The Nationalists have shown no intention of winding up the provisional quasi Government in Anatolia, but appear rather to intend to maintain it in being as a control on the Central Government.

the other hand, they appear to be making no demands on the latter, as the late Government should be impeached and meanwhile kept under surveillance.

4. The Government have published a new electoral decree, the object of which is to expedite the completion of the elections. It is hoped that it will enable the Government to convene Parliament by the middle of the year.

5. The executive created by the Nationalists is a purely military organization, and is not intended to be a permanent one. It is hoped that it will be able to maintain law and order in the interior.

6. The movement which might otherwise suffer the reproach of being the creation of swarming buckling adventurers.

7. Ahmed Rustem Bey, is a well-known renegade of Polish extraction, who has crowned a disreputable career by becoming a Turkish Ambassador in Washington, having to quit that post at the request of the United States Government.

8. Reouf Pasha, is Vali of Sivas. He was appointed to that post by the Committee of Union and Progress, as he resigned the post of Vali of Kastamonu during

the war, rather than carry out the deportation of Armenians, and had since remained without employment. Ever since his arrival at Sivas, however, he has shown great compliance to the Chauvinist element.

9. Reouf Bey, is a well known naval officer. He was Minister of Marine in Izzet Pasha's Cabinet (October–November 1919), and was the foremost of the delegates who signed the Armistice. He is reported an ardent supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress.

I have, &c.
(For the High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 136.

Control Officer, Konia, to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

Konia, September 25, 1919.

LE MOUVEMENT ASIATIQUE ET SES REPERCUSSIONS.
RAREMENT on vit départ de ministre déclancher revirement pareil à celui déterminé par la retraite de Damad Ferid Pacha. Sans aller cependant jusqu'à

1. The Government authorities have been entirely cut off from communication with the Central Government for over a week.

grows closer daily—and by remaining at his post the Vali could not prevent the

His presence here would incite his supporters to resistance, and the not result

Vali's resignation and departure it is hoped that this projected resistance and that when the Nationalists occupy Konia they will do so in an orderly manner. I may be avoided, and the instructions contained in paragraph (E) of the 23rd September, 1919, will have been complied with.

I beg to submit that the above was the only sane advice I could give the Vali, not in his personal interest, but also for the general welfare of the Konia population.

We made arrangements with the local railway authorities to facilitate the Vali's journey. As there is a possibility of the Nationalists endeavouring to capture or kill him on the journey, one of the railway stations en route from Konia to Eski Shehir, at my suggestion

in Konia he has striven energetically to maintain law and order, and abide by the instructions received from his Government. He has made a considerable effort to content the Christian population. In his dealings with me I have not found he has

The Nationalists may now be expected to take possession of the city within the next day or two.

In view of the above, I trust that my action has your approval. CONTROL OFFICER, Konia.

Enclosure 2 in No. 136.

Extract from the "Sтамбул" of October 6, 1919.

LE MOUVEMENT ASIATIQUE ET SES REPERCUSSIONS.

RAREMENT on vit départ de ministre déclancher revirement pareil à celui déterminé par la retraite de Damad Ferid Pacha. Sans aller cependant jusqu'à

l'effet de quelque baguette magique, on ne peut s'empêcher de reconnaître l'étendue du changement survenu du jour au lendemain. Peut-être va-t-on un peu trop vite et trop loin sous ce rapport, mais il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'une détente s'est produite. En sorte que l'on est porté à penser que la seule présence de Ferid Pacha constituait l'unique obstacle à un compromis entre la capitale et l'Anatolie.

L'entente entre le pouvoir central et le chef du mouvement anatolien vise maintenant par tous. Est-elle réalisée? Hier matin, le "Yak" encastré de motifs fleuris, l'annonçait formellement, spécifiant qu'elle avait été obtenue à la suite d'un échange de communications télégraphiques entre le Cabinet et les chefs du mouvement anatolien. Il y avait la garantie de l'intégrité et on félicitait les deux parties.

Cependant, l'"Akcham" ayant été demandé confirmation de la chose au Ministre de l'Intérieur, on a reçu la réponse suivante :

Je prie les journaux de ne pas publier de communications prématurées avant que le Gouvernement ait exposé ses vues. Nous viendrons à une amélioration et j'en suis convaincu; mais il faudra que vous patient quelques jours. Nous expliquerons ce que nous nous proposons de faire par la déclaration que nous allons publier.

Ce journal croit savoir, de son côté, que le Cabinet a décidé de ne pas chasser du mouvement de la teneur de sa déclaration. Il perçoit son assentiment. Cela fait, le désaccord se trouverait dissipé de lui-même. Une brève comme gagnée, dès lors, la cause de l'intégrité nationale plaidera en sa faveur.

A Constantinople

aux journaux
une façon de

entendu les journaux
le mouvement n'aurait rien d'insurrectionnel, bien que
promesse de s'y faufiler dans l'espoir de pêcher en eau trouble
par lesdits promoteurs serait la libération de Smyrne, la guérison de la rumeur
vilayets orientaux de l'Asie Mineure, bref l'intégrité territoriale.

Il voit deux indices permettant d'affirmer que le mouvement n'est pas unioniste
(1) le fait que Bekir Sami Bey, un adversaire de l'Union et Progrès, a présidé l'un des
deux congrès tenus par les délégués - celui de Sivas; (2) le serment exigé des affiliés
qui doivent s'engager à ne servir la cause d'aucun parti, et surtout de l'Union et Progrès, mais à sacrifier leur sang et leur
atteinte de l'ennemi.

En même temps, les journaux des provinces, retenus jusqu'ici par la poste, ont
en Asie Mineure au cours de ces derniers mois.

Les précautions prises à cet égard par l'ancien chef du Gouvernement au
connaté jusqu'à ne pas présenter à Sa Majesté les dépêches télégraphiques parvenues
d'Anatolie et jusqu'à lui dissimuler sous de fausses couleurs la nature du mouve-

Ce qu'apprenant, le sénéchal maréchal Fouad Pacha se serait p
cours de suite au palais impérial et aurait été reçu par le Sultan, à qu
par les congrès et

connaissance des proclamations,
est ainsi que le souverain aurait été mis au courant de la situation.

de recevoir, avant-hier l'ex-Ministre de l'Intérieur Adil Bey et l'ancien Cheikh ul-
Sahri Effendi.

En Asie Mineure

Par les documents rendus publics, on sait qu'il a été tenu deux congrès
régler la marche du mouvement en Asie Mineure: un premier, partiel, qui se tint
Erzeroum, et décida d'en convoquer un général à Sivas, pour le 10 juillet.

Le second congrès, tenu tard sous la présidence de l'ancien Vali
M. K.

Parmi les résolutions prises à ce co
sunt les vilayets d'Erzeroum, Sivas, M.

Trébizonde et le sud-est de l'Asie Mineure.
ces ne peuvent sous aucun prétexte être séparées l'une de l'autre. Les
habitants de ces régions professent vis-à-vis l'une de l'autre des

on ou intervention dans ces régions devant être considérée comme
se procédera à sa défense. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement, sous une pression

consentirait à céder ses provinces, un Gouvernement provisoire sera institué
Midi et la région sera administrée en conformité des lois présentes.

Le Congrès de Sivas, à son tour, a pris en septembre les résolutions suivantes
rendues publiques par manifeste. Les sept premières sont identiques aux principes
admis par le Congrès d'Erzeroum.

Les autres portent en résumé qu'à cette époque historique fut proclamé le principe
nations doivent elles-mêmes décider de leur sort. Il est obligatoire pour le
prendre sans retard les dispositions requises pour assurer la convocation, le plus tôt
possible, du Parlement.

Le congrès a décidé aussi que l'organisation nationale formée par la fusion des
droits de l'Anatolie et de la Roumélie. Un comité d'administration

Moustafa Kémal Pacha a lancé de Sivas une circulaire qui peut être résumée ainsi :

" Dans une dépêche, datée du 13 septembre, adressée au vali de Trébizonde Ghaleb
Damat Ferid Pacha disant que des groupes de bolchevistes, abordant au littoral
ont été arrêtés par les autorités locales.

Il est à noter que ces bolchevistes ont été arrêtés par les autorités locales et non par les troupes ottomanes.

Il est par ces manœuvres, cherché à incriminer la nation devant
le. Ce fut met en évidence qu'un certain nombre de personnes, ay
conscience à l'intérêt étranger, cherchent à étouffer la voix de la nation.

Alors que toute la nation exprime sa méfiance à l'égard du Gouvernement, celui-ci
il de parole et l'empêche de s'adresser à son Souverain.

La nation de sécurité, cherche à provoquer des dissensions entre les citoyens d'une même
nation. Par conséquent, l'"Association de la défense des droits de l'Anatolie et de la
Roumélie" saisit cette occasion pour déclarer encore une fois que personne ne veut
monstrer un tel Gouvernement et désire qu'un nouveau Ministère composé de
personnes honnêtes soit constitué.

Dans une adresse au Sultan des commandants des 15^e, 20^e, 3^e et 13^e corps d'armée
déclarent en substance qu'alors que la nation et l'armée, toutes les deux s'élèvent au
se sont réunies dans le but d'assurer le salut de la patrie et du trône
Gouvernement de trahisons vendus à l'ennemi prépare des complots de
une guerre civile a enlevé toute confiance dans le Gouvernement.

Le Congrès est indemne de toute influence politique, et
également indemne de tout sentiment politique, appuie les patriotes
et est d'assurer le salut de la patrie et du trône.

terminé en demandant la formation d'un nouveau Cabinet reclame
enquête au sujet des trahisons et déclare que l'armée ne pourra
la nation, qui a décidé de suspendre toute communication avec la capitale
formation du nouveau Cabinet.

Konia

La ville de Konia a participé au Tschiklati-Millié le soir du 26 septembre écoulé.
Le commandant Chakir Bey commandant intérimaire du corps d'armée de Konia, les notables,
les clercs et les négociants se sont réunis au kiosk pour élire un Vali intérimaire. Le

religieux Vehbi Effendi a été désigné. Tous les assistants ont signé le procès-verbal de cette élection.

Puis ont été désignés les membres des délégations chargées d'annoncer la participation de Konja au Teshkil-Millié, aux missions de l'Entente et au commandant des forces nationales à Yeni-Cheh.

Correspondances avec Kemal Pacha

Le Damad Chérif Pacha, Ministre de l'Intérieur, aurait longuement correspon-

Declarations du Prince-heritier

Le "Sabah" publie ce matin, en résumé, les opinions émises par le Prince-heritier pour le retour d'un état de choses normal.

"En examinant la question—à dit son Altesse—on comprend aisément que l'Union a été amenée d'abord par l'incapacité du Cabinet à gouverner le pays dans ce moment délicat et anormal par les raisons suivantes :

"Depuis la conclusion de l'armistice, une administration saine donnant confiance à la population de la capitale et des provinces n'a pas été instaurée.

Non seulement le Gouvernement n'a pris aucune disposition pour rassurer la nation au sujet de Smyrne, Andrinople et des provinces orientales, menacées à ce moment, mais le Ministère de l'Intérieur a qualifié le brigandage ("Tehé-yagmadçilik") les efforts déployés par la nation en vue de défendre les intérêts de la patrie. Ces faits ont mécontenté la nation."

D'autre part, la déclaration du Grand-Vézir relativement à l'octroi aux Arméniens des provinces orientales d'une large autonomie, a produit une pénible impression dans les régions, on l'en a cru que la patrie allait être cédée à d'autres.

Ainsi, ont-elles fini par perdre tout espoir dans le Gouvernement, et la nation dû chercher elle-même les moyens d'assurer le salut de la patrie.

1. Le Souverain et Calife, qui est le point d'appui de la nation et du Gouvernement, doit, sans inclination pour un parti quelconque, chercher à assurer l'équilibre de l'opinion publique et des courants nationaux.

2. Dans un moment si critique aucun Gouvernement ne devant assumer la responsabilité, il y a lieu de procéder immédiatement aux élections afin de consulter la nation.

3. Formation d'un Cabinet de concentration avec la concours d'hommes d'expérience.

4. La publication d'une amnistie générale.

L'Amnistie générale

L'amnistie générale, dont il est question depuis deux jours, ne concernerait que les organisateurs et participants du mouvement national.

L'Entente libérale

Au nom de toute la nation, nous osons déposer aux pieds de votre auguste Majesté nos sentiments de gratitude et de respect pour avoir daigné ordonner la destitution de l'ex-Cabinet, qui n'a pas reculé d'étouffer la voix nationale qui s'élevait de partout pour monter jusqu'à votre Majesté, trompant ainsi jusqu'à la fin son Souverain et la nation. La parole et le firman est à votre glorieuse Majesté.

Le secret est gardé. Il aurait été décidé de ne rien divulguer.

Il a présenté au Grand-Vézir le manifeste du parti

Les Communications télégraphiques.

Contrairement à ce qui a été annoncé, les communications télégraphiques avec les provinces n'ont pas été reprises. La Sublime-Porte a reçu seulement une dépêche de Castamon.

Nous disons, d'autre part, que le Ministre de l'Intérieur a correspondu par câble avec Moustafa Kemal Pacha; c'est ce dernier qui a demandé cet entretien. Vers le tard, une dépêche a été également reçue du mutessarif de Carassi.

Enclosure 3 in No. 136.

Extract from the "Moniteur oriental" of October 9, 1919.

PROCLAMATION DE MOUSTAFÀ KEMAL PACHA A LA NATION

NOTRE grande nation qui s'était réunie pour assurer la sauvegarde de nos droits, a été trahie par l'infamie de quelques traîtres. Ce Gouvernement illégal, qui ne s'est pas soucié de la nation, était susceptible de nous faire du mal par la situation qu'il conservait. C'est la raison pour laquelle nous avons comme nos ennemis voyaient défaits et désagréés.

Aujourd'hui, grâce à l'assistance divine, et grâce à la volonté de fer montrée par la grande nation, les traîtres sont tombés, et l'Etat et la nation se trouvent groupés autour d'un même objectif de délivrance et d'union. Deux faits sont à considérer :

1. Notre Souverain Calife a destitué le Cabinet Férîd Pacha dès qu'il a eu conscience des droits légitimes de la nation.

Le nouveau Cabinet présidé par Ali Riza Pacha a admis les principes de légitimité des mots enlevés par la censure de notre idéal national, et l'accord est complet entre le Gouvernement et la nation.

En conséquence, à partir d'aujourd'hui, nous appuierons de notre sympathie le Gouvernement, et prouverons ainsi une fois de plus que notre activité avait pour but la sauvegarde de la nation.

En regard des devoirs du Gouvernement, il incombe à la nation une grande tâche. Le grand principe était d'ailleurs de servir la nation et non d'entraver la loi. Ainsi, comme nous avons joint le moment où nous n'aurons plus qu'à assurer le calme et la liberté, nous que nous l'avons toujours fait. Notre nation qui ne s'est jamais démentie, gardera toujours ses qualités, et fera voir au monde civilisé qu'elle est capable de conserver cette terre glorieuse et sacrée.

MOUSTAFÀ KEMAL

Moustafa Kemal Pacha au Sultan.

Moustafa Kemal Pacha, Commandant en Chef des forces nationales, vient d'envoyer au Sultan la dépêche de remerciement suivante :

Au nom de toute la nation, nous osons déposer aux pieds de votre auguste Majesté nos sentiments de gratitude et de respect pour avoir daigné ordonner la destitution de l'ex-Cabinet, qui n'a pas reculé d'étouffer la voix nationale qui s'élevait de partout pour monter jusqu'à votre Majesté, trompant ainsi jusqu'à la fin son Souverain et la nation. La parole et le firman est à votre glorieuse Majesté.

MOUSTAFÀ KEMAL

Le 7 octobre 1935

Au nom du Conseil représentatif de l'Association d'Anatolie et de Roumélie pour la défense des droits.

dechaîner la colère des habitants turcs et à entraîner des actes de violence de la part fanatiques des les.

10. Les ordres relatifs au débarquement n'ont pas été strictement exécutés. Ils ont été mollement sans l'approbation du commandant de l'"Averoff", qui avait donné de la forme rassemblements turcs du côté de Caratna.

Les compagnies d'eyouzes qui devaient débarquer à Caratna pour occuper où elles ont débarqué derrière les autres fractions du régiment. Pour les suivre, les commandants des colonnes se sont conformés aux instructions qui leur ont été données. Ils ne savaient pas que les troupes turques étaient consignées dans leurs casernes près du Konak.

11. Les premiers coups de feu ont été tirés vers le coin de la place du Konak, l'entrée de la rue qui conduit à Cocanal.

Il est impossible d'établir avec certitude par qui furent tirés ces premiers coups. Les troupes grecques n'ont pas ouvert le feu et ont seulement riposté à ces premiers coups.

12. A la suite de ces premiers coups, une vive fusillade a éclaté. Les soldats qui se trouvaient dans les jardins de la place du Konak ont dirigé un feu violent contre les fenêtres de la Caserne et du Konak.

Il a été impossible de savoir exactement si quelques coups de feu ont été tirés certaines fenêtres de la Caserne après le commencement de la fusillade.

Aucune trace de balles n'a été trouvée sur les murs des bâtiments qui font face à la Caserne.

Quelques rares coups de feu paraissent avoir été tirés par les troupes grecques, le détachement de garde fut obligé de se défendre à coups de fusil contre une attaque éphémère.

Sur le chemin qu'ils ont parcouru entre la place du Konak et le quartier où ils furent enfermés, les premiers convois de prisonniers comprenant des soldats turcs, des officiers grecs, furent l'objet de bruits de la part de la foule que les accompagnait et même de quelques soldats grecs qui escortaient.

Tous ces prisonniers furent volés. Tous devaient crier "Zite Venizelos" en marchant avec les mains levées. Quelques-uns furent massacrés.

A part une ou deux exceptions, les officiers grecs n'ont exercé sur leurs biens aucun acte ni pour empêcher les violences.

Le 15 mai et jours suivants, les troupes grecques ont arrêté arbitrairement 100 personnes, parmi lesquelles un certain nombre d'enfants de moins de 14 ans. Le personnel et les élèves de quelques écoles furent même enfermés sur "l'île". Un nombre de ces prisonniers furent maltraités, pillés et détenus pendant plusieurs jours dans des conditions d'hygiène.

de pillage furent.

Les femmes furent attachées et les Turcs n'osèrent plus sortir avec cette escorte. Les hommes furent violés. Quelques assassinats furent commis. Ces violences et pillages furent exercés le plus souvent par la population grecque de la ville mais il a été constaté que des soldats grecs y ont participé.

16. Le nombre des tués et blessés le jour de l'occupation de Smyrne par les troupes grecques ont estimé de façon différente par les autorités turques et grecques. Les chiffres sont environ les suivants :

Grecs : soldats, 2 tués, 6 blessés, civils 20 tués, 20 blessés, 60 blessés.
Turcs : 300 à 400 victimes (tués ou blessés).

17. Après que la nouvelle du débarquement des forces grecques dans les villages des environs, les maisons turques et à voler le bétail turc ; d'incendier les villages.

18. Le colonel commandant les troupes grecques a envoyé le 21 mai le télégramme suivant :

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ne reçu que le 1^{er} juin les instructions lui faisant connaître ses attributions vis-à-vis des autorités locales.

Depuis le départ de l'Amiral Calthorpe (21 mai) jusqu'au 28 mai, le représentant de l'Entente n'a eu aucune communication avec les autorités locales.

Le 21 mai, le colonel commandant les troupes grecques a envoyé le 21 mai le télégramme suivant :

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Il est seulement prouvé que, au cours du mois de février, un grand nombre de ces caisses renfermaient des armes et des munitions.

Les autorités grecques n'ont autorisé que dans les premiers jours de mars le contre des caisses par les fonctionnaires turcs du service de la douane.

- 25. Ayasoulouk a été occupé le 25.
- Deunendyk a été occupé le 25.
- Baldjik a été occupé le 25.
- Aidin a été occupé le 27 mai.
- Eudemich a été occupé le 1^{er} juin.
- Nazli a été occupé le 3 juin.

26. Divers coups de main exécutés sur des postes grecs par des bandes ou insurgés turcs ont amené, de la part des Grecs, des représailles dont quelques-unes étaient justifiées par la situation militaire. Toutes ces représailles ont été brutales. Quelques assassinats furent commis de part et d'autre.

27. L'évacuation de Nazli a été faite dans la nuit du 19 au 20 juin. L'ordre du commandant du bataillon d'occupation. Cette évacuation n'a pas été faite conformément aux ordres du représentant de l'Entente donnés depuis le 14 juin, d'après lesquels les autorités locales turques devaient être prévenues à l'avance du départ des Grecs.

28. Les autorités militaires grecques expliquent ce mouvement en disant que le commandant du bataillon craignait une attaque et que, pour ne pas renverser l'ordre, il avait dû se retirer. Il n'a pas prévenu les autorités turques de son mouvement. Les ordres relatifs à l'évacuation de Nazli n'ont été donnés par le commandant supérieur que le 19.

29. Après ce départ, les autorités turques n'ont pas eu le temps de créer un poste d'ordre pour remplacer la gendarmerie désarmée et désorganisée pendant l'occupation grecque. Elles n'ont pas été en mesure de s'opposer au pillage et au meurtre de quelques familles grecques par des bandes turques entrées à Nazli quelques jours après l'évacuation par les Grecs.

30. Les habitants arrêtés à Nazli par les Grecs comme suspects, au nombre d'environ trente, ont été amenés avec les troupes en retraite. L'un d'eux fut tué en route, sous prétexte qu'il ne pouvait marcher.

Parmi les autres, quelques-uns purent s'échapper, mais le plus grand nombre fut tué au village de Kink au cours d'une bagarre survenue pendant la traversée du village, pendant laquelle un officier grec a été tué.

31. Après l'évacuation de Nazli par les troupes grecques, les attaques des bandes turques contre les postes grecs et les soldats isolés se sont multipliées.

Dans toute la région d'Aidin, la population était armée, ainsi que les Turcs.

32. Les troupes grecques ont exécuté aux environs d'Aidin des reconnaissances armées. Au cours de ces reconnaissances quelques villages furent brûlés.

Le 27, une de ces reconnaissances a été repoussée par les bandes qui l'ont poursuivie jusqu'à l'entrée d'Aidin. Le combat a continué le 28. Les assaillants ont fait usage de mitrailleuses de 105, dès le 28. Les Grecs ont reculé.

Le commandement et les témoins grecs affirment que des coups de feu ont été tirés par les habitants turcs sur des fractions de troupes grecques en retraite, au cours de leur retraite, où elles traversaient le quartier turc, situé au sud de la voie ferrée. Quelques incendies qui ont éclaté dans ce quartier turc, dans la matinée du 29, ont pris naissance au cours du combat.

D'autres incendies éclatèrent aussi dans ce quartier sur divers points isolés.

Un grand nombre de Turcs, hommes, femmes, enfants qui essayaient de sortir du quartier en flammes ont été tués sans raison par les soldats grecs qui gardaient les issues conduisant de ce quartier vers la partie nord de la ville.

Le commandement et les troupes grecs ont incontestablement perdu sang froid.

Les Grecs évacuèrent la ville dans la nuit du 29 au 30 après avoir subi de nombreux attentats et des crimes. Un grand nombre de civils grecs qui essayaient d'enfuir en accompagnant les troupes dans leur retraite ou ont été empêchés par le commandement.

33. L'incendie du quartier grec est dû aux bandes turques du chef Yuruk.

qui y sont entrées dans la matinée du 30 juin, et l'ont brûlé complètement après avoir incendié les maisons, dont elles ont tué les occupants.

Sans distinction d'âge ni de sexe, un grand nombre d'habitants grecs, rencontrés dans les rues, furent impitoyablement tués par les bandes.

Les habitants qui échappèrent à la mort, mais non pas au viol, furent au nombre de 2,000 ou 3,000 environ, purent se réfugier, avant l'arrivée des troupes, au couvent des religieuses françaises, d'où elles se rendirent au Konak sous la protection du Colonel Chiefik Bey, commandant la 57^e division ottomane.

De même, quelques notables qui avaient pu se rendre au Konak eurent en partie la vie sauve, mais quelques-uns furent exécutés.

Il n'a pas été possible d'établir avec certitude le chiffre des victimes grecques ou turques.

Le représentant du Gouvernement grec, entendu par la Commission le 7 septembre, estime que le nombre des victimes grecques est de 2,000 environ ; 900 cadavres étaient déjà retrouvés à cette date. Un témoin anglais estime ce nombre à 400 environ.

Un officier français qui a fait une enquête sur place quelques jours après les événements a évalué le nombre des victimes à :

- 1,500 à 2,000 Grecs,
- 1,200 à 1,500 Turcs,

en reconnaissant, toutefois, que l'évaluation des victimes turques a été très difficile à faire.

34. Les troupes grecques, à l'aide des renforts envoyés par le Général Nider, ont repris Aidin le 4 juillet. Elles ont incendié le quartier turc situé à l'ouest de la ville, où se trouvaient aussi des maisons grecques.

35. L'ensemble des incendies allumés entre le 29 juin et le 4 juillet ont certainement détruit les deux tiers de la ville d'Aidin, dont la population s'élevait à 30,000 habitants, parmi lesquels environ 8,000 Grecs.

Les maisons non brûlées ont toutes été pillées.

36. Avant la rentrée des Grecs à Aidin, la plus grande partie de la population turque avait été évacuée. Nazli Denizli, où elle est encore.

Un millier de Grecs ont été emmenés dans la zone turque, où ils étaient encore dans une situation matérielle très pénible au moment de la visite de la Commission à Aidin, le 11 septembre.

37. La réoccupation d'Aidin a été ordonnée par le Commandement supérieur grec, malgré les ordres formels du représentant de l'Entente.

Les autorités grecques ont agi sur ordre formel envoyé de Paris par M. Venizelos, le 11 septembre.

38. La plupart des villages situés le long de la voie ferrée entre Baldjik et Aidin ont été incendiés dans la région.

39. Actuellement, le calme est à peu près rétabli, sauf dans la zone très voisine du front où se livrent encore des combats d'avant-postes, qui causent des pertes et entraînent des mesures militaires, dont souffrent les habitants.

Il en est de même dans la région d'Eudemich, où l'occupation grecque s'est faite dans de bonnes conditions.

40. L'occupation du vilayet d'Aidin par les forces grecques a causé de grandes pertes matérielles au point de vue des récoltes et propriétés.

Les unes, impossibles à cultiver, sont dues aux pillages, au vol et à la destruction du bétail, dont une partie a été utilisée comme nourriture par les troupes grecques.

Les autres, de moindre importance, furent la conséquence des opérations militaires et des rencontres qui eurent lieu entre les forces grecques et les bandes turques.

D'autres enfin, très considérables, sont dues à l'incendie des maisons, des villages, et de la ville d'Aidin. On peut estimer que les pertes provenant de l'incendie d'Aidin représentent approximativement une valeur de 3,000,000 de livres sterling.

Les habitants turcs abandonnèrent leurs maisons et s'enfuirent des villages.

Les récoltes des olives souffriront également et les conditions ne s'amélioreront pas avant le mois de novembre.

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1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1862. It is a very long letter, and it is written in a very formal style. It is a letter of introduction, and it is written to the Congress. It is a letter of introduction, and it is written to the Congress.

nous l'impression causée par les événements de Pergame, et que les officiers n'ont

43 Le commandement militaire grec affirme que la répression grecque a été
entraînée tire des coups de feu sur de soldats grecs

[illegible]

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and titles, including "The Hon. Mr. Justice" and "The Hon. Mr. Justice".

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

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1. The first part of the text discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions, including sales, purchases, and expenses. It emphasizes the need for a systematic approach to record-keeping, such as using a ledger or accounting software, to ensure that all financial data is properly documented and organized.

2. The second part of the text focuses on the importance of regular reconciliation of accounts. It explains that reconciliation involves comparing the company's internal records with external statements, such as bank statements or supplier invoices, to identify any discrepancies or errors. This process is crucial for ensuring the accuracy of the financial statements and for detecting any potential fraud or mismanagement.

3. The third part of the text discusses the importance of budgeting and financial planning. It explains that a budget is a financial plan that outlines the expected income and expenses for a specific period, typically a year. By creating a budget, a company can better manage its resources, control its costs, and make informed decisions about its future operations.

4. The fourth part of the text discusses the importance of financial reporting. It explains that financial reports, such as the balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement, provide a comprehensive overview of a company's financial performance. These reports are essential for management decision-making, for communicating with investors and creditors, and for complying with regulatory requirements.

5. The fifth part of the text discusses the importance of financial control. It explains that financial control involves implementing policies and procedures to ensure that the company's financial resources are used efficiently and effectively. This includes measures such as establishing a system of internal controls, monitoring expenses, and conducting regular audits.

6. The sixth part of the text discusses the importance of financial risk management. It explains that financial risk management involves identifying and assessing the potential risks to a company's financial stability, such as changes in market conditions or interest rates. By implementing risk management strategies, a company can minimize its exposure to these risks and protect its financial assets.

7. The seventh part of the text discusses the importance of financial transparency. It explains that financial transparency involves providing clear and accurate information about a company's financial performance to all stakeholders, including investors, creditors, and the public. This transparency is essential for building trust and for ensuring the long-term success of the company.

8. The eighth part of the text discusses the importance of financial innovation. It explains that financial innovation involves developing new financial products and services that can help companies better manage their finances. Examples of financial innovation include the use of blockchain technology for secure transactions, the development of new financing options, and the use of artificial intelligence for financial analysis.

9. The ninth part of the text discusses the importance of financial sustainability. It explains that financial sustainability involves ensuring that a company's financial resources are sufficient to support its long-term operations and growth. This requires a focus on reducing costs, increasing revenue, and managing debt effectively.

10. The tenth part of the text discusses the importance of financial ethics. It explains that financial ethics involves adhering to a set of moral principles and standards when conducting financial transactions. This includes being honest, transparent, and fair in all financial dealings, and avoiding any actions that could be considered fraudulent or unethical.

responsabilité furent exercées par certains Turcs de la région. Ces actes de bri

... ..

Le pays est tranquille, mais le commerce est presque complètement arrêté. Les colons grecs qui ont quitté les territoires occupés par les Grecs y reviennent peu à peu.

[Faint, illegible handwritten notes]

47 Au sujet du transport de Grecs dans la province de Smyrne signalé par le Cheik-ul Islam Mustafa Sahir à la Conférence de la Paix.

(1) $\Delta x = 10^{-3} \text{ m}$, $\Delta p = 10^{-24} \text{ kg m/s}$, $\Delta x \Delta p = 10^{-27} \text{ kg m}^2/\text{s}$
 $\Delta x \Delta p \gg \hbar/2$, so the uncertainty principle is not violated.

The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1) as $t \rightarrow \infty$. It is shown that the solutions of the system (1) are bounded and tend to zero as $t \rightarrow \infty$. The second part of the paper is devoted to the study of the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1) as $t \rightarrow 0$. It is shown that the solutions of the system (1) are bounded and tend to zero as $t \rightarrow 0$.

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L'Amiral Bristol, Délégué des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.
Le Général Bunoust, Délégué de la France.
Le Général Hare, Délégué de la Grande-Bretagne.
Le Général Dill, Délégué de l'Inde.

Etablissement des Responsabilités.

[The following text is extremely faint and appears to be bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. It is largely illegible but seems to contain a list of names and possibly a date.]

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1. The first step is to identify the key components of the system. This involves understanding the hardware, software, and data involved. The next step is to define the requirements for the system. This includes identifying the functional requirements, performance requirements, and security requirements. The third step is to design the system. This involves creating a detailed architecture and implementing the system components. The final step is to test and deploy the system. This involves verifying that the system meets the requirements and is ready for use.

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diminué, le contraire survenant par suite par le télégramme du 7

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Lichtenthaler and Whistler (1973). The *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* contents were expressed as $\mu\text{g g}^{-1}$ of dry weight.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

... de leurs opérations militaires ou de police, elles ont même toléré

groupes ont avancé.

Les haines qui existent depuis des siècles entre Turcs et Grecs en ont incontestablement augmenté la fréquence et la sauvagerie.

Les Grecs ne sauraient, en toute justice, être accusés de

Les mêmes considérations s'appliquent aux régions de Pergame et aux environs.

[illegible]

S. Bien que la situation actuelle soit meilleure, le calme n'est pas encore rétabli dans le vilayet d'Adana.

Presque toutes les transactions commerciales avec l'intérieur de l'Anatolie sont arrêtées.

$\Gamma = \{ \gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n \}$ is a set of paths in G . Let γ_i be a path in Γ . Then γ_i is a sequence of vertices v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k such that $(v_j, v_{j+1}) \in E(G)$ for $j=1, \dots, k-1$.

de bandes de brigands, n'ont pas toujours une autorité suffisante sur leurs forces, les empêcher de se livrer quelquefois à des incursions. Il en résulte qu'une part de responsabilité leur incombe en ce qui concerne la situation actuelle du pays.

Derrière leur responsabilité apparaît celle du Gouvernement n'avait aucune autorité sur les chefs du mouvement national. Les Membres de la Commission

R. H. HARE
MARK S. BRISTOL

A. DALL'OLIO
BUNDEST

Constantinople, le 11 octobre 1919.

(3.)

Conclusions présentées par la Commission.

1. La situation créée à Smyrne et dans le vilayet d'Aidin par l'occupation hollandaise est fautive parce que

... les autres n'ont plus les s...

(4) L'occupation impose à la Grèce des sacrifices militaires considérables, hors proportion avec la mission à remplir, si cette mission est temporaire et ne doit avoir pour but que le maintien de l'ordre.

(5) Elle est incompatible dans sa forme actuelle, avec le retour de l'ordre et du tranquilité dont les populations, menacées par la famine, ont grand besoin.

2. La Compagnie estime

d.) Que, si l'occupation militaire du pays ne doit avoir pour but que le maintien la sécurité et de l'ordre public, cette occupation ne doit pas être confiée aux troupes grecques, mais aux troupes alliées sous l'autorité du commandement supérieur allié en Asie Mineure.

1. *la Grace.*

(c.) Que l'annexion pure et simple, envisagée ci-dessus, serait contraire au principe fondamental du respect des nationalités, car, dans la région occupée, en dehors de la ville même de Smyrne et d'Aivali, la prédominance de l'élément turc sur l'élément grec est incontestable.

Il est du devoir de la Commission de faire remarquer que le sentiment national grec a toujours été si robuste et si profond, que si le gouvernement grec eût voulu la force, c'est-à-dire devant une expédition militaire, que la Grèce seule ne pourrait

(a) Faire relever, le plus tôt possible, tout ou partie des troupes grecques par des unités beaucoup moins nombreuses.

(b.) Si, pour sauvegarder l'amour-propre grec, il est décidé qu'une partie des troupes grecques coopéreront à l'occupation, répartir ces troupes à l'intérieur de la région occupée pour leur éviter tout contact direct avec les forces nationales turques.

(c) Dès que l'occupation par les Alliés sera réalisée, exiger du Gouvernement turc

Cette gendarmerie devra être mise, le plus tôt possible, en état d'assurer l'ordre dans toute la région et de remplacer dans ce but les détachements alliés.

(d) En même temps que la réorganisation de la gendarmerie, le Gouvernement turc devra restaurer l'administration civile.

4. Les chefs du mouvement national ayant affirmé à plusieurs reprises que leur opposition n'est dirigée que contre les Grecs, les mesures proposées doivent leurlever tout motif de contestation contre le Gouvernement central de Constantinople tant qu'il n'a plus

ne devra plus empêcher le licenciement des troupes irrégulières.

Les membres de la Commission :

L'Amiral Bristol, Délégué des États-Unis d'Amérique.
Le Général Binoust, Délégué de la France.
Le Général Haro Délégué de la Grande Bretagne.
Le Général Dall'Olio, Délégué de l'Italie

Constantinople, le 13 octobre 1919.

(146646)

No. 138

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — (Received October 29.)

1885)
M. I. 100.
I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter from the 14th October, which I have received from my representative at Constantinople, dated her 20 1878.
The letter contains the following information: The Greeks in Smyrna and its environs, that it would invite the particular attention of your Lordship to this report, in view of the fact that the Greek troops have been withdrawn from Asia Minor of both the Greek and Italian troops (as set out in my telegram No. 1831 of the 17th September and in my despatch No. 1785 of the 1st October).
Their presence in these regions cannot possibly be deemed to be conducive to peace and order, but has shown itself to be the exact opposite.

I have &c

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner*

Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, to
Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

(No. 272)

October 14, 1919

I HAVE the honour to report that Italian activity, whether military, political, commercial, social, or otherwise, is making itself quite noticeable in town and district.

Some of this activity may be attributed to the fact that they want to create a Greek zone in the country in order to put themselves in a position to be able to take possession of Smyrna.

Their methods and their way of acting are very little removed from those of the Greeks, who are the more irritated against them in that they recognise in them adversaries of the same mentality.

There is no doubt that the decision to allow the Greeks to land in Smyrna was most distasteful to the Italians, and although they no doubt had to consent to it, they have worked actively against the Greeks within and without the Greek zone ever since.

In the Greek zone they are quick to seize upon any attempt on the part of the Greeks to assert authority, and outside the zone there is little doubt that they are doing all in their power to prevent the Greeks from doing so, and are encouraging them in their resistance against the Greeks. The deplorable conditions of the Aidin Railway and the districts adjoining it are due almost as much to Italian intrigue as to Greek disobedience.

That the Italians have become the carriers of the German and Austrian tradition again into Turkey seems to be undoubted. By taking possession of the best ports in the Adriatic and by seizing what was before the war the finest shipping line in the Near East, namely, the Austrian Lloyd, the Italians have obtained the Austrian Lloyd have been converted into those of the Lloyd Triestino, and the goodwill of the Austrian Company has passed to the Italian one.

In addition to acquiring the Austrian Lloyd steamers and connection, the Italians run the following lines of their own: Servizi Marittimi, Puglia, Marittima Italiana, Lloyd Sabauda.

Banking. Previous to the war, the Italians had no bank in Smyrna and have now acquired the Hungarian Bank with its goodwill and have turned it into Banco di Roma. How far the Banco di Roma will be a cloak for Austrian or Italian finances remains to be seen.

Schools, Churches, Hospitals.—One of the most prominent buildings of the town is the Italian School, which existed before the war and is the finest school building in the town. Since the Armistice, the Italians have taken under their protection an Austrian Church and the Austrian Hospital, much to the displeasure of the French delegate, who claims that all churches, hospitals, &c., in the Near East should be of French protection. The French delegate has succeeded in having a French hospital established along with the Italian over the former Austrian hospital, and on the 14th of October a diplomatic illness.

Italians had no hospital in Smyrna before the war.

A new feature is the opening of an Italian Red Cross Delegation in Smyrna and the establishment of Italian dispensaries in various parts of the town where drugs are dispensed and relief given. A good deal of this medical propaganda is done in the Muslim quarters. The opening of the Italian Red Cross establishment is undoubtedly a counterblast to the establishment, previous to the Greek landing, of Greek Red Cross missions in various parts of the country. These missions were looked on with great suspicion by the Turks, and presumably by the Italians who do not let slip any opportunity of following up any Greek move by a countermove.

Boy Scouts.—Following on the establishment of Greek boy scouts, the Italians also formed an Italian Boy Scout Corps. French, Armenian and Jewish boys followed suit.

Italian Protection.—Since the day of the Greek landing the Italian delegate has issued hundreds of papers of Italian protection to Muslims in this town, also to Armenians, Jews, and a few Greeks. Any Muslim with the slightest pretension to having any connection with Italy or Tripoli, or even with the Italian zone

in Asia Minor, can obtain without the slightest difficulty a paper of Italian protection. No previous residence is needed, nor is it thought necessary to have the annexation of the Italian zone in Asia Minor in order to convert Muslims who were born there but are now resident in Smyrna into Italian citizens. The Greeks undoubtedly feel very sore at the Italian pretension that these papers of special protection have any value, but as the Greek in Egypt or in Asia Minor or Macedonia has little difficulty in issuing papers of Greek nationality to any Greek-speaking Muslim, he can have little to complain of in the Italian action in this matter.

As regards Armenians, the Italians, like the French and ourselves, issue to them papers of special protection, but a fee is payable by Armenians who obtain such papers from the French or Italians, whereas we deliver these papers gratis. This practice should, I think, be altered.

Italian Naval and Military Forces.—Since and before the Greek landing, the Italian naval and military forces have been increasing in Smyrna and in the Greek zone. The Italian naval and military forces are at present doing a great deal of work that has to be done there. I am informed that a short time ago a number of Italian soldiers marched through the main streets of the town carrying a large Italian flag and a banner which read "Viva Italia e la Macedonia".

A special propaganda newspaper called the "Levant" has been started by them. A propaganda bureau has been started in the Parallele Street, Smyrna.

Italians and Greeks.—Both these nations, recognising each other as enemies, are doing a good deal of time in spying on one another, and in bringing to the notice of the delinquencies of the other or the attempts of the other party to obtain any form of advantage. At the same time both parties realise that they can exploit their enmity to obtain from the other Powers concessions in order to prevent them coming to open conflict, which would be, perhaps, the best solution of Greco-Italian rivalry in Asia Minor and would not be an unmixed evil.

Italians and Turks.—The Italians are, in my opinion, very afraid of the Turks, and realise that they are dependent on Turkish favour and goodwill for remaining in the Italian zone. On this account they allow the Turk a free hand in their zone, and also actively help him in order to curry favour with him. It would, perhaps, be an evil day for the Italians if the Turks were to carry out their threat of driving the Greeks out of Smyrna, because the Turk would then probably turn on the Italian and drive him out of Scalanova and Adalia.

JAMES MORGAN

146 48

No 132

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 20.

Constantinople, October 18, 1919

I have the honour to forward herewith a report from Captain Perring, now in the town, regarding the conditions prevailing in that area.

1. The conditions prevailing in that area, as expressed in paragraph 2, as to the movement of the Turkish forces, other reports rather go to show that Mustafa Kemal has no dealings with him whatever.

2. I have approved paragraph 5.

3. I fully concur with paragraph 6. There is no doubt that in the early days of the movement of the Turkish forces, the withdrawal of the Samsoun force would undoubtedly be attacked. The withdrawal of the Samsoun force has, of course, been made the most of by Mustafa Kemal.

4. I also have the honour to put forward herewith a translation of a message, dated the 18th October, from the Turkish forces to the British forces, in which the Turkish forces threaten to attack the British forces.

5. The threat against foreigners, which may possibly have been suggested by the withdrawal of the Samsoun force, is a direct result of the sectional nature of the Erzeroum Congress and the national character of the Turkish people.

6. The threat against foreigners, which may possibly have been suggested by the withdrawal of the Samsoun force, is a direct result of the sectional nature of the Erzeroum Congress and the national character of the Turkish people.

7. The threat against foreigners, which may possibly have been suggested by the withdrawal of the Samsoun force, is a direct result of the sectional nature of the Erzeroum Congress and the national character of the Turkish people.

[1356]

7. I would further draw the attention of your Lordship to the mention of E. in Turkey in the title at the foot of the document.

I have, &c.
(For the High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 139.

Captain Perring to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

Samsoun, October 1, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Mustapha Kemal movement has completed its organisation in the eastern vilayets and the movement is spreading rapidly west—viz., the adhesion of the Castemouni, Angora vilayets. At the present moment order and security are better than under the administration of the Government, and, with the exception of several small incidents, which have alarmed the Christian communities, the whole of the Samsoun district is calm awaiting events.

2. I beg to express the opinion that the whole movement originates with En Pasha, whose presence in the Caucasus there can be very little doubt of, and appearance at the head of the present organisation is openly talked of.

3. I beg to point out that in all Mustapha Kemal's proclamations no guarantee is given for the safety of the Christian, he states all have equal irrespective of race or religion, provided they do not do anything against the interests of the movement. Already several extensive searches have been made for arms in Christian houses. A great danger will immediately arise should any incident occur, as no Allied military force is available, there would be no means of checking or stopping massacring should any incident occur. Even the visit of a single officer could be sufficient to cause a general outbreak, the Moslem being extremely bitter against the Greek; this is greatly owing to the late Archbishop's attitude of course, the occupation of Smyrna, also a spirit of revenge for the Greek welcome Allied representatives.

4. The military forces at Mustapha's disposal consist of all regular and irregular troops without exception, they are well fed, better clothed, and are paid regularly. Officers are available and are busy training their units, inspecting arms in villages, arranging ammunition supplies, and proceeding very cautiously with mobilisation of males of the ages 20 to 37. Orders have already been issued that no passes are to be granted to leave the Samsoun area by sea to any male, Christian or otherwise.

5. Many Christians of military age as possible, I also propose to continue sending to Novorossiisk the remaining Greek refugees from that district, there being no possibility of their being able to proceed to their villages nor can they earn a living, presence at Samsoun, in view of the continuous stream of refugees from the interior will be a great danger.

6. Restitution of property, &c., is now completely out of the question, and attempt to restore properties would only further excite the Turk; I therefore propose that I be authorised to leave this work in abeyance.

7. The presence of any small or detached military force would be a further of danger, and unless backed up by reinforcements very quickly (which is almost impossibility) would be almost certain of being attacked, especially since the absence of the British troops at Samsoun.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING, Lieutenant, R.O.,
1st Suffolk Regiment.

Enclosure 2 in No. 139.

Mustapha Kemal to General Solly Flood.

To be forwarded to the British High (Extraordinary) Commissioner at Constantinople.

Sivas, September 25, 1919 (1335).

THE proclamations of the congresses convoked in Erzeroum in the name of Eastern Anatolia, and in Sivas in the name of the whole Ottoman fatherland,

respectively the 7th September, 1919 (1335), and the 11th September, 1919 (1335), the nation wishes publicly to make known to the world their lawful purpose which led to the present unity and organisation; also their fellow-feeling of patriotism which they maintain towards the non-Moslem elements.

2. Although complete peace prevails in the whole Ottoman fatherland, inasmuch as without any distinction of religion or nationality the protection of personal freedom is being maintained, we are informed that some ill-wishers are trying to attribute the movement which has sprung up from the national conscience to a movement against the non-Moslem elements.

3. On the 18th September, 1919 (1335), circular notes informed all the vilayets dependent sub-provinces that every subject of His Majesty possesses the same rights; also strangers in our country must be objects of Ottoman hospitality, provided they are not discovered in any action against our country and our nation.

4. The present demand of the nation is that, instead of the Fard Pasha Cabinet, whose acts of treachery to the country have been ascertained, a lawful and trustworthy cabinet which respects the rights of all subjects shall be formed.

Therefore I beg to state and confirm the maintenance of peace existing in our country, and the safety of our non-Moslem comrades who are protected against any attack.

I remain, &c.

(On behalf of the Representative Committee for protecting
the rights of European and Asiatic Turkey),
MUSTAPHA KEMAL.

148649

No. 140.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 1939. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 18, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an account of a conversation which took place here recently between Mr. Hohler and Br. The Staff to General Harbord.

Mr. Hohler is a somewhat larger view than the majority of the patriots who visit the Near East. It is to be hoped that it will have the effect of clearing up some of the unfortunate and entirely erroneous ideas which have sprung up in the minds of the British public.

On account of a conversation which recently took place between an officer and Lieutenant R. Dunn, U.S.N., Intelligence Officer to Admiral Bristol, I am sending you a copy of a letter which has been written and sent out here. As your Lordship is aware, England is practically the only country which has kept aloof from all the intrigues which are going on in this country, and which has refused all overtures of friendship on the part of the Turks, no matter what may be their political complexion.

As a result, we are credited with some deep and mysterious policy which it is the endeavour of everyone to ascertain. Consequently, when some slight explanation of our conduct which they want to prove. The result is that just the explanation of our conduct which they want to prove. The result is that just the explanation of our conduct which they want to prove. The result is that just the explanation of our conduct which they want to prove.

6. The fraternisation with the Turks, which is now so much on the increase in the native Christian communities, is having a very bad effect. A recent alleged interview with Mrs. Bristol, of which I enclose a copy, is a case in point. I understand that the Americans, as your Lordship is aware, publish an uncensored copy of the press news received by them; though, in view of Foreign Office despatches

No. 601 of the 8th October, it is difficult to say whence these messages emanate. attach a page of this news, including a very unfriendly and, of course, wholly erroneous statement concerning British activities in stirring up strife in the interior. The presumably comes from some irresponsible wireless station, but an unfortunate effect produced by the fact that the publication has an official heading, i.e., Navy Radio Press.

8. I do not think the Americans are following any definitive line out here present, but, as individuals, they take colour from their surroundings. Very few of them have any previous knowledge of the Near East, of the Committee of Union and Progress, or of the political history of the past ten years. In fact, they "green," easy for the Nationalists to spoon-feed and ready to rise to such catchwords as independence and self-determination.

9. A certain number, chiefly trade representatives, some missionaries and officers, desire to see an American mandate over the whole of Turkey, for their respective purposes of money, security and progress, and Imperialism.

10. The American journalist is, of course, a law unto himself, out for sensation and with a very superficial judgment of, or regard for, facts. Their utterances taken very seriously by the Nationalists, and one individual of this breed persuaded the Sims Conference that the Nationalist movement was wholly pacific and had the complete endorsement of everyone except England.

11. The anti-British colour shown is really more a reflection of Nationalist than anything else, though there is, of course, a certain amount of hereditary prejudice. I am inclined to think that, in a good many cases, though the voice may have a strong Yankee twang, yet the sentiments are those of Mustapha Kemal and his party. The opportunity of giving another twist to the British lion's tail is, in fact, good to be in need.

I have, &c.
For the High Commissioner,
RICHARD WEBB

Enclosure 1 to No. 149

An Account of a Conversation between Mr. Hohler and Brigadier-General McCoy

GENERAL MCCOY, second to General Harbord, came to see me this morning. He is of the regular United States Army and is an old friend of mine from Washington.

His journey is accurately described in the annexed extract from the report. He said that he had been very agreeably surprised by the situation apparent at all events—prevailing in the interior, but he attributed this to that which had struck him above all during his journey, namely, the exhaustion of the Turkish people. There were really, he said, no men left. He had been to find that the Christians had suffered greatly, but not to discover that they had suffered quite as much or more. He had been favourably impressed by Mustapha Kemal, who had treated the expedition extremely well. The mission would never have taken place had it not been for the occupation of Smyrna, but it is, the people are all sold for Mustapha Kemal, though they do not want to be bothered, they want to be left alone and to rest, and it will be a long time before they are again in a position to raise their heads; at present they are "down and out." Mustapha Kemal had made every sort of eulogy of the Americans just, and General McCoy, as a Mexican would whilst talking face to face with an American. But the rest, he showed himself strongly anti-British, and complained bitterly of encroachments. I asked what these were, and General McCoy said they were done after, and, the Pasha claimed, contrary, to the armistice; he mentioned specifically the Urfa region, the district north of Mossoul, and the efforts made to create independent Kurdistan by certain British officers, who had been almost arrested. Mahdita, Major Noel and Colonel Bell.

I was very glad at the opportunity thus presented to explain to the General what had been up to the present the lines upon which this High Commissioner

patronage—a quality which he had been highly praising in Mustapha Kemal—but experience showed that Turkish patriotism was different from any other, and was apt—very unfortunately—to take the direction of wiping out Christians. In the

of his remarks, he had said that there were very few Armenians left in the vilayets which were to form—according to the press—the new Armenia; only Kurds were left. He had set himself up against the Central Government, having inherited the organization, and, I feared also the spirit of the Committee, and it was if he hoped to establish himself somewhere in the interior where he was and whence he could

interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey.

action were to result in the establishment of a direct Committee

This decision was undoubtedly wise, though there were many reasons which counted in favour of assisting a Government such as that of Ferid Pasha,

by peaceful methods to mitigate the decisions of the Peace Conference rather than to overthrow them by force, as appeared to be the idea of the, to me, almost mythical

Kemal. Mustapha need be under no fear as to our encroachments. Urfa

towns had been occupied by us in strict conformity with the terms of the armistice, which allowed us to occupy places where danger to the Christians was

imminent. I had been here during the tragedies of 1895 and 1896, and again in

and after such experiences I could not bring myself to trust Turks with Christians more than a fox with geese, and it appeared to me that the Christians still alive were

protected by the suzerainty and goodwill of Mustapha Kemal, and were in the hands of new hostages in his hands for the benevolent behaviour of the Peace

Commission towards Turkey.

The same observation applied in part to the

that

he plain. This had already been proved by various

lated the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, and if Major Noel had been

spreading propaganda (as the general had said, a

that sense, it was entirely unauthorized so far as this

had only been allowed to go south in order

preservation of order, and they had given

id not engage in any form of intrigue or

it or against Mustapha Kemal, whom

I regretted that

But the side effect

greater responsibility in this matter than any other Power, but it was one to whom

very great importance was lent in England

As to the Urfa district, I understood we were already handing over all that region

to French control.

I repeated that we were entirely prepared to treat with Mustapha Kemal, or any

other person who might be called to power; it was, as he had said, exactly like Mexico,

no matter how many changes there might be in the individuals who were in authority,

that was an internal matter, and did not concern us, we were ready to enter into good

under with any of them, only we expected them to safeguard British interests,

we also expected them to observe the armistice, which included the preservation of order, the most important part of which was the protection of the Christian population.

October 14, 1919.

T. B. HOHLER.

Extract from the "Stamboul" of October 13, 1919.

LA MISSION HARDORD. LE COLONEL HASKELL.

UNE personne de la suite du Général Harbord, rentré samedi de la Caucase, fait les déclarations suivantes au Salut.

La mission, partie de Constantinople le 7 septembre, visita Kona, Adana, A-Mardin, Diarbékir, Kharpout, Malazia et Sivas. Dans cette dernière ville, le Général Harbord et M. de la Roche-Paillet furent reçus par le Gouverneur et le Lieutenant-Gouverneur.

Le 30 septembre, la mission parvenait à la frontière de l'Arménie, tandis que le chef de l'Etat-Major du Général Harbord partait d'Erzeroum à Bayezid, qu'un groupe allait à Oulou Kichla et un troisième à Annusnia et, de là, à Trebizonde. Le général lui-même, franchissant la frontière arménienne, allait visiter Sar-Kani Kars, Echmadsin. Le général fut reçu par le patriarche suprême de tous Arméniens.

Le général passa ensuite à Erivan, capitale de l'Arménie, où il resta deux jours.

La maison se retrouvait à Batoum, d'où elle est rentrée ici. Le général et sa femme restèrent ici jusqu'à jeudi, date à laquelle aura lieu le départ pour Paris.

Une copie du rapport sera remise à la Conférence et une autre au []

La Colonel Haskell

Enclosure 9 in No. 140

An After-dinner Conversation with an American Officer at Constantinople.

LIEUTENANT R. DUNN, United States Navy, dined with me on the evening of the 4th October. He is Intelligence Officer to the American High Commissioner at Constantinople. He had lately returned from Smyrna, having been with Admiral Bristol on the Commission of Enquiry and was keen and communicative on naval affairs generally. To my knowledge, since he has held his present position at Constantinople, he has, other than his five weeks' stay at Smyrna on duties with the Commander visited Tiflis, Trebizond, and Samson, via Batoum, to which port he made the 2nd U. S. S. "Gardania." He arrived in Turkey about February of this year on his first visit, and his only knowledge of Turkey and the East, as far as

to him, the American opinion of the Smyrna affair is that the Greek position and claims are untenable, as also is the position of the Italians, who, though the enemy has as the Greeks, have not sufficient forces to hold the Turks in check.

The conversation naturally drifted to a wider basin and the Nationalist movement came to the forefront. The American authorities could see nothing but the "intriguing policy in the present dealings with Turkey" in Allied European Peace. Britain was not excluded from this policy. The policy was "to find the present future Government of Turkey. British had done all in their power. Nationalists was shown in their own members had even been nominated rather the feebleness of that Cabinet incapable of dealing with the problem. They were carrying on the intrigues of attempting to solve a difficult problem, interests.

One of his duties is to read all the papers published in Constantinople. He remarked that the day after the fall of the Turkish Empire, Constantinople would be a free city.

that did not report it was the "Orient News." This led him to believe that the British were as far as possible trying to keep this "defeat" from their own people. When told that the "Orient News" was not published for local purposes but for the quicker circulation of news from Constantinople and the entertainment of the British forces in Turkey, he was in large type, that the paper was "printed and published in Constantinople, and must therefore be considered published in Turkey."

propaganda purposes.
 Regarding the fact of British intrigue so often, I asked him to give me a case without his knowledge. He then told me of a visit to Malatin of a Major Noel, who was a well-known Kurd. Major Noel, he asserted, was sent to Turkey in order to push our Mesopotamian bound-
 -rent, the Americans had at least three, and each other.

The first
who could not
think in their
world was the

Major Noel to the High Court
which Major Noel

_____ b, l, l, n to appear. They had
_____ t. Don did not know if the

to, it was concluded that the telegram was not his and he had reported to American that the telegram might be a forgery. He was sent to Madrid. Long asserted that

1990

and begged me to find out personally. The Americans, he stated, receive information from all sources and listen to everybody, but anything in the nature of ex-

he persisted in America's disinterestedness in Turkish affairs and was sure that we would not accept a mandate for Armenia alone. Even if the territories of the Caucasus were also included, the Daryna vilayet in connection with the Baku would be inadvisable. Our interests in Syria was only a secondary consideration and Palestine was not a question at all. This was the war

whole of Turkey ex Mesopotamia (not
and Persia)

_____ did not think that Turkey should be
as in pre-war days, but the French had already declared
they could not get anything better from the situation. I
_____ he had obtained this information from the local French official
_____ either only from reading the French newspapers.

ask America undertook in Turkey would be for the good of Turkey
backing of their self-interests, but they must be given at least
Nationalists represented the Turkish opinion and included
basis of the Nationalist party may or may not be
committee of Union and Progress, but, as the only possible
tion to the Committee of Union and Progress was its support of the
all further opposition was unnecessary owing to the present impotence of
harm. I asked whether even the American Relief Committee were an
American Government. He admitted that a
y be commercially interested, but in the large majority of cases

As for the Americans, however the Americans went, they were asked to accept policy in the East was a failure proved by the discontent shown

be safe to proceed upon the hypothesis that the mandate, if not already given, was presently be given to Great Britain.

To this I replied that, so far as my recollection extended, though there had been a classification of different forms of mandate drawn up by Lord Milner's Commission in Paris, the French had hitherto refused to agree to the grant of particular form of mandate with regard to any part of the Turkish dominions.

Mr. Davis then sought to establish a distinction between investigation and operation. He contended that it might be possible to allow a concessionaire to investigate upon the spot the nature of the concession which he had obtained without taking any practical steps to carry it into effect.

I said that, though this was a logical, I did not think that, in practice, it would be a very helpful distinction. A permission given to others, there were doubtless scores of concessionaires from the Turkish Government.

Mr. Davis then said that, if I could not imagine anything more unfortunate than to have Palestine overrun by groups of persons of different nationalities, endeavouring to ascertain what the concessions—the legal status of which had not yet been determined—were likely to be worth. I promised, however, to look into the matter and to let him have a reply.

I then took advantage of the presence of Mr. Davis to tell him an official protest, but as a fact of which I thought that in fact.

Mr. Davis, that I had good reason to believe that the United States.

In Constantinople, Admiral Bristol, was inspired by no very friendly feeling towards Great Britain, and was continually suspecting, and sometimes openly accusing, dark and sinister intrigues for which there was not a vestige of foundation. Not only had we evidence that Admiral Bristol had openly spoken to this effect in recent discussions in Smyrna, but I had an abundance of testimony from independent quarters that his whole action was characterized by a similar suspicion. Thus, I saw.

made for the Admiral to act up. Amongst the things upon the international stage in Constantinople.

I heard, none less anxious to get any individual advantage out of the situation or a sincerely desirous to be quit of responsibility than the British. Our evacuation of Cilicia; our retirement from Trebizond and Samouni; our reluctance to let forces play any compromising part in Asia Minor; our well-known refusal to take a mandate for any of these regions; and the sincerity and.

have been sufficient to protect us from the kind of insinuation in which Admiral Bristol appeared constantly to indulge. I should have thought it satisfactory co-operation, already very problematical, could only be retarded, and I.

It was not for me to make any suggestion, still less did I desire to make an official complaint, to the Ambassador, but if he felt disposed to take any informal steps to moderate the attitude of Admiral Bristol I thought that some good might be done.

While I was speaking to the Ambassador there was handed to me the telegram which your Excellency had sent, recording your conversation with Mr. Lansing. The possibility of hurrying on the negotiations as to the Turkish Peace Treaty to the Antwerp for that, as Mr. Lansing had suggested that, in the interests of the debate in the Senate and of the ratification by the United States of the Peace Treaty, it might be desirable to postpone the Turkish negotiations for some days, we should of course do nothing that would in all complicate the situation.

In no reasonable way, if we so desired, we should not at all enquire among our Allies whether they would be willing to consider the resumption of negotiations on that aspect of the general peace, of the desirability, in fact the necessity, of which he was as much convinced as we were, and, although he knew that Mr. Polk was anxious to return to the United States to spend Christmas with his family, he did not think that, if he were pressed to stay, there would be any part in the negotiations, whether they were conducted here or at Paris.

I am,
Yours,
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

147731]

No. 142

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon. (Received November 1)

Hamleh October 16, 1919

In answer to my telegram No. 1340 of the 8th September, 1919, I have the pleasure to inform you that recent reports from the British agent at Jeddah, as well as news from King Hussein himself, make it appear possible that the King is resigning at any time and perhaps without giving Colonel Byrd notice of his intentions. However this may be it would obviously be dangerous to establish the King's successor with as little delay as possible, in order to avoid an interregnum which might lead to anarchy or even civil war. Colonel Byrd would therefore be glad of any general instructions which could be issued for his guidance.

Emir Abdullah would be the best candidate for the throne. He is not too old, well known to the British, is progressive and is British in his ideas. He has considerable administrative ability learnt from long intercourse with the Turks, and thus, added to his popularity both in British and native circles, which enable him to establish himself without difficulty. He would also probably be able to persuade his father to abdicate in his favour. His elder brother the Emir Ali who is a serious rival of the Emir Abdullah, and therefore a serious rival of the British, is not so well known to the British, and it may be anticipated that he would be likely to bring responsibility upon the British agent the extent of which His Majesty's Government will be prepared to consider.

As regards a moral support, he will probably demand the maintenance at Jeddah of a British official as an intermediary with His Majesty's Government.

With regard to the re-establishment of a complete agency, I understand that the King would like to see the present agency. If the agency as such ceases to exist, it might be placed in charge of a senior official with whom political affairs who would be appointed temporarily as British agent. It would perform the duties of a British agent.

If Abdullah would rely largely on His Majesty's Government for material support, and is certain to ask for a statement from the Government of the subsidy after December 1.

My subject proposals for a loan to the Hedjaz to supplement his reduced income. I do not suppose it is possible to make any definite statement on this subject.

As regards the continuance of the principle of subsidies and stipends which is the basis of the present treaties, and of the arrangements concluded with the sheiks such as the Sultan and the Sultan of Lahij, we should presumably have to give preferential treatment to the ruler of Mecca. Any indication which could be given in this respect would I undoubtedly do much to enable the King to.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY

148039

No. 143

Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon. (Received November 3)

American Embassy, London, October 31, 1919

The matter of our conversation of yesterday, I have just received a despatch from the State Department saying that it is informed by the Standard Oil Company of America that a representative sent to Baghdad to investigate petroleum conditions in Iraq is forbidden to operate by British authorities while a geologist, probably in the field.

I have based upon the assertion that representatives of private concerns are not being allowed equal privileges with those of British or other nations in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the adjacent regions.

iteration the possibility that the inconvenience which might arise up-
of these missions if they should come in any appreciable number.

I believe me &c
JOHN W. DAVIS

[140217]

No. 144.

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Croze.

(No. 7228.)

Commission of Enquiry into the events attending the Greek landing at Smyrna, 1919.

He continued that it was entirely contrary to the whole conception of justice
a should be condemned without having access to the
to loss to explain to the Greek Parliament
to the Conference that a fresh

evidence.

My Rtd. Lord, I am sure that the Commission which is now concerned in the

and to questions asked in Parliament. M. Venizelos anticipated that the matter was

I am, &c
CHURCH OF KEDLESTON

Enclosure in No. 144

M. Venizelos to Earl Curzon

M. VENIZELOS presents his compliments to Earl Curzon of Kedleston
following his letter of 16th October, has the honour to request his Lordship to
into consideration the following point:—

M. Venizelos

and kindly made to him.

London, October 27 1919

[149750]

No. 145

Sir M. Chretham to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 526.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 457 of the 22nd September, 1919, I have the
honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th October.

says.

Enclosure in No. 145

Note 2 on the seizure of Colonel Jacob's Mission at Bafra.

THE following note has been compiled with a view to assisting the various A. S. S.

Colonel Jacob's mission to the Turkish Government, and the seizure of the mission at Bafra.

It does not appear to be any more important than it did seven weeks ago
in a somewhat pessimistic letter written on the 10th September Captain Na-
shid, the Indian political officer with Colonel Jacob, stated that the trustees were
much.

considering
the safety of the mission preparations for a trip

to use all their influence to secure the return of the mission to Hodeidah. The effort had also been sent out to Bajil.

The efforts of the political officer, Hodeidah, had been supplementary to those of Colonel Jacob, who preferred to retain charge of the negotiations, and considered should be consulted before any action was taken.

Mahmud Nakhli was reported to have arrived at Bajil on the 19th September.

On the 21st September Colonel Jacob got a letter through to Hodeidah following is an extract:

Received this day a letter from the Zorany tribe. It is over the seal of Mahmud Nakhli.

It is now known that the Imam and Mahmud Nakhli are in the hands of the Zorany tribe. They think that the Imam is now in the hands of the Zorany tribe.

The Qulrah sheikhs are the evacuation of Hodeidah and free trade by sea and land. They allege that the trade route from Hodeidah to Morawa was cut off to them was the raising of the blockade. They Zorany, etc., to come and see Hodeidah (for the Zorany to start making as a volunteer duty), and in return ask me to write to you to allow passage of the Zorany very essential at once, provided of course that no raiding takes place."

The Imam and Mahmud Nakhli are in the hands of the Zorany tribe. They think that the Imam is now in the hands of the Zorany tribe.

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Personalities

The Imam Yahya lays claim to the ownership of all those parts of the Aden protectorate and Asir; indeed, he probably also includes the Zorany in his aspirations. During the war he maintained a more than violent neutrality towards the Turks, and his true feelings towards us are not known. Certain parts of the Yemen—notably, the Tihama—were occupied by the Imam and since their departure the Imam has endeavoured to extend and strengthen his influence over them. He sent friendly letters of welcome when he received the Imam's letter.

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The Yemen.

The Tihamah, which has to be crossed to reach Bajil, is a level plain with rice inland. Bajil, nearly 40 miles by road from the coast, is only 600 feet sea-level. The Tihamah is chiefly soft, sandy, sterile desert. Then follows maritime range, which throws out low foot hills towards the coast and occasional culminated in masses rising to 5,000 feet above sea-level. The Yemen plateau, with an altitude of about 7,000 feet.

The climate of the Yemen naturally varies greatly. Heavy winds are prevalent from the sea, from north-west in summer and south in winter. Rain seldom reaches the coast. The climate becomes healthy and bracing as higher elevations are approached further inland. Winter fogs are very prevalent on maritime ranges. This zone has two rainfalls—one in early spring, the other in summer.

At Sanaa the weather is said to be cool and pleasant all the year round. Route to Hapl from Hadramdah.—The road is said to be passable for all light wheeled transport. For the first mile the route traverses (north) sandy plain, which gradually develops into mud dunes covered with low grazing for camels and donkeys. The going is difficult at mile 10 there is a small wall with slightly and through a belt of tall bush, following a watercourse, then through short scrub up gentle rise to Tannan at mile 15.

Tannan is merely a collection of mud huts forming a caravanerai for travel. It is unpalatable, but not injurious. 15½ north-east of Tannan is an ex-Turkish post to guard the telegraph line. The road makes a wide detour.

The road here debouches on to broad, gently rising towards the east and covered with coarse grass, gradually to cultivation at mile 20. At mile 21 the road runs east, descends down a stony, wady bed (W. 21) it is dominated by low foot hills on the north of the town. In ordinary times the district being an agricultural one.

Zaranig for Dharmag. A powerful centre in Beit-el-Fayh. Reported to be notorious caravan raiders, are leanings towards the Idri and Abe (or Abayyah). This is estimated at 3,000 to 6,000 men. Shafar with pro-Idri tendencies. A. B. yent A. J. (G. of Murawa, friendly towards mission). Qubrah—Occupies territory extending from the sea for about 50 miles north of Hadramdah. They can put 3,000 to 4,000 men in the field. Shafar with pro-Idri tendencies.

Abul Hadi. Consistent.

Yahya Ali Muxaryah. Chief en point in the capture of Jamal Baghawi. Khuzam.

Sheikha Mohammed Zaid and Khuzam wrote to the Idri, and the latter thought to have replied advising them to release the mission. Ramleh, October 11, 1919.

APPENDIX

Since the foregoing note was written two interesting documents have come to hand. The first is a letter from the Imam Yahya, dated the 19th September, to the Political Resident, Aden. The Imam explains that, agreeably to our request, he put the military action he had planned against the Qubrah for the release of Colonel Jacob's Mission, but it is clear from the tone of his letter that he is not prepared to make any compromise with the Qubrah, and that he would, if he could, inveigle us into handing him military aid to secure his overlordship of the Tihamah tribes.

"Some of the Qubrah," he says, "have made mean and foolish demands. It is necessary that we should close every door to their requests, to show indifference, and to shut the doors against the cupidity of the impudent Qubrah. If the matter remains as it is, then there is no alternative but to take action and make a common display against the Qubrah to put an end to extricate the mission."

The second document is a letter written by an Aden merchant, Abdul Kadir Mackawi. It is an illuminating commentary on our Yemen policy, and deserves more than a cursory perusal.

"The question of the future government of the Yemen," he writes, "has not yet been settled, and the provinces are in a state of anarchy and chaos. The Imam is governing the Sanaa (Shafar) country, and it seems that he intends to rule the whole of Yemen. In my last letter I described the attitude of the Sanaa towards the Imam, and I need not repeat here what I wrote in that letter. The Imam's rule over the whole of Yemen will in a short time be an accomplished fact. The Sanaa are unable to resist his troops, and their attempt at resistance is followed by the massacre of the population. The Sanaa were willing to acknowledge his suzerainty and pay him all taxes, etc., if the civil administration, in accordance with their wishes, is left to them. The Imam's rule over the whole of Yemen is in accordance with the surrender, and the places conquered by him are now governed by the Imam's Zaidi codes and regulations. The Arabs of Yemen cannot understand why Great Britain insisted on the withdrawal of the Turks and would not accept a mandate for Yemen as it has done in the case of other countries. Such a mandate, at least for the Sanaa, is with the approval of the Allied Powers, and the Imam by a delegation consisting of the representatives of the Sanaa would most probably not have been opposed by the Imam, especially if he saw that they were determined to carry out their decision by all means. The Imam would think of the demands of the combined Powers."

The subject of the capture of the mission, Abdul Kadir Mackawi asserts that change of attitude of the Qubrah sheikhs, after promising a safe-conduct to Colonel Jacob, was due to propaganda of Mahmud Nadim and his fellow intriguers, who misrepresented the aims and motives of the British Government, and attributed to it all the evils that have fallen upon the Arabs. The blockade of their ports and the removal of the Turks (their protectors against the Imam), which nearly reduced them to starvation and their country to anarchy, and the arrival of Colonel Jacob on a mission to the Imam to hand over to him, as they were told, the Shafar country and its people, were support to the Turkish propaganda.

"Now," continues Abdul Kadir, "the silence of the British Government on the matter and their omission to counteract the effect of these reports left a bad impression on the minds of the people and strengthened the case of the Turks' friends. These were under the impression that after all the sufferings and troubles caused by the war and the war, a new era would dawn upon their country on the departure of the Turks, as the British Government would become their future ruler and protector, or at least support to the Turkish propaganda."

The withdrawal, in the lurch. If anything has done more to alienate the sympathy and good feelings of the Arabs of Yemen it is that blockading business. The sympathy and good feelings of the Arabs of Yemen is an asset not to be lost.

It is done to restore British prestige and credit, and to remove from the minds of the Arabs the impression that Great Britain is working with the Imam against them.

that it would be a mistake to give him even only our moral support in his efforts.

(1356)

A handwritten musical score for the song "The Rose Tree". The score is written on ten staves. The first staff begins with the title "The Rose Tree" and the key signature "F#". The music is written in a cursive, handwritten style. The lyrics are written below the staves, corresponding to the melody. The score includes various musical notations such as notes, rests, and bar lines. The handwriting is somewhat faded and the paper appears aged.

H. GAKIAN + W. J. ...
Acting Director, Arab Bureau.

Hamlet, October 12, 1910.

[148679]

No. 146.

[The page contains extremely faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side.]

and out more on the subject.

I have, &
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

1150511

No. 147

[illegible]

Enclosure 1 in No. 147.

M. Clemenceau to His Highness Emir Feisal

Altesse,

Paris, le 2 novembre 1919

VOUS avez bien voulu me signaler, par votre lettre du 25 octobre dernier l'agitation que vous a fait éprouver la décision prise par la Conférence de la Paix le 15 septembre dernier relativement à la relève des troupes anglaises par les Arabes dans une zone définie en Syrie et en Cilicie.

Vous craignez que l'exécution de cette décision ne soit interprétée par les Arabes

troubles dont vous voudriez dégager votre responsabilité.

Pour éviter ces éventualités, votre Altesse propose de constituer une Commission chargée d'étudier les modalités de l'évacuation des troupes anglaises, de l'administration provisoire de nature à sauvegarder l'unité du pays, à maintenir la harmonie entre les différentes zones occupées et d'assurer les droits des habitants.

J'ai pris connaissance de vos vues avec beaucoup de sympathie et je tiens à déclarer d'une manière générale que le Gouvernement français n'a jamais été sincèrement désireux d'assurer à la Syrie, comme à la Mésopotamie et aux autres pays d'Orient libérés par la victoire des Alliés, le régime de liberté, d'ordre et de progrès, conforme aux principes libéraux de sa politique, qui sont en même temps ceux de la Conférence de la Paix.

Je suis persuadé que la coopération établie entre les Arabes et leurs Alliés

permettra de régler leurs relations conformément à leurs traditions, aux vœux des populations et à la liaison de leurs intérêts. Les Gouvernements français et anglais resteront à cet égard aussi étroitement unis dans la paix qu'ils l'ont été dans la guerre.

La question que vous voulez bien poser aujourd'hui est moins étendue et paraît d'une grande simplicité. Il ne s'agit en effet que de faits, sans que les principes soient modifiés. Ni la condition politique de la Syrie, ni ses frontières éventuelles ne sont en question. Vos inquiétudes et celles que la population pourrait éprouver doivent donc être faciles à dissiper. Dans les régions où les soldats français tiennent la place des soldats anglais, j'ai la certitude que nos chefs militaires assureront les populations et maintiendront l'ordre. Il vous appartient, avec votre autorité, d'agir de même à Damas et à Alep. Je suis tout prêt à venir à votre appel pour vous aider à maintenir l'ordre et à empêcher qu'il ne soit troublé par des agitateurs qui ne pourraient que compromettre les intérêts des Arabes et diminuer la confiance que la Conférence est prête à leur accorder.

Un simple exposé des faits vous montrera que la nomination d'une Commission ne ferait actuellement que compliquer la situation et retarder l'exécution de la décision du Conseil suprême.

Je suis, d'ailleurs, tout disposé à envisager avec vous, au point de vue de la paix, les questions qui vous préoccupent en tenant compte de nos grands intérêts.

Dans ces conditions, toute garantie est donnée au point de vue de l'avenir, la question politique est intégralement réservée. L'administration locale n'est pas une décision n'est prise quant aux frontières. L'ensemble des intérêts dont vous préoccupez la légitime volonté reste confié aux décisions de la Conférence de la Paix. La nomination d'une commission pour étudier les modalités de l'évacuation et modifier l'administration actuelle du pays serait non seulement inutile, mais contraire aux principes du Conseil suprême.

Je suis, d'ailleurs, tout disposé à envisager avec vous, au point de vue de la paix, les questions qui vous préoccupent en tenant compte de nos grands intérêts.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

C. CLEMENCEAU

Enclosure 2 in No. 147

His Highness Emir Feisal to M. Clemenceau

Conférence de la Paix, Secrétariat de la Délégation
du Hedjaz, Paris le 5 novembre 1919

Permettez-moi d'insister dans la réponse que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'envoyer, en date du 3 novembre 1919, une nouvelle confirmation de la sympathie que le Gouvernement français n'a cessé de témoigner à ma nation et une preuve manifeste de son désir d'assurer à la Syrie comme à la Mésopotamie et aux autres pays arabes libérés un régime de liberté, d'ordre et de progrès.

Les Arabes qui ont combattu pour obtenir leur indépendance ne peuvent pas se contenter de ces nouvelles assurances, qui viennent leur confirmer les déclarations antérieures et les promesses réitérées des Puissances alliées. J'en suis d'autant plus convaincu que je n'ai cessé dès la première heure de travailler à l'inauguration de cette politique d'entente et de confiance réciproques qui a contribué à la défaite de l'ennemi et assure la libération du pays.

Il est dans le but de la Conférence de la Paix, et dans le but de la Conférence de la Paix, de former une commission chargée d'étudier les modalités de l'évacuation des troupes anglaises et de leur remplacement par les troupes arabes.

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Que votre Excellence me permette de vous dire que les événements qui se produisent, et auxquels j'ai fait allusion, sont nullement le fait d'agissements conscients. Le mouvement qui se produit, inévitablement dans le pays est un mouvement essentiellement national où il serait un peu délicat de faire appel à des troupes étrangères, dont l'intervention ne serait pas comprise par le peuple. D'ailleurs, le sentiment développe le peuple de Syrie est directement inspiré par les déclarations officielles des hommes d'État alliés et pour le triomphe du grand national, la France à leur tête, ont soutenu la plus terrible et la plus longue des guerres.

Les grands chefs de l'armée française, qui ont forcé l'admiration du monde en défendant en même temps leur patrie, les principes immortels du Droit de la Liberté, seraient eux-mêmes dans l'embarras pour tirer l'épée, en réclamant son indépendance, ne demande que le droit et la liberté pour les mêmes chefs héroïques ont si vaillamment combattu.

Le Conseil suprême, en prenant acte du changement prévu dans la situation de la Syrie, sans m'avoir entendu, m'a imposé une responsabilité grosse de conséquences.

Les Arabes ne sont toujours attachés à mériter la confiance des Alliés. Ils ont les principes que ceux-ci ont proclamés qu'ils foudent leurs espérances dans la réalisation de leurs légitimes aspirations. Il dépend beaucoup de l'Excellence que cette espérance ne soit point déçue et que leurs convictions ne soient point ébranlées.

Quant aux inquiétudes qui m'assiègent et à l'instantanéité que je témoigne, elles proviennent uniquement de préoccupations personnelles. Guidé par le constant souci de servir ma nation et d'être loyal vis-à-vis de mon Allah, j'estime de mon devoir de vous les yeux de votre Excellence la situation telle qu'elle se présente dans la région.

La situation telle qu'elle se présente dans la région, telle que d'aucuns voudraient la présenter. J'ai dans mon âme et en conscience l'effervescence qui va agiter tout le pays. Encore une fois, le souci de maintenir les bonnes relations entre les Arabes et leurs Alliés et d'éviter tout danger de rupture à menacer l'existence de notre jeune nation, me porte à vous en informer.

Je ne puis me faciliter tout cela, mais je vous prie de vouloir bien en tenir compte.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 147

Note to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference

I WAS called in September from Damascus by his Excellency the Minister of Great Britain to discuss the Syrian Question with the Great Powers. In London, his Excellency handed me an *aide-memoire* involving certain points of the present administration in Syria. He said that similar copies were handed to representatives of France, America, and Italy. I understood from the conversations and interviews which ensued that the said *aide-memoire* was not based on any agreement between Great Britain and any other Power, but it is simply a statement showing the decision of Great Britain taken for reasons of economy as to withdrawal of her troops from certain Arab provinces. The whole question is supposed to be a provisional military arrangement, neither administrative nor political, taken for the maintenance of order until the final decision of the Conference as to the future government of the country.

Having carefully read this document and having closely observed the situation in the Arab provinces since the Treaty of Truce was signed with

the conclusion that the execution of this project would not only entail disagreement with the rights of nations, but would also be detrimental to the peace of the East. I am persuaded that the Great Powers with interests in the East will suffer harm in proportion to their respective interests. The two Powers cannot have been aware of the troubles which may arise from any alteration in the status quo established since the occupation for this agreement will alter the provisional administration established since the occupation without making any suitable arrangement in lieu of it.

When the British Government informed me of this plan, which they called a "project," based on the Sykes Picot Treaty of 1916, I protested, and put forward my objections.

The British Government, having realised the situation accepted the proposal to appoint a Committee of American, French, and Arab delegates to consider the question involved in the proposed evacuation and to establish a united provisional administration to take the place of the present one.

At the same time, the British Government expressed the desire to see the project carried out.

It did not approve the suggestion, and expressed the desire to see the project carried out.

Furthermore, the French Government also refused to agree, as they considered it a violation of the Sykes Picot Treaty.

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I find it difficult to understand that the project is a purely military one. It seems to me that it contains many economic and political points that should only be decided by the Peace Conference. The fact of taking away the supreme power of administration from a single head and the division of the country into three different zones is surely a very important change in the present administration, and cannot be considered a purely military measure. Such matters as the railway arrangements and zones of influence, &c., &c., do not come within the measures to be taken for the preservation of order until a final settlement of the Syrian Question by the Peace Conference.

2. According to the proposed arrangements the Arab provinces are to be divided into three districts, one under British administration, another under French, and a third under the Arab Government. This is to say that the Syrian nation, which has always been looking forward to a unity of administration, is now to be split up and put under a separate Government. The harm resulting therefrom is a

very serious one, and is likely to be fostered and encouraged by ignorant officials, or even competition between

tribes, who will be tempted to destroy any system which have come through one distinct administration. Troubles will begin on the spot and will spread into the heart of the country.

[1336]

... that portion left to the Arab Government is said to be independent Arab province but is again divided into different zones of influence one under the British and the other under the French. Any assistance required one of these two sub-divisions should be asked for from the Power which exercises influence over it. Has ever a nation in the history of the world been able to make any progress under such obstructive circumstances? This arrangement undoubtedly disheartens the people and creates disaffection among them. The Allies and will do everything in their power to defend the Arab nation. They are a weak nation and they will be unable to resist for long but they will nevertheless meet death for their just cause. Who will then be responsible before the civilised world for such a sacrifice? No one can persuade the people of the country that they are wrong in their fixed ideas. Every one who has had experience of the prevailing feeling amongst the people can say that peace and order can never be maintained without bloodshed.

3. The withdrawal of British troops is proposed to be made on a ruling which is not recognised by the Arabs nor by the United States Government. It is on entering the war that they would not recognise any secret agreement entered into by the Allies to the Sykes Picot agreement of 1916 which dealt with the country as if it were private estate or a mere parcel of goods at a time when her own people were fighting from Syria to the desert and offering their lives for her independence. Any action based on a ruling not recognised by the Peace Conference cannot be executed without a special discussion from that Conference.

4. The Commander-in-Chief, when the Allied troops occupied the country, withdrew my agents from the coast and made a declaration to the Syrian people that he proposed to occupy the country and establish a unified administration in the name of the Allies. His administration thus formed would remain active until the time as the Peace Conference gave its last decision. The Syrians considered this declaration as a pledge given by the Allies, and their country as being placed in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief acting on behalf of the Allies, establishing a single administration which he promised to maintain as above stated. I take it that no change in the fundamental basis of this arrangement can be made before the proper time comes or before another administration based on the principles is established. Great Britain recognises this pledge but says it was anticipated that such a long delay would pass before such a decision should be made by the Conference. Is this delay the fault of the Arab Syrian nation or have they committed any disloyalty which deserved such a punishment? We have always shown complete loyalty to the Allies ever since we rose against the Turks, and least we expect in the fulfilment of a promise given by the Commander-in-Chief.

5. The over excited feeling now prevailing in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, caused mainly by foreign interference is no longer a secret. Any person having the slightest knowledge of what has been going on in the Syrian province is undoubtedly convinced there will be trouble, and in many places if the *status quo* of the present administration is changed.

I therefore beg you in the name of humanity and the interests of peace, in the name of the Arab nation and in the name of the multitudinous interests of Italy, Great Britain, and America in the eastern world, that no new doors be opened for further troubles, of which we all may see the beginning, but of which the end cannot be foretold. The incidents of Smyrna and other places are still fresh in memory.

I very much fear that the mischief will spread throughout the Moslem world. The people will think that there is a definite intention to persecute Islam. You will still remember that the rising of the Arabs headed by my father the King, has given the first blow against the hated principle of fanaticism. The Arabs attacked the Moslem Turks because they were oppressors and joined the Allies believing that they were fighting for right and justice irrespective of religion. I personally

was surrounded from every direction and every religion. Our unity was national and religious. A great number of men who are working with me now in this noble cause do not belong to my religion. This must prove to you how distressed I am if this high ideal is debased to religious conflict through misunderstanding, mismanagement and imprudence.

You must agree with me that it is in the interests of all to preserve the

... during the short period of time previous to the decision of the Peace Conference rather than cause trouble to occur for no logical reason. I am therefore of the opinion that the Great Powers should be informed of the serious situation as well so that immediate steps be taken for the interested Allied Powers and in arms to consider the interests of each Government according to the ideal justice for which we have fought together.

I conclude by emphasising my request to be allowed to lay in person a full statement of my case, which touches my country more closely than it does any other, for it will be on me and my people that the results of any action whether for good or evil will fall.

FFISAL.

November 6 1919

151212

No. 148

Pier-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon — (Received November 12)

No. 2001.)
M. Lord

Constantinople, October 28 1919

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information some notes which have been prepared in this High Commission on the Nationalist movement in the Samsoun area.

I have

J. M. DE ROBECK High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 148.

Notes on the Nationalist Movement in the Samsoun Area

... out the last hope of existence. This has remained the sentiment of the vast mass of the people, the desire for peace and security, oblivious of the cost.

... Constantinople began to consider how best to retrieve as much as possible from the ruins. One by one parties appeared representing a few political groups each working for power. At this time the imposition of any peace terms would have been easy.

... this phase lasted till the 15th May, when the Greeks landed at Smyrna. The result of this was like breaking open an ants' nest — temporary stupefaction, much confusion, and a few hardy souls spitting acid at the invaders.

A period of resistance followed. The Central Government pinned its hope to the ultimate good will of the Allies and the influence of the mass of the Moslem world. In opposition appeared the Military Party which hoped to save Turkey by its own action. They realised that Constantinople and the Central Government were

... Among this party was Mustafa Kemal Paşa. It would appear that the Central Government was not without sympathy with the Military Party. A system of army inspectorates with large powers was devised, and early in May Mustafa Kemal was sent as inspector to Samsoun.

The Turks were excited. They had been caught napping at Smyrna. There was good reason for believing that an Armenian State was to be formed, and many talked of a Greek Pontus State. The military were determined to be prepared to prevent another coup.

Mustafa Kemal at once set to work to rouse his area. He made Amnassia his headquarters from Allied control — his headquarters. From here he sent emissaries as far as Kharput and Diarbekir. Backed by Refat and Hamid Bey he proceeded to put down brigandage and enlist the brigands in his new national army.

... seemed appeared to be revolutionary and dangerous. The Greek and Armenian authorities waited in silence, ably backed by the American missionaries. The massacre at Amnassia. Mustafa Kemal saw the same and took steps to prevent such an eventuality.

On the 19th June Mustafa Kemal moved his headquarters to Konya, where he

Up till then the leaders had acted much like naughty schoolboys fearing the staff at any moment. Meeting with no opposition from the Allies, and realising the futility, and perhaps the complicity, of the Central Government, they came out

On moving to Erzeroum, Mustafa Kemal left the General Officer Commanding the 3rd Caucasus Division orders to resist the landing of foreign troops. The latter proceeded to do, and practically issued an ultimatum that if the newly formed Greek battalion landed at Samsoun he would not be responsible. As usual, the Turks feared that the arrival of a British battalion meant that a Greek force was following along behind. The General Officer Commanding, however, had given them his orders, and he was replaced by strong action from Constantinople. The Greek battalion landed without any incident.

Maslafa Kemal's intrigues were now spreading far and wide. He was in contact with the Kurds, and information received from Armenian and other sources endeavoured to indicate that he had some understanding with

Erzeroum has now become the centre with Konia as a minor centre. F. Amassia and Erzeroum were some 6 000 men and 2 000 men, and a military zone was declared. The Congress of Erzeroum was announced and what was to all

On the 7th August the Erzeroum Congress published its decisions. This group only represented the eastern vilayets. It proclaimed itself loyal to the Sultan and the Turkish Empire but attacked Damad Ferid's Government as unable to protect Turkish interests. It decided to protect Christians, but to resist by force all en-

On the 12th August the Veli of Angora announced his adherence to the 3rd movement, and it was found that Mustafa Kemal was in close touch with the 7th of the Nachivan district. An alarmist report stated that Mustafa Kemal had

arly in September a new Congress was called at Sivas which became the center of gravity. This Congress professed to represent all Turkey. It issued declarations against the Central Government. It maintained that it stood for the interests of the Turks, while Damad Ferid stood for those of the Allies.

The movement now extended outside the Samoun area westwards down the way. On the 12th September Angora was in the hands of the Nationalists, and Kaya Hissar more or less under their control.

It was very evident that the movement was the work of a clique, and had to touch the mass of the people, who are always prompt for peace and amity.

It was very evident that the movement was the work of a clique, and limited to touch the mass of the people who sat down praying for peace and security. On the 15th September the control officer, Samsoun, reported that the local population were hoping for Allied intervention against the Nationalists. The movement at

1. The first part of the report, "The State of the Union," is a general statement of the condition of the country, and is the most important part of the report. It is a statement of the condition of the country, and is the most important part of the report.

“time being as much interested in the protection of the Christians as the Allies
are, and that the carrying out of the terms of the convention was the Nation

yes, and that the carrying out of the terms of the armistice was the Nation's hope of salvation. They argued the effete and corrupt Government of Constantinople had never represented the Turks. It has ruined Turkey. We represent

At one time the Nationalists intended to mobilise Christians. On the 12th

On the 25th September the Sivas Congress found this unwise and decided to call up only Turks for the present.

On the 20th September the Armenian quarter of Samouni was surrounded and searched for arms. A number of Armenians were beaten. This led to a panic, and all who could prepared to leave for Constantinople.

On the 1st October Damad Ferid Pasha's Government, bound hand and foot by

A report from the Commander in chief of the 9th October stated that all was

A report from the Commander in chief of the 9th October stated that all was quiet and satisfactory at Samsooun and that trade was reviving. The Nationalists were in complete control. Brigandage round Samsooun had stopped but still continued round Trebizond. The Christians were frightened, and the Nationalists

The Mutawarrif of Eski-Chibir having been murdered on the 10th October another was appointed. His declaration is interesting. He declares that he has been appointed by the Sivas Government as representing the nation. He will ar-

Briefly, the position may be summarised as follows: born in Constantinople, bred in Byzantium, the Nationalist movement had spread across until it controlled the whole

of Erzeroum, the Nationalist movement had spread across until it controls the whole of Anatolia except the Greek area, and has a considerable hold in Thrace. It has won the sympathies of some of the Kurds, Arabs, and Tartars. The Central Government has become no more than the puppet of Constantinople and the

Thrace, the state of the

ference in internal affairs while keeping a stranglehold on the Central Government, combined to produce this result. There were dangers of Christian massacres and brigandage on the upland. For the moment the Nationalists have checked the

...some areas conditions have improved. The Allies have either shown considerable

the picture will appear. The Nationalists are organising, gaining morale, drill and recruiting, collecting funds, and endeavouring to rouse a torpid people to resist

Understand one argument alone—the dragon. Each day makes the imposition of unwelcome peace harder.

Reports show certain outstanding features both in the Samsoun and the whole
The reports show that the Christians are being persecuted. The reports
at protecting the Christians and resist outside assistance and interference.

There is a strong and rapidly growing stronger feeling of resentment against the French authorities by the efforts of a mission sent to this area by the French authorities. The local population are hardly touched by the more... They would prefer to be left alone... The French authorities are too weak to enforce their will. The local population are hardly touched by the more... They would prefer to be left alone... The French authorities are too weak to enforce their will.

152068

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. (Received November 14)

(No 2013)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 30, 1919

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 801 of the 8th October, paragraph 7 of my letter to your Lordship No. 1930 of the 18th October I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information, copy of a dated the 20th October, which I have addressed to his Excellency the United Kingdom Ambassador.

J M DE ROBECK High Commissioner.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th October, and in reply to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the United States Naval Radio Press.

3. The items which recently attracted my notice have dealt with stories in

Allied Powers mentioned above

Turkey as between that country and the Allied Powers, who are still in a state of war. I feel convinced that your Excellency will agree that the repetition of such inflammatory or harmful statements can serve no useful purpose and can, in fact, only be most undesirable at such a time as the present.

I have, &c.

J M DE ROBECK, High Commissioner

151221,

No. 10

received from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, showing the present military situation and resources of the Turkish Forces.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 150.

General Sir G. Milne to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

and a map (B) showing approximate distribution of the Ottoman regular forces. As regards irregular forces, I attach a schedule (C) showing the number of the high have been called up to prevent advances by the Greeks in Asia Minor.

Investigation is being carried on in order to record and check those

wherever inspection could be made it has stood this test

to the armistice, but it has been estimated at 600,000

To sum up, the position in Turkey in Europe appears to me satisfactory. In most of a line drawn north and south through Sivas, the Ottoman army is weak. No unidentified guns, for instance, have appeared opposite the at Sivas, as would certainly have been the case had such existed. The schedule is undoubtedly mainly at Erzurum, whence all

SCHEDULE (E).—*Ottoman Machine Guns.*

At Armistice. Handed over.

SCHEDULE (F).

Crane and Machine Co.,

1. Excluding the 11th Army Corps area (Diarbekr) and the XVIIth Army Corps (Samsat), both of which Army Corps have been only partially disarmed, there does not appear to be any appreciable number of machine guns available to the National Government as an allowance to the regular army, except in the XVth Army Corps (Tarsus).

2. The XIVth Army Corps (Panderion), however, has still more than 100 machine guns to hand over, according to information received. But as none of these have turned up in front of the Greeks it is possible to hope this discrepancy is an error.

her,—No estimate possible

in the Smyrna area, and the quantities stored at Derinje and Ismet (which include a very large amount sent from Kutania), there is,—

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5. There are definitely the following at Erzeroum and Van.—

Fragment available at Kew-herb.

Heavy gun
Field and mountain gun

7. 10

4 P 24

31

Total bolts =

Small area evaluation

* This includes a number of guns claimed by the Turks to be unserviceable, and never included in their returns.

At 6 am—

Heavy guns

Mountain range ..

13

4. 7

Total sheet =

2

৭ ৮

• • •

4

6. The XIIIth Army Corps ammunition has been concentrated at Durbek—
amount unknown, but probably considerable.

7. There are various small depots of ammunition not greatly affecting the result.

171132

No. 151

Sir R. Crowe to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 12.)

No. 2123. (Confidential)

by land

Paria, November 10, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1537 of the 8th November, recording the
ings at the Supreme Council on that day, I have the honour to inform your
p in detail of the attitude adopted by me when the discussion on the report of
Syriana Commission was resumed on the 10th November by the Council.

2 I began by
unanimous (see Mr. Balfour's design
in draft
than the Council real
the invest

the investment of the Turkish troops and taken contrary to the allied naval officer by the occupation of certain towns across and across. The Commission, after investigating to the Council. The latter did not, however, could report as to whether the Council were justified in to occupy a certain area round Smyrna, or as to whether should be allowed to continue to hold this mandate, until the whole question of Turkey should come before and be settled by the Peace Conference. The drafting of

* purely military command

Therefore, that the report of the Commission might with advantage be virtually as falling into two separate parts: first, the facts and action of the Greek troops and the allegations against them, together with the assignment of responsibility for the facts, secondly the more general conclusions as to the future attitude to be adopted towards the Greek occupation. Taking the first part first, I pointed out that this question had really been already settled by the Council themselves, and I recalled the following facts: As explained by M. Voulzeos at the Council's sitting on the 8th November, he had on the 23rd June taken responsibility before the Council for ordering the Greek troops to make advances in

Between the 18th and 23rd June M. Venzakou had four letters to M. Clemenceau on this matter, to none of which he received an answer and he himself says that the Council did not disapprove his action.

between the Greek and Italian zones of occupation. This agreement had been approved by the Council on the 18th July, and communicated to General Milne, who

to the Smyrna incidents. General Milne had since
ed a certain line which he thought the Greeks could hold, except that in the
l by the boundary of the Smyrna sandjak and the Venizelos-Tutoni line
including Aidin and the railway as far as Koussok). General Milne suggested
that the Greek troops should advance from Aidin as far as the Kochak C...

advance which might lead to further fighting, or that the angle should be occupied by Allied troops.

I by Greek, French and the Greeks could be with Turkey. I had already been settled by the Council on the 8th November that the Greek army was now sufficiently strong to the zone delimited by General Milne, and he was confident that they could do so.

5. At this juncture I took the opportunity of pressing M. Clemenceau to his decision not to send a French battalion to the Aidin area, in which I was ind supported by Mr. Polk, who pointed out that the alternative offered by G. Milne, i.e., advance of Greek troops from Aidin to Kuchak Chai (reoccupation b the war (unthinkable) might render the Council responsible for further between the Turks and the Greeks. I was also supported by General Bunsell, the president of the Smyrna Commission who was present, and with felt convinced that Turks would not attack again in the Aidin section if French and British present. M. Clemenceau finally promised to give me a to-morrow, the 11th November, but did not hold out much hope that French could be sent. He was quite ready to accept General Milne's alternative that the Greeks should remain in occupation.

6. I returned to what might be termed the first part of the Commission's report. While in no way wishing to call in question the spirit of impartiality and sincerity with which the commissioners appeared to have conducted their enquiry, and presenting fully the value of the work which they had done, I from sympathizing with the reason which M. Venizelos had advanced on November to explain his inability to accept the conclusions of the commission report, i.e., the fact that, without the knowledge or approval of the Supreme Council, neither the names of the Turkish witnesses nor their evidence had been on.

actual facts as regards the exactions and massacres, as recorded in the Commission report, could be substantiated. Moreover, M. Venizelos himself, I venture think, accepted them in the main. He had himself caused enquiry to be held and guilty punished, as the report itself pointed out, and General Bunsell, in his statement, confirmed this. Lastly, I observed that for a considerable period order been re-established and reigned both in Smyrna and the neighbouring towns, though course on the fringes of the Greek occupation, where their troops were in the Turks. Even here it might be hoped that the result of General Milne's work might effect a material change for the better.

7. My views appeared to be generally accepted by the Council and it was that a letter should be written by M. Clemenceau to M. Venizelos, saying that the Council sympathized with M. Venizelos' attitude in the matter of the procedure adopted by the Commission, they were impressed with the serious facts brought to notice in the Commission's report, in the accuracy of which seemed substantiated by the evidence, and concluding by urging prudence and restraint on the Greeks, repeating that their occupation of the area was provisional pending the final decision of the Peace Conference regarding Turkey.

8. I venture to transmit for your Lordship's confidential information a copy of a memorandum written by Mr. Philip Kerr for Mr. Balfour's information in July 1918, and a dossier of

reference to this tells materially in M. Venizelos' favour as regards various points on which the Greek troops were said to have advanced without the authority of the Council or of the S.V.C. at Smyrna. Much of this evidence was not available to the Smyrna Commission, and as it refers to proceedings of the

of Four, which are supposed to be and remain absolutely secret, I could not bring it to the attention of the Council now. A copy of a further memorandum by Mr. Forbes Adam comparing in *extenso*, as regards two cases of alleged unauthorised advance by the Greeks, the Commission's report with the evidence of M. Venizelos, as given by Mr. K. and bringing the matter up to date, is also enclosed. These papers serve to give further reasons which led me to adopt the attitude before the Council which I have set forth above.

I have, &c.

FRANK A. CROWE.

15.671

party to London. I attended, by appointment, to see Mr. de Fleurbaey in the Foreign Office. He was accompanied by M. de Fleurbaey. Our conversation, which lasted for more than an hour, covered all the more important questions connected with the Near and the East.

After a mutual exchange of friendly sentiments and sincere intentions, M. Pichon asked me to describe the situation as it was in Paris.

Information which he gave about the state of negotiations with the Turks was much more sanguine than that which had been reported to us by our own sources. I could not help thinking that it was considerably coloured by hope. He was not at all about the suspension of negotiations between the Emir and M. Clemenceau. On the contrary, he described their correspondence and intercourse as being of the most amicable character. He said nothing of the appeal of the Emir to the Peace Conference, although at the moment I had that appeal in my possession. He said about any difficulties arising out of the military evacuation, which had already been discussed, although at the moment I had that appeal in my possession.

He said nothing about the prospect of danger in the wider field. I as a whole. Instead, he represented the Emir as gradually receding from the position which he had at first taken up, as having put forward extravagant pretensions which were now being watered down, and as realising by degrees that he had taken much too seriously, and probably might not find the support, even in his own camp, upon which he relied. M. Pichon evidently desired to give me the impression that negotiations with the Emir would ultimately eventuate in the manner which the French desired.

He did not dispute this poor estimate of the situation, although it was far from coinciding with the information I had received from Paris. The important thing I found, was that the French and the Emir should not split and should move their conversations to a point at which some sort of agreement might be reached.

The French Foreign Minister was emphatic in his declaration that any suspicion or intention had been removed, and in his satisfaction at the effect of that effect which we had supplied, both to his own Government and to the Emir. He clearly did not think that the case was one in which we, at any rate, were likely to arrive at a dangerous situation.

While danger

I so manage matters that our two nations were brought into contact, while he remained out of the picture.

It is to say that, America having disappeared from the scene as the settlement of the East, and all chance of an American mandate for any of the Turkish Empire having in his opinion, vanished, there remained only one thing to be considered and revolved, namely, the Turkish question.

From this point of view, he was authorised to say that his Government were prepared to enter into confidential discussions with us as soon as we either M. Clemenceau would come here alone, or he would come with the Emir, or he would depose the latter. In any case, conversations must take place, and understanding must be arrived at, before the Peace Conference addressed itself to the Turkish question.

With gratification both the necessity of such an interchange of views and the possibility of a meeting with M. Clemenceau. I pointed out to M. Pichon

that, quite apart from the larger question of peace with Turkey, there were matters connected with the Emir Feisal's case which could be settled only by some special discussion. There was, for instance, the question of the eastern boundary line of the coastal area in Syria which we were now evacuating, in order that we might be by the French. This matter had been more

appeared prematurely upon the scene, might be fraught with serious danger. I thought that the military frontier ought to be the limit of provisional military action by the French. Then, I said, there were in addition such questions as the of the subsidy to Emir Feisal between the French and ourselves; the control of railways; the replacement of British by Arab troops in the areas into which the were not to advance; the risks of risings or disorders there; and the future bound of the protected areas in the Syrian State: all of which questions must be raised and agreed upon by the French and ourselves. They were 1 of them sources of possible mischief, and the sooner they were examined and composed, the better.

But, I went on to say, there was a much larger issue than the more settled these questions by negotiation or otherwise between the French and ourselves was a much larger question than even that of the mandates for Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine—although of course it was highly desirable that these mandates be arranged, and that we should all settle down to work in those countries as soon possible. I referred to the peace with Turkey itself, and here I desired to go a deal beyond the suggestion of the French Minister, and to submit to him a proposal on behalf of His Majesty's Government. I understood that the proceeds of the Conference in Paris deal with the Peace Treaty, so far as they had not gone, and the matters arising out of them, were likely to be brought to a close the end of the present month. There seemed to be a general desire that the Conference in its present form should then dissolve. Why, I asked, should it not meet perhaps in another form and in another place, to deal with the Turkish question which had hitherto seemed to find favour was this: that the Conference having completed its present labours, would take a holiday, that, when the elections were completed, it would meet again, probably in Paris, and that, some in the early part, possibly not till the spring, of next year some sort of agreement about Turkey might, it was hoped, be reached.

By next spring, I said, there might very likely be no government to deal with at all. It was more than possible that there would be no one to accept the sort of treaty which Allie would desire to impose. It was even conceivable that the few parties on the scene with a seat upon the Albes, and dare them to the case, I did not see how we were to conquer Asia Minor, or who to do it; and the ignominious result might be that the weakest and

I asked, should not the Conference meet at an early date next month? It might well meet after the conversations with the French statesmen in London. For the

agreed to send a representative here. In these circumstances, would it not be desirable to arrange at once that the Eastern question be reserved for London, and taken up and determined here? My own impression was that, if this idea were favourably regarded, a settlement might be arrived at in a month, or not much more. The Conference, if it met in December, might, if adjourn for Christmas, meet again early in January, and complete its work in the middle of that month.

I enumerated to the French Foreign Minister the main headings of the which would have to be decided. They were, it seemed to me, the following: the future of Turkey-in-Europe and the setting up of some form of administrative control in Constantinople, whether or not the Sultan was left in Stamboul

was to have any foothold in Asia Minor or not, the question whether a man

date were given or accepted, some form of international supervision of the Caucasus, the and the future of Kurdistan. These were matters that required questions the solution of which had to some been prejudged, such as the fate of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Upon other questions, the kind of understanding between France and ourselves which Pichon had predicated was most desirable. If we could attain it at the conversations

M. Pichon explained to me in reply that this was an entirely new proposal, which

use way. For instance, he described to me the system of elections going on simultaneously or in rapid sequence in almost every electoral area and for almost every

or five different places and capacities. France would not have elections till the middle of January, and it might therefore be open for French statesmen to go abroad for a discussion. Nevertheless, he promised to put forward the suggestion, with which I told him that M. Cambon had for long warm sympathy, and he would let me have an early reply.

any such plan, and I impressed upon him that the proposal I had put

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Foreign Office, November 12, 1919.

152008

No. 153

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 2045)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 2, 1919

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship a report on the political situation in the Samoun area by the control officer at that place, which has been communicated to me by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

2. I would invite your Lordship's attention specially to the sixth paragraph of the report, as it bears on the security of the Christians in the interior of Turkey is dependent upon the goodwill of the Turks, and that, if it is proposed to impose drastic and "humiliating" peace terms on this country, it is essential that the Powers should, in the first place, take account of the

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK.

High Commissioner

THE situation in the Samsoun sanjak is good. When the news of the change of Cabinet arrived it created very little interest among the population.

The Mutessarif, Hamid Bey, has gone off on a supposed brigand hunt to Unyeh and Fetsin, and Lieutenant Popplewell is paying a visit to the same place in order to discover the real object if not that given, of the Mutessarif's visit.

Literary officers, of whom several have arrived recently from Constantinople, of the latter, notably a certain Riza Pasha, who appears to be an agitator, still talk of very little but politics and the future of Turkey, and themselves the saviours of the country, comparing the present to the Constitution.

The very few really intelligent Turkish inhabitants look up distrust, and ask for nothing better than a British protection for the country common people do not think, but will follow any lead that is given to them. Military service is not required of them.

The military party has well organized a gendarmerie of surrendered Turkish Lazz brigades; but beyond these and the few troops that it already possesses, the inhabitants against a European force although the initial did join in a massacre of Christians with great pleasure.

There is a very strong anti-Christian feeling, that is held within bounds by military party and by important civil officials, who do not consider the present moment suitable one for such a feeling to express itself in action. But, if this constraint were taken away, and the slightest encouragement given to the people, massacres in the interior would take place without fail. Four Greeks were killed recently by Turks at Laiki.

The departure of the British troops from Samoun encouraged to a certain extent the supporters of the Sivas movement, who published the statement that it had forced the evacuation. Local CUP Turks were also inclined to become more conspicuous than usual, but the visit of the "Iron Duke" and a few words of decided them to be

The Syrian Congress is not so violently anti British as it was to believe that the anti British feeling was chiefly due to fear that the British would take offensive action against them. The anti British sentiment is chiefly old C.O.P. men and escaped prisoners. Haid Pasha and Kotechuk Djem are our men.

Generally speaking, the most satisfactory solution of the Turkish question that possibly be obtained by the Turks is considered to them to be the evacuation of Smyrna and cession of territory to Armenia. Retention of Smyrna by the Greeks is held to be a possible danger, and cession of territory to Armenia a certain danger of an un-

Control Officer, Su-

October 16, 1913)

1520251

No. 154.

Vice Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon — (Received November 14)

(No. 2011.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, November 4.

I HAVE the honour to report that a few days ago I visited the Sublime Order to return the visit of Mustapha Rehid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. There was nothing of particular interest in the conversation, except that I had opportunity to question him as to the accuracy of a report I had seen in that paper, to the effect that Mustapha Kemal had telegraphed to the Government demanding that the new Parliament should be summoned to meet at Broussa, at Constantinople, so that in conducting their deliberations they might be free from certain undesirable foreign influences. His Excellency hastened to assure me that he knew nothing of any such message. I suggested that if the idea were carried out it would imply the practical transference of the capital to Broussa, but Kemal

2. I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum which has been written by Mr. Hohler on the question of the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople. I am entirely in concurrence with his views.

I have, &c

J. M. DE ROBERTA
High Commissioner

enclosure in No. 154

Memorandum by Mr. T. B. Holder

idea of convening the Turkish Parliament at Broussa is perhaps one which
be contemplated with favour. We here are in entire ignorance of the real
Conference, but it must be permitted to believe that the Turkish Empire will be
down to Asia Minor, and not even very probably to the entirety of that; that
rule; whilst compliance with an interpretation of the Wilsonian principles
may result in the formation of Greek and Kurdish independent States in the West and
in the East.

Pera and Galata have remained comparatively unscathed, but these districts are of a cosmopolitan crowd, which gives its character to the town far more than the Turkish population comprised largely of refugees huddled together in the quarters which have become exposed by the flames. It seems unavailing that the ruler of a third-rate kingdom in Asia should still possess so great a capital, the very ruin of which is beyond his means as is being proved at this very time; it is as if a landlord, whose farm and buildings were in complete dilapidation, should endeavour to occupy and to maintain from family pride some noble old historic castle. Again, if there is any certain lesson to be derived from history, it is that the Turk is incapable of governing even himself, to say nothing of other races, and it is necessary to go no further than Constantinople to obtain at once abundant proof of his

[illegible]

the Turks would be hurt by seeing these places fall from their control, but not their piety or religious fervour.

It is frequently stated, though there is considerable difficulty in determining with how much truth, that the Turks do not know or will not admit that they have been conquered. It is highly desirable that they should not be left with the slightest illusion in this respect, and nothing will bring it home to them with such effect as to deprive them of their capital. The Sultanate is now become a very tawdry hollow show, and the present sovereign, a man apparently of high principles and aspirations, though of weak character and little courage, and who is entirely averse to the work of a Nationalist party who have brought him into his present position, and a trouble-bearer of all such brilliancy as still existed.

The house of Osman would seem to be no prince who by ruling his people. But from its very nature of conspiracy and the scheming which will inevitably grow up among the various Moslem States which are about to come into being in the East as a result of the disruption of the Turkish Empire is likely to find a more fertile soil in Constantinople than in the rest of the Sultanate, and perhaps also of more to be transferred to the clearer atmosphere and more peaceful surroundings of the early capital of the Turks. It appears to me there is a danger of over-estimating the shock to Moslim feeling at large by the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, and I believe there is greater risk, in reality, in leaving them there to brood over their fallen greatness, they understand no treatment but that of force, and they are fairly prepared now to receive a violent shock, and it can be detrimental that the Moslems at large should be given any opportunity to perceive that it is entirely disadvantageous to stand against the British Government.

5. The difficulties that beset the question of the Government of the town, should it be taken from the Turks, are obvious, and whilst there seems to be no solution save that of placing it under an international régime, the example of Tangier stands as a warning. It is, however, a question of human ingenuity - if indeed it prove impossible to place it under a single mandatory to devise some scheme by which an equitable and practical administration may be created that will give liberty and justice to the motley population and the varied interests centred here.

1152026

No. 155

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — (Received November 14)

N. 2067

My Lord

I HAVE the honour to forward to you the report on the present political situation in Transcaucasia, which has been prepared by the High Commissioner, J. M. de Robeck, and the Staff of the High Commissioner.

2. As the messenger is leaving for England within an hour, there has not been time to copy the report, and one copy only is therefore enclosed.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
High Commissioner

Enclosure to No. 1.

Report on the Situation in Transcaucasia.

"Iron Duke" at Constantinople,

November 2, 1919

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the present political and general situation in Transcaucasia, made as the result of my recent visit to that country.

2. Transcaucasia, that is to say the region bounded on the north by the main Caucasus chain and on the south by the old Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian frontiers, is at present divided into four separate territories, namely, the three republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Russian Armenia (sometimes called the "Ararat Republic" and the province of Batum, which is under British military occupation. There are also various small neutral zones, composed of districts.

The mountainous regions of the Caucasus are, as a rule, very fertile and well watered, and the climate is generally very pleasant. The population is very dense, and the country is very rich in minerals. The principal cities are Tiflis, Baku, and Batum. The principal occupations are agriculture, stock raising, and mining. The principal exports are grain, oil, and minerals. The principal imports are cotton, sugar, and other manufactured goods. The principal trade routes are the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Persian Gulf.

3. The province of Batum owes its origin to clause 15 of the Armistice with Turkey, Batum having been at the time of the conclusion of the Armistice in Turkish military occupation.

4. The crucial question in Transcaucasia, a question on which all other questions in the country are dependent, is that of the recognition or otherwise of the three republics by the Peace Conference. The question has multitudinous aspects, conditions in the three States differing widely, but there are two facts common to the situation, namely:

- (1) Recognition, if granted, will run counter to the aims of Denikin and Kolchak for an "Undivided Russia."
- (2) Recognition must necessarily be accompanied by a mandate in order to protect the three States both from reconquest by Russia, and from internecine warfare.

5. Before submitting any observations as to British policy with regard to recognition, I propose to outline briefly political conditions in the three republics.

GEORGIA

Of the three States, Georgia has had the longest continuous independent existence, and perhaps the most pronounced national consciousness. She has a distinct language, script, and an ancient literature, and an independent national Church co-extensive with the kingdom. Kingdom and Church were forcibly absorbed by Russia in 1801, but they never abandoned the hope of recovering independence. When Georgia declared her independence of Russia in 1918, the Church of Georgia similarly renounced its dependence on the Church of Russia, and, while remaining in full communion with the Russian and other Orthodox Churches, has resumed its status of an "autocephalous" and independent Church.

The present Georgian Government is Social Democrat, but anti Bolshevik. The Georgian people are probably much more conservative than their Government, and it is thought that at the forthcoming elections the parties of the Right will be far more strongly represented than they are in the present Constituent Assembly.

The instinct of the Georgian people is naturally sympathetic to any Power that is hostile to the Bolsheviks, with whom they have nothing in common. Any restoration of Bolshevism in Georgia is rigidly suppressed, and the bulk of the population in the country are Russians and Jews, not Georgians. On the other hand, Georgians are in a quandary as regards Denikin. They sympathise with his war against Bolshevism, but they cannot but regard him as the principal

opponent of their independence. Denikin has made it abundantly clear that independent Georgia is incompatible with what he is fighting for, namely, undivided Russia, so to the Georgians, the ultimate success of Denikin means end of their independence, unless some mandatory intervenes to preserve it.

With Azerbaijan, Georgian relations are on the whole cordial, despite points of difference, mainly commercial. Georgia has, for example, lent Azerbaijan army a number of her officers, and both countries are united by a dread of reincorporation by Russia, and to a lesser degree, by a common dislike their mutual neighbour, Armenia.

As regards the latter, Georgian antipathy is directed against Armenians individually rather than against the Armenian Republic. Georgia is quite capable of making common cause with Armenia and Azerbaijan for the purpose of preserving Transcaucasian independence as against Russia. She probably dislikes Armenians within her own borders more than those beyond them, the reason being that the bulk of the wealth of the country has found its way into Armenian pockets.

All the best houses in Tiflis are owned by Armenians, and although the Armenian Republic is as a neighbour somewhat of a *mauvais coucheur*, Georgia is inclined to see in it a means of ridding herself of a number of unwelcome guests.

The Turks the Christian Georgians, who form the overwhelming majority of the race, are unhesitatingly hostile. Moslem Georgians living in Batumi have bonds of sympathy with the Turks, but carry no political weight. At the same time, there is said to be a Georgian representative at the headquarters of Mustafa Kemal, the reason doubtless being that Georgia, in her desperate eagerness for independence, is prepared to accept recognition wherever she can get it. This reason also explains Georgia's friendly relations with Germany prior to the German collapse. Germany, aware of the importance of Georgia's geographical position on the direct route to Persia, Afghanistan, and India, bargained with Turkey to secure Georgian independence, which she was the first officially to recognise and even now Germany is making efforts to capture Georgian sympathy and Georgian trade. Her argument to Georgia is as follows: "Russia and Germany are bound to come together once Russia has been reconstituted. Russia will need German help, and Germany will make the independence of Georgia one of the conditions on which she will afford that help. In return, Germany asks for the monopoly of the concessions granted by Georgia." Quite recently Germany has invited Georgia to send 300 Georgian children to Germany to be educated free of charge in German schools.

AZERBAIJAN

The national or separatist movement in Azerbaijan is of much more recent growth than in Georgia or Armenia. It was, in fact, unheard of until 1917. Georgia took the lead in the idea of separation from Russia, and from the fear of the Tatars of Baku than of any similar group of Tatars elsewhere. But the idea of independence has by now taken deep root and the Azerbaijanis, while friendly to the Russian people, and while anxious for economic reasons to be on good terms with Russia, who is their natural customer, would be prepared to fight rather than go back to the old régime of incorporation with a centralising Russia.

The members of the two principal political parties in Azerbaijan, the Musavat and the Jafar Khan, are both friendly to the idea of independence of Georgia, sympathetic so far as his fight against Bolshevism is concerned, suspicious as to his Pan-Russian aims.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Denikin have been very friendly. Denikin's policy in Daghestan. Azerbaijan has been very friendly to Denikin, and that Denikin has now occupied that region, and has proceeded to conscript the Moslem population (which under the Tsarist régime was exempt from conscription) has caused much alarm at Baku, where it is feared that an attempt may be made to abetting. Towards the end of October Denikin notified Azerbaijan that he would not tolerate the Azerbaijani flag on the Caspian, and this, together with the news that Denikin has caused much alarm at Baku, where it is feared that an attempt may be made to abetting.

The natural dislike of the Azerbaijanis to the Armenians is made use of by the Turks and the Kurds, who do their best to incite them to attack Armenian

villages and massacre their inhabitants. This they do in the belief that, the smaller the number of Armenians in the world, the smaller will be the territory to be

There is a certain amount of sympathy for Turkey in Azerbaijan but the feeling, due largely to pan-Islamic propaganda, is sentimental rather than practical. It is discounted to a considerable extent by the fact that three-quarters of the Moslems of Azerbaijan are Shi'ahs, and only one-quarter Sunni, and the Azerbaijanis, who are a practical people, are well aware that Turkey is not in a position to do anything for them. This does not prevent them from making use of Turkish officers to stiffen their army.

It should be added that the republic of Azerbaijan has no connection with the Azerbaijanis who are Tatars also, but there is no question of their withdrawing from Russian rule and joining the republic.

ARMENIA

The Republic of Armenia, as it exists at present, lies entirely within what was formerly Russian territory, but it is understood that three schemes for its ultimate boundaries have been propounded. These schemes are --

- (1) Nubar Pasha's project of a vast Armenia running from the Black Sea and Persian frontier to the Mediterranean at Alexandretta. In this area the Armenians form only about 3 per cent of the total population.
- (2) The "Six Vilayets" scheme, namely the existing Armenia with the vilayets of Kivas, Erzerum, Kharput (Mamuret-el-Aziz), Diarbekir, Bitlis and Van.
- (3) The so-called "Erivan project," namely existing Armenia with the vilayet of Erzerum, that part of the vilayet of Trebizond east of Kerasund, and roughly the portions of the vilayets of Van and Bitlis north of the 30th parallel of latitude.

The Armenian Republic, which corresponds to the present boundaries, is said to be in a state of confusion, and the present Armenian Republic is in a state of confusion.

President of Armenia, M. Hatusian, is a wealthy Georgian Armenian, who was a successful Mayor of Tiflis, and has with commendable patriotism left his business and order to himself the new Armenian Republic. In politics he is a member of the Dashnak party, which controls and even terrorises the Government. The Dashnak party, which controls and even terrorises the Government, has shown much interest in the field of leaving the Volunteer Bands against the Turks, and thereby securing such independence as Armenia has already won. In politics their influence is pernicious. They are intensely socialistic, they are controlled by threats and blackmail they are the prosperous bourgeois Armenians of Tiflis, Baku, Rostov, Batum, &c., and they would lose their political supremacy and their monopoly of government posts. It is evident that the Dashnakists prefer a small and chaotic Armenia controlled by themselves to a settled Armenia which would attract the more constructive elements of the Armenian race.

6. The one point upon which all persons with whom I spoke in Transcaucasia were unanimous--such persons including British officers, British civilians with long experience of the country--was that the Armenian Republic is in a state of confusion.

The Armenian Republic is in a state of confusion, and the present Armenian Republic is in a state of confusion.

ity of their anti-German feeling. It is said that the Armenian Republic is in a state of confusion.

came in contact that whether Bolshevism is a danger to the Armenian Republic is in a state of confusion.

Again, it is evident that reconstituted Russia will make every effort not only to recover Transcaucasia, but also to resume her pre-war activities in Persia.

At this very moment M. Sazonof is said to be seeking to obtain for Russian interests the Armenian Republic.

of the future will find it difficult to forgive the Anglo-Persian agreement. It is admitted, the wisdom from the British point of view of detaching Transcaucasia from Russia, and from German influence, can scarcely be doubted, not so much on account of the wealth of the country, as on account of creating a buffer between a more or less Germanised Russia on the one hand, and Persia, Mesopotamia, India on the other. In other words, the strong desire of the Transcaucasians for independence of Russia coincides with what seem to be the true interests of British policy.

The existence in some form or other of an independent Armenia is presumable a foregone conclusion. Georgia has already been assured of the sympathy of His Majesty's Government, the completion of the Transcaucasian buffer by the inclusion of Azerbaijan would not seem, therefore, to involve any departure from a

... three States are to be recognised it will be necessary, as stated, ... should be placed under one mandatory Power, both to preserve them from reconquest by Russia and to prevent them from becoming a second Balkans. It would not seem desirable that the mandatory should be Great Britain, for whoever takes the oil of Russia. Moreover, we have no need to control it, namely, the oil, can have no other market than Russia. The United States, with her well known sentimental interest in Armenians and her less widely advertised but equally keen interest in Caucasians would seem from the British point of view the most desirable mandatory, being best able to bear the brunt of Russian hostility. But if she can be induced to accept the mandate it should not be a nominal American mandate in which the work is performed by British officers lent to the United States for the purpose. In such a case the blame for any mistakes would tend to fall on the British shoulders, the kudos for success to be monopolised by the mandatory Power.

8. It cannot be said that the Americans at present officially employed in the Caucasus have given those with whom they have worked or come in contact a favourable impression of American methods. Colonel Haskell, the Allied High Commissioner, who is said to have been the nominee of Mr. Hoover, has not only Transcaucasians, but his own subordinates, by his tactlessness, his bearing methods, and his disinclination to remedy his ignorance of local conditions by consulting persons acquainted with the country. It is believed in Tiflis that his departure is due to General Harbord's recommendation for his recall. Colonel R. S. A. is at present replacing him as Acting High Commissioner.

The unofficial relief organisation known as the A. C. R. N. E. (American Committee for Relief in the Near East) has lately been taken over by an official military organisation known as the N. E. R. (Near East Relief), which is controlled by the United States Army. The army officers who have been sent out in charge of this organisation have made themselves very disliked by the natives, and there is also a good deal of friction between them and the remaining volunteer workers belonging to the A. C. R. N. E. They have the reputation of being extremely dictatorial and

... thing of native habits or ways of thought. The officers I met in Armenia bear this reputation. Their organisation of relief work, judging from what I saw of it in Erivan, and from what I have heard there and elsewhere in Armenia, leaves much to be desired. They appear to combine relief work with business; their flour is

... cent, and their staff includes experts in oil and cotton. An English mining engineer long resident in the Caucasus told me that he had recently been invited by a N. E. R. officer to undertake on his behalf the Georgia agency for the purchase of wood

It is only fair to say that several of the Americans realise their lack of qualifications to deal with Eastern races, and openly express the hope that if the United States accepts the Transcaucasian mandate she will be able to rely on the loan of British officers with Eastern experience.

There is an impression in Tiflis that General Harbord's recommendation is in favour of an American mandate for Transcaucasia, provided that it is accompanied by the mandate for Turkey.

9. The Italian missions in the country are nothing more or less than commercial agents for Germany, a fact of which everyone in Transcaucasia is fully aware. Their purpose is to obtain timber, mining and railway concessions from the three republics.

I learned from a reliable source in Baku that at the time when the question

an Italian mandate for the Caucasus was under consideration the Italian terms as to Azerbaijan included the following --

- (1.) The forced substitution of Italian paper lire for the local currency at the rate of 40 roubles to the paper lira.
- (2.) The collection by Italy of all royalties on oil exported from Baku.
- (3.) The appropriation by Italy of 50 per cent. of the shares of each of the oil companies working at Baku.

10. Another instrument of German propaganda is to be found in the wireless stations at Tiflis and Baku, which take in daily via Moscow a large quantity of German press news. The news, which appears to be just as offensive to the Entente as it was in war time, is published in full in the local newspapers. The stations are worked by the Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments respectively. When I enquired why no British press news was apparently taken in from Baku, it was stated, with what truth I cannot say, that it was because Baku messages were made too quickly

... can be taken in without difficulty. In addition to the Georgian Government W/T Station at Tiflis the Italian mission has at Tiflis a receiving station.

The Armenian Government has a station at Erivan which is not yet in working

11. From the material point of view, as also in the interests of British trade, it is desirable that the fate of the Transcaucasian States should be settled as soon as possible. There are good openings for British capital in the country in the

... suspended. The great need of the country is exchange on Europe, which in its present indeterminate position it cannot obtain.

The absence of a controlling authority able to deal with the conflicting interests of the three republics is also responsible for much overlapping in railway administration and for mutually invidious treatment as regards the importation of goods. Each of the three States insists on separately managing its own section of Transcaucasian railways. There are unwise and vexatious Customs regulations, the train personnel changes at each frontier, and there is no pooling of the rolling-stock. This inability to combine in a direction where combination is all concerned would no doubt be at once corrected.

Similarly the mandatory Power would prevent Georgia putting, as she is doing at present, every obstacle in the way of supplies entering Armenia, such supplies having to pass in transit through Georgia. She would also no doubt put a stop to the present practice whereby the politicians in Georgia, by raising the prices of the necessities of life, thus unconsciously encouraging Bolshevism.

12. The present position of the oil industry at Baku is briefly as follows --

Some 160 firms are working in the district, but 85 per cent. of the total output is controlled by four groups, namely: Nobel Brothers, the Shell group, the Lianosoff group, and the Russian Société Neft, who in turn have certain working agreements between themselves in connexion with output, the use of the Transcaucasian pipeline, employment and payment of labour, &c.

The most powerful group is Nobel Brothers, who are not only producers, but also refiners and distributors on a large scale, and who, besides dealing with their own products, purchase from other producers, and have controlling interests in numerous refineries working in other parts of Russia. Nobel Brothers have their own fleet of oil tankers and river barges, the latter including motor-driven craft up to 3,000 tons of oil in bulk.

Nobels are a Swedish family established in Russia, but the bulk of the oil was until quite recently, German. I heard, however, at Baku that no definite details as to the deal were obtainable locally.

The Shell group, besides its own produce from the former Rothschild refineries at Baku, controls that of other companies at Grozni and in Transcaucasia, numerous refineries, and through its subsidiary, the Société Mazut, which has storage in all the principal Russian towns, as well as steamers and tankers, in normal times does a large distributing business throughout Russia.

The Lianoseff group is financed by Russian banks with the assistance of the Russian and General Oil Trust, an Anglo-French concern. Quite recently Neftebrothers have bought up a large number of the shares of this trust, which they are in control to a certain extent.

The Russian Société Neft, originally a small distributor of naphtha products in Russia, and then a producer in the Baku district, has within the last six years expanded into a powerful group, with the aid of French capital provided through Messrs. Louis Dreyfus and Co., of Paris.

The Standard Oil Company has lately made an unsuccessful attempt to acquire a footing in the Baku district.

The overwhelming bulk of the Baku oil products is consumed in Russia. It cannot, except as regards lubricants, and to a certain extent, kerosene, compete further west with Roumania, Galicia, and American products. The mazut is sent to Russia via the Volga, where it is used for fuel on the railways, &c. The bulk of the kerosene goes to Russia for home consumption, although a certain quantity is sent abroad via Batum, whither it is conveyed by the pipe line. Baku oils are exceptionally rich in lubricants, of which large quantities are shipped abroad. On the other hand they give but small percentages of benzine and paraffin.

As no Baku oil now passes into Bolshevist Russia, storage accommodation at Baku is taxed to its utmost, and unless the Russian market is opened up before long the producers will be faced with the alternatives of letting the oil run to waste or of closing down production. There are now stored at Baku 3,500,000 tons of oil, and the impossibility of procuring the necessary materials prevents the storage accommodation from being enlarged.

The labour employed at the Baku oil fields amounts to 80,000 men, representing almost the entire industrial labour of Azerbaijan; if these men were to be discharged, or were put on reduced wages owing to unemployment, the resulting industrial upheaval would have the most serious effects both on the oil-fields and on the country generally. The labour is composed almost equally of Tatars, Persians, and Armenians.

The normal output from the Baku area up to March 1918 was between 1,000,000 and 800,000 tons monthly. Since then it has dropped to between 500,000 and 350,000 tons. This decrease is partly due to the fact that the output of the Azeri field has fallen from 400,000 to 200,000 tons, and partly to the fact that the output of the Baku field has fallen from 600,000 to 350,000 tons. The decrease is also due to the fact that the output of the Baku field has fallen from 600,000 to 350,000 tons. The decrease is also due to the fact that the output of the Baku field has fallen from 600,000 to 350,000 tons.

The Baku-Batum pipe line is a 10-inch pipe line 100 miles long, with pumping stations at intervals of 35 miles. The line has not been in use since the Russian Revolution, and the demand for oil is now met by the Baku field alone.

The Azeri field is a 10-inch pipe line 100 miles long, with pumping stations at intervals of 35 miles. The line has not been in use since the Russian Revolution, and the demand for oil is now met by the Baku field alone.

The communication is that provided by the Mercury Company with Petrovsk, Lenkoran, and the Persian port of Enzeli. Dockyard activities are also being carried out at Baku.

14. A word should be added as to the future of Batum province. It is, of course, most anxious to take it over, but he could only do so (assuming we were to evacuate it) at the cost of war with Georgia, and probably with Azerbaijan and Armenia as well. The fate of Batum is linked with that of Transcaucasia generally, and if it is decided to recognise the Transcaucasian republics, Batum must be united with the State of which ethnologically and geographically it is a part, namely Georgia. The only other possible claimant is Armenia, who might wish to control one end of the Transcaucasian railway, but ethnologically such a claim could not be substantiated.

As regards the armies of the Transcaucasian States, Georgia has an army of about 60,000, with over 3,000 officers. She has, in fact, more officers than she can at present employ.

The Azerbaijan army is thought to consist of about 20,000 regulars, with perhaps twice that number of irregulars.

The Armenian army consists of 20,000 regular troops, but only has uniforms for 1,000.

Each of these armies possesses several competent native generals who have seen service as generals in the old Russian army.

A certain number of Russian officers of Russian nationality is also employed in the Armenian army.

I have &c

H C LUKE Lieutenant Commander, R V V R
Political Officer

152298

No 156

India Office to Foreign Office - (Received November 15.)

Sir,

India Office, November 14, 1919.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward for submission to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a translation of a note read by Ahmad-ibn Thunayyan at the India Office Conference on behalf of Ibn Saud.

Mr Montagu would suggest that, with Lord Curzon's concurrence, the question raised in this note might be considered at an early date by the Committee on Middle Eastern Affairs.

The hope was expressed at the interview that the note would be answered to Ahmad-ibn Thunayyan as from the India Office, and that it would be held before the departure of the representative of Ibn Saud.

Enclosure in No. 156

Note read to India Office and Foreign Office Joint Conference on behalf of Ibn Saud by Ahmad-ibn Thunayyan, November 1, 1919.

(Translation.)

AS the subjects of His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz, His Majesty's Government sent an official representation through their consul at Jeddah to the effect that Ibn Saud, as a subject of His Majesty's Government, committed himself to the following conditions:

1. His troops from the Hedjaz, His Majesty's Government would treat him as an enemy and sever relations with him and discontinue his subsidy. Ibn Saud, in the tenour of this representation and said: "What has caused His Majesty's Government to write thus?" saying that he had frequently informed His Majesty's Government of the attitude of the Sherref and his acts of aggression against the Hedjaz, and had gone so far as to request the despatch of a force to deal with the difficulties existing between him and the Sherref.

2. His Majesty's Government would treat him as an enemy and sever relations with him and discontinue his subsidy. Ibn Saud, in the tenour of this representation and said: "What has caused His Majesty's Government to write thus?" saying that he had frequently informed His Majesty's Government of the attitude of the Sherref and his acts of aggression against the Hedjaz, and had gone so far as to request the despatch of a force to deal with the difficulties existing between him and the Sherref.

3. His Majesty's Government would treat him as an enemy and sever relations with him and discontinue his subsidy. Ibn Saud, in the tenour of this representation and said: "What has caused His Majesty's Government to write thus?" saying that he had frequently informed His Majesty's Government of the attitude of the Sherref and his acts of aggression against the Hedjaz, and had gone so far as to request the despatch of a force to deal with the difficulties existing between him and the Sherref.

4. His Majesty's Government would treat him as an enemy and sever relations with him and discontinue his subsidy. Ibn Saud, in the tenour of this representation and said: "What has caused His Majesty's Government to write thus?" saying that he had frequently informed His Majesty's Government of the attitude of the Sherref and his acts of aggression against the Hedjaz, and had gone so far as to request the despatch of a force to deal with the difficulties existing between him and the Sherref.

5. His Majesty's Government would treat him as an enemy and sever relations with him and discontinue his subsidy. Ibn Saud, in the tenour of this representation and said: "What has caused His Majesty's Government to write thus?" saying that he had frequently informed His Majesty's Government of the attitude of the Sherref and his acts of aggression against the Hedjaz, and had gone so far as to request the despatch of a force to deal with the difficulties existing between him and the Sherref.

6. His Majesty's Government would treat him as an enemy and sever relations with him and discontinue his subsidy. Ibn Saud, in the tenour of this representation and said: "What has caused His Majesty's Government to write thus?" saying that he had frequently informed His Majesty's Government of the attitude of the Sherref and his acts of aggression against the Hedjaz, and had gone so far as to request the despatch of a force to deal with the difficulties existing between him and the Sherref.

the preliminary agreement and its ratification anew on both sides with a view to give effect to it.

If you honour the patent to north and south, and that which is the prophet: "Whose benediction the Turaba, and Kinnu, and Bush, have done before and frequent if it is not sent the above are our boundaries, as we with the instructions of Ibn Saud, and whose transg

and the q
Najd. This
but if it is

enhancement of the original temporary subsidy and continuance in perpetuity for the rehabilitation of his territories from the ruin caused by internal wars and during the occupation by the Turks, and on their behalf by Ibn Saud for a period of fifty years.

3. The question of the demarcation of the boundary and of the despatch of Mr. Philby to Ibn Saud as desired by the latter as political agent empowered for the solution of this problem and other kindred problems, and for the purpose of discussion with Ibn Saud, as he has some knowledge of our conditions and those of our neighbours, whether States or cities, seeing that he has been long in Arabia.

[152998]

No. 157

Colonel C. E. Wilson to Major Young. — (Received at Foreign Office, November 18.)

My dear Young:

I SEND you the following remarks which

regarding Hussein's probable abdication

considered opinion of Emir Abdullah the

of influence in the Hedjaz I have met, is that should Hussein abdicate something very like general anarchy in the Hedjaz, and I think it probable that unanimous opinion is correct. Such a state of affairs would not be good for Imperial interests. It is unlikely that the Akhwan would remain quiet, would probably attempt a serious invasion of the Hedjaz.

In my humble opinion, the Akhwan movement is the most troublesome of the Arabian situation; the longer the Indian Government supports him have up to date, the longer will be the series of difficult situations which will His Majesty's Government, whether Hussein abdicates, dies, or remains in his position.

Hussein and the Arab chiefs believe that the Indian Government is against the Majesty's Government, and it is difficult for them to understand why the Moslem Power in the world should support a sectarian movement which aims at overthrow of orthodox Islam.

Denys Beay (Political, Simla) in a private letter to me, dated last July, writes: "The lifting of the Akhwan embargo was indeed a relief. Had it materialised, effect in India would, of course, have been appalling."

I am prepared to believe that Ibn Saud personally is loyal

a "whole hogger" in wishing to convert Islam generally to Wahabism.

tion of the Akhwan was probably carried out with a view to political, rather religious, aggrandisement but we must take facts as they are, and Ibn Saud is of the really fanatical Akhwan, thus, support given to the former is support given to the Akhwan movement.

Hussein holds that there is no difference between orthodox Wahabism and Akhwan movement; I do. The latter is essentially a fanatical movement of a militant and aggressive nature.

I submit it is important for us to do all we can to keep Hussein from abdicating for the present, and a definite declaration on His Majesty's Government's part that they recognise Khurma, Turaba and Basha as being within the legitimate boundaries of the Hedjaz would probably keep him going, and I suggest that I be given some such message to deliver to him from His Majesty's Government. At the same time, Hussein should be asked to depute a responsible representative to go to Cairo (I would try and get Abdulla sent) to meet a representative of Ibn Saud there to fix on a boundary. I entirely disagree with Philby that a boundary commission should

any permanent result.

Should something on these lines be approved, I would suggest that a message be sent to Hussein saying that I will be leaving for Jeddah shortly and will discuss the whole situation with him, including His Majesty's Government's proposal for dealing with the Hedjaz Nejd boundary question.

Hussein has frequently expressed his intention of visiting England when peace with Turkey is concluded if he has not previously resigned. I suggest that I be given authority to tell him that His Majesty's Government would welcome a visit, and am inclined to think that if Hussein came here the result would be

"off his chest," and it would prove a real education. I think England would also tend to keep him from

of the general situation in the East, would, I think, be harmful for us at the

foreign to Cheetham's suggestion that we should get Hussein to nominate his successor, I have given a lot of thought to the situation which might possibly be created in the event of Hussein's abdication, and think I told you that the

as King, &c., if he makes good his position. I cannot recommend this course but

it has many obvious drawbacks, though less serious than approaching Hussein to his own Prince.

not impossible, to separate Emir of Mecca and the latter ap, contingent being perhaps any move on our part in appointing or trying to Short of Mecca is likely to be resented by Moslems

best policy is to do everything in reason to keep the case until the Turkish treaty is signed, and then

trusted His Majesty's Government, but his belief in our intentions has been severely strained owing to the way in which we have hitherto dealt with the Khurma question. If we take a sympathetic line with him now, as well as we can, and give him confidence, we retain his trust, and need have no fear that he will not carry on relations with foreign countries exclusively through us. You can assure the time I should much like to have a talk with you regarding

Government's views.

Owing to my intimate and should like to — and, indeed, than

years undisturbed, and that he can be made as useful to us in peace the last three years of the war

Sincerely yours,

C. E. WILSON

Correspondence between Sherif of Mecca and His Majesty's High Commissioner
(Cairo, -) ceased at the Foreign Office, November 19.)

*Communication from Sherif of Mecca to Mr. Storrs, Oriental Secretary
to British Representation, Cairo.*

To the dear honourable, may God protect him,

I PRESENT to your dear honour my affectionate regards and respects, and
I shall do my best to make the enclosed note, containing the p-
effective, as you are capable of doing.

I am not so anxious about the ideas of the people here, because they are closely bound
your Government by community of interests.

Do not be at pains to send aeroplanes or men-of-war to throw reports
rumours, as was done before, because the matter is now decided.

What we desire to beg you is to open the way for the Egyptian Government
and the charitable offerings of corn for the Holy lands, i.e., Mecca and Med
which were stopped since last year.

For verily, the sending of this grain for this year and last would be an imp-
factor in laying the foundations of our mutual advantage.

This should suffice for a person of your grasp.

In conclusion I offer you my best salams and respects.

July 14, 1915 2nd Ramadan 1333.

Kindly do not trouble to send any correspondence until you see the result of
the bearer only, and, if you should think fit, give him a written token to make it
for to reach you when we find it necessary.
It is all right.

Enclosed with foregoing

To his Honour

WHEREAS the whole of the Arab nation without any exception have de-
in these last years to live, and to accomplish their freedom and grasp the reins
their Administration both in theory and practice, and whereas they have found
felt that it is to the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them
and them to the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions (which are based
the maintenance of the honour and dignity of their life) without any ulterior in-
whatsoever unconnected with this object.

And whereas it is to their (Arabs) interest also to prefer the assistance of
Government of Great Britain in consideration of their geographical position
economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above mentioned Gov-
which is known to both nations and therefore need not be emphasized.

For these reasons the Arab nation sees fit to limit themselves, as time is
to asking the Government of Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the at-

leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it
all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, until such time as
occasion for making the actual negotiations.

Firstly England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab coun-
ded on the north by Mersina Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which di-
falls Birejik, Ufa, Mardin Midani, Anadina Island, up to the border of P-
the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra, on the south by the
Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is, on the

Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina England to approve of the
proclamation of an Arab Khalfate of Islam.

Secondly — The Arab Government of the Sherif to acknowledge that England
have the preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries whenever
tions of enterprises are otherwise equal.

Thirdly — For the security of this Arab independence and the certainty of such
preference of economic enterprises, both high contracting parties to offer mutual
to the best ability of their military and naval forces, to face any foreign
which may attack either party. Peace not to be decided without agreement
of both parties.

Fourthly — If one of the parties enters upon an aggressive conflict, the other
party to assume a neutral attitude, and in case of such party wishing the other to
forces, both to meet and discuss the conditions.

Fifthly — England to acknowledge the abolition of foreign privileges in the
countries, and to assist the Government of the Sherif in an international
convention for confirming such abolition.

Sixthly — Articles 3 and 4 of this Treaty to remain in vigour for 15 years, and
if either wishes it to be renewed, one year's notice before lapse of treaty to be given.

agreed and united for the attainment, at all costs and in all of this noble object,

in a period of 30 days after receiving this intimation; and if this period should lapse
before they receive an answer, they reserve to themselves complete freedom of action.
Moreover we (Sherif's family) will consider ourselves free in word and deed from
the bonds of our previous declaration which we made through Ali Eff.

[Undated and unsigned]

(2)

Mr H. McMahon to His Highness the Sherif Husayn (taken), dated August 30, 1915.

After compliments and salutations.

We have the honour to thank you for your frank expressions of the sincerity
of your feeling towards England. We rejoice moreover that your Highness and
your people are of one opinion, that Arab interests are English interests and English
Arab. To this intent we confirm to you the terms of Lord Kitchener's message,
which reached you by the hand of Ali Effendi, and in which was stated clearly our
approval of the Arab Khalfate when it should be proclaimed. We declare once
more that His Majesty's Government would welcome the resumption of the
Khalfate to be an Arab of true race. With regard to the questions of limits,

such details in the heat of war, and while, in many portions of them, the
and regret, that some of the Arabs in those very parts, far from assisting us, are

inform us how and where they should be delivered. We are moreover arranging
for the transport of the Arab forces and for the transport of the Arab forces.

Friendly reassurances Salutations.

(Signed)

A H McMAHON.

English Translation of Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, dated September 9, 1915 [29th Shawal, 1333].

To His Excellency the Most Exalted, the Most Eminent—The British High Commissioner in Egypt; may God grant him Success

WITH great cheerfulness and delight I received your letter, dated 19th Shawal 1333 (30th August, 1915), and have given it great consideration and regard, in spite of the impression I received from it of ambiguity and its tone of coldness and hesitancy with regard to our essential point.

It is necessary to make clear to your Excellency our sincerity towards the illustrious British Empire, and our confession of preference for it in all cases and matters and all forms and circumstances. The real interests of the followers of our religion necessitate this.

Nevertheless, your Excellency will pardon me and permit me to say clearly the coldness and hesitation which you have displayed in the question of the limits boundaries by saying that the discussion of these at present is of no use and time, and that they are still in the hands of the Government which is ruling ought to be taken to infer an estrangement or something of the sort.

As these limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom should satisfy and with whom we should discuss them after the war is over, but peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by these words as is set on this.

Therefore they have found it necessary to first discuss this point with the one whom they now have their confidence and trust as a final appeal, viz. the illustrious British Empire.

(Literal translation of the above passage)

"And therefore they saw the discussion in it first the place of their own and trust the axis of final appeal now, and that is the illustrious British Empire."

Their reason for this union and confidence is mutual interest, the necessity of regulating territorial divisions

and

the feelings of their inhabitants, so that they do not to meet her (England) or any of her allies in opposition to their resolution which would produce a contrary result, which God forbid.

(Literal translation of above passage as follows)

"the feelings of its inhabitants to know how to have their future and live for to meet her or one of its allies in front of their resolution when the thing a contrary result, which God forbid."

For the object is, honourable Minister, the truth which is established on a which guarantees the essential sources of life in future.

Yet within these limits they have not included places inhabited by

of words and titles

or angry

With reference to your remark in your letter above mentioned, that some of our people are still doing their utmost in promoting the interests of Turkey your (illustrious) Majesty would not permit you to make this an excuse for the tone of and hesitation with regard to our demands, demands which I cannot admit that a man of sound opinion, will deny to be necessary for our existence; nay, they essential essence of our life, material and moral.

Up to the present moment I am myself, with all my might, carrying out in my country all things in conformity with the Islamic law all things which tend to benefit the country.

In order to reassure your Excellency, I can declare that the whole country, those who you say are submitting themselves to Turco-German orders, are waiting the result of these negotiations, which are dependent only on your refusal or acceptance of the question of the limits, and in your declaration of safeguarding their religion first and then the rest of rights from any harm or danger.

Whatever the illustrious Government of Great Britain finds conformable to its is subject communicates it to us and specify to us the course we should

In all cases it is only God's will which shall be executed, and it is God who is the real factor in everything.

With regard to our demands, we are waiting for your decision.

As to the grain, it is from the special Wakfs, and has nothing to do with

the said grain is from the special Wakfs, and has nothing to do with

If you think it should be, let the grain of the two years be transported in a special steamer or to Jeddah in an official manner, in the name of all the natives as usual, and a of the steamer or the special "Mamur" detached as usual every year on his arrival at the port, will send to the Governor of Jeddah asking for if the grain at Jeddah, or a responsible official to take over the grain, and necessary receipt signed by the said Mamur, that is, the Mamur of the steamer. He should make it a condition that he would accept any receipt but

the steamer or the "Mamur" (detached with the grain) should make anything contrary to this arrangement, he should warn

the steamer or the "Mamur" (detached with the grain) should make anything contrary to this arrangement, he should warn

If you choose to send a reply to this, please send it with honour.

29th Shawal, 1333 [September 9, 1915].

Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, to the Sherif of Mecca, dated October 25, 1915.

To the Sherif of Mecca (with titles).

October 25, 1915.

I HAVE received your letter of 29th Shawal with much pleasure, and expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction.

I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation, such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the moment had not yet arrived when they could be most profitably discussed.

I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as of vital and urgent importance. I have therefore lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction.

The districts of Medina and Alexandria and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries.

Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the 11 and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Meccah.

When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice, will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable form of government in those various territories.

Britain only, and that such E

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her traditional friends, the Arabs, and will result in a firm and lasting peace, which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the liberation of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.

It was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings, which, thanks to the clearness of instructions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without mishap, in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present sad war. God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom to all peoples!

(Here follow the usual compliments.)

Translation of a Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, His High Commissioner, Cairo, dated 27 el Hiyj, 1331 November 5, 1915.

[illegible]

(In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate)

To his Excellency the most exalted and eminent Minister who is endowed with
highest authority and soundness of opinion. May God guide him to
Will'

I RECEIVED with great pleasure your honoured letter, dated 15th Zul
(24th October, 1916), to which I beg to answer as follows :-

and Beirut and their sea-coasts are purely Arab provinces, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab, they are both descendants of one fore-

We Moslems will follow the footsteps of the Commander of the Faithful, Omar Khattab, and other Khalifs succeeding him, who ordained in the laws of the Prophet that Moslems should treat the Christians as they treat themselves. He, with reference to Christians "they will have the same privileges and

as it accords with the general interest of the whole nation.

2. As the provinces of Irak are parts of the pure Arab Kingdom, they were under the direct rule of its Governments in the time of Ali Ibn Abu Talib, and his successors; and as in them began

and war, and their traditions cannot be forgotten by them. Consequently we cannot
the Arab nations or make them submit to give up such a title to nobility.

to render an accord easy, and take

mentioned in that I have the 11 down

The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the problem and the need for a new approach. It then presents the proposed method, which is based on the use of a novel algorithm. The results of the experiments are presented in the next section, followed by a discussion of the conclusions and future work.

[Faint handwritten notes and bleed-through from the reverse side of the page are visible.]

[illegible][illegible]

$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{4}$

foreign influence, will direct their efforts to

workings shown in our action have already been stated.

2. When the Arabs know that the Government of Great Britain is their Ally, who

6. Our letter dated the 29th Shau'al 1333 (29th September, 1915) gives an the

'O exalted Minister' that you will not interfere with internal affairs.

...is expected. We have done our utmost in making concessions in order to
...satisfying both parties. We know that our lot in this war will
...be a hard one. We shall do our best to bear our part of it
...and to see that we are not out of the fight.

tion which I see in the Arabs for the attainment of their objects I was
preferred to seclude myself on one of the heights of a mountain, but they, the
Arabs, have insisted that I should guide the movement to this end.

May God keep you safe and victorious, as we devoutly hope and desire.

(Unsigned.)

Dated 27 of Hiy 1333 [November 5, 1915]

[1358]

*Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, to the
Sherif of Mecca, dated December 14, 1915.*

To Sherif Hussein:

(After customary greetings and acknowledgment of previous letter.)

I AM gratified to observe that you agree to the exclusion of the vilayets of Mer-
and Adana from the boundaries of the Arab territories.

I also note with great pleasure and satisfaction your assurances that the Arabs
determined to act in conformity with the precepts laid down by Omar Ibn Khat-
and the early Khalifs, which secure the rights and privileges of all religions alike.

In stating that the Arabs are ready to recognise and respect all our treaties
Arab chiefs, it is of course understood that this will be done in accordance with
the Arab kingdom, as the Government of Great Britain has always recognised
which already exists.

With regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and Beyrout, the Government of Great
Britain have taken careful note of your observations, but, as the interests of our
France are involved, the question will require careful consideration, and a
communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.

The Government of Great Britain, as I have already informed you, are
give all guarantees of assistance and support within their power to the Arab
but their interests demand, as you yourself have recognised, a friendly and
administration in the vilayet of Bagdad, and the adequate safeguarding of
the interests of the British Empire in the region.

We have no intention of interfering with the rights of the Arabs in the
Arab territories, and we are prepared to discuss the question of the
Arab territories in the future.

It is our policy to maintain the integrity of the British Empire, and we
are prepared to discuss the question of the Arab territories in the future.

any peace in terms of which the freedom of the Arab
territories is secured.

As an earnest of our intentions, and in order to aid you in your efforts in our
cause, I am sending by your trustworthy messenger a sum of 20,000*l.*

(Customary ending)

(Signed) H. McMAHON.

(7)

Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, dated January 1, 1916 (25th Safar, 1334)

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

To his Excellency the eminent, energetic, and magnanimous Minister

WE received from the bearer your two letters, dated 9th Safar (17th Decem-
ber, 1915), with great respect and honour, and I have understood their contents.

Your honour will have realised, after the arrival of Mohammed (Faruk),
and his interview with you, that all our procedure up to the present was
for the purpose of securing the interests of the British Empire, and that
everything was the result of the decisions and desires of our peoples, and that
but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the position they
people) have pressed upon us.

These truths are, in my opinion, very important, and deserve your honour's
attention and consideration.

As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our
previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done
so to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the Blessed and
Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what
may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made
between them during the present war and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the
Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished,
we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France
in Beyrout and its coasts.

really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of our certainty and
assurance in trusting her glorious Government, leave the determination of the amount
to the perception of her wisdom and

As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our
previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done
so to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the Blessed and
Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what
may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made
between them during the present war and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the
Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished,
we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France
in Beyrout and its coasts.

Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished,
we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France
in Beyrout and its coasts.

It is our policy to maintain the integrity of the British Empire, and we
are prepared to discuss the question of the Arab territories in the future.

any peace in terms of which the freedom of the Arab
territories is secured.

As an earnest of our intentions, and in order to aid you in your efforts in our
cause, I am sending by your trustworthy messenger a sum of 20,000*l.*

(Customary ending)

to the declarations which you gave in the conclusion of your honoured letter,
therefore, the honourable and eminent Minister should believe and be sure, together
with Great Britain, that we still remain firm to our resolution which starts learnt from
two years ago, for which we await the opportunity suitable to our situation,
in view of that action the time of which has now come near and which
drives towards us with great haste and clearness, so that we and those
are of our opinion may have reasons for such action against any criticisms or
difficulties imposed upon us in future.

our expression—"we do not want to push you to any hasty action which might
may ask for when necessary, such as arms, ammunition, &c.

you my great veneration and respect.

(Unsigned)

Dated 25th Safar, 1334 [1st January, 1916].

(8.)

*Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, to the Sherif of
Mecca, dated January 25, 1916*

(After customary greetings.)

Cairo, January 25, 1916.

WE have received with great pleasure and satisfaction your letter of the 25th Safar
January, at the hands of your trusty messenger, who has also transmitted to us
our verbal messages.

We fully realise and entirely appreciate the motives which guide you in this
most important question, and we know well that you are acting entirely in the interests of
Arab peoples, and with no thought beyond their welfare.

We take note of your remarks concerning the vilayet of Bagdad, and will take the
question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the time for
final settlements arrives.

parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to a anything which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France. It as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting for the Cause of Right and Liberty.

In this great Cause Arabia is now associated, and God grant that the result of our mutual efforts and co-operation will bind us in a lasting friendship, to the mutual welfare and happiness of us all.

We are greatly pleased to hear of the action you are taking to win over to our joint Cause, and to dissuade them from giving any assistance to our enemies, and we leave it to your discretion to seize the most favourable moment further and more decided measures.

You will doubtless inform us by the bearer of this letter of all we can assist you, and your requests will always receive our immediate consideration.

You will have heard how El Sayed Ahmed el Sherif of Senusai has been beguiled by evil advice into hostile action, and it will be a great grief to you to know that has been so far forgetful of the interests of the Arabs as to throw in his lot with our enemies. Misfortune has now overtaken him, and we trust that this will show him

(153212)

No. 159.

Sir R. Crowe to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 19)

(No. 2155.)

SIR R. CROWE presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of notes from the Hedjaz and French Delegations respecting Syria.

British Delegation, Paris

November 17, 1919

Enclosure 1 in No. 159

Secretary-General of the Hedjaz Delegation to Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.

Le Secrétaire général de la Délégation hédjaziennne a l'honneur de commu au Secrétariat général de la Conférence de la Paix la note ci-jointe de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Fayçal, à l'adresse du Conseil suprême

Le 6 novembre 1919

Note au Conseil suprême de la Conférence de la Paix, Versailles

Au mois de septembre dernier, son Excellence le Premier Ministre de la Grande-Bretagne m'a fait venir de Damas afin de discuter la question de Syrie avec les grandes Puissances. A Londres, son Excellence m'a remis un aide-memoire, où il question de certains changements dans l'administration actuelle de la Syrie. Les copies de ce document, me dit-il, ont été remises aux représentants de la France, l'Italie, l'Espagne et de l'Italie. Au cours de la correspondance et des entretiens qui ont

lieu entre une autre Puissance quelconque, mais qu'il s'agit uniquement d'une déclaration indiquant la décision prise par la Grande-Bretagne, pour raisons d'ordre au sujet du retrait de ses troupes de certaines provinces arabes. Toute la question consiste n'être qu'un arrangement militaire à titre provisoire, qui n'est pas d'ordre administratif ni politique, et qui a pour but le maintien de l'ordre, en attendant la Conférence de la Paix prenne une décision définitive sur la forme du Gouvernement à donner au pays.

générale des provinces arabes depuis la signature de l'armistice avec la Turquie (et, comme vous ne l'ignorez pas, je suis bien placé pour juger les affaires de mon pays).

de mon peuple, la paix générale se trouvant en même temps profondément troublée.

Les deux Puissances n'ont pas dû se rendre compte des troubles qui pourraient résulter de toute modification apportée au *status quo* établi depuis l'occupation, car cet accord l'administration provisoire établie depuis l'occupation sans prendre aucune

que a porté ces

l'accord Syrien de 1916

ment les raisons de mon attitude

de la gravité

en suite d

gime actuel

ent français refusant d'accepter, ainsi qu'il nous en a informés lui-même, la britannique, sauf en ce qui regardait l'évacuation des troupes britanniques le 1^{er} novembre. Les deux Gouvernements, ne consultant que leurs propres dans la question, n'ont pas accordé toute l'attention voulue à l'effet produit sur l'union de la Syrie. Comme je suis responsable de la sécurité et du bien-être j'ai également porté à la connaissance du Gouvernement français les objections de nos amis à cet arrangement, et j'ai à nouveau proposé la commission mixte. Le Président du Conseil des Ministres français, dans sa séance toutes mes propositions, parce que, dit-il, il ne peut aller à l'encontre des décisions du Conseil suprême, il ajoute que les troupes françaises sont prêtes à maintenir l'ordre dans leur zone d'occupation, et à s'abstenir de le faire ailleurs dans une propre région, au premier appel de ma part. Je crois que M. Clemenceau a l'impression que le mouvement que nous redoutons n'est le fait d'"agitateurs" et non l'explosion spontanée du sentiment national. Et je doute que le Conseil suprême et l'opinion publique du monde civilisé approuvent des mesures qui, tendant à réprimer des mouvements nationaux absolument légitimes, ne peuvent avoir d'autre résultat qu'une effusion de sang.

Le Conseil, ayant simplement "pris note" de l'accord du 15 septembre 1919, tel qu'il m'a été communiqué par le Gouvernement français.

Le Conseil, selon toute apparence, croyant que le projet qu'on lui soumettait n'était nullement la relève des troupes et n'entraînant aucun changement d'ordre politique ou administratif dans les territoires ennemis occupés et qui sont maintenant

est évident que le projet proposé n'a pas été approuvé par les autorités intéressées.

Je demande la permission d'exposer rapidement moi-même quelques-unes des raisons des objections.

1. J'ai peine à comprendre que le projet soit purement militaire. Il confère plusieurs questions économiques et politiques qui ne devraient pas être traitées par la Conférence de la Paix. Le fait même d'enlever le pouvoir à la seule direction et diviser le pays en trois zones différentes, dans lesquelles chacune un système différent, est assurément un changement très important porté à l'administration actuelle et ne saurait être appelé une mesure militaire. Des affaires telles que les chemins de fer et les zones d'influence, etc., ne peuvent être comprises que les mesures à prendre pour le maintien de l'ordre, en attendant un règlement définitif de la question syrienne par la Conférence de la Paix.

2. D'après les arrangements, proposés les provinces arabes devront être divisées en districts. Un sous l'administration britannique, un autre sous l'administration française et le troisième sous le Gouvernement arabe. Cela revient à dire que la nation

syrienne, qui avait toujours compté sur une administration unique, devra maintenant morcelée et chaque partie soumise à un Gouverneur.

Le résultat sera un coup mortel porté au pays. Des discussions entre des régions différentes, suscitées et encouragées, selon toute probabilité, par des fonctionnaires ignorants, ou même par les rivalités entre des administrateurs multiplieront et neutraliseront tout le bien qui aurait pu résulter d'une administration distincte.

Des perturbations commenceront aux frontières et s'étendront jusqu'au cœur du pays.

De plus, la portion laissée au Gouvernement arabe est appelée province indépendante, mais elle se trouve divisée en différentes zones d'influence, dont une est soumise aux Britanniques et l'autre aux Français.

Si l'une quelconque de ces deux subdivisions venait à avoir besoin de secours, il faudrait le demander à la Puissance qui exerce son influence chez elle. Y a-t-il en une nation dans tout le cours des siècles qui ait jamais pu faire des progrès d'intraves pareilles? Cet arrangement découragera sans aucun doute le peuple arabe du développement chez lui. Il éprouvera de la méfiance à l'égard des étrangers et fera tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour défendre l'unité de son pays. La nation faible et ne pourra résister longtemps, mais, néanmoins, elle affrontera la défense de sa juste cause. Qui alors sera responsable devant le monde civilisé de ces sacrifices? Personne ne saurait convaincre le peuple de ce pays que ses idées sont erronées. Tous ceux qui ont pris connaissance du sentiment général qui prévaut parmi ces populations diront que l'ordre public ne pourra jamais être maintenu.

3. Le retrait des troupes britanniques n'effectuera, dit-on, d'après une déclaration qui pourtant n'est reconnue ni par les Arabes, ni par le Gouvernement des États-Unis, qui a déclaré à son entrée en guerre qu'il ne reconnaîtrait aucun accord secret, je

dominus privé, ou comme un simple ballot de marchandises au moment où la jou du pays se répandait de Syrie jusqu'au désert et donnait sa vie pour sa liberté. Toute mesure basée sur une décision qui n'a pas été reconnue par la Conférence de la Paix ne saurait être mise à exécution sans une discussion sur la part de cette Conférence.

4. Le général en chef, au moment de l'occupation de la Syrie par le peuple syrien qu'il se proposait d'occuper le pays au nom des Alliés. Son administration, au moment où la Conférence de la Paix prendrait une décision définitive.

Les Syriens ont considéré cette déclaration comme une garantie donnée par les Alliés et ont estimé que leur pays était placé sous la garde du commandant en chef au nom des Alliés, et organisant une administration unique qu'il avait de maintenir comme il est dit ci-dessus. Elle comprend qu'aucun changement les bases fondamentales de cet arrangement ne pourra être apporté avant le

5. La surexcitation, causée principalement par l'intervention imprudente d'étrangers, qui règne dans les provinces arabes ainsi que dans les milieux musulmans de l'Empire ottoman en Asie n'est plus un secret. Toute personne peu au courant de ce qui s'est passé dans la province de Syrie est, sans aucun doute, convaincu qu'il y aura des désordres dans beaucoup de localités, si on apporte des modifications au statu quo.

En conséquence, je vous supplie, au nom de l'humanité et dans l'intérêt de la nation arabe et au nom des innombrables intérêts de la France, de l'Italie, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Amérique dans le monde oriental, de ne pas la porter à de nouveaux désordres dont nous pourrions tous voir le commencement, dont il est impossible de prévoir la fin. Les incidents de Smyrne et autres lieux encore présents à notre mémoire. Je crains beaucoup que le mal ne se répète tout à l'autre du monde musulman. Le peuple pensera qu'il existe un plan bien

persister l'Islam. Vous pourriez-vous rappeler encore que la révolte des Arabes par le Roi mon père a porté le premier coup au principe exécutif du fanatisme. Les que les Turcs musulmans parce qu'ils étaient des oppresseurs, et se sont

de distinction entre les religions. En ce qui me concerne, j'ai pendant la guerre en le fanatisme partout et toujours. Les Arabes de toutes les religions se sont groupés autour de moi, venant de toutes les directions. Notre unité était nationale et non pas religieuse. Un grand nombre des hommes qui travaillent pour cette cause nationale n'appartiennent pas à ma religion. Ceci vous prouve à quel point je serais découragé si cet idéal si élevé est abaissé jusqu'à une guerre de religion par suite de malentendus de mauvaise administration et d'imprudence.

Vous estimerez avec moi qu'il est de l'intérêt de tous de maintenir plus grand pendant le court délai précédant la décision définitive de la Conférence de la Paix plutôt que de laisser des troubles prendre naissance sans raison logique. En conséquence, je suis d'avis que les grandes Puissances soient informées du sérieux de la situation telle que nous la considérons, de façon que des mesures immédiates soient prises pour que les Puissances alliées intéressées et leurs frères puissent examiner les intérêts de chaque Gouvernement d'accord avec l'idéal de justice pour lequel nous nous

Je conclus en demandant avec instance à être autorisé à présenter moi-même au quel autre, car c'est sur moi et sur mon peuple que les conséquences de toutes les décisions, soit pour le bien, soit pour le mal, retomberont.

FAYSAI

Enclosure 2 in No 159

Note by the French Delegation.

1. La décision de la Conférence de la Paix ne paraît pas répondre à la situation présente et ne semble pas susceptible d'être mise à exécution. Son double but essentiel est en effet :

1. De revenir sur la décision prise par la Conférence le 15 septembre relative à la relève des troupes anglaises par les troupes françaises en Syrie.
2. De demander à être entendue sur le fond de la question concernant l'occupation des populations de la Syrie.

Toutefois, la relève, aucune modification ne paraît ni utile, ni possible. En fait, l'exécution de la mesure est commencée depuis le début du mois et se poursuit dans des conditions qui indiquent que les inquiétudes de l'Emir Fayçal ne sont pas

La décision de la Conférence a nettement marqué que la relève n'avait que le caractère d'un arrangement purement militaire et que l'occupation militaire indispensable.

Au point de vue de l'avenir, la décision de la Conférence a marqué que la solution définitive des questions de mandats et de frontières n'était pas préjugée par les mesures prises.

idée comme partie du problème général de paix avec la Turquie, au moment où le Gouvernement français a déclaré verbalement et par écrit à l'Emir Fayçal que

il donnait. Il a ajouté que, dans ces conditions, un mouvement indigène ne serait

Il a eu soin, pour ôter tout prétexte aux agitateurs, de porter à la connaissance des populations syriennes le sens exact des décisions du Conseil suprême et de l'exécution de la relève, en affirmant la volonté commune des Alliés d'assurer aux pays d'Orient par leur victoire le régime de liberté, d'ordre et de progrès promis aux populations de leurs desirs, de leurs vœux et de leur intérêt.

En ces conditions, il ne semble pas qu'aucune modification puisse être apportée à la décision prise et est en cours d'exécution.

(d.) Hardened as we have become during this war to widespread calumnies, I cannot help feeling that if the facts were known assistants from G Britain would be generally approved to save a people who are not as nor bourgeois, but women, and children who have lived through a period of untold horror of starvation only at the end of it.

It is not necessary to import food. There is abundance of the South. A million tons of grain could even be exported, but what is required is means of transport and a better administrative service. The latter is slowly improving under General Holman's direction, now conveyed by British officers, and the stuff gets to the army, and the former, General Holman asks for 1,000 locomotives and a reinforcement of railway and "Q."

(e.) I asked whether the character and function of the naval part of the mission might not be changed with advantage, i.e., instead of a Naval Mission in the field make it a mission at Sevastopol. General Holman undertook to Denikin on this point, without in any way committing the Admiralty. The nucleus of the Russian Black Sea fleet is to-day at sea. Its growth will be slow, it will nevertheless soon become a force of influence on the Roumanian, Bulgarian, Georgian, and Anatolian fronts. If, through a naval mission, some form of British control can be exercised over policy and operations, we shall be in a better position in the future.

A detail in this connection is that a commodore means far more to them than a captain. (g.) As regards the Caspian, I heard good reports of Captain Sergaev. He has also been recently reinforced with officers and men. (h.) Admiral Gerasimov, whom I met, is General Denikin's naval adviser. Suitable for many reasons, chiefly age, health, and inertia.

At the outbreak of the revolution he was at Keral (P), being shot in the head, was nearly beaten to death by the Bolsheviks. He is not entirely sympathetic to the British, and I think General Holman, who is on intimate terms with Denikin will seek a way of getting replaced by a more energetic and knowledgeable officer.

I endeavoured to get after the ice had imposed a truce on naval operations by sea and river, their efforts should be directed to training and men at Sevastopol for the spring. The old naval personnel scarcely exists, will have to start from bed rock with young men, and are not likely to succeed in mounting their ideas as to the relations between officers and men. It is in this

Concerning Denikin's western front, General Holman gave me to understand that the volunteer army would not try to cross the Dniester. Denikin was content to leave the question of Bessarabia to the Ukrainians, he said, wants self-government under Russian, not under Pethrus was looked upon as an impostor, a brigand, a mere "killer of Jews." His force was estimated at 15,000 men.

But since it was stated had appeared to General Keyes his position towards Denikin and his intention to back Petlura no longer, so that generally speaking the situation with Roumania appeared very much easier.

4. Having on the 10th of the month (11th) M. Wardlaw at Sevastopol was interested to hear the views of Denikin and General Holman concerning Azerbaijan, and Daghestan.

General Holman furnished me with circumstantial evidence of many hostile actions against Denikin's southern front, the most serious being those which threaten his to Petrovsk and his oil supply at Gromi.

Denikin accuses the Georgian people of any hostile desire, but the Government, he is convinced, is not innocent. Germans and Turks are again the mischief, aided by Bolshevik elements scattered throughout the Caucasus.

It will be difficult, but I think not impossible, to bring about some solution. These "countries" cannot exist side by side in a state of independence. They must fall as prey to the Turks or the Russians eventually. Their Governments are self-elected, an assembly merely of self-assertive men.

It is clear that these people that the Turks are beaten, the is beaten and the Bolsheviks in process of being beaten, that they will be in independence if steps are now taken to evict or restrain such elements and such independence shall endure until a solid, just government has been founded. I believe Denikin could devote himself wholeheartedly to his northern front of dissipating strength to keep his rear secure.

Second, good propaganda; the third, a conference at some central spot at which representatives of the Great Powers could state an agreed policy and show what advantages accrue to these so-called republics by conforming to it.

Denikin mentioned that he had many Kubans fighting for him, and that the people as a whole were for him, but the Kuban Government treated them as traitors.

6. General Holman has already reported that in a number of cases very satisfactory officers have been sent out to join his mission. At such a time and in such a place it appears to me inexcusable to send officers who are unable to maintain British discipline. The danger to such officers is out of all proportion to the actual offence committed and (this much can be said on their behalf) they are probably quite unaware of it.

I am sure the Admiralty will bear this in mind when naval officers are required for similar service.

7. As there has been a general impression that Denikin has in his entourage a number of officers of German sympathies, I inquired of General Holman as to this. He said that amongst some Russian officers, especially the younger ones, such an undoubtedly existed, and it is because these officers feel that they have been and are still going through, many of the trials that the Germans endured— their own, persecuted by the "common people." Amongst the older officers, however, towards Germany. They knew well enough that once in Germany's grasp there would be no escape for their country.

General Holman could not say that the Italian, French, and United States missions were purely commercial. A Polish mission has recently been added in connection with Denikin.

The character of our military mission is understood and appreciated, would for Great Britain an influence in Russia that should not be allowed.

8. General Holman paid tribute to General Denikin himself. He spoke of absolute straightforwardness and unswerving policy. Expediency is unknown to him. He will make no promises that he cannot fulfil, and he is ready to fight down all

My short acquaintance with him leads me to believe that this estimate is correct. He is unpretentious, unpretentious, and when he speaks his mind in a direct and impressive manner, but has a sense of humour.

10. These observations are not, in the main, such as will immediately concern the

point of view of an outsider, however constructed beforehand, may be of value. For instance, such a remark as "Holman is more Russian than the Russians," or "Wardlaw more Georgian than the Georgians," and so I have thought it worth while to report my impressions, having in the last three days had the opportunity of conversing at great length with both of these officers, also with General Sir G. F. M. Lie

Sevastopol at 0800 on the 14th October, "Iron" proceeding up harbour. Fast to buoy which gave her ample room to swing. The weather was fine throughout my stay. The following Admirals were present in port—

Vice-Admiral Nenukof, Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet.
Vice-Admiral Sahbu, Admiral of the Port.
Rear-Admiral Bouhnoof, Chief of Staff to Admiral Nenukof.

The usual official calls were exchanged that day. On the 15th October, accompanied by my staff, I was shown over the fortifications and all the points of interest, including Maakof, Redan, Panorama, etc., and also we motored out to have a

Vice-Admiral Nenukof entertained us and all the priv-
and in the evening I returned their hospitality by

Admiral Sabin strikes me as tac-
Admiral Nenukof

their present positions by Admiral Kolchak. Admiral Nenukof is rather old, has
look of the sea about him, is untidy in appearance but quite alert mentally
English very fairly, and on all naval questions he seemed to me to have sound
The combination of Nenukof and Boubnof should be good. Nenukof, a thoughtful
experienced head; Boubnof, a young officer (only 40), full of ideas, a great student
history, especially the history of our service, which he knows intimately
humane and high principles. I formed a great opinion of Admiral Boubnof,
at the Russian navy was not short of officers, as more ships had been
quired for them lost, but that a great deal of weeding out would
necessary as many of the officers of the old regime were unsatisfactory.

The new Russian navy that Admirals Nenukof and Boubnof are
be modelled on British lines. The men are all to be volunteers, and a sufficient
seems to be assured, and a careful selection will be made. Their pay is going to be

No man will be selected whose antecedents and present political opinion are not
suspicion. Selection will be confined to a good class, i.e., a class above the
class, by which I understand the artisan and shop-keeper classes.

As regards the officers of the new navy, on the day of "Iron Duke's"
first day of the examination of cadets at the Naval College was taking
hoped shortly that 400 cadets will be in residence at the College, and the

is well qualified to do so, having been a gunnery officer in the past and head of
War College. He is keenly interested in naval tactics; he was severely wounded at
the battle of Tsushima while serving in the "Oral." He married a daughter
Admiral Rodzestvensky. The Russian officers are keen and enthusiastic about the
navy, and appear to realize that in order to become efficient and avoid future out-
they must establish quite a new relationship between their officers and their
T is a point which I took too liberty of impressing on them more than
for if they are unable to create a feeling of loyalty they will be building on the sand.

Admiral of cruiser "Korndof" stated that he carried 88 officers, his com-
is far as the stock of uniform
and carried out the more important and responsible duties of seamen, such as
layers, anything to do with
and gun room with the old
but can now do

ships, despite the lack of paint, are far more presentable than the French ships.
we passed to-day I noticed how steadily their crews stood to attention on all occasions
In Captain Erzsart they have an energetic head of the Submarine Service,
commands great respect for his attack on the "Geben" in the Black Sea, for which
was awarded our D.S.O.

Great pleasure was expressed at the prospective return of the "Volga"
ships, despite the lack of paint, are far more presentable than the French ships.

In Captain Erzsart they have an energetic head of the Submarine Service,
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Great pleasure was expressed at the prospective return of the "Volga"
ships, despite the lack of paint, are far more presentable than the French ships.

I feel sure that the conversations with these officers have done good, and that the
sight of a ship like the "Iron Duke" in their inner harbour, as well as the behaviour
and appearance of our ship's company in the town, had a wholesome effect.

[48099]

No. 161.

Dear Ambassador,

THE question of permitting investigation
territories of Palestine and Mesopo-
your recent conversation with me of the 31st ultimo has had careful consideration, and
I now send you my promised reply

As regards operation the
roads, &c., the view with
enemy territories

That the provisional character of the military occupation does not warrant the
of decisions by the occupying Power in matters concerning the future economic
of the country

Accordingly, our policy has been to prohibit the institution of any new undertakings,
taken advantage of, before the war

The view has equally governed our attitude in regard to investigations and
private individuals or firms may wish to undertake in occupied enemy territory
and our action in prohibiting this class of operations has been further ruled by the
ple that nothing should be done which might in any way compromise the future
rites of the country, to whom, we consider, should be left the decision as to the
measures necessary to be adopted for ensuring the development of the
natural resources of the territory which they will be called upon to administer

We have also felt that to open the occupied territories to prospectors during
temporary military tenure would be most undesirable, as it would inevitably lead to a

Office, and that steps were imm-
his mission had been ascertained.

With regard to the Standard Oil Company, I realize that their complaint arises
out of the fact that a representative of the Shell group visited Mesopotamia in the early
of this year. I think, however, you already know that the visit of this representative

Office, and that steps were imm-
his mission had been ascertained.

behind were not permitted to work any on in
only been allowed to stay because their ser-

authorities for the repair and working of certain
obtain supplies of oil needed for military and transport purposes. These

as soon as there is no further use for their services in this direction.

best way of rectifying it would be to consent to its repetition. So innocent, indeed,
His Majesty's Government been of any conscious discrimination that we have

refused at least eleven applications from British firms and syndicates to carry out
investigations and studies in various parts of occupied enemy territory, and to this
I propose, so long as the existing conditions prevail, unflinchingly to adhere.

Believe me, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

154611

No. 162.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 22.)

No. 59.)

Lord

Tiflis, October 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on my recent journey in Armenia:—

1. On the 14th October, at 3 p.m., I left Tiflis by special train accompanied by
Grundy, Commander Birkett, R.N., Lieutenant-Commander Luke (these two

It here by Admiral de Radek when he visited me on the 10th October (1914) near Marouka Orbelani attached to my mission by the Georgian War Captain Anuf (of the Armenian army). On leaving the neutral zone of Borchkalo, I was welcomed in a prepared speech by the Commissary of Karaklis behalf of the Armenian Government.

morning of the 1 [redacted] .
 atation the President (M. Khatisian), the Ministers, the civil and military authorities
 a guard of honour was provided. Speeches were made by the President and the

with me in the commodious house provided by the Armenian Government for Cap. Gracey, and I took up my quarters there and received on my arrival the visits of those who had met me at the station.

set of the city is pitiful. The streets are all kept, and the wind car-
ried dust. Everywhere there are wretched refugees in rags, hun-
gry, and demoralized. M. Khatsman told me there were 200,000 in the district of
Ararat Republic. There are epidemics of typhus, cholera, dengue, malaria, and o-
f the general state of the public health is bad. The Americans are doing
what is possible to relieve this great mass of suffering, and are themselves paying the
toll of illness and mortality. Of the troops on the southern frontier 70 per cent. are
sick with malaria and as there was no quinine I immediately telegraphed to
M. Khatsman to get some for the sick troops. Dengue

about what I saw. . . out places two men lying on the ground dying of hunger
exhaustion, and the appearance of some of the children was very p.
were pecking up refuse in the streets and eating it. The shops were bare of
and almost the only food for sale in fair quantities was fruit and melons. An
. . . streets of pity, sick disgust, and misery at

at present is more depressing than any place I have ever seen.

4. During the afternoon I called and saw the Ministers, the foreign and other authorities, and I have already conveyed to your Lordship the points of interest discussed with M. Khatchian. I went also to His Holiness George 5th, Catholicos of Armenia.

strong personality of striking appearance, and I was glad to have the opportunity

I venture here to suggest that a regular interchange of friendly letters between the hierarchy of the Church of England and the heads of the smaller Christian Churches would be greatly appreciated by the latter.

in the evening I was entertained at a dinner by the American Legation. The guests included the representatives of the governments of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yugoslavia. The dinner was given by the American Legation and was a most enjoyable occasion. The guests were seated at long tables and the food was excellent. The evening was most enjoyable and the guests departed in good spirits.

Following my invariable rule I made no public speech. I will confess
thought of the hungry people outside spoiled my appetite, and I was so

Among the guests was Colonel Daly, who has since been appointed Ame-

I was grieved to see how the monastery had suffered since I last visited it nine years ago. There are now only twenty-two monks in residence. All the most valuable church property, including the splendid library, was transferred to Moscow for safety in the war, and in thus exposed to great risk of destruction or pillage. The buildings are sadly in need of repair, the fine trees have all been cut down, and the monastery was formerly the peaceful, well kept abode of cultured scholars is now, to a

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1038.

6. In the afternoon Muz. Khatissian (a Russian by birth) held a reception.

which I had the opportunity of meeting the chief political leaders, including the two delegates recently arrived from Paris, sent by Boghos Nubar Pasha, and two representatives of the American Armenians. These gentlemen had come to Erivan to discuss questions of policy with the Ararat Government, and I have been given to understand that one of their chief aims is to prevent too slow a rapprochement between that Government and the Russian Volunteer Army. One of the things that we must, in my conversation with the American and Turkish Armenians was their evident disinclination to make any long stay in the Republic as at present

7. I may mention that the President lives in a very modest way in a small apartment over an apothecary's shop, though he has a handsome house in Erivan (now given up to refugee work), and the Ministers generally are very poorly housed. The hereditary General, Thomas Nazarbekof, Commander-in-chief, seemed to have only one poor room for himself.

At the invitation of the Parliament I was present at their sitting in the
On my entrance the President made a speech of welcome which was much
I by the House and the public who crowded the galleries. The deputies
to be serious, well-educated, and business-like: there were three women among
M. Kastner sent me in the evening a letter, of which I annex a

On the morning of the 17th October I left in my motor-car with Captain M. Orlov, 1st-Commander Luke. We were followed by another motor-car, driven by M. Orlov, and Captain Yablokof (attached to the 1st Cavalry Division, since M. Orlov's death, and Captain Grmoy's office; this was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division on Don), attached to Captain Grmoy's office; this was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division on Don). We afterwards learned, had a series of accidents, and we did not meet it till our return to Barnaul from Novo-Bayand.

10. The state of the roads was very good, and at various places we found men at their maintenance and repair. In the forenoon we approached Klenovka

We were then entertained at breakfast by the commissar of the district who we met out along the lake by a good road.

I may here mention that about a week ago Armenia laid the foundation of her power by launching at Elenovka, with much ceremony, a motor-boat armed with a machine gun and manned by a lieutenant, who has under his command forty men. For a distance of over 20 miles every house was in ruins, as the result of a

Baynad detachments of cavalry and boy scouts (refugee orphans from Turkish Armenia) were drawn up on the road as guards of honour and followed us into the town.

11. The district of Novo Baykand, in the bleak highlands above Lake Goktcha, at a height of over 6,000 feet, was not able, even before the war, to produce half the food necessary for the inhabitants. There is now a large refugee population, and the cattle for the winter are, in spite of the good work of the American relief authorities,

the whole population, turned out to greet us, and there were parades of cavalry and bands, and the streets were guarded with troops.

After buying a rearing for 5000 upland, I returned to Edenboro and found the members of my party there.

12. In the dusk we drove along the lake in sight of the island with the monastery and, mounting to a height of about 5,000 feet crossed the pass near Dorka and by a splendid zig-zag road descended over 2,500 feet to Delijan, where we arrived about 7:30 P.M., and were hospitably entertained by the family of the ^{Armenian} general who built and now looks after the road.

contrast to the ruins and squalor of Erivan and the desolate shores of Lake Urmia, and to the local authorities, the homes for the relief of the Armenians, and to the elder people busily engaged in the carpet-making

industry established and organised by Captain Gracey some time ago (before he service of the Foreign Office), while the orphan children (of whom I saw one in use with large gardens and meadows on the river bank outside the on the property first request. The children, though many of them still had an expression of terror on their faces very sad to see, and others were scarred and disfigured by the I also saw the prison, the occupants of which, though somewhat crowded, seemed nourished and as comfortable looking as could be expected; I was told they chiefly robbers and murderers.

...ples were in my presence drawn from the ... to verify the report on that heavy ... The behaviour of the ... O.P.M. I was ... women and children

... flowers into my car and cheered

4. By a fine smooth road, through a well-timbered, fertile country, past villages and tilled lands, I arrived at Karax before dark. The place seemed ... I spent

... but is a trading centre of some

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... and depressing ki

... ago distributed 1,800 e

the railway station, encamped in the open air (like hundreds I had seen were crowds of sick, hungry, dirty, exhausted people of all ages.

15. After the comparative comfort of Tiflis and the positive luxury of Baku it painful to see the misery of Armenia. Not only have the people reached the

which has in many cases passed the breaking point, and in all has produced

likely ... the ... and a fervent Italian propagandist, is a frequent visitor.

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But the non-recognition hitherto of the independence of the Republic of Armenia in the spheres of finance, politics, and the army

In view of this, I, in the name of the Government, ask your Excellency to

The extremely sympathetic attitude of the British Government and people towards Armenia and the Armenians is well known, and we therefore boldly count on England's

of the desires of the Armenian people

Your personal attitude towards the interests of Armenia gives me full assurance that my request will find in your Excellency a powerful supporter

AL KHATISSIAN,

Minister-President of the Republic of Armenia.

154439]

No. 163.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 22.)

Constantinople, November 6, 1911

WITH reference to my letter No. 1935 of the 20th October, relative to the activity of the Italians in Smyrna and its environs, I have the honour to forward herewith for your information a copy of a further letter, dated the 22nd October, which I received on this subject from my representative at Smyrna.

I have, Sir,

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 163.

Mr. Morgan to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

October 22, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 14th instant, it is reported to me on good authority that a man named ... and a fervent Italian propagandist, is a frequent visitor.

JAMES MORGAN, Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna.

154340

No. 164

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 2152.)

(Telegraphic) En clair.

Constantinople, November 10, 1910.

THE information contained in your telegram No. 1727 gives rise to serious ... The already extraordinary prolongation of the armistice has brought ... a state of real chaos which we have managed to palliate so far by a series of ... but it is not correct to anticipate "a period of peace" for some time to come. ... period of at all events six months, I feel it my duty to point out some of the principal difficulties we must be prepared to meet.

1. Finance.—See my telegram No. 1851 and my despatch No. 1775. 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grant any loan without controlling it, presumably this control would have to take an international form, which is most cumbersome and I think undesirable. It could hardly

Government himself, which he wishes carried on, or to come to Constantinople, he has, as you are aware, suggested that the elections which are proceeding are of course the best possible and will result in the nomination of practically a pure Committee. It is possible that they may be able to raise funds.

4.—The situation is quite unparalleled. Ottoman Courts, Ottoman subjects, and Allied troops are subject to Allied courts martial. But this no courts of law exist at the moment of writing. The Turkish Government refuse to adopt proposed temporary international tribunal, and even this would be quite inadequate palliative. Criminal charges are dealt with in a rough and ready way by the inter-Allied police, but with no real legal sanction; offenders are arrested and then released after a few days, as there is no prison accommodation, no tribunal which can deal with, say, a case of fraud. There are measures which it is most desirable to enforce in the public interest, such as the prevention of profit or the speculation in roubles and shipping, passport or customs, but we can, more or less, impose our decisions on the Porte, we have no legal authority over foreigners. This absence of law courts, tolerable as it was for a time, is every day greater disadvantage.

Police and Sanitary.—In accordance with War Office instructions (see telegram No. 88 of 14th January) the British military authorities assumed control of the Turkish police and sanitary administrations, admitting French and so that the controls might take on a proper inter-Allied complexion. But to our action as regards the police, the French assumed control of the gendarmerie, which we declined to participate. They have, I gather, made very little with their organization, which they appear to have used, under the guidance of an indifferent general named Poulon, who was employed in the gendarmerie before war, mainly as a means of propaganda and of obtaining information. The police control under British supervision has given fully as satisfactory results as could possibly be hoped for in the circumstances, directing the action of the Turks, and the money to meet the expenses, only the cost of the foreigners employed borne by the respective Allied Governments. Crime is kept within fairly reasonable limits, but the heads of the inter-Allied police have found themselves forced into the position of being a kind of court of summary jurisdiction, and to give orders of military necessity.

In sanitary control of the city and environs was similarly taken over by British military authorities, who adjoined to themselves representatives of the Allies, as well as Greek and Russian representatives. This body is called the Commission sanitaire internationale, and gives directions to the existing municipal organization. Its control, however, has never been effective, as we have furnished no money, and, as the municipality possess no means (see my telegram No. 2004), they are always able to plead lack of means as an excuse for not carrying out recommended measures. Plague and typhus exist here, and I am advised that, while the former probably presents no great danger, we must be prepared to face a considerable epidemic of the latter during the winter, the health of the Allied troops has to be safeguarded. The above-mentioned Commission is responsible for all the work that has been done, but it is immensely hampered by lack of means and competent personnel as well as by the action of General D'Espèrey. When the headquarters of the Allies were moved here he, as Commander-in-Chief, introduced from Salonica a Commission internationale d'hygiène, composed of the directors of medical services of the three Allies, to which he added on here representatives of the navies and of the two Turkish sanitary administrations (municipal and quarantine), as well as of other nationalities. The Allied Commissioners are also represented. This body possesses properly no executive functions, though the French members are continually trying to extend its sphere, and I understand that it issues instructions in quarantine and in matters, though the executive remains in the hands of the Turkish Commission de Defense sanitaire des Frontières. Here, again, effective action is greatly hindered by lack of funds (see my telegram No. 1946). You will see that no more unsatisfactory

state of affairs could well be imagined, but it must continue as long as does the

4 Foreign Relations.—I am glad to say that my relations with both my colleagues are entirely satisfactory and cordial, even if the attitude of the Italian Government is ambiguous and lends itself to certain suspicions. When the divergence of our views and interests, as well as the natural and instinctive efforts of the Turks to accentuate them, are taken into account, this result may almost be considered as surprising. This

and seriously menaced by the attitude of who is consumed with vanity and a sense of his own importance, and who never loses an opportunity to presume upon his position of Commander-in-Chief for interfering in every kind of matter, from municipal latrines to the relations of this High Commission with the Turkish Government, none of which depend in the most remote manner upon his responsibilities as Generalissimo. He has

possible to replace him by some person of a less overbearing and more conciliatory nature. It is of course a standing enigma to the world at large here, but especially the Turks, why the Supreme Command in Turkey is not in the hands of that country, and why it is not overthrown the Turkish Empire.

Internal Situation.—As indicated above, this is very obscure. It seems clear that the present Government has not been able to come to an agreement with Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalist movement, which appears to be meeting with quite serious success. Accounts have come to my ears of serious engagements between them

of Turks are stated to have taken place, the anti-Nationalists being ill-provided with arms. The Christians have not been touched so far. My French colleague learns that the Entente libérale were making vigorous attempts to overthrow the present Government, and he seemed to think that I was interested in the movement, but I have most fully adhered to your instructions, namely, to insist on the maintenance of law and order and of legally constituted authority, but to take no action which could be interpreted as assistance to any one party, and I have taken special pains to emphasize to the Turkish Government and to my colleagues that this and no other is the policy of His Majesty's Government. It is one which it is not entirely easy to follow; for recently several arrests have been effected, and I am at a loss to know whether the arrested were implicated in plots against the present Government, or whether they were not constituted authority.

At all events, the discord existing among the Turks themselves is undoubtedly on the increase and can only tend to their future weakening. Nevertheless, you must be under no illusion as to the necessity of a considerable military force if it is desired to impose upon the Turks any really onerous conditions of peace or to ensure stable safety to the Christians.

It is my duty to inform you that the Turkish delegates absolutely refused to accept the occupation of Constantinople, a point upon which, I think, you might advantageously count.

It is a fact which relieves us perhaps of certain responsibilities, but which certainly imposes upon us greater ones. In any case we have under the armistice no right to declare an occupation now for declaring an occupation. Arguments based upon an occupation are invalid.

My recommendations, then, are as follows:—

- (1) The presumption I have made is convenient, and is sufficient to justify the action in making an advance till the Nationalists are forced to come out into the open.
- (2) The situation really can only be met by a declaration of occupation, from which I submit we are precluded by considerations of good faith. But apart from this I can see no sound remedy, and we must get along as best we can, relying upon His Majesty's Government and the Peace Conference to support such action as we may be obliged by circumstances to take should the occasion arise.
- (3 and 4.) The remedy is clear. It is very necessary to remove General Franchet d'Espèrey, whose existence appears no longer justified by circumstances, or, if it is

place him by a man of wider views and who understands more perfectly duties and the obligations of an ally.

8. I venture to hope that the considerations in my despatch No. 1836 will with your Lordship's attentive consideration.

9. I am reporting separately on the situation with regard to the native Christian population of Turkey (see my despatch No. 2110, M/2348 of 11th November, 1919).

154459

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 2110)

My Lord

WITH reference

Constantinople, November 11, 1919
of the 4th November

native Christian population

2. Owing to the Nationalist movement in Asia Minor, arising out of the occupying and growing tendency on the part of the Nationalists in the interior to make for the sea-coast, where they arrive destitute and homeless, to swell the crowds of refugees, for whom it is already impossible to procure adequate food and accommodation in the coast towns and villages.

3. Even at Constantinople, under the eyes of the various committees organising the relief of Armenian and Greek refugees, a recent visit which the Assistant Commissioner paid to an Armenian refugee camp at Haidar Pasha revealed an indescribable state of affairs. Men, women, and children were huddled into tents where there was hardly room to move, the necessaries could not be preserved, and in weather the whole place was deep in mud. Moreover, there were not enough tents and several families were camping in the open, sitting on their bundles all day and sleeping on the bare ground at night.

4. Some explanation of the difficulty in housing the refugees may be found in the destruction caused by the Nationalists in the Christian districts. Buildings required for military needs, but it is always the Christian element who has to bear the chief burden of suffering. If this state of things exists in the

5. No stronger proof could be given of the anxiety which the present situation

Armenian Patriarchate recently called jointly upon me, arriving together at the Embassy, for the purpose of drawing attention to the dangers and sufferings of the Christian population—an unparalleled instance of fraternity in the history of their country (see my despatch No. 1923 of the 18th October).

The various relief organisations which are endeavouring to cope with this mass of human suffering never contemplated the possibility of having to continue operations over another winter, with the fate of Turkey still hanging in the air and without the material assistance and support of a controlling Christian Power which was raised a year ago.

7. The Armenian Committee, which is dependent on voluntary contributions, is almost exhausted its funds; the Greek Committee was never able to operate beyond Thessalonica and the Asiatic shore of the Sea of Marmora, and it now depends for its grant from the Greek Government curtailed by a sum of 200,000 l.; the American Committee for Relief in the Near East is also being obliged to reduce its staff and staff in a very large measure, and it is seen with dismay that the great American political and material assistance which had been aroused by the

Enquiry now seem doomed to disappointment.

8. Meanwhile, the needs are

The work of the relief officers of this High Commission in obtaining the return of their property to returned refugees, which was proceeding satisfactorily,

not make itself felt for some months, when Turkish resentment for being fanned into a flame by the anti-British propaganda of the Nationalists when the services of the relief officers would be more valuable than when they met with obstructions and hostility instead of co-operation.

to Christians have to be left in distress.

It earned prestige and personal influence which they had acquired with all the population have been seriously impaired.

10. With regard to the question of the personal security of Christians in Turkey, it is true that Mustafa Kemal Pasha proposes to guarantee their safety, provided they do not threaten the integrity of the Empire, but after the war they will be placed in the word of an

Nationalist leader who regards the surviving Armenians and Greeks as so many hostages for the exaction from the Allies of more favourable terms of peace for

the Near East might be compared to a jelly. Touch it in one place and the whole trembles. The events at Smyrna have had their repercussion at the length and breadth of the land. The Christians are now bewildered and bewildered by the seeming change of front, when, after proclaiming

world our solicitude for their welfare, they see us apparently abandoning them to their fate, and terrified—and justly so—as to what their fate may be. Britain occupies the unique position in the eyes of both Moslems and Eastern Christians, on the one hand to the existence within the British Empire of vast numbers of fellow subjects and on the other to our consistently sympathetic attitude to all down-trodden races, while all alike recognise in her the Power which has the moral effect of what they regard as a betrayal in the hands of the Moslems, who are very much of an enigma to them. Despair must be the result, while the Moslem is encouraged in a fresh course of

12. Another result of the indefinite prolongation of the armistice is to increase and emphasise the chaos already existing in Turkey, militarily, politically, and financially. Signs are not wanting that the present Government is as helpless as its predecessor in establishing its authority over the country, nor can it be otherwise when Allied occupation interferes with almost every branch of administration. To add to this, serious distress is inevitable during the coming winter among the many thousand Moslem refugees from the Smyrna area, who are now homeless and

number of these refugees have been accommodated in villages vacated by deported Christians, but in their blind ignorance, the Turks had destroyed much which might now have served for the maintenance of their own distressed co-religionists, cutting down olive and mulberry and wrecking houses and buildings in the most wanton fashion.

13. Meanwhile it is not to be supposed that German and Bolshevik agents have been idle. On this fertile soil they could sow the seed of revolution and anarchy with insane hatred of the Allies, which would be bound to bring forth a crop of violence and crime. Every district has its band of brigands, patriots, and even in the vicinity of Constantinople robbery under arms is

principal victims being naturally the unprotected Christians. All these elements of disorder stand Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his trained officers, hating and fearing the British, who they know would stand a state of things in which their occupation would be gone, and ready to proceed to any length to keep Turkey for the Turks and free from foreign interference—above all, the Government of Great Britain. A prolongation of the armistice served their purpose well. Every week sees their influence grow as the disorder and distress becomes more acute. The resulting situation will render the task of imposing terms of peace on Turkey

ly more difficult when it comes at last to be undertaken. 14. It must be that the armistice is still to continue for some time to come, it becomes necessary to consider what immediate steps should be taken to ameliorate, at least, the situation. It is hopeless to look to the Turkish Government for this. Representations to the Grand Vizier, notes to the Porte

it impossible for the Christians to earn their living, and by boycotting terrorism to drive them again from the area.

by practically exhausting
misery & threat

Great Britain, who has shattered the fabric of Turkish
 " Her times in the surviving Christian population, should
 fate, but assume the responsibility of their relief until their fa
 tant she should do this either alone or in concert with her Allies

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, November 21, 1948

COMMUNICATIONS are passing between our respective military authorities with regard to the evacuation by the British troops of the coastal areas in S defined in the provisional agreement recently concluded between Mr. Lloyd and M. Clemenceau in Paris. It has been agreed that this is a purely military action, and is not intended to prejudge or compromise the future political and administrative settlement of those areas by the Peace Conference. It may be well for me to place on record that it is being carried out by His Majesty's Government without prejudice to the future determination of the northern and eastern frontiers of Palestine, which will require to be examined and readjusted in the settlement.

I am, yours sincerely,
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 167

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 24.)

Mr. Lamb,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter which I received from Harriet v6 Itlaf, a political Party, to the Grand Vizier, in which he expounds the reasons why she has decided to abstain from taking any part in the election of deputies to the Chamber. It should be noted that the Greek and Armenian communities have decided before to have nothing to do with the elections.

The elections are now in full swing throughout the country, the Constantinople press are filled daily with articles on the subject. I doubt that in the provinces the usual methods of intimidation and fraud are employed with the only pretence of disguise in order to ensure the return of the

assembly of Congress of Union and Progress and Nationalist partisans and delegates I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner

Memorandum

The Entente libérale Party has already submitted to you by its exposé of the September and 13th October its point of view concerning the election of deputies, as well as concerning the real character of the national forces in Anatolia, which, ~~by the Turkish and British Governments~~ have thrown into calamity a big nation of 600 years.

This Committee has ever since filled its safes by plundering and stealing, by speculating and bribing, by killing and deporting, and by using all sorts of oppressive and illegal means. This Committee succeeded to open again its doors by importing great sums from Anatolia, and by collecting in the capital after the Armistice many desert officers connected with it, as well as by appointing many high officials to important posts, and thus through the organisations made in Constantinople. All our efforts and our repeated applications to the Government to point out abyss in which the nation is led remained fruitless.

The ominous Committee consists of persons famous for having secured their way
and most disastrous results, and availing of this they drew innumerable advantages.
It consists of persons who have hid ten the crime they perpetrated, and by rejecting all
not meeting any impediment of whatever description, and profiting of the
party, both verbally and in writing, that all the officers, officials, and gendarmes
will influence the elections, and as they had already done before, by using threats
and force, they will violate the electoral rights of the nation, and they will thus bring
in the middle a body under the name of Parliament which will execute all their
operations by obtaining in their hands all the destinies of the nation.

We had then pointed the way in which the elections could be safely carried out, and we had requested that measures might be taken to this effect accordingly. But

Salih Pasha, who returned from Amassia with Kara Vassif Bey, representative of the national forces in Constantinople, had published in the papers that the agreement between them forms in a way a fourth force.

Dependence of the national movements sent without paying any postal tax.

compelled the country to conclude an armistice under very bad conditions, and consequently were accountable for all this.

The Government is coming into contact for the sake of an understanding with a commander whose rank was taken away by Imperial Order for disobedience.

Government is appearing as Governor, Vakil, Mutasarrif and other official
and were present at the ceremony and by the national forces, without

Under the circumstances, we beg to bring to your Highness's knowledge with regret that the League and Party which formed the conviction that the political situation of the country had become impossible, and which is more interested in the election

[1856]

In view of its possessing branch offices everywhere in Anatolia and in Roumelia possibly take part in the elections of to-day pending the return, to its normal condition.

Consequently, our party considers its sacred duty to demand the protection of a bound to punish officially all criminals. We believe that the Government should satisfy themselves with the convictions brought forth by Salih Pasha in consequence of his having been sent to Amassia, but to send a commission chosen by our party to have the criminal acts mentioned in the attached list examined on the spot so that legal penalties might be imposed according to the results which would be attained.

Appendix.

After the writing out and sending of the above letter, our President should come to an understanding with the Government of Constantinople, and should demand that the Government should take the necessary steps to protect the party, and should demand that the Government should take the necessary steps to protect the party, and should demand that the Government should take the necessary steps to protect the party.

List of Criminal Acts.

(Translation.)

1. The arrest of Tervik Bey, Kaimakam of Cushek, and his imprisonment at Sparta.
2. The arrest of Vasi Bey, Mutesarrif of Borlor, during the execution of his duties, the confiscation of all his documents, his exile and imprisonment at Sparta.
3. The arrest of Muheddin Pasha, Vall of Angora, and his exile to Sparta.
4. The assassination of Hilmi Bey, Mutesarrif of Eski Shehir; letting free the assassin after having arrested.
5. They have sent Izret Effendi, Control Officer at Sparta, to his land; imprisoned him there for five days, and tortured him.
6. They prevented Halis Effendi, Police Director of Konia, to do his duty.
7. They have sent Ismet Effendi, Control Officer at Sparta, to his land; imprisoned him there for five days, and tortured him.
8. They prevented Halis Effendi, Police Director of Konia, to do his duty.
9. They have sent Ismet Effendi, Control Officer at Sparta, to his land; imprisoned him there for five days, and tortured him.
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13. They have sent Ismet Effendi, Control Officer at Sparta, to his land; imprisoned him there for five days, and tortured him.
14. They have sent Ismet Effendi, Control Officer at Sparta, to his land; imprisoned him there for five days, and tortured him.
15. They have gathered and collected from all parts very big sums of money.
16. They threatened by death Mahmoud Effendi, ex-Mudir of the Nahie

At Hissar in the Kaza of Tokat and obliged him to run away to Constantinople in order to save his life.

18. They condemned to death Hadji Mehmed Ali, President of the *Entente libérale* Party in Eski Shehir; the secretary Burhannedin; and one of the members, Selviye Effendi, after killing Subhi Bey, the Mutesarrif, the terms came to these three persons, but in the meantime they ran away to Constantinople, seeking refuge to the English.

19. They exiled the Mudir of the village of Fartek as well as Ismail Bey, Kaimakam of Bor, to Nemshehir, the Mudir of Public Instruction at Nigde Aramboun and the judge of Onlou Kiahla to Nigde; they thrashed the judge and they threatened the Kaimakam.

20. They arrested Nail Bey, Mutesarrif of Navouza, to evacuate the

the Congress of Erzeroum by proclaiming a general strike, considering it a general centre; Moustak, the owner of the "Selamet," published in Trebizond, strongly objected; they therefore his house one night and tried to send him to the court martial of Erzeroum; they summoned him to the court martial and he was killed.

21. They arrived now at Constantinople

22. They have gathered force thousands and thousands of people from Erzeroum, specially 70,000 from Eski Shehir, 30,000 from Erzeroum, and 30,000 from Burhan.

23. The fact that Nail Bey, one of the chiefs of the revolutionary movements, who was condemned to death for massacres and deportations, has again joined them to-day is acting in the name of the national forces.

24. They have compelled, using force, Haji Mustafa Effendi, M. A. (religious), to pull down the placard of the *Entente libérale* Party's premises there, with the assistance of the soldiers with bayonets on the rifles; they imprisoned him and threatened him to such an extent that he was

25. They are still doing so against the actions of brigandage.

26. They have gathered 100,000 Turkish liras on Kutahia; they

27. They have attacked, with a force of 1,000 men, the district of Sivas

28. On this occasion the rebels of Anatolia attacked Mustafa Bey, of Alashehir, one of the notables of the place; they blew up his house by bombs, and he scarcely succeeded to escape to Constantinople with only one of his daughters.

29. The newspaper "Atelink Seuz," published at Castamouni, wrote on the 19th

30. under the title of "Candidate Deputies," the following

31. The National Rights at Castamouni

32. It was reported by Mustafa Kemal, after the 15th

33. For this reason, the National Rights at Castamouni

34. Constantinople by the National Rights at Castamouni

35. was opposed to the National Rights at Castamouni

36. National forces in Erzurum, Bolou, and other places

37. His Majesty that the Central Government should at once be informed in view of its treacherous dealings, and that in case of the resignation of Lord Pasha (Cabinet) they

are ready to march on Constantinople perfectly. The *Entente* Powers will remain entirely neutral. All of the movement.

39. The fact that Saadeddin Effendi, Kassikam of Seari, informs by telegram dated the 27th October, 1919, that he invited all honourable personages who do want to participate in the elections, to appear before him, and then openly threaten them.

Enclosure 2 in No. 167

Extract from a Constantinople Newspaper

UN VOTE TYPE.

La question du vote contesté de Fatih se précise. Il apparaît que c'est une question de Stamboul—la partie occidentale.

Ces électeurs sont au nombre de 3,000 seulement. La moitié d'entre eux n'ont pas participé à l'opération. En effet, les votes exprimés sont au nombre de 1,500 sur ceux-ci, les 1,050 étaient des bulletins imprimés uniformes, avec une signature au-dessous.

Les votes imprimés ne sont-ils pas valables? Ici ne dit rien à cet égard. Mais le préfet Djemal Pacha, chargé, de par ses fonctions, de ces élections, considère que, sur 1,200 votes les 1,050 sont imprimés, constitués comme la manifestation organisation (il a dit "une force") destinée à faire prévaloir ses candidatures.

De ceci et de ce qui s'est écrit dans les journaux, il est permis de déduire que l'on fait allusion à une action des Unionistes.

Le Conseil d'Etat, consulté, a déclaré qu'il ne trouve aucune prescription légale à appliquer en l'espèce et ne peut donc rendre les votes imprimés valables ou non. Il ne sait s'il y a eu manœuvre.

A rapprocher de ce qui précède le cas de ce Vali agha de Pacha-Baghdad, auquel un membre du conseil des anciens de l'endroit avait demandé son cachet pour l'apposer, dit-il, sur une pièce relative à la distribution du pain, et qui s'en servit pour signer un bulletin de vote du Milli-Congrès.

[155758]

No. 168.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 1391.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 26, 1919.

M. CAMBON opened his conversation with me this afternoon by raising again the question of the proposed Anglo-French guarantee for the integrity of Belgium.

He seemed to be under the false impression that the British Government had finally and definitely declined to have anything to do with the matter. I pointed to him that this was not the case, and that the decision taken by the Cabinet was merely this: that they did not wish at the moment to take independent action in Belgium before the question of the Anglo-American guarantee of the French was itself in a less precarious position.

We presently found ourselves simultaneously pointing out to each other a feature of the case which neither of us had fully realised at our last interview, namely, that a new guarantee is not given to the Belgians by Great Britain and France, but by the United States. In other words, if Belgium does not get the new guarantee, she will be left upon the old one.

I said that, in these circumstances, inasmuch as, even if we gave the new guarantee to the Belgian Government, while it might satisfy their desires, it did not seem to me that it would at all tempt the Dutch Government to accept the draft treaty had been proposed in Paris, I did not quite understand why the Belgian Government were so eagerly pressing the matter.

The Ambassador also was unable to answer this question.

When I asked him whether his Government would prefer to offer the new guarantee or to remain content with the old one he said that he had no

instructions on the subject, but that personally he inclined towards maintaining the Treaty of 1839.

I promised to examine the question of the two alternatives and to communicate again about them.

His Excellency then spoke to me in terms of great apprehension about reports concerning probable pourparlers between Mr. O'Grady, whom we had sent there, and the

of the proposed exchange of prisoners. The French Government had

been to anything that M. Litvinoff might say upon the larger question of peace with Soviet Russia, and to send home a memorandum which, it was understood, M. Litvinoff was anxious to submit. This memorandum was said to contain proposals in regard, among other things, to the blockade and the financial and economic situation upon which the Bolshevik Government would be disposed to make.

In reply to this I told the Ambassador that Mr. O'Grady's instructions had been to the contrary; that he had been deputed to deal with the question of the exchange of prisoners, and that he was not to encourage or embark upon any wider subject. I believed that he had been told that, if M. Litvinoff desired to secure the

be the basis of the rumours which had reached the French Government. There would be nothing improper in such action on Mr. O'Grady's part; but on the larger question I had been very careful throughout to prevent there being any misunderstanding and to confine him within the limits of his instructions. I thought, therefore, that the French Government had been somewhat unduly alarmed, but I would watch the matter very carefully myself.

M. Cambon said that there were also a number of French prisoners confined in Moscow and he asked whether it would be possible for Mr. O'Grady to include in his mission an effort to secure their release.

I said that I thought the best thing I could do was to ask Mr. O'Grady by him the facts of the case, with a view to giving help if it were possible to do so. For this the Ambassador expressed his hearty thanks.

We then discussed the question of the transfer of the Peace Conference to London of the meetings of the Peace Conference in order to deal with the Turkish Peace.

I said that no official reply to this proposal had been received, though I understood that it was not favourably regarded by M. Clemenceau.

M. Cambon said that, during his recent visit to Paris, he had not been able to see M. Clemenceau, who was away in the country, and he had had only one short talk with M. Pichon. The latter had, however, mentioned the objections of the President du

a labour which, I observed, had been spun out for the best part of a year.

While M. Clemenceau had offered to come with M. Pichon to England in order to reach an understanding with us, and while we should warmly welcome such an interchange of views, I could not share the French view that, even if we did come to an

words be got through in a few days. On the contrary the questions which remained for settlement, and which I enumerated to the Ambassador, would probably

Whom we could spare, or how the R. ...

unreasonable that the latter should now insist on retaining the venue in Paris, and be so unwilling to submit to the slight inconvenience of transferring their

ties for a short time to our capital. I contemplated going to Paris myself before

enceau then.

As regards the situation in America, the Ambassador expressed the opinion

League of Nations as embodied in the Covenant. The American Government, the Senate would have been in the least deterred by acting as it might choose on each occasion as it arose under the covenant. The President was convinced, would insist on retaining precisely the kind and degree of which it claimed in the reservations.

I did not argue the matter at length, but I pointed out that our view reservations was a different and much more serious one, that, so far as I knew, President Wilson himself was not at all likely to take them lying down, and that latest news as to the attitude of America, derived from our Ambassador there and from what Mr. Davis and Mr. Polk had said to me here, was that there still remained a possibility of a compromise which might save the covenant of the League and American participation. So long as there was still this possibility, it seemed very much better to work for that end than to throw up the sponge and admit at an early stage what amounted to practical defeat.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
CLAUDE MONTELL

[155729]

No. 160

M. Clemenceau to Mr. Lloyd George. -- (Received at Foreign Office, November 26.)

Office of the President of the Council,
Paris, November 2, 1919.

The Prime Minister,

I HAVE to thank you for the perfect clearness with which you have your point of view concerning our Syrian negotiations, just as I have myself, on the friendly intentions of British policy with regard to France.

You gave us the proof of your intentions when you declared to the Emir that you took responsibility for the relief of the British troops by French and that you advised him to come here to reach an understanding with the French Government.

In point of fact, if this procedure had been followed at once at that time, at the time of the occupation of Damascus a year ago, the difficulties would without doubt have been avoided. I am pleased to see that there is no chance of their recurring between us, and that the Conference will have nothing to do but to sanction our agreement for the French mandate in Syria and the British mandate in Mesopotamia. Each of us will work with the Arab Governments and administrations of our respective mandates on liberal conditions under which we will respectively give our effective support and assistance in accordance with our agreements.

I have never called in doubt the sincerity of the sentiments of the French Government, nor have I ever suspected the uprightness of Sir E. Grey, whose character is just as deeply respected in France as in Great Britain; but in my view, secondary agents on the spot, who do not realise the complexities of the situation, have let themselves be influenced by the fact of the British occupation of the territories.

I do not intend to take up point by point the detailed historical details contained in your note of the 18th October, although I continue to regret that

of 1915, not even the text of which had been communicated to us, just as our agreements of 1916 had not been communicated to the Arabs—a dangerous error in 1916 as a secret understanding between us for the partition of the Arab countries contrary to the agreements, in too absolute a form, of 1915 with King Hussein.

I interpret in a manner less restrictive than you the rights which result from the French and British Governments with regard to the Arab Governments from the agreements of 1916 and the declaration of November 1918. These will, moreover, be finally defined by the terms of the mandate which the Conference alone is qualified to determine.

I must, however, make two points clear —

The replacement (which I had failed to notice) of the term "protéger" by that of "soutenir," effected several months after the signature of the agreements and accepted by M. Paul Cambon on his own initiative, had as its only object to avoid an ambiguity, our intention being not to exercise a protectorate over the Arab federations, but merely to add them our exclusive assistance in every form.

As regards our conversation of December 1918 I cannot admit that I consented to an equivalent to the concession of the British mandate in Palestine. It would have been unprecedented that such concessions should have been made being on the one hand

the Emir Feisal. Perhaps you have kept the map which I thought it necessary to communicate to you to this effect.

The case of Mosul has, moreover, this special aspect, that the town is included in the Arab zone of the French mandate under the same category as Damascus and is claimed by our Arab Allies under the same conditions.

I welcome with the greatest satisfaction the assurance that the Arabs have not a single rifle, machine-gun, or gun, contrary to the reports furnished by our agents, and that I am very glad to hear that the Emir Feisal is in a position to communicate to you to this effect.

The negotiations pursued on our side with him at Paris have been very courteous, although they have not yet resulted in an agreement. The essential difficulty lies not in the excessive ambitions of France, but in the absolute designs of the Emir, who does not seem yet ready to understand the necessity for the Arabs to accept the French mandate.

His general attitude makes as difficult for you as for us the unequivocal understanding which we all desire, but which demands from each of us equivalent concessions. However this may be, the intermediate phase of the mandate, the utility of which has notwithstanding been confirmed by the Conference, is not yet frankly accepted by him. I would not despair of convincing him.

Every attempt to separate the two peoples would be in vain. The alliance of the two peoples, and the depth of the sentiments which bound them after five years of war, are the most powerful factors in the world.

Please accept, Sir,
CLAUDE MONTELL

[155730]

No. 170

Emir Feisal to the Earl of Derby. -- (Received at Foreign Office, November 26.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 21, 1919

I HAVE the honour to hand your Lordship the enclosed letter for forwarding to the Prime Minister, also a copy of my last letter to M. Clemenceau for the perusal of His Majesty's Government.

I have, Sir,
FEISAL

Enclosure 1 in No. 170

Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George

Paris, November 21, 1919

I HAVE come to realise that the French Government, in spite of continued suggestions for an amicable settlement, intend as a result of your aide memoir of the 12th September, 1919, to occupy some of the districts evacuated by the British troops around Damascus, such as Bekaa, Baalbeck, Zebdani and also other places around Hama, Hama and Aleppo.

These districts, as you know, are part of the territory where the British Government undertook to establish an independent Arab State, and in accordance with this they handed over the administration to the Arab Government at the time of occupation. Any violation of the boundary by any Government or in any way contrary to the wishes of my father the King and the expressed desires of the people will be considered as an aggression which the Arab army cannot be blamed for resisting. This violation is expressly a breach of international law and sacred rights of the people.

In the name of my father the King and his Government I call upon the British Government to immediately help in the difficulties arising from this arrangement which is alleged to be temporary, until such time as the Peace Conference will determine the future of the whole country, the littoral as well as the interior.

I again beg to remind the British Government that they cannot exonerate themselves from the responsibility of their agreements with us which we still expect them to carry out.

I reserve to myself the right to bring once more before the Peace Conference our country's cause.

I have, &c
FEISAL

Enclosure 2 in No. 171

Emir Feisal to M. Clemenceau

M. le Président,

Paris, le 20 novembre 1919

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 19 novembre, en réponse à celle que j'ai adressée à votre Excellence en date du 5 de ce même mois.

J'ai eu le profond regret de voir que ma lettre ne vous a pas paru correspondre à la situation et que, par conséquent, elle n'a pu vous donner satisfaction. Je me suis donc adressé à votre Excellence de ma demande, concernant la nomination d'une commission, ne vous a pas semblé tout à fait exacte.

Si ce n'était le souci de vous éviter de longs détails, j'aurais bien voulu donner à votre Excellence de plus amples explications pour justifier mon point de vue et ma façon d'envisager la situation. Néanmoins, je me permets de vous soumettre le passage de la lettre de Mr Lloyd George, datée du 10 octobre, en réponse à la proposition que je lui ai faite pour la nomination de la commission. Il y est écrit :

"Ils seraient très heureux d'arranger une réunion immédiate entre vous et des représentants français, anglais et américains, pour régler de la façon la plus amicale, et à la satisfaction de tous les intéressés, les problèmes que comprend le retrait prochain des troupes britanniques de la Syrie le 1^{er} novembre 1919."

Il me semble que le sens de cette lettre ne prête à aucune interprétation équivoque. C'est évidemment que le Gouvernement britannique a agi en principe sur la proposition. Aussi dans l'espoir d'obtenir votre assentiment, je me suis empressé de répondre à votre aimable invitation, transmise par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères britannique, et je suis venu à Paris, pour m'entretenir et régler en premier lieu avec votre Excellence les problèmes découlant nécessairement de l'opération de la relève.

A cette occasion, je tiens à vous réitérer les assurances que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous répéter. Ce n'est nullement la relève des troupes britanniques, en elle-même, qui est en question.

En effet, l'opération, telle qu'elle est prévue, entraînera de fait un changement dans les limites et dans l'administration actuelles des zones, et cela ne peut que provoquer une grande effervescence parmi la population, malgré toutes les déclarations antérieures et toutes les assurances qu'on pourrait lui donner. Le peuple arabe m'a accordé sa confiance et m'a chargé de la responsabilité de sa direction politique, comme je m'étais chargé de la responsabilité de sa direction pendant la guerre, à la fois droit d'attendre de moi des garanties effectives et des assurances formelles pour dissiper ses inquiétudes. De mon côté, je crois avoir le droit d'attendre des Arabes leur concours bienveillant pour m'aider à maintenir la confiance réciproque entre eux et les Arabes, œuvre à laquelle je me suis sincèrement consacré, et que j'ai

jusqu'à ce jour menée avec succès. Je suis, cependant, obligé d'avouer que, malgré tous les efforts que j'ai déployés depuis mon arrivée ici, je n'ai pu encore obtenir aucune garantie efficace qui puisse m'autoriser à rassurer la population.

La seule entrevue relativement courte que j'ai eu l'avantage d'avoir avec le Général Gouraud n'a fait que confirmer l'opinion que j'avais déjà des grandes qualités de ce brillant chef de l'armée de la victoire, elle justifie amplement sa réputation et l'opinion exprimée dans la lettre de votre Excellence. Je n'ai

aucun moment douté de la sincérité et de la noblesse de vos sentiments, ni de vos dispositions de la grande nation française envers mon pays. Je suis aussi convaincu que le Gouvernement de la République est très désireux de prendre en

dérivation les vœux de ce peuple qui s'est rangé aux côtés des Alliés au moment le plus critique de la guerre, et qui a apporté sa modeste contribution à l'œuvre de la victoire en Orient. Aussi je ne fais qu'interpréter les vœux de ce peuple et sa foi dans

la justice et l'équité de votre Excellence, en me permettant d'insister pour arriver à une solution qui puisse lui donner la conviction que son existence n'est pas menacée.

Votre Excellence m'ayant fait comprendre que la question était du ressort de la Conférence, je ne puis, bien entendu, que vous adresser au Conseil suprême, non pas pour amener une décision définitive, mais

pour que la Conférence règle définitivement le sort de l'Orient.

Je suis toujours d'avis que c'est au Conseil suprême qu'il appartient de donner la solution satisfaisante, si toutefois votre Excellence ne juge pas

qu'il y ait lieu de prendre en considération la suggestion suivante que je me permets de vous soumettre :

1. Au maintien des troupes arabes dans les limites de la zone qu'elles occupent depuis l'armistice, des troupes britanniques dans la Palestine et des troupes françaises dans la zone ouest occupée par elles. D'autant plus que rien ne justifie un changement, dans les limites actuelles des zones, avant la décision de la Conférence.

2. La nomination d'une commission composée de trois membres : un français, un anglais et un arabe, désigné chacun par le commandant de la zone respective. Cette commission siégera dans une ville qui sera choisie en Syrie, elle aura pour mission de régler d'un commun accord les différends qui pourraient surgir entre les trois zones et sera chargée de maintenir la cohésion et la liaison entre les différentes administrations.

Je considère que cette solution aura le grand avantage de sauvegarder l'unité du pays et de faciliter la tâche des trois Gouvernements. C'est encore le seul moyen de convaincre la population que la mesure adoptée est de caractère purement militaire et ne vise en aucune façon à imposer des doctrines.

Le désir que votre Excellence a manifesté de rechercher une solution qui tienne compte des vœux des populations et de nos intérêts respectifs, m'encourage à vous proposer cette solution.

Le désir que votre Excellence a manifesté de rechercher une solution qui tienne compte des vœux des populations et de nos intérêts respectifs, m'encourage à vous proposer cette solution.

de, afin de m'aider à préparer les voies à une entente effective.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président, que je ne puis songer à rentrer en Syrie; je serai donc très heureux de recevoir un moment plus tôt une réponse favorable de votre Excellence.

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During the past year Ibn Saud had no conflict with another of the
of His Majesty's Government, His Highness Sherif Hussein, the King of the
Without going into the merits of the controversy, he wished to make it clear that
was a state of affairs which His Majesty's Government could not vi-
copies of cohesion and unity replace
discord in Arabian. the first essential to the attainment of this
was that the two greatest independent rulers of Arabia should live at peace with

that a strip of country should be left unoccupied between the com-
 Ibn Saud had, however, in the meantime received a previous message from the
 Majesty's Government which had induced him to suspend hostilities and return to
 Riyadh. Mr Philby was accordingly unable to deliver the message of His Majesty's
 Government, and Ibn Saud had remained in possession of Khurma and

Ahmed Ali Thunayyan replied that he had no doubt that if he were to meet with King Hussein himself, but he was not authorized to give to this effect, nor could he say anything as to the place of meeting. He said that he was not a representative in the event of a personal interview between the two rulers.

Ahmad-ibn-Thunayyan again pointed out that he had no authority to give a definite answer, but his personal opinion was that Ibn Saud would accept arbitration.

The Secretary of State replied that His Majesty's Government could not undertake this until they saw the agreement, but that they would be glad to accept any reasonable agreement arrived at by the two parties, and would use their influence to restrain either party from infringing it in future.

There was, so far as
any necessity for its removal.

As to No. 3, the question of an embargo on goods from New Orleans is now deposited entirely on the relations between the two rulers. If, as he hoped, before the next pilgrimage season commences they had found a solution to their differences, the embargo would not arise.

and ally of His Majesty's Government. He did not quite understand the last suggestion, that Mr. Philby should be despatched to the Sand as political agent empowered for the solving of the boundary and other kindred problems, inasmuch as the proposals now put forward by His Majesty's Government would, he hoped, result in all these problems being solved without British intervention.

in conclusion, he impressed upon Feisal-ibn-Saud and upon Ahmad-ibn Faysal the paramount necessity of Ibn Saud's establishing friendly relations with the King of the Hijaz. This was the most important point, and all questions of detail should be made subordinate to it.

No. 172.

[illegible]

before despatch, I should myself have drawn attention to the inaccuracy of the statement contained in the added words.

It is unnecessary to raise the point myself in the Supreme Council, but it is necessary to revive discussion on a subject which generally engenders some heat in the Conference, and also because M. Venizelos himself has, for the same reason, asked me to let the matter drop. He merely desired by this note to me to place on record the true state of things, and I would add that, so far as I can gather from the records available, M. Venizelos's version is entirely correct, the warning as to the provisional nature of the Greek occupation having been given, not at the time when M. Venizelos was invited to occupy Smyrna, but after he had effected occupation.

I have, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 172.

M. Venizelos to M. Clemenceau.

Dear Sir Eyre Crowe,

Paris, November 20, 1919.

I HAVE duly received the letter which the President of the Conference addressed to me under date of the 18th November. As I am desirous of avoiding further dispute with him, I shall not forward an official reply to the above letter. I am taking the liberty, however, of assuring you that the statement which appears in the report of the President at I was "formellement averti" of the temporary nature of the occupation of Smyrna is not exact.

When Mr. Lloyd George spoke to me first of the decision regarding the occupation, he made no mention whatever of its temporary character. And when I appeared before Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and Mr. Wilson in order to discuss matters relating to the occupation, I was made of its temporary nature. Only after the occupation had taken place I appeared before the Supreme Council. M. Beniamin Zaidi, in discussing the extent of the Greek occupation, was made for the time in that meeting of "temporariness," concerning the extent rather than the nature of the occupation.

I do not, of course, infer that the occupation entrusted to Greece is equal to a definite recognition of her sovereignty over the occupied area. It is only that when Greece was asked to proceed to this occupation, not only was it made to me of its being temporary, but on the contrary it was implied—though tacitly—that this occupation was the first step towards giving part of Western Asia Minor. Mr. Lloyd George testified as to the correctness of my impression.

I have, &c.
K. VENIZELOS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 172.

M. Clemenceau to M. Venizelos.

Conférence de la Paix.

Paris, le 18 novembre 1919.

M. le Président,

Le Conseil suprême a pris connaissance de votre lettre du 17 novembre dernier, répondant à la communication qu'il vous avait faite, après avoir entendu la lecture de votre rapport. Vous avez bien voulu donner à cet égard.

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le Conseil estime que les impressions que vous exprimez au sujet de l'occupation de Smyrne ne modifient en rien la déclaration faite par le Conseil suprême sur le caractère provisoire de l'occupation militaire grecque. Vous en avez été formellement averti au moment où la décision a été prise par le Conseil des Quatre.

Il appartient à la Conférence de la Paix seule de décider, au moment où l'ensemble de la question d'Orient sera étudié par elle, quel sera le sort des différentes régions de l'ancien Empire ottoman.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
CLEMENCEAU.

Enclosure 3 in No. 172.

M. Venizelos to M. Clemenceau.

Délégation hellénique au Congrès de la Paix.

Paris, le 15 novembre 1919.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 12 novembre, au sujet de la Commission d'Enquête de Smyrne. L'esprit d'amicale confiance dont s'inspire la réponse du Conseil suprême aux énonciations écrites et aux réserves verbales que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui exposer me fait un devoir de ne pas insister sur les vices dont est entachée l'enquête par suite de nombreuses irrégularités commises au cours de la procédure adoptée par la mission.

Mais je manquerais à la déférente sincérité de sentiments que j'ai toujours témoignés au Conseil suprême si je ne signalais pas à sa bienveillante attention les points que, sur deux points, me suggère la réponse qu'il a bien voulu me donner.

En premier lieu, le Conseil suprême exprime l'espoir que la tension dangereuse, qui ne pas avoir cessé actuellement de se faire sentir sur les limites de la zone grecque, sera peu à peu réduite par la sagesse et la justice de l'administration grecque à l'œuvre de délimitation récemment terminée par le Général Kiazim Pacha, chef des forces alliées en Asie Mineure.

Le Conseil suprême peut absolument compter sur le maintien de l'ordre le plus parfait dans la zone d'occupation de la Grèce hellénique. Mais ce serait se méprendre sur la réalité des faits auxquels est due la tension dangereuse persistant sur les limites de la zone que d'en attendre la réduction des effets de l'indiscipline grecque. Sa vigilance ne s'exerce, en effet, qu'en dedans de ces limites, alors que la tension dangereuse provient des attaques entreprises du dehors. Leurs auteurs ne sont pas des Grecs.

Enquête où ils ont voulu discerner une défaveur pour le régime grec. Dès lors, ils ont répété leurs impudentes agressions avec une fréquence d'autant plus grande qu'ils ont vu que les troupes grecques doivent se borner à les repousser sans pouvoir les poursuivre.

L'examen objectif des faits conduit à la conclusion que le bon ordre régnant dans la zone d'occupation grecque sera également assuré au delà de ses limites aussitôt que les Turcs, privés de l'espoir de trouver des appuis pour fomenter des troubles, auront conscience de leur défaite. Ce résultat sera certainement obtenu par les déclarations définitives de la Conférence de la Paix.

En second lieu, le Conseil suprême remarque que l'occupation de Smyrne n'a été

envoyée à Smyrne des troupes grecques, le Conseil suprême ne pouvait se méprendre sur la signification qui devait y être, à bon droit, attribuée par le Gouvernement et le peuple grec. Les revendications de la Grèce sur Smyrne et la région avoisinante n'ont pas été officiellement formulées.

Et la Conférence, longuement défendue devant le Conseil suprême et notamment soulevée par la Commission spéciale des Affaires grecques. En allant à Smyrne, la Grèce avait déjà un titre avant que si elle n'y avait pas encore de titre légal, elle y avait déjà un titre.

Elle n'avait pas ses troupes comme simples instruments d'exécution sur une terre étrangère, comme elle l'avait précédemment fait en Russie, mais bien comme les organes les plus intéressés au succès d'un mandat international ayant pour objet le maintien de l'ordre dans un pays essentiellement grec.

Dès lors, si l'occupation n'a pas constitué, au point de vue strictement juridique, un droit nouveau de la Grèce, elle n'en a pas moins créé une situation de fait nouvelle, qui ne peut être négligée. Si elle a augmenté pas les droits que la Grèce avait auparavant sur Smyrne, et que la Commission des Affaires grecques a déjà reconnus, du moins elle corrobore et redouble la confiance légitime avec laquelle la nation hellénique attend la décision finale de la Conférence de la Paix.

Je partage entièrement ce sentiment, car je suis convaincu que les droits de mon pays sur Smyrne sont en parfait accord avec la situation générale du monde comme avec les vœux et les intérêts des populations.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

E. K. VENIZELOS.

Facteurs 4 in No. 1, 2

M. Clemenceau to M. Venizelos

M. le Président,

Le Conseil suprême a reçu la lettre du 10 novembre 1919 et a bien voulu lui adresser sa réponse. Il a également pris connaissance du rapport de la Commission et examine ses conclusions.

Au cours de votre audition par le Conseil suprême, vous avez réservé quant aux conditions imposées par le Colonel Mazarakis. Ces conditions l'auraient fait envisager par la Commission.

Envisagées par la Commission, les conditions de votre demande, sujet de la communication des témoignages au Conseil grec, les travaux de la Commission se trouvent déjà tellement avancés qu'il n'est plus possible de donner suite à ses instructions.

Tout en admettant ainsi ce qu'il y avait de bien fondé dans les réserves que vous m'avez fait formuler, le Conseil suprême ne pense pas que les résultats de l'enquête soient comme entièrement viciés en ce qui concerne les faits relatifs à la violence commise par les troupes grecques. Il a rendu hommage à l'impartialité des membres de la Commission et à la conscience scrupuleuse qui a présidé à leurs travaux.

Le Conseil est d'accord que les incidents survenus à la suite du débarquement des troupes grecques à Smyrne ont semblé indiquer l'absence presque complète des mesures de précaution que les circonstances exigeaient de la part des autorités civiles et militaires grecques—omission qui a été rapportée par la Commission.

Le Conseil suprême appelle votre attention la plus sérieuse sur les conséquences de ces incidents et sur la nécessité de les éviter à l'avenir. Il prend acte de vos déclarations quant à l'ordre qui règne aujourd'hui dans la ville et dans ses environs. Il espère que la menace d'insécurité, qui ne paraît pas avoir cessé actuellement de se faire sentir sur les limites de la zone de l'occupation grecque, sera peu à peu réduite par la sagesse et la justice de l'administration grecque, et grâce à l'œuvre de délimitation récemment terminée par le Général Milne, commandant des forces alliées en Anatolie.

Quant à la région d'Aidia, les Puissances ont décidé qu'en présence des difficultés pratiques et des inconvénients politiques que peut présenter l'organisation d'une administration interalliée, elles préfèrent maintenir la situation de fait existante et l'occupation grecque.

A un autre point de vue, le Conseil désire obtenir de vous des renseignements sur la situation actuelle de la région d'Aidia.

Le Conseil suprême rappelle enfin que l'occupation de fait de Smyrne et de la région avoisinante par les troupes grecques n'a été décidée que pour des raisons de fait, et ne constitue aucun droit nouveau pour l'avenir. Il ne s'agit que d'une mesure provisoire qui laisse entièrement intacte la liberté de la Conférence de la Paix de régler les différents problèmes posés sur la question d'Orient en tenant compte de la situation générale du monde, ainsi que des vœux et des intérêts des populations.

Veuillez agréer, M. le Président, l'assurance de ma haute estime et de ma haute confiance.

156779.

17.

Colonel Meinertzhagen to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 20)

No 311. (C P O)

General Headquarters,

My Lord,

Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Cairo, November 10, 1919

In amplification of my cable No. 40305 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to submit the following report on the present situation in Syria and Palestine

Situation in Syria

The situation in Syria is at present very complex. There are two distinct schools of political opinion. The one is in favour of accepting any Government which gives security and permits healthy development, the other is above all anti-French, but also would prefer the exclusion of all foreign elements and the reinstatement of pre-war conditions. This latter party is in the majority in the towns and along the Arab-French borders. To the moderate party, who are willing to accept a French mandate, belong the more educated business men, the majority of the Bedouin, and the Druzes of Jebel Druze. Great efforts have been made by the Arab authorities to win over these two latter parties, but it is my opinion that the Rualla tribe under Nuri Shulani are not inclined with the choice of a mandatory Power or the unity of Syria. They are

willing to buy their friendliness with subsidies. The Druzes have alone shown a willingness to accept a *fait accompli*, and have given signs of ingratiating themselves with the French, this being due to our persistent attitude of neutrality and not to any liking for the French. Their threat to give active assistance to their brethren in the Lebanon is, I consider, as empty as any Bedouin threat to leave the desert and fight in military operations in the Lebanon and on the Syrian coast. I may add that I recently visited the Rualla tribe encamped some 80 miles east of Damascus, where I found them most friendly, though they pointed out that French officers would not be allowed to wander about the desert in motor cars. They were, however, willing to accept a subsidy from the French so long as it was paid to them in Damascus and not in the desert. I do however intend to get into closer touch with the Druzes of Jebel Druze when the evacuation is complete, at the express invitation of their leader, Nuri Pasha-el-Atash.

Yassin Pasha, the leading spirit in Syria, is now known to be in correspondence with Mustafa Kemal, though actual proof could only be obtained by using violence to the disguised Turkish officers who act as carriers. Yassin is aiming at reinstating Turkish rule in Syria, not so much on national or pan-Arab grounds, as on those of personal power. In this he is an open disciple of Kemal. There is little doubt that at the present moment Yassin's influence has replaced for the bad that of Feisal and the reasonable influence of Feisal. He now carries with him the confidence and majority of the people. It is even doubtful now whether Feisal can assume control of an administration which must move with public opinion or disappear.

A situation which contains a large percentage of genuine national feeling and a conviction of having been unfairly treated cannot fail to be dangerous when regional feelings are used as a stimulant and when the leading spirit is governed by

2. Damascus is the natural centre of political feeling. Other towns will be largely guided by events in that city. I therefore do not anticipate any serious trouble till we commence to evacuate Damascus. Arab feeling has been changed from anti-French to anti-European. This is now noticeable in propaganda where hostile insinuations are made to the English and friendly overtures made to Turks and even Germans. Unarmed demonstrations, previously of rare occurrence and with good intention, have now given place to armed demonstrations of almost daily occur-

... though trivial in themselves, might at any moment necessitate ...
In the Lebanon there are frequent but isolated acts of violence in which French troops
have no more than one occasion been used

the above factors constitute nothing more than was

... the future of political officers

The evacuation of Syria by our troops and the splitting up of OETA East
into a northern and southern zone, under French and B

... the future of political officers

Situation in Palestine

In Palestine ...

... antagonistic to Zionism and a British mandate over Palestine

The second feature is the lack of some visible sign of the birth of Zionism in
... the future of political officers

and for easing the general economic situation.

2 The purpose of the ...

The National Organisation will not fail to take precautionary measures against any decisions of the Government contrary to the interests of the Organisation.

Further, I have been informed that I will not be able to proceed to Sivas before I have received a reply to these proposals.

- I beg your Highness to be so kind as to reply to my telegram No. 3 and to inform me as to the answer which I am to return to the commissioners of the Organisation regarding the above-mentioned demands.—SALIH.
6. As was stated in article 5 of the decisions of the Sivas Congress, the commissioners of the National Organisation will exercise control over following: (a) conclusion of peace, (b) financial matters, (c) executive and political matters until the opening of the Chamber. In the event of resignation of the Cabinet, no Ministers will be appointed among the opponents of the National Organisation.
 7. To include in the Council of Ministers certain persons in accordance with decision of the Congress and the demand already submitted.
 8. The execution and accomplishment without delay or negligence by the Government of the points decided upon in the Sivas Congress, namely, the foreign policy of the Empire; the treaties to be concluded with Allied Powers and other countries, especially with Russia and Bulgaria, be based upon the sovereignty of the Ottoman Caliphate and nation. Relations with the English and French Governments to be undertaken to (a) l.
 9. The Government to check the movement against the Nationalists at Adana Bazar; to ensure security (for the National forces) in any place where similar events may occur.

The National Organisation will not fail to take precautionary measures against any decisions of the Government contrary to the interests of the Organisation. Further, I have been informed that I will not be able to proceed to Sivas before I have received a reply to these proposals.

I beg your Highness to be so kind as to reply to my telegram No. 3 and to inform me as to the answer which I am to return to the commissioners of the Organisation regarding the above-mentioned demands.—SALIH.

(2.)

The Grand Vizier to Salih Pasha, October 19, 1335.

REPLY to telegram of the 18th October, 1335:—

The decision of the Council of Ministers which has received the assent of His Majesty the Sultan in reply to the conciliatory proposals of the honourable commissioners (National Organisation).

In view of the principle for which the National Organisation has been constituted, namely, for the defence of the country and of the nation, a principle maintained by decisions of the Congress of Sivas.

In view also of Ottoman and foreign public opinion, and especially of the matters of the highest importance.

The Government, with a view to ensuring success in these matters, accepts in principle the proposal of the National Organisation to appoint commissioners to the executive power until the opening of the Chamber, in order that it may not be supposed that a second power exists behind the Government. It accepts the first article.

It also accepts the proposal of the National Organisation to hold elections in the population in places where the candidates and deputies of the Organisation may be elected, provided that the elections take place in complete freedom.

As regards the second paragraph of article 2, the draft of a law has approved by the Council of Ministers and is on the point of being endorsed by the High Military Court, in conformity with which the service of senior officers is fixed at ten years only, and the right of election and of voting as a candidate (etc) is granted to these officers.

With regard to articles 3 and 4, the present Government has agreed on principle to negotiate with the Allied Powers, and after these negotiations to rely upon public opinion, and to submit them to the Chamber immediately upon its being convened.

With regard to article 5, the good intentions of His Majesty the Sultan towards the National Organisation are proved by his declarations to the nation. He will never forsake his Imperial protection within the limits of his sovereign rights and those of the Caliphate, and he has deigned to request you to bring to the knowledge of the National Organisation his Imperial satisfaction with the assurances, by action and by oath, of the complete fidelity of the nation towards his Imperial person.

With regard to the question of the supervision which is mentioned in article 6, as already been stated, the principles of admitting the reasonable demands of the commissioners as a Commission of Advisers until the opening of the Chamber has been accepted.

The modification to be effected in the Council of Ministers, according to article 7, would not be advisable at the present moment; His Majesty the Sultan desires that the present Cabinet should regulate all affairs until it can obtain a vote of confidence at the opening of Parliament, and with regard to article 8, since the executive power is responsible for the decisions of the administration of the political affairs of the country, the political arrangements and treaties to be concluded with the Great Powers and other Governments will be submitted in case of necessity to both Chambers.

The Government agrees to an exchange of opinion in case of necessity with the commissioners to be known as the "Commission of Councillors" until the opening of the Chamber.

The necessary measures for the earliest possible cessation of collisions caused by a certain effervescence at Adana Bazar and Bozki, resulting from the great attachment of the nation to the National Organisation, have been taken; but the Government requests that the Organisation should also do its part, and draws the attention of the nation to the necessity of maintaining order and peace.

We beg you under present conditions to delay your departure to Sivas and to remain until the present decision of the Council of Ministers to the honourable Commission and to communicate to me the reply, also to return by the vessel placed at your disposal.—ALI RIZA, Grand Vizier.

(158735)

No. 175.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 29.)

Constantinople, November 19, 1919.

Sir, I have the honour to transmit herewith a list of telegrams from the National Organisation, which I have received from the French.

2. The telegrams are of a more or less uniform character, and possess no individuality. The signatories telegraph for the most part on behalf of local "national" committees. My object in forwarding the list is to show how widespread are the manifestations of the national movement organisation, and how untiring are the efforts of its organisers to popularise the idea of resistance to any decision at the Peace Conference tending to the dismemberment of the territory which remained under direct administration at the time of the armistice. My French colleague informs me he also has received a very large number of similar communications.

3. Of more importance than these telegrams from all and sundry is a recent telegram from the National Organisation, which is sufficiently important to receive your Lordship's special attention.

4. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's pronouncement was censored out of some of the local press and was given wide publicity. It created some little stir in the French High Commission, and has a very serious effect on the agitation against the new form given to the occupation of Cilicia. I understand, confidentially, that M. DeFrance has been considering the advisability of enlisting the participation of myself and the Italian High Commissioner in the High Commission.

5. M. DeFrance has not as yet taken action in this sense, but he enquired conversation with Rear-Admiral Webb what I proposed to do in the matter. E. Admiral Webb replied that he had not yet consulted me, but that he thought probable that I should take no notice of the communication beyond reporting it to the Lordship.

Enclosure 1 in No. 175.

[illegible]

the Peace Conference, and against his proposals to total victory based on the world by article 12 of the principles of Wilson.

The massacres, oppression, and atrocities and the policy of extermination carried on in the vilayet of Adia, which was given to the Greeks to occupy with a view to settling the claims of the Armenians, are connected with those perpetrated in the vilayet of Marash, where the same policy of extermination was carried on. These acts have occupied, using the Armenians as their instrument. These acts are part of a series of flagrant injustices of a political nature.

We protest with all our energy against the illegal proceedings of the Entente Powers up to date, and we hope that they will of their own accord return to more humane and equitable sentiments towards our country and our nation, who will continue resolutely to defend its existence and its lawful rights with all the material and moral forces at its command, rather than consent to dismemberment and slave

We wish to advise the Powers of the *Entente* that our whole nation, in the widest sense of the word, is united in this legitimate and sublime decision, a continuation of the inhuman policy which the *Entente* Powers, deaf to the legitimate voice of our nation, are following may entail fatal consequences, not only for a few countries, but also possibly for the two hemispheres.

responsibility before Providence and humanity of such a disaster lies
entirely with the Patent Law. We are here acting in defence of the
unity cherished by our nation, whose only object is the defence of its rights to
the We want our legislators to support the cause of George and Aaron and
we are convinced that they will not give their sanction to all this injustice.

156472

No. 176.

Foreign Office to Colonel Wilson.

Foreign Office, December 1, 1919.

Foreign Office, December 1, 1919.

You should inform him that you have just returned from London, where the whole question of his relations with Ibn Saud has been discussed by His Majesty's Government. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has not only a great personal interest in the question, and is very anxious that the two rulers should compose their differences.

in person or before some impartial arbiter to be appointed by His Majesty's

If it is the case, as King Hussein contends, that his ownership of Khurma and Raiba is incontestable, there does not appear to be any valid objection to his

producing the proofs which would convince any impartial person at once of the ju-
of his claims.

He should realise that there is at present no question of the public demarcation of the boundary by a British Commission. It is only suggested and strongly urged by His Majesty's Government that he should agree to meet Ibn Saud personally with object of arriving at an agreement on all points at issue between them. You remind King Hussein that he has previously expressed his willingness to meet Ibn Saud should His Majesty's Government so desire, and add that they will readily arrange for the meeting to take place at Jeddah, Cairo, or Aden.

It is not anticipated that public opinion in the Hedjaz and elsewhere will necessarily jump to the conclusion from the fact of this meeting that the ownership of Khurma is being arbitrated upon. It may not even be necessary for an arbiter to step in at all, and only in the event of King Hussein and Ibn Saud failing to come to an agreement might it be necessary to suggest the appointment of an impartial British official to assist in arriving at a conclusion. In the event of King Hussein meeting difficulties about a personal interview with Ibn Saud you should point out to him that the alternative of a meeting between plenipotentiaries of the two parties would not be likely to produce so satisfactory a result, though His Majesty's Government would prefer even this alternative to direct intervention on their part.

King Hussein must realize that if, without an agreement between the two
Ibn Saud was now called upon to withdraw his forces, the result might be that the
whole militant power of the Akhwan would be let loose upon the Hedjaz. There was
nothing in the circumstances of the recent conflict to lead His Majesty's Government
to believe that King Hussein's troops would be able to resist such an advance.
might even lose Mecca and thus incur the odium of the Moslem world in ge-
subject his own name to the greatest stain that could rest on the memory of a Moslem
ruler. No one knows better than His Majesty that British troops could not come to
his assistance. He would be the last to invite or expect them to do so. In these
circumstances it seems the height of unwisdom to provoke a further advance which
His Majesty has not the means to resist, but which equally with him His Majesty's
viz., to avoid any such calamity and, by an agreement between the two po-
potentates principally concerned, to bring about a condition of peace and unity in the
Arabian peninsula.

Ibn Saud for his part has also demanded from His Majesty's Government a definite recognition of his various claims, but has been told that His Majesty's Government must decline even to discuss them until he has made a real effort to come to an agreement without their intervention. It is believed that Ibn Saud will be quite ready to come to Jeddah and have a friendly conversation with King Hussein on the latter territory, and he is also being told that in the event of negotiations failing His Majesty's Government will have no alternative but to propose the decision of an impartial arbiter.

His Majesty's Government do not consider it necessary at this stage to discuss the question of Khurma. They are aware of the strong feelings entertained by King Faisal on the subject, and they have not recoiled from the attitude which they have previously adopted. Only in the event of the King and Ibn Saud failing to come to an agreement on the matter would it be necessary for a British arbitrator to investigate the case and to arrive at a decision.

His Majesty's Government are hopeful that by these suggestions they may have once more testified their sincere regard for King Hussein and their recognition of great services which he has rendered to the Allied cause during the war. They seize this opportunity of again assuring him of their entire faith and trust in his good intentions, and in his true friendship and loyalty to Great Britain; and you are authorised to inform His Majesty that nothing would give greater pleasure to His Majesty's Government than to receive him in London in the course of next year and

it is essential that the risk of hostilities between himself and Ibn Saud should be entirely removed so that trouble should not break out in his absence.

A copy of these instructions is being communicated to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, with whom you should discuss them before proceeding to Jeddah.

I am, &c

GERALD SPICER.

1578773

No. 177.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 3.)

War Office, December 2, 1919.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to enclose herewith, for the information of the War Office, a copy of a letter dated the 20th October, 1919, from the Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, forwarding a "History of the Nationalist Movement in Turkey," which, in their opinion, gives an accurate account of the movement.

The Council are confident that Lord Curzon will appreciate the point on which General Milne's letter lays emphasis in paragraphs 4, 5, and 18, viz., that the question of the peace terms to be imposed on Turkey must now be considered in relation to the highest importance to the request which General Milne reiterates in paragraph 4. Knowledge of the nature of these terms beforehand in order that there may be time to make such arrangements as may be possible.

Lord Curzon will observe that, from paragraph 8 of the letter, modified ideas regarding the future state of Armenia are beginning to prevail.

I am, &c.

B. B. CURITT.

Enclosure in No. 177

General Sir G. Maude to War Office.

1. Next, $\partial_t u_{\varepsilon}, \partial_t u_{\varepsilon}^{\pm} \in C^1([0, \infty); L^2(\mathbb{R}^n))$.

I HAVE to state a few facts in connection with the New York letter to
 my wife and the present and balanced account of events much
 more than I can do in the present state of affairs, should
 I have the opportunity.

2. In the case of a p -adic expansion of x , and

- (a.) Because it serves as a veiled threat, which they believe will influence the Peace Conference.
- (b.) Because the organization of the populace in a military way is the normal organization of the Turkish people. Military organization is the only organization which the Turks understand, and the steps taken by the Nationalist Party are admirably calculated to bring all the political power into their hands, and to make the results of the coming elections a mere instrument of their will.

It is therefore advisable to contemplate a situation in which the use of military force becomes necessary, and to consider it in the light of possible decisions to be made by the Peace Conference.

I do not desire in any way to influence these decisions, but it is proper to point out that the force required to enforce the peace terms will vary greatly according to the nature of these terms.

three main questions, on which Mustafa Kemal and his followers in their country declare a non possumus, are the question of the question of Armenia, and the question of Thrace.

For any $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$, let \mathcal{S}_α be the set of $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ such that $\mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{a} = \alpha$. Then \mathcal{S}_α is a hyperplane in \mathbb{R}^n and $\mathcal{S}_\alpha \cap \mathcal{S}_\beta = \emptyset$ if $\alpha \neq \beta$. For any $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$, let \mathcal{S}_α be the set of $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ such that $\mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{a} = \alpha$. Then \mathcal{S}_α is a hyperplane in \mathbb{R}^n and $\mathcal{S}_\alpha \cap \mathcal{S}_\beta = \emptyset$ if $\alpha \neq \beta$.

10. In Armenia the crux of the question is that there are very few Armenians, and

require large force. It is at orders that no Armenians were to be allowed to be repatriated without the use of force, provided that settlement is within certain limits.

9. The evidence upon which this is asserted was obtained by the I. (c) branch my staff, and can be studied in detail in a series of reports to the War Office.

10. The true value can be put on these reports only if it be clearly realised they are conversations between leading Turks who have no idea that they are overheard.

11. These conversations are therefore of very great value. They show the

an offensive against Armenia may be discounted. They also show that the Turk

are prepared to

the 11th Division

fuel in a tent, and wood as dear as sugar. Therefore he proposes to

the following stock on the Bayrakli Kurakhs decauville. "A though," he says,

hope by the National

Division

no reason to suppose that adjustments

Party.

are so drastic in the treatment

Turkey that the older men, who have the spirit of a

wilder spirits in check, then it will turn out that the

greatly prejudiced the military position of the Allies. The popul

and now united for the first time; it is difficult to order the force who

available in the event of a national rising.

14. Between the solution without force and the

preceding paragraph, there are many other situa

vary according to the degree of dis

extent to which the most balanced opinion among

In order that the situation may be considered beforehand, it is most im

forecast of the peace terms should be presented to the Allied military auth

for them to consider what, if any, additional force will be required to meet the sit

which the announcement of the peace terms will create. In this way alone there

the forces now at my disposal are only sufficient to bring pressure to bear on

country.

I have, &c

G. F. MILNE, General,

Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea

154459

No. 178.

Foreign Office to the British Council Officer, Supreme Economic Council.

Sir,

For

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit herewith copies of despatches which have been received from His Majesty's High Commissioner Constantinople describing the critical state of destitution which already prevails among the Greeks and Armenians of Turkey, and which, together with the arrival of

expressed by Admiral de Hodek to the effect that if these populations are to be saved from the fate which hangs over them, the measures taken must be both immediate

early opportunity of drawing the serious attention of the Supreme

grave state of destitution prevailing in Turkey, with a view to the adoption by the

Economic Council of measures to provide relief for the suffering population

save them from death and disease. These measures might, in Lord Curzon's

of whom for the neighbourhood of Aidin, and to Christians.

I am, &c

J. A. C. TILLEY

58730

No. 179

Sir E. Curzon to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 6.)

2210,

Lord,

Paris, December 3, 1919

I HAVE had the advantage of reading your Lordship's despatch No. 1391 of the 23rd ultimo to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, recording a conversation with Lord Curzon in London, in the course of which the possibility of transferring

reference from the former to the latter capital was discussed.

taking place at Paris, like that of the peace with the other enemy Powers. I have however, made the suggestion to M. Clemenceau, and have no means of forming opinion whether it would be likely to meet with a favourable reception on his part.

I have, &c.

(For Sir Eyre Crowe)

H. NORMAN.

[159178]

No. 180.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 2194)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report, dated the 11th November, which I have received from my representative at Samsoun, relative to the Nationalist movement in that district.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

High Commissioner.

Enclosure No. 181.

Captain Perring to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

(No. 340.)

Samsoun, November 11, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Nationalist movement is now very unpopular in this district and that Moustafa Kemal, owing to his having stated that a special envoy of the Sultan, which is now discovered to be untrue, is discredited and openly attacked.

2. The only result of the movement here has been the apparent establishment of a committee for the Christians, but the Turk is only prevented from massacre and open persecution by the fears of Allied intervention.

3. The various bands of brigands and irregular troops are now disappearing, but more with the idea of looting and massacring than taking part in any fighting.

4. It is obvious here that any attempts at mobilisation would be a complete failure, the only remaining adherents of the movement being military officers and officers of the Gendarmerie. Such as penetration into the interior by Greek troops or the formation of a large independent Armenia, it is bound to fizz out.

and, although considerable sums were secured, they are not likely to be increased by any further donations.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING

[159187]

No. 181

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 2203.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 24, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1676 of the 11th September, transmitting copy of a report received from Lieutenant Slade, R.N.V.R., regarding a visit to towns on the southern coast of the Black Sea and commenting on the situation of the Christian inhabitants in general, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a communication and enclosure received from Captain Perring, my representative at Samsoun, concerning his visit last month to Unieh, Fatsa, Ordu, Kerasun, Trebizond, Rize, and Batoum.

2. Your Lordship will observe that, as regards the all-important question of security (the settlement of which is a necessary preliminary to the successful co-

... (the situation in the Trebizond district, for example, shows a progressive deterioration. The district is now openly controlled by a brigand chief who is too inert, to suppress the authorities and whom the Vali of Trebizond is powerless, or too inert, to suppress. The improvement in the conditions at Unieh and the scattering by the mutessarif of Samsoun of the lawless elements in the Fatsa kazn show that much can be effected by a display of some measure of energy.

The Turkish army is disquieting. The pirates are almost exclusively of the Lazistan seaboard.

4. The methods which the Turks are employing to render life unendurable for their Christian fellow-countrymen are deserving of careful attention. The Greek or Armenian is no longer systematically massacred; he is prevented from making a livelihood in Turkey. His business is boycotted, his outcrops made dangerous of access and farmed out to Moslems, who repudiate their engagements, and his houses and property retained. It is consequently not a matter for surprise that the Greek and Armenian refugees are again leaving Asia Minor in increasing numbers.

5. As regards the attitude of the Turkish officials and local notables towards the undoubted hostility and open defiance encountered by Captain Perring at Kerasun and the sudden outbreak of illness which the approach of His Majesty's ship "Cynthia" caused amongst the authorities at Rize are alike illuminating. Even the more competent officials make no secret of their sympathy with Moustafa Kemal and

I have &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 181.

Captain Perring to Sir J. de Robeck.

(No. 310.)

October 29, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have visited the following coastal towns in B.M.S. "Gardania": Unieh, Fatsa, Ordu, Kerasun, Trebizond, Rize, and Batoum.

I have also attached separate reports on each of the above towns.

I found everywhere that Greek refugees who had returned to Turkey have either left the country again or are on the point of doing so, in consequence of the persecution by Greeks who had remained in Turkey throughout the war.

These refugees are unable to obtain possession of their properties, or to cultivate same with knowledge that they will be able to market the crops: also owing to the fear of further persecutions.

4. Armenians in large parties (as many as eighty families in one party, have left for Russia, and the same is becoming more general. Many communities are being exterminated.

5. The Turkish army is disquieting. The pirates are almost exclusively of the Lazistan seaboard.

6. The methods which the Turks are employing to render life unendurable for their Christian fellow-countrymen are deserving of careful attention.

7. As regards the attitude of the Turkish officials and local notables towards the undoubted hostility and open defiance encountered by Captain Perring at Kerasun and the sudden outbreak of illness which the approach of His Majesty's ship "Cynthia" caused amongst the authorities at Rize are alike illuminating.

Even the more competent officials make no secret of their sympathy with Moustafa Kemal and

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the more competent officials make no secret of their sympathy with Moustafa Kemal and

this case to the kaimakam of Kerasun and he informed me that he was unable to maintain order with the gendarmes at his disposal. This, I beg to point out, is absolutely incorrect as cases frequently occur of a Christian village retaliating on Turkish neighbours, and in every case the Turkish authorities are able to send a force of gendarmes immediately to investigate and in most cases pillage the Christian village.

I have the honour to inform you that the kaimakam of Kerasun, who is in charge of the district, has informed me that the gendarmes are unable to maintain order with the gendarmes at his disposal. This, I beg to point out, is absolutely incorrect as cases frequently occur of a Christian village retaliating on Turkish neighbours, and in every case the Turkish authorities are able to send a force of gendarmes immediately to investigate and in most cases pillage the Christian village.

The kaimakam of Kerasun (Laz) do not live in the larger of the coastal villages, but in the small coastal villages, preferably where there is a small port, to suggest that these smaller villages be visited, and the kaimakam of Kerasun, who is in charge of the district, has informed me that the gendarmes are unable to maintain order with the gendarmes at his disposal.

I have, &c
J. S. PERRING

Enclosure 2 in No. 181

Report by Captain Perring on his visit to the Coastal Towns of Unish, Fatsa, Ordu, Kerasun, Trebizond, Rize, and Batoum.

October 15, 1919.

KAIMAKAM: Mahmoud Djelaledin (arrived one month ago).

A very great improvement has taken place both in the town itself and in the district. All report that, with the exception of the incident reported in my No. 240 dated the 8th August, and which has now been amicably settled, no complaints made by the Greeks or Armenians; both communities express satisfaction with the kaimakam, and hope that the present state of affairs may continue. At the request of the kaimakam, I wrote to the chief of the Armenian community at Kouaklek telling them that, provided they took no further aggressive measures, the incident in my No. 240 was closed, and I requested them to use every means to avoid friction. In return for this letter, the kaimakam has sent a representative to investigate property questions in this neighbourhood, and to arrange for its return. I also informed the Armenians that unofficial means of obtaining the return of property must cease, all claims for the future were to be made through the appointed official.

All property in the town has now been returned.

FATSA

No new kaimakam has been appointed, and Hamid Bey is now holding an enquiry into the actions of the late sub-Governor.

Hamid Bey is staying here to settle the many disputes and to clear the district brigands; he informed me that he intended to remain twenty days, visiting the villages. He has already arrested eight of the principal criminals (Turks) and destroyed their organisation, for which he is using troops sent from Samsoun.

No further trouble or complaints should be received from this district, and Hamid Bey has displayed not only great energy but great firmness in dealing with previously very troublesome district. Several bands of robbers have been completely exterminated.

There are two small villages within 5 miles of Fatsa that are the cause of numerous incidents, and, as these are in the vilayet of Trebizond, Hamid Bey is unable to deal with them. He suggested that these villages be transferred to the sanjak of Djank at present they are uncontrolled. Laz land near these villages, and, he states, use them as bases for raiding along the coast.

ORDU

1, 1919

Kaimakam: Ali Bey, appointed 27th May, 1919.

Police, 6.

Gendarmes, 133

Population: town, 14,000; villages, 311; total population, 17,000.

The officer in charge informed me that these were lately arrested deserters, but I am informed that this is incorrect, and that many men have already been sent for training at Sivas and towns in the interior.

In the town itself security is moderate. Nobody, however, dares to venture outside his house after dusk. Outside the town no security exists for the Christian either day or night; murders are very frequent, and the local doctor informed me that one day he dressed several wounded.

The Greeks were deported, and lost heavily owing to the brutality of Kazim Bey, who was responsible for the death of several thousand, both Greek and Armenian.

No property is being returned, and the Turks control the entire port trade owing to the Christian being unable to harvest any of the crop.

The Armenian community has almost ceased to exist, and the remainder are only waiting means of transportation to leave the country.

The Laz are very active in this area, and are continuously raiding the coast.

KERASUN

October 16-17, 1919.

Kaimakam: Rade Nadim Bey (appointed 8th October).

Population: town, 13,285; villages, 155; total population, 117,893.

Police, 8.

Gendarmes, 178.

Osmen Agha rules the whole district and gives orders to the Governor and other officials. As a result of the deportation of the district, none exists, especially in the villages, where Osmen Agha and his followers are absolute despots. He is openly anti-Christian and is determined to keep the Christians out of the district. He is openly anti-Christian and is determined to keep the Christians out of the district. He is openly anti-Christian and is determined to keep the Christians out of the district.

The Greeks were deported to Sivas district, and lost a large number of their property. They were ordered to return to their homes, but were not allowed to do so, and were continuously being driven from district to district for the whole period of the year.

At the first opportunity to leave the country, the Greeks are very active, and walk about openly heavily armed.

There is no possibility of re-establishing security in this district without the use of force. The Turks are very active, and walk about openly heavily armed. There is no possibility of re-establishing security in this district without the use of force.

Mehmed Nouri, chief of the port and a Turkish naval officer, was not only frankly anti-Christian, but he was also a very active robber. He was not only frankly anti-Christian, but he was also a very active robber. He was not only frankly anti-Christian, but he was also a very active robber.

The whole Turkish community live on the proceeds of their robberies and the sale of the goods of Christian goods stolen during the deportations and unless the goods are returned to the Christians, the Turkish community will not return to the district.

TLEBIZONE.

October 19 and 20, 1919.

I called on the Vali, who had just returned from Erzeroum. He informed me he was in complete agreement with Mustafâ Kemal Pasha, and that the Natio movement was the only means of Turkey obtaining any form of representative government, and that the movement would greatly strengthen their delegation when eventually they were called to Paris.

I also called on the British control officer, Captain Crawford, and the French and American representatives.

The Greeks informed me that no complaints could be made of lack of security in the town, but that they were unable to travel even two or three hours' journey into the interior.

The Armenian community, although very small, is very well organized; their orphanage and relief works are very successful.

No property questions have been investigated, and the Armenians informed me that as many as 800 houses are still in Turkish hands.

RIZI.

The mutessarif was stated to be ill, and apparently all officials were suddenly taken ill on the approach of H.M.S. "Gardenia." I was therefore only able to see a Government clerk and a police officer, neither of whom could give any reliable information. I was informed that there are only five Christians in the town itself, all of whom, they informed me, were absent for business purposes.

I was informed that no security exists, and that the whole community are largely interested in motor-boat traffic with Russian Caucasian ports and in commerce along the Anatolian coast.

BATUM.

I called on the Military Governor (General Colos-Colha), who informed me that he had issued orders that all refugees landing at Novorossiysk were to carry out their military service in the Volunteer Army. He also informed me that he was feeding over 7,000 Armenian refugees daily.

He complained that a large smuggling of arms was taking place, and that these arms were coming from Black Sea Turkish ports. I informed him that Ruzi was notoriously the centre of this traffic.

I called on the British consul general and the principal British trading firm established at Batoum.

[159836]

No 182.

War Office to Foreign Office—(Received December 9.)

Sir,

War Office, December 8, 1919.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of Earl Curzon, the following telegram received from Lord Allenby, with reference to his conversations with General Gouraud on the 27th November.

I am to draw particular attention to paragraph 3 of this telegram regarding northern boundary of Palestine, and am to say that the Council have no doubt that General Gouraud will eventually claim to occupy the country down to the southern boundary of the blue area, which is, as Lord Curzon is aware, south of the line of the 36th parallel. Lord Allenby desires to establish as a temporary line between his own troops and those of General Gouraud.

I am to say that the Council agree with Lord Allenby in thinking that a definite arrangement which should be made between the local commanders on the spot, in order to point out that, as is shown in Lord Allenby's telegram of the 27th November, General Gouraud acts under the orders of his own Government in these matters, and will doubtless quote such orders on the subject to Lord Allenby when the time comes. Lord Curzon will remember that it was not until orders were sent by the French Government that General Gouraud would consent to any delay in penetrating into the Bekaa.

The Army Council, therefore, consider that much time, correspondence, and action may probably be avoided if the French Government is officially approached at once on this matter, and I am to ask that Lord Curzon will take the necessary steps as early as convenient.

In the meantime the Council are despatching the attached telegram to Lord Allenby.

I am, &c.
B. B. CUBITT

Enclosure 1 in No. 182.

Mr. Churchill to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.

FIELD MARCHAL NO 182. In order to avoid any misunderstanding with France, the following telegram is being sent to the French Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 182.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr. Churchill.

Telegraphic.

CONTINUATION of my E.A. No. 2892.

1. After General Gouraud had informed me he was determined to proceed with the occupation of the Bekaa, we agreed to send Colonel Walters Taylor and a French staff officer to Damascus to announce the decision to the Arab authorities, and that General Gouraud did not intend to interfere with Arab administration, and would permit Arab troops to remain in Bekaa under certain conditions. I sent a personal message in code to Emir that General Gouraud's decision had my full approval, and that I trusted the Arabs to maintain the same relations with French troops as they had hitherto.

2. I think that the Arabs may possibly allow French troops to relieve our troops in the Bekaa. Though Gouraud himself is anxious to be on good terms with Arabs, it is my opinion that he will have difficulty in resisting political pressure from that party of French opinion which is frankly hostile to the Arabs, and would be glad of any pretext to occupy Damascus and the interior.

3. I discussed the northern boundary of Palestine with Gouraud, and informed him that I was in agreement with the DETA as to the fact that the boundary should be fixed without prejudice to future arrangements. I understood that Gouraud was in agreement with the DETA as to the fact that the boundary should be fixed without prejudice to future arrangements. I considered it important that the French Government should be informed of the fact that the boundary should be fixed without prejudice to future arrangements.

4. I returned to Cairo to-day.

[160263]

No. 183.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon — (Received December 10)

(No. 2213. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 27, 1919

I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information Intelligence Summary No. 14, issued by Advance Headquarters at Smyrna, which have received from my representative there.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 183.

Operations and Intelligence Summary No. 14 — Northern Asia Minor.

(Period November 13-19 1919, inclusive.)

General

(Secret.)

APART from the unauthorised forward movement of the Archipelago Division at the end of October, no further move forward of the Greek forces has yet been reported to have taken place. This delay is probably due to the fact that on the 1st November the High Commissioner at Smyrna received from the Peace Conference a map on which was marked the exact line which they should occupy in accordance with the decision of the Peace Conference. This definite line differed in several important details from the liberal interpretation of the line which had been prepared and issued by Greek Headquarters to their divisions for the purpose of carrying out operations. In consequence of the receipt of these orders, Greek Headquarters modified their original orders and substituted an order, dated the 16th November, which was in conformity with these instructions.

2. The only portion of the national forces which has given any indication of future attitude in view of the present provisional settlement of the limits of the Greek zone is the command of Demirdji Mehmet, "Commander of the National Forces of Aidin and Mughla." He has sent threatening telegrams to General N. and has also replied to General Milne's instructions to the Ottoman Government to withdraw 3000 metres from the line of demarcation by a refusal to withdraw, since that would expose yet more of the Moslem population to the "tyranny and cruelty of the Greeks." In other areas on the Greek front the national forces have taken no action except for a slight skirmish on the front of the Archipelago Division.

3. Within the Greek area conditions are apparently critical in the Odun district, where the numerous bands in the Massis north and south of the Odun valley are rapidly becoming a scourge to the whole countryside. No further action has been made by them to interfere with the British.

4. The Vah of Aidin has protested again against undue Greek interference with the rights of the Moslem civil administration, particularly in the case of the Weekly Summary "No. 6, paragraph 30) where the Ottoman gendarmes and authorities were prevented by the Greeks from conducting the enquiry; and concerning the wholesale imprisonment and deportation to Greece of some Turks from the Odemish area. In the latter instance, whatever may be the merits of the individual cases of arrests, it would appear to be a reasonable military precaution to endeavour to prevent assistance being rendered to the bands within the Greek area, but the judicial procedure after arrest and subsequent deportations would appear to provide justifiable reasons for the Vah's protest.

Greek Dispositions and Activities.

Dispositions and Movements of Troops.

5. Instructions have been issued from Greek Headquarters to all divisions for occupation of the new line authorised by the Peace Conference from the sea to Adana, inclusive, copies of a tracing sent by British Advanced Headquarters showing the new line being attached. Up to date, however, no official intimation has been received of any further occupation since the unauthorised move in the Pergama area mentioned in Summary No. 12.

6. Greek Headquarters have been informed that south of Badelama, i.e., on the Geure-Omerli front no change in their present line is to be made.

7. The only local change occurring during the week has been the move of one battalion, 1st Regiment from Aidin to Tireh, which took place on the 11th and 12th instant.

8. The strength of the Greek army in Asia Minor, according to a statement issued on the 12th November, is as follows:

	Official	O.R.S.
Fighting services	240	55,493
Divisional troops	47	1,242
Corps troops	398	8,028
	2103	72,761

of whom 5,947 are in hospital, as compared with 6,289 shown in the return of the 2nd November.

Activities.

1. The only action reported on the front during the last week. The only action was an encounter which took place on the 11th November on the march from Aidin to Tireh. The engagement lasted an hour and a half, and Greek losses were nine killed and twenty wounded.

2. The only action reported on the 12th November was a small engagement in the district of Adana. The Greek forces were reported to be in a concentration in the district of Adana.

3. An action was reported on the 12th November in the district of Adana.

4. An action was reported on the 12th November in the district of Adana.

5. An action was reported on the 12th November in the district of Adana.

Italian Dispositions and Activities.

14. No changes reported during this week.

Italo-Greek Relations.

15. The only action reported about the village of Kopler (vide "Weekly Summary" No. 13, paragraph 12) was on the 12th November. The action was clear, i.e., the bed of the Mushluk Dere.

[1356]

S F 2

S C P. Railway Area.

37. In connection with restrictions on imports into the Greek zone from the Afion Kara Hissar direction (see "Summary" No. 12, paragraph 34), it is interesting to note a telegram, a copy of which has been received from Greek Headquarters from Lieutenant Colonel Delaunay, French Director-General of Railways, Constantinople, to Captain Champigny, Director of the S C P. Railway, to the effect that he was not to permit more than ten or at the most fifteen wagon loads of wheat to be sent to Smyrna per day from the whole of the area between Ahmeth and Afion Kara Hissar. According to a Greek agent, the Kaumakam of Ushak on 7th November handed the railway inspector a letter in which he demanded the entire cessation of the transport of foodstuffs to the Greek zone.

38. On the 10th November the officer in command of the garrison at Ushak sent a letter to the stationmaster requesting the despatch of two wagons to Kapaklar in order to bring wheat to Alasbehir. At Bal Mahmoud Turkish soldiers are preventing the shipping of foodstuffs. The Mudir of Banaz has received orders from Kutaya for the stationmaster allowing him to despatch all wheat at the time on hand in the station, but forbidding any further transportation of cereals. Similar conditions prevail almost everywhere on the line between Afion Kara Hissar and Sareis.

39. The general situation at Manisa is good, and no incident of any sort has been reported since the murder of two Turkish women on the 16th September (see Weekly Summary No. 10, paragraph 30). At present the women are allowed to go freely to their work without any molestation whatever. That this is due to General Dugroponis there can be little doubt, since previous to his arrival in July things were very unsettled indeed in this district. He has set himself steadfastly to improve the discipline of his troops and gained the confidence of the Turks by straightforward dealing, and has been loyally aided by the Mutessarif in his efforts.

40. He continues, however, to be nervous about his strategic position and seems to fear that if his reserve troops were withdrawn from Manisa, he might be confronted with a rising in the town. This however, is very unlikely, especially as the Mutessarif would be checking any such movement. It is probable that he was before successful in checking under far more difficult circumstances.

41. The position of the Mutessarif is anomalous, as is that of every Turkish official in the Greek zone, since he has no gendarmerie or police which can enforce his orders and can only deal with routine and purely Turkish matters. The taxes of the district have been sold to a Greek, who is finding difficulty in collecting them from the Greek villagers, who refuse to pay taxes to the Turkish Government or rent to the Turkish landlords, when they think there is no Government to force them to do so.

42. The Greeks complain continually that the S C P. lines are used to pass Turkish agents and spies through the lines to and from Panderna and Afion Kara Hissar, and even hint that the French are too intimate with the irregulars on these lines. The same complaints, however, have been made by the Turks, and the true state of the case probably is that the railway affords unhampered passage to both sides.

43. A ferry for artillery and infantry has been constructed for use on the Kum Chai, over which a bridge is also projected at Munteveli.

Soma Asciut Area

44. A prisoner taken by the Greeks at Arvali on the 10th November states that the Turks who took part in the attack on Kalem Keui some days previously were specially recruited for it and afterwards disbanded and returned to their villages.

45. Lieutenant Colonel Kei Ali, in command of the forces at Karagach, left on the 5th November for Constantinople with 100 demobilised Arabs. His place has been taken by Major Reshid Bey.

46. According to a report from Intelligence Officer Pergama, there are at Bulikesri 1,000 irregulars under Naim Bey, ex-Chief of Police at Smyrna. It is rumoured that Ahmet Bey, at the head of the Circassian bands from the Gennen district, has notified the irregulars that they must disband immediately, and that he would secure obedience to his commands by force, if necessary.

47. According to papers captured by the Greeks in their recent advance, there are now nearly 2,000 irregulars in the Soma district. This is not considered an unlikely figure, as the activity of the Greeks in this sector would naturally provoke

an increase in the forces against them, since it makes an appeal to the villagers, who is always the first to desert to work his land, but who on seeing his land and family in danger, returns at once to the colours.

Economic Situation in Aidin Vilayet

48. The spell of cold weather which began a few days ago is showing how acute the economic situation is in almost all districts of the interior. Reports from several areas state that no sowing has yet been done for various reasons. At Manisa, although conditions of security behind the Greek lines are good, the comparative absence of rain so far has prevented sowing, while in Odemish the state of the country precludes any considerable effort to work the land. From Soma shortage of seeds, added to the condition of public safety, has prevented any useful work being done.

49. The only signs of any practical interest in the economic situation being taken by the Greek Government is the fact that the Commander at Pergama has prepared a list of farmers and cultivators requiring seeds. According to information contained in a wire from the Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople, the Vali of Smyrna has reported this to his Government and impressed on them the necessity of anticipating the provision by the Greeks of seeds for Turkish farmers owing to the loss in prestige which the Government would inevitably sustain, should it fail to do so.

In general the restriction of imports mentioned in paragraph 37 above, has persisted in, cannot fail eventually seriously to affect the whole question of food supply, especially in Smyrna itself, and a further rise in prices is inevitable.

Issued by General Staff, Advanced British Headquarters,
Smyrna, November 22, 1919.

[161752]

No. 184

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 15)

No. 571,
My Lord,

Cairo, November 22, 1919

With reference to my telegram No. 1614 of the 31st November, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of the literal translation of the Arabic letter from King Hussein to Emir Faisal which was forwarded to me for transmission.

As I reported in my above-mentioned telegram, I have returned the letter to the British agent, Jerdiah, and instructed him to hand it back to the King.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY

Enclosure in No. 184.

King Hussein to Emir Faisal.

(Literal translation.)

Sir,

Mecca, 5th Safar, 1338 (November 1, 1919).

I CABLED you on the 30th Moharram, 1338, informing you of the receipt of your letter of the 25th September, 1919. I enclose herewith a copy of the same telegram as well as copies of former telegrams for confirmation.* After this and before any discussion I only pray God to be your support and mine.

As for your enquiry about the date and the case of conscience which were created by your accusations in the matter of what happened in connection with the conditions of our preliminary agreements with Great Britain, and especially your statement that I had given you a pocket, I do not know, Sir, what to say about this, except to beg you to consider my letter to his Excellency the High Commissioner of the 20th Zil K'ida, 1338, a copy of which I sent to you and of which you acknowledged the receipt. You will find in it that which will not only acquit us of what you have referred to, but will also show

* Not printed.

nothing additional in our favour. Thank God I maintain those principles until the end. I have been for strong insistence I would not have sent on that subject which he says, "I am pleased to inform you that His Britannic Majesty's Government has approved all your schemes. I am also pleased to hear that you are of aversion to protesting against [arguing with] Great Britain, also now prevents me from naming the date of another letter of his Excellency's, in which he says, "Great Britain is not the least interested in the situation of the East, and I am sure that to what may be agreed upon." I spoke very frankly in my letter mentioning the 20th of June, 1919, and I am sure that I am not alone in my agreement wrongly or that something had happened which necessitated me to do so. And then to say that it is urgent for me to withdraw from the situation and give it up! On that date I receive your remarks on what concerns commerce. Suppose, Sir, on all that is said and then accuse me of whatever you like. Supposing, Sir, that there was nothing of that; was it right of Great Britain, after admitting that we have fought with her side by side, when neither France nor Italy could help her, to gratify France by giving her our country and our people? Therefore, the result is, Sir, that if I encounter an incident (notwithstanding patience and tolerance promised), and if anything interferes with my decisions, as you have a ready done more than once, I will withdraw that same incident. I understand this as you understand the day from night. Moreover, if the Syrians decide to fight for their liberty and independence, I will not hesitate in going over to them to co-operate with them in my capacity as an individual Arab, so that they may know that I did not betray them. God will not guide traitors. This, Sir, is the extent of my intellect. You will excuse me if I do anything which you may think wrong. I am according to intentions. God is Master of all, and He is my Guardian over you.

HUSSEIN.

[161867]

No. 185.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 15)

(No. 2249)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 28, 1919

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of an interesting report received from Captain P. Hadkinson, Relief Officer attached to this High Commission, concerning conditions in the vilayet of Balıkesir and the sanjak of Balıkesir, and to invite your Lordship's special attention to remarks on the subject of the National Movement.

Mr. Rylands, the High Commissioner, has had the opportunity of mentioning to his Highness the Grand Vizier the matters of non-repression of the brigand bands and the disgraceful condition of Brusa prison. This latter is also being brought to the notice of the Director-General of Prisons and will be looked into personally by Lieutenant Wilson and his French and Italian colleagues during their forthcoming visit to prisons in the interior.

I have &

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 185.

Captain Hadkinson to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

Constantinople, November 12, 1919

AFTER a sojourn of two months in the vilayet of Brusa and in the sanjak of Balıkesir, during which I visited the principal towns and localities, I beg to report on the situation as follows:—

General Security.

Although the authorities have at last awakened to the fact that the security of the country needs attention to be secured, and that a few months' fortnight active measures to suppress brigandage have been adopted, still the latter is on the increase, and every day sees new bands springing up. The

of affairs cannot but be attributed to the complete apathy of the Brusa court-martial. 105 persons arrested so far for brigandage.

I made very strong representations to the Governor-General about this, and I pointed out to him that the public execution of a few of these bad characters would

He not only fell in with my views, but also expressed the hope that our military authorities with the object of getting the court-martial to sit, at the same time that not only capital punishment should be meted out to all the

but also to see that the sentences were carried out. I subsequently called upon the newly-appointed military governor, who informed me that since taking up his duties he had a number of troops to another to Gemlek, and a third to Karaja Bey, and as a result brigands were daily being arrested. He further informed me that the court-martial had at last been formed, and that so soon as the President, expected from Constantinople, arrived, it would sit and deal severely with these criminals.

passengers and relieved them of all they possessed. The boats were then taken away with their boats. The Greek brigand "Kirmani" and his band are still at large, and more fighting has lately again taken place between the Albanians and Circassians at

intentions of the Government may be, these latter are at present unable to cope with the situation.

My personal opinion is that the

intentions of the Government may be, these latter are at present unable to cope with the situation.

National Movement

The Western national movement, which originated with the occupation of the Balkans, has now spread all over the country, but not as much favour, especially in places where heavy sums of money are levied for the maintenance of the militia; on the other hand the people are sick of the war and inclined to continue under arms, however well they may be paid. Having

ir, and coming into touch with a good many of the leaders, I am to-day never convinced that the Committee of Union and Progress is at the bottom of this national movement, whatever may be said to the contrary. I have fully satisfied myself that about three-fourths of the leaders I have come across are members of the Committee of Union and Progress. I have had this confirmed by Mr. Valli of Brusa, from whom I obtained a good deal of information on the subject, as well as on the situation in general.

There can be no doubt whatever that the stronger this national movement becomes the more difficult will it be to suppress it, and the ultimate pacification of the country will under the circumstances be a very difficult and lengthy matter, for the majority of the population, the great mass of the people, the day they will be disbanded.

General Elections.

The urns are being tampered with. From what I have seen and heard, the final results are sure to show a majority of ex-Committee of Union and Progress members. In one town I was assured that, out of about 500 voters, 410 having abstained from voting, the majority of the voters were ex-Committee of Union and Progress members, in charge of the urns,

[1356]

3 G

completed the number by inserting an equal number of votes in favour of a member of his party.

Wherever I have passed through it is the same old story, pressure is brought to bear on the Christian element, as well as on the uneducated lower classes, for persons favoured by the local authorities. In Bilejik, the Armenians complained they were threatened with reprisals if they did not vote for a certain Merjimek Zade Ahmed, an ex-Committee of Union and Progress member, accused of murdering about 30 Armenians and helping in the deportations.

The elections, as carried on at present, are a disgrace, and should certainly be put a stop to, or else not recognised by the Allied Powers, for they are far from representing the wishes of the people of this country.

French Propaganda.

Continues very active and openly all over the Brusa vilayet. At the end of this month a French hospital was inaugurated at Brusa and all the Turkish civil and military authorities were officially invited and attended (I was the official not invited). Speeches were exchanged, there was much fraternising, all the Turkish children present were presented with cakes, books, and poetic these latter commemorating the event. Whilst proceeding from one locality to other, or visiting towns, I very often came across French officers, who I thought were on official mission, but who I discovered were actively engaged on propaganda work in some instances under my very nose.

Prisons.

Of all the premises I have so far visited those of Brusa break the record regarding sanitary conditions. The detentive prison, or building in which persons arrested are incarcerated prior to their being tried, is about the vilest it has ever given me to set foot in. I found, huddled together, in six averaged sized cells, 207 men, among which several were suffering from syphilis, in an advanced stage, and other contagious diseases. I even came across, lying in a corner and putrid and dying state, a man suffering from the former disease.

The atmosphere in the rooms was simply stifling and nauseous, and in one instance I could not stand it, and was obliged to leave the cell before completing my investigations. The Governor-General, to whom I gave a piece of my report, informed me that several times already he called the attention of his Government to the deplorable conditions of the prisons, but so far did not succeed in obtaining any improvement. The buildings in course of construction, and which will comfortably contain over 2,000 prisoners. On my urgent representations, however, the Governor got the Administrative Council of the province to vote 500*l* with which four big rooms of the new building can be completed and a good number of the prisoners transferred there.

In view of this very unsatisfactory state of affairs, I beg to suggest that the Government should take steps to improve the sanitary conditions, for it is a sin to keep human beings, however bad they may be, under such deplorable sanitary conditions.

Work of Commissions.

Owing to the present marked hostility towards the Christians, I have in certain localities considered it advisable to put off restoring property. In Brusa, however, the Armenians took exception, because one of the decisions of the Mixed Commission was not executed, and withdrew their member. I asked the Head Priest, "Mourahaz," to reappoint him or someone else, but he replied that, in view of the present situation, it was preferable to wait till peace was signed, or at least such time as matters settled down somewhat. According to the Government endorsement in this particular case, it is evident that the Ottoman Government has given the authorities contradictory instructions. The High Commission and the Minister of the Interior, concerning the execution of decisions arrived at by the Mixed Commissions.

At Bilejik the Mixed Commission, composed of two Armenian and two Moslems, presided by the Mayor, have looked into and settled, from the 15th to the 4th October, 1919, one hundred claims. Hundreds of other cases, referred

to the restitution of Armenian houses occupied by Turkish refugees, have been dealt with direct by the local authorities, but the buildings, as usual, have been left in such a pitiable and dilapidated condition that the majority are uninhabitable. About one-fifth of the Armenian houses, about 5,000, deported from this town, have returned, the remainder are to be considered as lost.

P. HADKINSON, Relief Officer

181870

No. 181

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon (Received December 1)

(No. 2252.)

Constantinople, December 2, 1919

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that although the Nationalist movement in Anatolia is local, although almost certainly connected with activities of the Liberal and Nighiaban parties in Constantinople, and has shown itself strongest in the Konia vilayet and in the districts between Broussa and the Dardanelles. It is to my mind clear that the Nationalists have at present no strong support in the general population of Anatolia, the movement is not so much "national" as a purely political organisation which, based upon the army, and making use of the elements of the population which come to the front in times of disorder, has dominated the generally docile and law-abiding population of the provinces.

2. As giving a concrete expression to the resentment felt by all Turks alike at the injustice of Damad Ferid's Cabinet, was something definite to be achieved. Since that time, except for making the elections, its rôle has been one of passive expectation, and enthusiasm has waned. Forced levies of money on towns and villages have caused much resentment amongst the population, already bled white by the costs of a long war.

3. The opposition movement in the Balikesir-Broussa district is now in its full vigour. It is headed by a certain Circassian, Ahmed Anzavur by name, who bears a high reputation, and was formerly a member of the Government. He has gathered a considerable body of adherents round him, and has defeated with loss certain forces sent against him by the local military commanders.

4. The movement in the Konia district has officially been settled. Under Damad Ferid's Government the Governor General of the vilayet of Konia was Kemal Bey, an enlightened and capable administrator. He took a strong line against the Nationalists, and having many supporters in his province kept his district loyal after the rest of the country had been overrun by the Nationalists, he returned to Constantinople only when the situation had become hopeless, and the Cabinet was on the point of falling.

5. The procedure adopted by the Nationalists was, as a rule, to send detachments of a small number of men under a few energetic officers to the various local centres, there established their own partisans as rulers, and imprisoned or otherwise disposed of any opponents. They then proceeded to levy contributions for the Nationalist cause.

6. Such a party appears to have entered the Bozgir district (about 50 miles west of Konia) early in October. It first demanded a contribution, this being objected to, its members attempted to collect it by force, but met more than their match, and only a few returned to Konia. The Nationalist authorities in Konia sent a further force to subdue the "rebels," but the latter had in the meantime been reinforced by detachments from the neighbouring vilayets, and repulsed this attempt, inflicting considerable loss on their assailants and, it is stated, even capturing two machine guns. A third and more considerable force of Nationalist troops, however, then entered the district, and is reported to have burnt two or three villages, the defenders withdrawing into the mountains.

7. Attached is the translation of a petition addressed to the British High Commissioner at Konia, from the notables of twenty-seven villages in this district.

Bozgir attracted a considerable measure of attention at

Constantinople, and a mission under General Hurshia Pasha was lately sent to the Konia district by the Government to report on the situation, and bring about some satisfactory arrangement between the opposing forces. This mission has not yet returned, and it is unknown what effect its arrival has produced.

I have, &c

(For the High Commissioner).

RICHARD WEBB

Enclosure in No. 186

Translation of a Petition from the Notables of Twenty-seven Villages

To the British Political Representative, Constantinople, c/o the British Control Officer, Konia.

The Union and Progress Committee, organised at Bozgir (south-west of Konia near Doughtla Göl) under the title of National Forces, have ordered mobilisation of the educated classes, the notabilities, and leading residents, by *prokla*

With the object of obliging the population to recognise the National Forces they ordered, they opened fire with artillery and machine guns on the people of various villages, in the Striatat district and thus caused the death of a considerable number of both Moslems and non Moslems. They have also destroyed by artillery fire and bombs some eight or ten houses in Kayajik, Akharli, Odan, and Epek villages together with the human beings, the animals and furniture therein. Owing to the interruption of postal and telegraphic communication we cannot report atrocities to higher authorities.

Since for the space of a month the tranquillity and peace of the district have been infringed, and the re-establishment of peace appears to be an impossibility since, also, owing to the Armistice terms, our Government is not sufficiently strong to deal with the Nationalist forces, therefore we beg the assistance of the British Government in doing what is necessary with all possible speed.

We beg you, therefore, Sir, upon receiving this report, to stretch forth your hands in help, in order to save Bozgir from the fire and tyranny of the Nationalist forces.

(Signed by notabilities of following villages)

Baghajak Kevanlik, Papoushulji, Hadji Yonouslar, Dondlu Karabak, Houlouslar, Seoyul, Gidret, Bekle, Chat, Yalunizja, Kiraz, Aghaj, Baybaghan, Fakiler Tebe Erisi, Ekisar, Saristad, A Pomar, Akharli, Goundekun, Ali Cherchi, Karaja Erd.

October 28, 1919

[161872]

No. 187

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 15.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report, dated the 15th November, by the Naval Intelligence Officer at Ismid, relating to local opposition to the Nationalist movement, which I have received from General Staff Officer (Naval).

I have, &c

(For the High Commissioner).

RICHARD WEBB

Enclosure in No. 187

Report on Local Opposition to Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

IN a recent report I stated that there was in this district a counter-movement opposed to Mustapha Kemal and his so-called "National Defence" forces. The leader of the opposition movement was a Major Bekir Bey, who recently collected a force of about 600 armed men in the neighbourhood of Adabazar. There they came into collision with part of Kemal's men. Some shots were fired without doing serious harm to either side, and as Kemal's followers were stronger, those of Bekir Bey dispersed and abandoned their leader, who went into hiding.

The Turkish authorities took immediate steps to crush the new movement and ordered the arrest of Bekir Bey. As he was not to be found, a large reward, I am told, was offered for his capture, but without result.

2. Meantime Bekir Bey succeeded in escaping to Ismid, where he hid in a friend's house. On my return here from hospital a few days ago a message was brought to me

house late one night, when he talked a great deal about the political situation. The substance of his conversation was to the following effect:

(1.) He and his followers are supporters of the former Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha,

realise that in such friendship lies their only hope of salvation from ruin.

(2.) The so-called National Party under Mustapha Kemal Pasha is merely a pretence of the Committee of Union and Progress under a new high-sounding name, and all the leading men in that movement are former prominent Unionists, many of whom have a very black record.

(3.) As the Government had allowed Mustapha Kemal to form his army, and usually acquire such strength, he considers that he should also have the freedom in forming his party and supporting his policy even with the aid of Kemal's organisation.

The fact that the Government, in co-operation with Kemal, has at once sought to crush his (Bekir's) movement is taken by him as clear proof that the Government and the Unionists are working together and that the former is conniving in the distribution of arms and general opposition to the Allies.

(4.) As Bekir's party was formed expressly for the purpose of cultivating friendship with the Allies, he suggested that the Government should protect them from persecution by the Government. That help, he suggested, should partly consist in supplying his party with money and arms, as they are all poor, while the Unionists had a large amount of money in their hands. They also had secured the support of most of the newspapers by bribery.

3. Bekir Bey, I understand, has now succeeded in escaping to Constantinople on a goods train.

4. In the course of a conversation with the governor here, I casually referred to the movement, without, however, informing him of my interview with the latter. The governor said Bekir was a vain and ambitious person, who managed by lies about pretended support he was receiving not only from the people of Anatolia but from the British Government to succeed in deluding a few stupid people and inducing them to follow him, but that as soon as they realised his unreliability they promptly deserted him.

W. GORDON CAMPBELL, Captain, R.M.

November 15, 1919.

162639

No. 188.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 17.)

Tiflis, December 10, 1919.
In conversation 7th December, Azerbaijan Prime Minister told Colonel St.okes that the Prime Minister, Mr. Kazem Bey, had been in communication with Persia and gave impression that His Majesty's Government approved.

Prime Minister asks whether His Majesty's Government authorized or supported proposal.

He thinks confederation with Georgia and Armenia essential, but had no thought of Persia. He considers it is possible, however, that His Majesty's Government might prefer confederation of the two States.

I have told Colonel Stokes that I presume Prince was merely expressing his personal opinion.

(Addressed to Tehran, No. 7.)

[159836]

No. 189.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 1479.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 17, 1919

I TRANSMIT herewith for your Excellency's information copy of letter of the Prime Minister to the War Office, dated 17th December, 1919, in which the Prime Minister states that the boundaries of British and French military occupation in Palestine and Syria

territory administrations are not identical with the boundaries of the various zones of the agreement of May 1916, which was referred to in the aide-memoire presented to the Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau on the 13th September.

3. In this aide-memoire the Prime Minister proposed that the garrison in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia should be replaced by an Arab force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Hama, Hama, and Aleppo should be replaced by an Arab force.

4. It was, however, stipulated that British troops should remain in Palestine defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba, and that the boundary of Palestine was determined, the British Commander-in-chief should have the right to occupy outposts in accordance with the boundary claimed by the British Government.

His Majesty's Government have decided, however, that in occupation of that portion of occupied enemy territory administration east of the line of the Sykes-Picot line, which was the subject of the proposal, the Government have decided to modify to this extent the proposals set out in the Prime Minister's aide-memoire was the imminent danger of a regrettable outbreak on the part of the population of Syria, who regarded any alteration in the existing temporary administrative boundaries as an indication of permanent changes of a nature calculated to prejudice the decisions of the Peace Conference.

Actuated no doubt by the same motive, the French Government undertook to have also agreed to accede to the request of His Highness Emir Faisal and to refrain for the present from occupying the districts which lie to the east of the boundary of the blue zone and the existing administrative boundary between occupied enemy territory administrations east and west.

The logical corollary to these two concessions to local feeling is that the existing boundary between the spheres of British and French occupation should remain unaltered, and His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided to withdraw their troops from that portion of occupied enemy territory administration west of the line which they had hitherto intended to retain them, and to restrict the area of their occupation in Palestine to occupied enemy territory administration south.

8. Your Lordship should take an early opportunity of communicating this decision to the French Government, pointing out that it is a substantial concession as compared with the proposals contained in the Prime Minister's aide-memoire, and expressing hope that in the light of the considerations outlined in this despatch they will raise no objection, and will inform General Gouraud accordingly. You should make it clear at the same time that this decision has been arrived at by His Majesty's Government in the light of the considerations outlined in this despatch, and that the boundaries of Palestine, which will require to be examined and readjusted in the future settlement.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[163278]

No. 190.

Colonel Meinertzhagen to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 19.)

(C.P.O. 74.)

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,

December 5, 1919.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your confidential letter of the 23rd October, I have the honour to forward the following remarks:—

There is no direct evidence to show that the Banco di Roma is acting in a manner which would warrant the conclusion that the Banco di Roma is a commercial and political agency prompted by the Italian Government, and that it directs its efforts, against those of Great Britain. There is little doubt in my own mind that these conclusions are correct.

The main points to be considered in this connection are:—

1. In Egypt the bank is known to be at any rate in sympathy with the national movement, and therefore working against Great Britain. It is unlikely that it is guided by a different policy in Palestine.
2. In Palestine the bank is freely making loans on provisional contracts. Such unsound business can only be justified on political grounds.
3. They utilise an active propaganda machinery for commercial penetration in Palestine.
4. The Cairo City Police report on the 31st October of this year that three persons were sent to Syria in September last for political work against Great Britain on behalf of the Italian Government, their object being to stir up Arab feeling against the British administration. Their instructions were received from the manager of the Banco di Roma.
5. The Banco di Roma has clandestinely opened branches in various localities in Syria in spite of instructions forbidding such action.
6. There is a mass of indirect evidence of a less serious nature, which tends to confirm the suspicion that the bank's activities, both political and commercial, are directed against Great Britain, and that the methods they employ are not those customary in a respectable banking establishment.

I have, &c.

R. MEINERTZHAGEN, Colonel,
Chief Political Officer.

[163275]

No. 191

Colonel Meinertzhagen to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 19.)

(C.P.O. 92.)

General Headquarters, E. F.

Expeditionary Force, Cairo, December 2, 1919.

My Lord,

AT the request of the Chief Political Officer, Bagdad, I have the honour to forward to you a copy of a report No. 37 from the Political Officer at Damascus, dated the 15th October, 1919.

I understand that the Chief Political Officer, Bagdad, in communicating with your Lordship desires to refer in particular to this report.

I have, &c.

(For Chief Political Officer),
W. F. SHIRLING,

Lieutenant-Colonel

Enclosure to No. 191.

Report No. 37.

G. H. Q., Cairo.

(C.P.O. 92.)

THE political situation in Damascus and Syria generally remains somewhat obscure, but the mandate as much as ever, are nevertheless becoming resigned to it, and the ardent Nationalist and pro-English party are rather despairing.

Some of the notables are already approaching the French with a view to their future should the latter come to the aid of Syria. Amongst them are Mohamed Fakhri, El Azou, Abdul Rahman Pasha, and Sheikh Mithgal and Mashur. Two of the sheikhs of the Aneiyeh, who are also reported to be working for the French.

The Nationalist and anti-French movement, in fact, appears to be rather losing its force, and should the French come in with troops, they would be unlikely, I think, to meet with any organised resistance.

The majority of the population of Aleppo are not in sympathy with the Nationalist movement and they are generally uneasy as to the possible results of their efforts to incite national revolution.

The activities of these are turning more and more towards encouraging the

although given favourable conditions this is by no means impossible, and will certainly be attempted by the leaders of the Bagdadi party and other extreme sections. It is, however, inevitable to lead to a rapprochement with the Turks and with Mustafa Kemal. It is safe to say that the majority of the Moslems in Aleppo vilayet, and a very large number in the vilayet of Damascus, are in sympathy with Turkish aspirations, and would prefer union with Turkey to being under an unpopular European Power.

Two pamphlets which were recently distributed in Aleppo—one from Mustafa Kemal setting out his aims, and the other addressed to the people of Syria. Also a report of an agent, a Monopolist.

2. While the report is

truth of the... growing in strength... have failed to appeal to the... of the Administration... tolerance, extended to the Bedouin, especially... hand, they are not sufficiently extreme for the more ardent Nationalists and irreconcilable anti-French party.

added to the popularity of Sherifian rule. King Hussein's name carries no weight whatever, and there is no question in Syria of accepting him as Caliph.

The request made by Emir Zaid on the 14th to be allowed to return to Mecca was... he realised that his position is becoming difficult. I can think of no reason for his wishing to leave Syria. His position and that of Feisal is undoubtedly unenviable, since they are mistrusted and disliked by many of the people. I can hope for no act.

all the lower and middle classes were pro-Turk, and trouble might be expected if the... withdrawn, though they stated there would be no organised... of... as all the people of Damascus wished for was peace and... I think, however, the risk is considerable, in view of the state of feeling in... Islamic movement now on foot.

5. Large numbers of prisoners of war continue to return. There have recently arrived in Damascus amongst them four officers from the Yemen and eighteen

Arabs. These are... with the Turks. These are professional soldiers, and the only army which can offer them a career is the Turkish army; it would appear, therefore, that if the release of prisoners continued Mustafa Kemal is not likely to suffer from shortage of officers.

6. The commanders of the three brigades of the Arab Army have recently been changed. The General Officer Commanding Aleppo brigade is now Rushdi Safadi, an Arab officer trained in Germany, and on the staff at Constantinople throughout the entire war. He returned from there about two months ago. The General Officer Commanding Damascus brigade and the post commandant Damascus are both Turks though domiciled in Damascus. They also returned only a month or two ago. The General Officer Commanding Derna brigade, an Arab from north of Aleppo, was

army attaché at Vienna, and during the war served entirely on the European front. He returned to Syria two months ago. These officers are certainly considerably more experienced than those they have replaced, but their politics will require watching.

7. An incident occurred recently at Kunetra, which has now been amicably settled. A certain Circassian, a relative of Emir Said-el-Jezairly, managed to obtain some twenty-five to thirty recruits for the gendarmerie in O.E.T. West. The Arabs and Bedouin sought to find in this an excuse for a quarrel with the Circassians, and issued an ultimatum to the Circassians demanding the return of these gendarmes. The Arab Government despatched troops to the spot and ordered the Arabs to abandon their attitude, and I am informed that the matter has now been peacefully settled. An armoured car also visited Kunetra on the 12th, and produced an excellent

J. N. CLAYTON, Major.

Damascus, October 15, 1919.

APPENDIX L

Circular (printed in Turkish)

1. We do not want to have a war with foreigners.
2. We do not want to have a foreign Government in our country.
3. We promise security to the public without distinction in religion.
4. We shall defend the rights of our nation until death, in order to avoid its fall.
5. The lands which belong to Turkey against Wilson's
6. Everyone keep to his work and business. Our aim is justice.
7. We put to death without mercy everyone who stands against what we
8. Whether he be a Moslem or a Christian.
9. Moslems who love our Sultan. We have the right to the Caliphate.
10. Our nation have taken up arms for this cause, from east to west, from Erzerum
11. Those who gave right to 300,000 Armenians did not give right to 16,000,000 Turks. In order to... and no matter what life is worth, we shall defend our right.

APPENDIX M

A letter to the Syrians (in Turkish).

My Brethren,
I speak to you with a pleading voice, emanating from a heart full of sorrow. I speak to you with a voice that is full of grief and the vision of wrong deeds.
Let us put an end to this misunderstanding, and let us stretch our hands to make peace together and point our arms towards the traitors who wish to tear up Islam. Otherwise every repentance will be of no use whatever later.
Do not be cheated by their false promises. You have before you the secret agreements between the enemies of religion. There is not one among you who does not know the principle of Gladstone. Wake up, and do not fall asleep again. We do not intend to take possession of the country of the Moslems, but we wish to save it from those who think that it is a very desirable material, and these are the enemies of Islam. The victorious Unitarians (Mowahidun) will attack their enemies who exceed them in number, depending on the divine care and orders.
Konia and Khadavandikar are now connected, and by the liberation of Konia the... between the Arabs from the East have been cut. Our Mejlis will soon be the guests of their Arab brothers, and by their union they will conquer and destroy their enemies. Long live our brothers in religion, and may the enemy be conquered!

us to discourage the sending of numerous delegations to Paris and London, but to undertake to transmit any written statements of aims and aspirations. We followed that rule with everyone. At the same time we had maintained, equally with everyone, an attitude of complete reserve as to what they had to expect for the future.

4. We had, I said, been not less reserved with the Kurds than with the other nationalities to express aspirations. As for the High Commission, I said, I had not the

interested in it as an element on both sides of our military

He had made a short preliminary tour, started on a more extended tour of which the Turkish authorities. This brought him

who had thrown in his lot with the national movement, ordered the arrest of the Bedrhan, and even of Major Noel himself. Major Noel saw in this something different from

him recommendations, and in all good faith he telegraphed to us to protest. interpretation on all this, and leaped to the conclusion that there was a partitioning compact between Ferid Pasha, who wanted to quell the and perfidious Albion, which wanted to create a Kurdistan. I said, was moonshine. Major Noel was a specialist in Kurds, and he had personal sympathies with the people he knew all about. already said, one of enquiry, not of propaganda.

why His Majesty's Government had encouraged the Bedrhans to accompany him on the hope that their influence could be used to promote peace and quietness in a troubled region during the transition period. The project of using such influences in that had been frequently discussed with Ferid Pasha. The Bedrhans themselves had told distinctly that that was the only purpose for which His Majesty's Government favoured their going to Kurdistan.

8. My object in making this statement was to make it clear that any action taken by us from time to time on behalf of individual Kurds was not to be taken as in that we were running Kurds, either as nationalists or as possible elements in a combat against the present Government or the national movement; also to counteract to the sedulous efforts which are being made to work up feeling against His Majesty's Government by attributing to them as an already settled thing a policy complete dismemberment of Turkey. I was careful to avoid saying anything which might suggest that His Majesty's Government would decide against Kurdish aspirations, and I distinguished clearly between the present and the future.

9. The Minister said it was true that our attitude has been misrepresented. He thanked me for the information I had given him, and said it would be very useful here to voice Kurdish aspirations, as being really representative. I said that our attitude which he could see as he chose, I could only answer his present question personally and confidentially.

10. Our practice was, I said, to listen to anyone who seemed to represent any serious element of national opinion. We did not, as in a law court, ask people to produce powers of attorney before hearing them. We sized them up and formed our own opinion of their seriousness and representative character. In the case of the Kurds, I said, I had no doubt of the sincerity of the Kurds, and my own feeling was that the bulk of the Kurds

to have a plane of thought and custom to make it possible to apply criteria. I was, however, satisfied that the Kurdish club came from people entitled to a hearing, i.e., they were serious and did not represent the Kurdish race.

11. I Pasha then said that he was going to ask the question. I said that if that people who did represent it would also

reason for leaving the Turkish question in abeyance? The opinion was generally that the Allies were deferring a settlement of set purpose in order that Turkey might be ruined completely, materially and morally. I said that I was

reason for the delay, it was not that. So far as I knew, it was the nature of the problem. It was desired to provide a special regime for Turkey proper, i.e., Asia Minor and Constantinople, which would harmonise all interests. The Conference had looked much to the States and the attitude of the United States had so far been rather disappointing. of finding satisfactory solutions in these circumstances was the genuine

13. Rehid Pasha then said that speaking as a person to another, he could tell me that the English attitude had been a mistaken one from the beginning of the armistice. We had had the sympathy of even element in Turkey and we had nothing to stimulate it. I said I knew that the sentiments of the portion of the country were pro-English. If we had had opportunities thereby, as we had it was His Majesty's Government were perfectly determined not to be from

14. Rehid Pasha asked why it was not possible to discuss the future of the country in an informal way with Turkish statesmen, who after all had governed the country for centuries and knew them as no one else could. To his remark the Turks had governed the country for centuries, I could not resist exclaiming, *vous l'avez fait si mal!* and adding that, though I was always talking to him in Greek and Armenian, I pitied the governed Turks just as much. He admitted justice of this *boutade*, which brought the interesting portion of the conversation to an end. The Minister went off into a long account of conversations with Colonel Dady London towards the end of 1912, in which he foretold with approximate accuracy the of events in the Balkans and Constantinople. The point was that the truth of a forecast was due to his knowledge of the peoples concerned.

A. RYAN

British High Commission, Constantinople,
November 27, 1919

13693

No. 193

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 20.)

No. 2286.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, December 4, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a High Commission and representatives of the Greek High Commission and the Armenian Greek Patriarchates, held on the 26th November.

2. The proceedings were of exceptional interest; the lively anxiety, approximating to despair, of the representatives of the two main races of the Ottoman Empire as regards public security and relief is revealed throughout.

3. With respect to security, the situation presented is one of almost unbroken lawlessness. The prevalent lawlessness is forcing the Greeks and Armenians of the interior of the villages to take refuge in the large towns in Allied occupation, where they further tax the already severely strained resources of the Relief Committees.

4. Various suggestions for improving the situation, whether by arming as rural forces or by other means, are put forward and discussed. One and all, however, encounter difficulties, it be a shortage of effectives or the objection—largely technical and academic

there would appear that the distribution of arms is contrary to the terms of the armistice.

5. The reinstatement by the Nationalists, after his hardly-achieved dismissal, of the anti-Christian kaimakam of Boghazian, in the vilayet of Angora, is a grievance and is not the first occasion on which such action has been taken by Mustapha Kemal's organisation in defiance of the Central Government.

6. As regards relief, the situation during the coming winter will be an unfortunate one. In Cilicia, for example, the Armenians are said to be expected in addition to 8,500 already in receipt of relief. The clothing of such a large number are utterly beyond the resources of the "Arménienne nationale arménienne," and, although the French authorities are stated to be giving their attention to the matter of accommodation and may be expected to grant some further assistance, there is some justification for the remark of Dr. Tavitian that the refugees are faced with two alternatives—starvation in Cilicia or repatriation in Aleppo.

7. Finally, all present agreed that the furnishing of relief during the coming winter can no longer be met by voluntary subscriptions; some form of advance Allied funds is necessary if many thousands of deaths are to be avoided.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
High Commissioner

Encl sure in No. 193.

Minutes of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting between the Armenian Greek Section and Armenian and Greek Representatives.

Present.

Lieut.-Colonel Graves.
Lieut.-Colonel Riina
Mr Hurst
Lieutenant Tucker, R.N.V.R.
M. Pallas, representing the Greek High Commission.
Dr. Theotokas, representing the Greek Patriarchate.
M. Calvocecos, representing the Greek Patriarchate.
Dr. Tavitian, representing the Armenian Patriarchate.
M. Tchakirian, representing the Armenian Patriarchate.

I. Public Security.

DR. THEOTOKAS said that, as brigandage could visibly be practised with complete impunity, the number of bands was increasing daily. At Chatalja the Mutassarif had guaranteed to restore order in ten days, but since the end of 12th November members of a band had entered Chale and beaten a Greek subject subsequently carrying him off. A French gendarme who was there had done his best to prevent the band from doing so, saying he had no confidence in his superior who were in league with the bands.

As regards the interior, eight Greek villages had been burnt down by their Christian inhabitants, who had left for Cilicia, Smyrna and Constantinople.

In reply to a question from Colonel Graves, Dr. Theotokas stated that he had received reports from the interior that the Greek population was being opposed to Armenians travelling in the interior.

Dr. Theotokas also mentioned that from Boghazian, Turkey, the Christian kaimakam, Avni Bey, had at length been dismissed, but the Nationalists had reinstated him. In this district Avni Bey was also preventing the Armenians from obtaining their stipulated share of the produce where fields owned by them were being cultivated by Turks. Dr. Theotokas stated that ever since the armistice there had been constant complaints from Boghazian.

At Aintab, he continued, the Turks were well-armed, and waiting for a favourable

moment to attack the Armenians. A large number of Turkish officers were much in evidence in the town.

Dr. Theotokas suggested that, as French gendarmes were already at certain places such as Chale, it might be practicable to distribute them in small groups, in view of the general insecurity everywhere prevalent.

As regards the Adana Plain, where there had recently been some bad cases of banditry, Dr. Tavitian stated that the situation was now normal; the number of the tribes had been demanded.

Colonel Graves pointed out that there were considerable bodies of troops in Cilicia and that action could thus be taken; whereas with a few gendarmes nothing could be done against regular bands.

Dr. Theotokas: They were threatened with a fresh immigration of returned Greek refugees on a large scale, owing to insecurity. Refugees were also leaving the villages coming into Constantinople, thus placing an additional burden on the funds of the Relief Committee.

If the Lash, who were invariably the most dangerous element, knew that there were arms in the villages they would not attack them so readily.

M. Pallas asked whether there were still no chance of rifles being distributed to the Armenians for self protection.

Colonel Graves: The matter was not lost sight of, but it was one of very great difficulty, as, according to the terms of the armistice, all rifles, &c., had to be given up. Nevertheless, as so many of the brigands and malefactors were armed, it was natural that one should wish the law-abiding section of the population to be equally well off in order to be able to protect themselves.

Dr. Theotokas asked whether, if the despatch of gendarmes was out of the question, it would not be possible to distribute small detachments of troops. There were, he added, villages which had been attacked up to four times, and the situation was deplorable.

Dr. Tavitian suggested the possibility of Turkish gendarmes, with Allied officers, or Dr. Theotokas mentioned the idea of a sort of militia recruited amongst the Armenians, with European officers.

Colonel Graves pointed out that we were unfortunately not administering the affairs of Turkey; we were here to see that the terms of the armistice were properly observed.

Dr. Theotokas: The Turks were arming Moslems to attack Christians; this was contrary to the terms of the armistice.

Dr. Tavitian concurred, and said that if only the terms of the armistice were properly observed they would be quite satisfied.

Dr. Theotokas: In one district of the Marmara region 200 to 300 rifles had been distributed in the previous year, and the situation had been improved there.

Relief.

Colonel Graves: M. Pallas said that the Greek Patriarchate had prepared a note to the High Commissioners regarding the possibility of obtaining a loan for relief purposes. It was suggested that this should be considered.

Dr. Tavitian stated that confiscated Armenian funds in Turkish hands would constitute a good security for such an advance, as regards the Armenians, such funds were considerable.

The Armenian Patriarchate had approached the Turkish Government as regards help for their orphans, and the Turks had offered to give £ T. 1,000 a month.

According to a telegram received the previous day from a member of the American Orphanage at Harput, they were seriously contemplating the necessity of shutting down the Armenian Orphanage there owing to scarcity of funds.

Colonel Graves: They were all agreed as to one thing. Relief work could not be carried on with voluntary subscriptions; people had given all they could by

the matter was one of feeding, housing, and clothing hundreds of thousands of people for months—they would have to reckon up to the harvest of next year—and the expenses would run into millions.

A letter had been received from the Director-in-chief of Relief and Repatriation at Constantinople, asking for more information regarding the situation in Cilicia.

As large numbers of Armenians were being sent from Syria to Cilicia,

Il reste bien convenu que, pour les questions territoriales, nous nous en sommes remis à l'arbitrage de la Conférence de la Paix. — — — — — et d'autre nous y apporterons un large esprit de réconciliation, d'amitié. — — — — —
Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Président de la Délégation nationale arménienne
à la Conférence de la

BOGHOS NUBAR.

Enclosure 5 in No. 194.

General Cheraf Pasha and Boghos Nubar to M. Clemenceau

M. le Président,

Paris, le 20 novembre 1919.

NOUS nous faisons un plaisir de remettre ci-joint à votre Excellence copie d'une lettre adressée à M. le Président de la Conférence de la Paix, signée par nous, représentants de la Délégation de l'Arménie intégrale et de la Délégation kurde à la Conférence de la Paix. Votre Excellence verra que, contrairement aux assertions de nos adversaires, prétendant que les Arméniens et les Kurdes ne pourraient vivre en bonne intelligence, nous avons conclu un accord en vue de — — — — — revendications nationales.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Président de la Délégation kurde à la
Conférence de la Paix,

CHERIF.

Le Président de la Délégation nationale
arménienne,

BOGHOS NUBAR.

(Cette lettre a été adressée aux Présidents des Délégations anglaise, américaine, italienne et japonaise auprès de la Conférence de la Paix.)

[165691]

No. 195

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — (Received December 29.)

(No. 2317.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 11, 1919.

I HAVE in more than one recent despatch remarked on the extreme eagerness which is now being shown in official Turkish circles for the early conclusion of peace, and the insistence with which the Grand Vizier and other Ministers insist, whenever opportunity offers, on the necessity for an early solution.

2. About three weeks ago great publicity was given to the fact that the Turkish Government had made a formal representation to the Allies with the same object, and the greatest anxiety was manifested in the press and among the public as to the result. One suggestion which has been put forward to account for this eagerness on the part of the Turkish Government is that Mustafa Kemal has urged them to take such action, feeling that he is uncertain how much longer he can hold the national movement together.

3. I had myself no definite knowledge of such a representation until the 27th November. I received from the Italian High Commissioners a telegram from Rome, stating that a telegram from the Turkish Grand Vizier, dated the 16th November, had been laid before the Supreme Council. My French colleague then explained to us that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had asked the same request had been made to the Italian High Commissioner and myself.

4. Your Lordship is no doubt already aware of the contents of the Grand Vizier's telegram, but I enclose, for convenience of reference, a copy received from my French colleague after the meeting mentioned above.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK.

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 195.

Grand Vizier to M. Clemenceau

1. Le dernier délai accordé à la Délégation bulgare pour la signature du Traité d'armistice expire le 15 novembre courant, et prenant en considération la lettre de votre Excellence adressée au chef de la Délégation ottomane en date du 10 juin écoulé, je viens la prier de vouloir bien fixer le jour auquel celle-ci pourrait se trouver en France afin de se mettre finalement en relations avec le Congrès des Puissances alliées.

[165694]

No. 196.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — (Received December 29)

(No. 2321.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 12, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2166 of the 19th November, I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of a further telegram from Mustafa Kemal Pasha complaining of the proceedings of the French authorities at Adana.

The strenuous attitude taken up by the leaders of the Nationalist movement in regard to the new arrangements in Syria and Cilicia goes far to disavow the view widely held in this country, and especially by the advocates of what is called an "English policy," that there is a definite working understanding between the French and the Nationalists.

3. It is probably true that many individual Frenchmen, including persons in official position, sympathize with the national movement, and would for one reason or another welcome a solution of a Turkish question based on what is the main plank in the Nationalists' programme, namely, the maintenance of an undivided Turkey.

4. I have no reason to suppose that the highest French authorities are pushing this policy in anticipation of the demands of the Conference. If they were doing so, there could be no greater set-back to their efforts than the action of the Government in choosing this moment to take charge in Syria and Cilicia.

5. Further indications that the French are not really taking too much trouble to soothe Nationalist susceptibilities is afforded by the fact that they filled the columns of certain local French papers with glowing descriptions of the benefits conferred by French administration on the vilayet of Adana.

6. Following upon the enclosed telegram from Mustafa Kemal Pasha, I have received a number of telegrams of the usual type from committees of national defence, &c., at various places in the interior complaining of the alleged action of the French in forcing the people of Adana to fly French flags.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 196

Telegram despatched from Siras on November 28 by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the name of the Representatives of the Association of the Defence of Rights.

(Translation.)

THE French, acting in principle contrary to the clauses of the armistice by remaining in occupation of the Adana district, have recently through police agents and gendarmes distributed French flags among the whole population of the town and have forced the inhabitants to hoist them not only over private houses, imposing a fine of 100L in case of non-compliance, but also over official buildings.

According to information received from Adana, the whole Mahomedan population in the last degree pained and disgusted at this act, which is contrary to international law. We protest energetically in the name of Ottoman national unity against this act and we demand redress.

165708

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—Received December 11.

(No. 233th.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, December 13, 1919

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2311 of the 7th December, relative to a conversation between Mr. Hohler and Sheikh Abdul Kadir on Kurdish affairs, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information report of a conversation which Mr. Hohler had on the 9th December with the Armenian Patriarch, ~~at~~ a ~~understanding~~ alleged to have been arrived at between the Kurds and the Armenians.

I have, &c

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 197

Wetmore, A. P., 1960.

I HAD a conversation this afternoon with the Armenian Patriarch to enquire as to the understanding alleged to have been arrived at between the Kurds and the Armenians. His Beatitude said that some time ago there had been some understanding on between him and the Kurdish club here, but they had rather been two very divergent sections in the club. The tendency was for the older members inclined to continue with the Turks, whereas the younger ones considered that the policy had been tried for too long without the slightest success, also there were differences of opinion among the various tribes. He had, however, now received from Paris the statement to the effect that Baghlan Nubar Pasha and Sherif Pasha had signed an agreement, but the details had not yet reached him. As soon as they did it was his intention to recommence negotiations, not only here but also in the provinces, though they were greatly hampered by the action of the Turks, who refused to allow liberty of travel in the country. His Beatitude said that the Armenians had never suffered from the Kurds, who had only perpetrated massacres when incited thereto by the Turks. Otherwise they had lived their quiet history alongside and amongst the Kurds on perfectly good terms. I suggested that whilst an independent Kurdistan stood, so far as possible, from all traces of Turkeydom would appear to give the most genuine guarantees possible for the lives, the liberty, and the honour of the Armenians, it would be a great work for any nation to undertake. His Beatitude said that the Kurds were not in very clear majority, and I enquired whether, as a system of tribal rule and inter-tribal warfare had been prevalent in older times had not been one of tribal rule and inter-tribal warfare, and any central Government. His Beatitude entirely endorsed this, saying that the Kurds were merely dwellers in the mountains addicted to pastoral pursuits, whilst the Armenians lived in the plains and followed husbandry. He would welcome the re-establishment of such a system. He said that he believed the majority of the Kurds to be desirous of independence, and that only a few tribes, the chief of which was the Mulla at Viranşehir, decided in favour of predilection for the Turks. He reiterated the conviction that the Kurds and Armenians could get along perfectly well together if left alone, and if the Turks could be, so far as possible, eliminated from among them. I expressed the general opinion that the success of the negotiations gave promise to the best hopes of many of the Armenian difficulties, and whilst I was in contact of the view of His Majesty's Government, I could not but believe that the negotiations which would meet with their entire approval, especially as they had lately been instrumental in procuring the conclusion of a pact between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. I pointed out, however, to him that the Armenians had broken their promise which had just reached us from Mr. Wardrop, the Armenians had broken their promise by recent attacks on several villages in the Zangazur district. He said he would use his influence to stop any future infraction of the promise.

M. Zaven said that, as with the Kurds, so the Armenians had always lived on

tolerable terms with the Azerbaijanis. Hostilities, massacres, and reprisals had only broken out when Azerbaijan had become a kind of succursal of Turkey, full of Young Turk agents.

T. B. HOHLER

December 9, 1911

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1. *See* Admiral Sir J. de la Motte-Rouge — (Record 100, 100, 100).

(No. 2341)

My Lord

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 183, asking for a list of port, railway, mining, and industrial concessions held by foreigners other than British subjects in any part of the late Turkish Empire, I have the honour to forward herewith a list which is believed to be fairly complete.

In many of the companies are described as Ottoman, the capital invested is named is mainly foreign, of the nationality given in each case.

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[illegible]

Enclosure in No. 198

List of Port, Railway, Mining, and Industrial Concessions held by Foreigners other than British Subjects in late Turkish Empire.

Company	Nationality.	Capital.
Brasserie réünie Bonost Nectar	Swiss	Fr. 6,000,000
Brasserie de la Paix		
Société générale de Chemin de Fer et Travaux publics	French	
Société du Chemin de Fer ottoman d'Anatolie	German	Fr. 175,000,000
Société Impériale ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad	(German)	Fr. 18,000,000
du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad à Mossoul		
Société des Chemins de Fer de l'Asie Mineure		£ 100,000
Société des Chemins de Fer Mondrairie-Kroum	{ French Belgian German	Fr. 2,000,000
Compagnie d'Exploitation des Chemins de Fer orientaux	{ German Austrian	Fr. 50,000,000
Société des Chemins de Fer de l'Asie Mineure		Fr. 10,000,000
Société des Chemins de Fer de l'Asie Mineure		Fr. 10,000,000
Compagnie des Eaux de Scutari-Ladikoy		£ 100,000
Compagnie ottomane des Eaux de Beyrouth	German	Fr. 4,000,000
Compagnie ottomane des Eaux de Smyrne	French	Fr. 2,750,000
Société anonyme ottomane d'Electricité (Constantinople)	{ French Belgian German	Fr. 12,000,000
Société ottomane d'Electricité de Smyrne		£ stig. 100,000
Société anonyme ottomane des Tramways et d'Electricité de Damas		Fr. 6,000,000
Société anonyme ottomane des Tramways et d'Electricité de Beyrouth	French	Fr. 6,000,000
Société Impériale ottomane d'Eclairage par le Gaz et l'Electricité de Beyrouth	{ French Belgian	Fr. 12,000,000
Société anonyme ottomane du Gaz de Beyrouth	French	Fr. 2,300,000
Société anonyme ottomane de Constantinople	French	£ T. 600,000
Société anonyme ottomane de Constantinople	French	Fr. 6,000,000
Société anonyme ottomane des Chemins de Fer métropolitains de Constantinople		£ T. 165,000
Société anonyme ottomane des Mines de Balis-Karadeniz	German	Fr. 2,000,000
Société des Charbonnages de Chiamy	French	Fr. 12,000,000
Société ottomane d'Héraclee	French	Fr. 12,000,000
Société anonyme ottomane des Batons de la Cornu d'Or	German	£ T. 50,000
Société anonyme ottomane industrielle et maritime...		£ L 100,000
Compagnie de Remorquage, Pilotage et Sauvetage...		Fr. 100,000
Société anonyme ottomane des Quais, Docks et Entrepôts de Constantinople		Fr. 23,875,000

Company.	Nationality.	Capital.
Société anonyme ottomane des Docks et Ateliers de Haut-Beyrouth ...	French ...	Fr. 264,000
Compagnie ottomane des Ports, des Quais et Entrepôts de Beyrouth ...	French ...	Fr. 6,000,000
Société du Port et des Quais d'Alexandrette ...	German ...	Fr. 3,000,000
Société du Port et des Quais de Chio ...	French ...	Fr. 8,000,000
Société du Port de Haidar-Pacha ...	German ...	Fr. 14,500,000
Société des Quais de Smyrne ...	French ...	Fr. 250,000
Société de Publications françaises et étrangères ...	French ...	Fr. 12,500,000
Société des Bains de Koury-Yalova ...	Belgian ...	Fr. 40,000,000
Société immobilière des Bains de Mer de San-Stefano ...	Austrian ...	Fr. 12,500,000
Régie concédée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman ...	French ...	Fr. 12,500,000
Société de Tabac (I.O.B.) ...	German ...	£ T. 909,854
Société des Tramways de Constantinople ...	German ...	£ T. 25,000
Société des Tramways Smyrne-Guez Tepe ...	German ...	£ T. 25,000
Société nationale pour le Commerce, l'Industrie et l'Agriculture dans l'Empire ottoman ...	French ...	£ T. 200,000
Société ottomane de Commerce, d'Agriculture et d'Industrie ...	German ...	£ T. 75,000
Société générale d'Entreprises dans l'Empire ottoman (Roads) (Routes) ...	French ...	Fr. 4,000,000
Compagnie industrielle du Levant ...	Belgian ...	Fr. 4,500,000
Société anonyme ottomane de Construction ...	Italian ...	£ T. 22,000
Société commerciale, industrielle et financière ...	Italian ...	£ T. 100,000
Société anonyme du Crédit "Union ottomane" ...	Italian ...	£ T. 10,000
Compagnie ottomane du Chemin de Fer Haleb-Samssa ...	French ...	
Gas de Dolus Baglache (Perrier) ...	French ...	
Société ottomane des Tramways Régiaux (Nord et Sud de Beyrouth) ...	French ...	

No. 199.

[165716]

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 2344.)

Constantinople, December 16, 1919.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 1807 of the 25th November, relative to an enquiry which is being conducted by the Committee of Greek Claims in Paris into questions concerning the Greek administration at Smyrna, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a joint note on the subject, dated the 10th December, which has been addressed to the Greek High Commissioner by the Allied High Commissioners.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 199.

Joint Note communicated to Greek High Commissioner.

LES Hauts-Commissaires soussignés ont l'honneur de faire savoir à M. le Commissaire hellénique à Constantinople que la Commission des Affaires internationales a été chargée par le Conseil suprême de procéder à l'examen des questions relatives à l'administration hellénique à Smyrne.

Les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés ont, en conséquence, été chargés d'établir certains faits précis relativement à l'ingérence des autorités helléniques dans les affaires administratives et judiciaires qui relèvent soit de services interalliés, soit de l'autorité ottomane.

Dès que les Hauts-Commissaires alliés auront réunis ces documents, ils ne manqueront pas de les soumettre au Commissaire hellénique à Constantinople pour qu'ils soient l'objet d'une étude contradictoire.

Les Hauts-Commissaires sont convaincus que cette enquête aura les plus heureuses conséquences et que, lors de gérer les services helléniques à Smyrne, elle facilitera leur délicate mission en précisant leurs attributions et en définissant leur rôle.

A. DEFRANCE.
RICHARD WEBB.
MAISSA.

Constantinople, le 10 décembre 1919.

[165720]

No. 200.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 2353.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 16, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 2132 of the 21st December, 1919, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the notes addressed by the Armenian and Greek Patriarchates to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople, appealing for an advance of funds for relief purposes from the Allied Governments, to be recovered from Turkey in the financial settlement on the conclusion of peace, as the voluntary contributions on which the various relief organisations chiefly depend are quite inadequate to meet the requirements of the distressed Christian populations of Turkey during the present winter.

2. These appeals were the subject of discussion at the High Commissioners' meeting on Friday, the 12th December, when my French and Italian colleagues concurred with me in the opinion that it was incumbent on the High Commissioners to do their utmost to represent the very serious situation disclosed in the notes of the Patriarchates to the Supreme Council, on whom the responsibility for the decision to be taken would then lie. My Italian colleague desired to point out that the sufferings of a portion of the Moslem population also deserved attention, this observation applying more particularly to the Turkish refugees from the Smyrna vilayet, of whom there are reported to be at least 30,000 in a state of extreme destitution in the district lying south of Aidin.

3. The French and Italian High Commissioners, who have already sent home copies of the notes of the Patriarchates, agreed to send telegrams also to Paris and Rome to urge the matter to the attention of their respective Governments, M. Maïssa again emphasising the desirability of mentioning in this communication the needs of the Moslem refugees.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 200.

M. Dorotheos to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

Ecumenical Patriarchate,

Constantinople, November 6/19, 1919.

Sir,

THE sympathy and encouragement which the work of relief to the suffering Greek population of Turkey has always received from the British High Commission lead me to submit to your Excellency the following appeal:—

As your Excellency is aware, the number of Greeks deported to the interior of Asia Minor during the European war amounted to about 500,000, of whom only about half are estimated to have survived.

The Central Commission of Relief to the Greek Deportees, appointed by the Patriarchate, in order to carry out the work of repatriation and relief of the sufferers, has spent up to date 613,586L, this sum being derived from private funds subscribed by the Greeks of Constantinople and from a subsidy granted by the Hellenic Government, which has been most generous in its support, in spite of the very heavy calls upon it for relief in Salonica, East Macedonia, and Smyrna. Relief on a generous scale has also been provided by the American Commission of Relief in the Near East, particularly in the northern and north-eastern vilayets of Anatolia.

Unfortunately the resources of our Commission are rapidly becoming exhausted, and we are informed that the American Commission finds itself in a similar position. If there was a near prospect of the armistice coming to an end and the present condition of anarchy in the interior of Asia Minor being terminated, we should have less reason to be anxious about the future. But unfortunately there is every prospect of the present situation continuing over the winter, nor can we look to the Turkish Government for any substantial assistance in repairing the suffering which it has inflicted on its Christian subjects.

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Numbers of the deportees have returned to their villages to find their homes either completely demolished or so damaged that they cannot provide sufficient shelter against the cold of the winter.

The population is equally destitute of warm clothing and blankets. Our Commission, owing to its limited funds, has been obliged to confine its activities almost exclusively to Thrace and the shores of the Sea of Marmora, thus neglecting the Black Sea region which is one of those where the Greek population has suffered most. Numberless orphans are still wandering about uncared for in the villages owing to lack of accommodation in the existing orphanages and lack of funds to open new ones.

It is obvious that, without relief measures on a large scale, there is bound to be great mortality this winter among the refugees, and especially among the old, the women, and children. The enormous discrepancy between the requirements and the funds available is shown by the fact that out of an estimate of 4,000,000, which in a statement handed in May last to Lieutenant-Colonel Pears, representative of the Supreme Economic Council here, was estimated as the minimum required for the effective relief of the Greek population in Turkey, only 800,000L have been available, contributed exclusively by the Hellenic Government.

In view of the impossibility of our being able to obtain any further appreciable assistance either from the Hellenic Government or from private sources, I have the honour to suggest to your Excellency that it might be possible to place the matter before the Allied Governments, with a view to obtaining an advance or a relief grant, similar to those which were granted to various countries at the beginning of this year through the agency of the Supreme Economic Council. A sum of 1,000,000L, though falling far short of the real requirements, would, in my opinion, suffice to tide over the winter. This sum, if not given as a relief grant, might be considered as first charge on any sum which Turkey will be obliged to pay as an indemnity by the Peace Treaty.

I feel sure that the Allied Governments, who by now are all too familiar with the indifference of the Turkish Government towards its Christian subjects and who must realise that the inevitable protraction of the armistice is exposing these Christians to further hardships, which were originally not contemplated, will be prepared to examine this request for assistance in a sympathetic spirit.

I have, &c.

The Locum Tenens of the Ecumenical Throne,
DOROTHEOS, Metropolitan of Broussa.

Enclosure 2 in No. 200.

Armenian Patriarchs to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Constantinople, le 3 décembre 1919.

LA prolongation inopinée de l'armistice a créé à la nation arménienne, et particulièrement aux Arméniens de Turquie, une situation des plus alarmantes. Au lendemain de la victoire des Alliés, tous nos nationaux, mus par un élan de solidarité suprême, avaient uni leurs efforts pour secourir, de toute façon, ceux de leurs frères échappés aux horreurs des déportations et des massacres. Ainsi, furent recueillis et hospitalisés environ 12,000 orphelins, en attendant que les circonstances permettent de sauver au fur et à mesure ceux qui erraient à travers l'Empire ou que détenaient les Turcs, et dont le total s'élève, d'après les évaluations les plus mesurées, à plus de 100,000. Nos moyens d'action étant particulièrement restreints, nous avons échelonné nos ressources générales de façon à faire face aux besoins indispensables prévus pour une période maximum de quelques mois. Mais cette période une fois dépassée du double, voire du triple, il ne fut plus possible aux Arméniens de secourir les misères dont l'accusation, la vérité, le caractère imprévu, allaient au delà des supputations les plus pessimistes. La nation se trouve aujourd'hui réduite à constater l'insuffisance absolue des ressources dont elle dispose pour subvenir aux nécessités les plus immédiates. Au milieu de l'hiver, de nouvelles complications viennent de surgir : les autorités turques empêchent aux Arméniens tout déplacement à travers l'Empire, ce qui ôte aux uns la possibilité de travailler pour vivre, et aux autres les chances d'échapper aux dangers qui menacent par le fait des agissements des nationalistes et de l'attitude hostile et agressive des Turcs fanatisés. De sorte que, si aucun remède n'était apporté à cet état de chose déplorable, des centaines de milliers d'Arméniens des deux sexes et de tout âge seraient voués à une mort certaine.

Dans ces conditions, le Patriarcat arménien avait, à la date du 2 septembre 1919, adressé au Gouvernement ottoman, une note pour lui demander de disposer en faveur de ces orphelins, de la quote-part leur revenant de droit sur la surtaxe perçue, sous diverses formes, par l'administration turque au bénéfice des orphelins. Le Département de l'Intérieur a, par sa note responsive du 18 novembre 1919, fait connaître au Patriarcat arménien "qu'il était conforme à la gloire de l'État d'allouer une somme mensuelle de 1,000 livres turques aux orphelins arméniens." Le Patriarcat se réserve de répondre, par une note longuement motivée, à cette étrange communication de la Sublime Porte, qui semble ne tenir aucun compte du passé et des écrasantes responsabilités incombant au Gouvernement turc.

D'autre part, les démarches déjà tentées auprès du Conseil suprême économique pour faire attribuer une avance aux Arméniens, n'ont point donné de résultat. Dans ces conditions, nous considérons que le dernier moyen qui s'offre de sauver d'une mort certaine les victimes précitées, consiste à faire un suprême appel aux sentiments de justice et d'équité des Alliés, afin qu'ils veuillent bien consentir au Patriarcat une avance de 2,000,000 de livres sterling, pour compte du Gouvernement turc, à valoir sur les créances en espèce et en nature de ce dernier envers la nation arménienne.

En effet, indépendamment des indemnités dues à la nation du chef des déportations, massacres, pillages, destructions de biens meubles et immeubles, &c., le Gouvernement turc est dépositaire, suivant l'article 16 de la loi ottomane sur les biens abandonnés :

1. Des biens appartenant aux Arméniens et dont les propriétaires restent inconnus (Eabkhassi medjhoulé).
2. Des biens meubles, objets de culte, objets d'art, manuscrits, ex-votos, &c., que seize siècles de généreuse pitié chrétienne avaient entassés dans les 209 couvents et 2,000 églises sacrées par les Turcs.
3. Des immeubles de rapport appartenant à ces institutions et dont les revenus ont été encaissés pendant la durée de la guerre, conformément à la susdite loi.

Le caractère incontestablement légal de ces créances, lesquelles chiffrent par des dizaines de millions, et qui, en tout état de cause, devront être acquies à la nation arménienne, n'échappera point à l'appréciation impartiale des Alliés. Aussi, espérons nous fermement que leur généreuse sollicitude à l'égard de la nation martyre, s'exercera en ces graves circonstances, pour nous aider à remplir les dures et pressantes obligations qui nous incombent.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Chef de la Communauté arménienne-protestante,
ZENOPE BEZDJIAN.
Le Locum-Tenens du Patriarcat arménien-catholique,
A. SAYEGHIAN.
Le Patriarche des Arméniens,
ZAVEN.

[165721]

No. 201.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 2354.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 16, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the minutes of proceedings at the meeting of the Armenian-Greek Section of this High Commission on the 10th instant.

I have not thought it necessary to forward copies of the reports read by the representatives of the Greek and Armenian Patriarchates at this meeting, as their contents are fully summarised in the enclosed minutes, but I have the honour to bring to your Lordship's notice the following points to which they draw special attention—

1. The general state of insecurity in the unoccupied provinces of Turkey, and the critical situation prevailing in certain districts of the vilayet of Broussa, where there appears to be a renewed attempt to terrorise and drive out the surviving remnants of Armenian population on the part of the Turkish authorities, supported by the irregular bands of the Nationalist organisation. The inhabitants of a few Armenian villages in the district of Isnik, who had escaped deportation and massacre in 1915, have armed and organised themselves for self-defence since the proclamation of the Armistice, and

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there is no doubt that in some cases they have committed reprisals upon their Turkish assailants, thus affording a pretext for the persecution which they are now undergoing. I regret that the narrow limits now placed by the Treasury upon the expenditure for relief and repatriation will render it difficult, if not impossible, for this High Commission to accede to the Armenian Patriarch's request for the appointment of a British officer to this district, or to give any practical assistance in preventing or alleviating the sufferings complained of.

2. Complaints that the Christians are forced by the local authorities to take part in the elections to the Turkish Parliament, in spite of their almost universal unwillingness to have any share in proceedings which are a mere mockery of genuine Parliamentary representation.

3. Complaints of the levying on returned deportees of taxes alleged to be due for the period of their exile. A joint note has been addressed to the Porte on the subject by the Allied High Commissioners, a copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship with my despatch No. 2285/5035/58, dated the 3rd December, pointing out that a decree was promulgated shortly after the signature of the Armistice exempting returned refugees from such taxation and requesting that the practice should cease.

4. Renewed complaints of Avni Bey, the Kaimakam of Boghazlian, who was dismissed by the Central Government, but reinstated by Mustafa Kemal's Nationalist organisation. The Armenian Patriarchate is now informed that this man has been transferred as Kaimakam to one of the oases of the Konia vilayet—a characteristic Turkish method of disposing of a bad governor.

5. The increasing need for relief, and the failing resources of the various organisations now endeavouring to afford assistance to the distressed Christian populations of Turkey. Copies of the notes of the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs to the High Commissioners appealing for Allied financial assistance for this purpose are being forwarded to your Lordship under a separate despatch, No. 2353/5046/19 dated the 16th December, and their contents was summarised in my telegram to your Lordship No. 2132 of the 9th December.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 201.

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, CONSTANTINOPLE.

December 10, 1919, 11:30 A.M.

Minutes of the 20th Meeting between the Armenian-Greek Section and the Armenian and Greek Representatives.

Present:

Lieutenant-Colonel Graves.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bians.
Lieutenant Tucker, R.N.V.R.
Miss Liley, for Mr. Hurat.
Mr. Pallis, representing the Greek High Commission.
Dr. Theotokas, representing the Greek Patriarchate.
Mr. Calvocoressi, representing the Greek Patriarchate.
Dr. Tavitian, representing the Armenian Patriarchate.
Mr. Tchakirian, representing the Armenian Patriarchate.

1. Public Security.

Dr. Tavitian reported that, according to information received from Boghazlian, the Turks there had begun to drive away from their houses Armenian women and children whom they had been retaining since the early days of the deportations. Each day numbers of orphans applied for relief, and out of about 200 widows who sought help it was only possible to provide for half this number owing to shortage of funds.

In this locality also Avni Bey, Kaimakam prior to the Armistice and again reinstated by the Turks, has been making a tour throughout the whole district inciting the Turks against the Christian elements, and atrocities and thefts were numerous as a result.

Dr. Tavitian continued that reports had been received regarding the critical condition at Broussa and the surrounding districts. On the 5th November a large

brigand band had attacked a native village in the district of Isnik, resulting in three men being killed and eleven severely injured. The Turks took advantage of this assault to declare that they had been attacked by Armenians and the gendarmerie arrested eight of the leading young men, submitting them to intense torture, burning the houses of the Armenians, and reducing all Christians throughout the whole district to a state of panic. The condition is most critical, and it was asked whether a British officer, accompanied by an Armenian or Turk, could be appointed to circulate in this region and to endeavour to restore calm. The Armenians fear that the Turks will use these disturbances as an excuse to disarm the Armenians completely, when they would be more than ever at the mercy of the Turks. Massacres or deportations are also feared.

Dr. Tavitian also pointed out that the arrangement made that the harvests were to be equally shared between the Turks and Christians was not being adhered to. According to information from the region of Broussa the Turks were ill-treating the Armenians to the utmost extent and depriving them of the olive harvest; bands were organised for this purpose, and from one village 10,000 to 12,000 kilog. of olives had been taken by the Turks. The terrified Armenians do not dare go out of their houses to protect their property. The Armenians state that as long as the commander of the gendarmerie, Abdul Rezak, retains this position there will be no security for them, and request that he be dismissed.

In continuation he stated that at Balikesir the situation is also most critical. The Nationalist Party is very strong there and are exciting the population against the Christians by publishing articles in a newspaper, "Izmir Doghron" ("Towards Smyrna"), one of them being entitled, "The Armenian Savagery."

Similar reports regarding the serious state of insecurity had also been received from Eski Shehir, Tehalgara, Sivas, and other places. At Sivas there was a large brigand band headed by Keurkhello Bahram; these attacked the Christians, robbing them of their farming implements, and carrying away the corn and flour from eleven mills which belonged to Armenians. This was the second time the millers had been robbed, and they are now without any means of livelihood whatever.

At Causerea the Christians were forced to take part in the elections and several Armenians were killed in the disturbances which ensued.

Complaints regarding the unfair division of the harvests had also been received from Broussa, and a state of great insecurity prevailed throughout all that region. The Turks were attacking the villages and pillaging the churches, and taxes were being levied on returned Christians, and on their churches, contrary to agreement.

Dr. Theotokas said that all reports received by the Greek Patriarchate from Christians in the Interior were absolutely of the same nature as those read by Dr. Tavitian. Assassinations were a daily occurrence, attacks against whole villages were frequent, villages and churches were sacked, brigandage was rife and Christians lived in terror of their lives. Insecurity was especially great round Konia and that district, owing to organised Nationalist bands; also at Ordu, Kerasounde, and elsewhere. At Ordu, as elsewhere, the Christians were forced to take part in the elections, being led by gendarmes who administered heavy blows to any who objected.

As an example of the atrocities perpetrated on the Christians, Dr. Theotokas related an attack made by the order of the Mudir at Hainana, in the Sandjak of Angora, by the Turkish night watchmen on the houses of the Christian notables, who were absent from home, when the doors were broken in, the women and children turned into the street in the middle of the night and their belongings searched.

Another case was quoted from which it appeared that the head of a leading Greek family, named Doxaki Lefteri, of Silivri, had been in prison for three months on a totally false charge of being responsible for the disappearance of a certain Sheikh Talaat. In the same week as Talaat disappeared two Christians were assassinated near Teando by the gendarmes of Chelou. The authorities took no notice of this double assassination, which they knew to have been committed, but imprisoned Doxaki for the disappearance of Talaat, for which he was not responsible, but after three months of imprisonment the local authorities pronounced him innocent, and ordered him to be released. The matter, however, was brought up to the Hiyeti-Ittihatî ("Chambre des mises en accusation"), which ordered that Doxaki should still be detained. His health is suffering severely, and fear is entertained on his behalf if he is not soon released.

Similar reports of outrage and ill-treatment are being received constantly from Pasha-Keny and other places in the Sandjak of Scutari, as well as from Gallipoli, Balikesir, Rodosto, and elsewhere. It would appear that the leaders of the

Nationalist organisations met in the latter half of November at Bahkessir to confer together on the systematic recruitment of Moslems and the measures to be taken against the Christians.

Dr. Theotokas further drew attention to the fact that in spite of the agreement which had been made that returned refugees should not be taxed, taxes were levied on them in numbers of places. Colonel Graves said that a letter had been addressed to the Porte on this subject, which he trusted would have the desired effect and that these taxes would be remitted, for while certain towns and villagers had been mentioned the measure applied to all.

Dr. Theotokas stated that a further difficulty encountered, especially round Rodosto, by repatriated Christians was that on their return they found that Turks had taken possession of their houses, and were even pulling down their churches to build barracks with the material. Thus returning Christians were forbidden by the Turks to enter their own houses.

2. Relief.

Colonel Graves said that a letter had been received both from the Greek and Armenian Patriarchate, addressed to the three Allied High Commissioners, on the matter of the urgent need for help in obtaining funds for relief purposes, and that the question was to be considered at the approaching High Commissioners' meeting. He added that in the meantime the attention of the British Government had been drawn to the urgent need and critical situation, and that it was hoped that some help would be forthcoming.

Dr. Theotokas said that the censor prevented Armenian articles appearing in the press, which had been written in the hope of gaining sympathy and help for the destitute Christians, and asked Colonel Graves if he could do anything in the matter.

Dr. Tacitian stated that as regards funds they were living from day to day, and if money was not forthcoming from Europe or America they would be obliged to dispose of church property and valuables to raise funds; the most valuable property, however, had been removed by the Turks, who had sacked the convents where the objects of greatest value had been kept. The question of the depot which had been discovered in Stamboul, where valuables belonging to Armenians had been deposited by the Turks, was referred to, and Colonel Graves stated that the matter was being taken up and the Turkish Government held responsible to return these goods to the Armenian community. The question of the large sums which the Ottoman Government must have acquired from rents of Armenian property was also noted.

M. Pollis reported that the work of his Commission in distributing relief in the form of agricultural implements, seed, and animals to returned refugees, had nearly come to an end, as the money was almost exhausted and a small portion was being retained in order to afford help to cases of urgent need.

3. Islamized Christians.

M. Tehakirian asked whether any answer had been received from the inter-Allied Police, with regard to the measure proposed at the previous meeting, for specially appointing two or three picked men of the inter-Allied Police to recover children from Turkish houses. Colonel Binus replied that he had taken the question up, and that though the number of policemen was greatly reduced he thought that some such arrangement would be made.

4. Transport.

Dr. Theotokas raised the question of the transport difficulty, as formerly the Turkish Government paid for returning refugees up till the 15th September, but this was now forbidden by the Central Government, in addition to which the Anatolian Railway now offered no reduced fares whatsoever. He stated that there were a large number of refugees at present at Konia, who really belonged to the Constantinople district, but who were prevented from returning to their homes on account of lack of funds for their transport.

Meeting ended at 12:30.

(Next meeting, 24th December.)

[165674]

No. 202.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.---(Received December 29.)

(No. 1235.)

My Lord,

Paris, December 27, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 1241 of to-day's date, copy of the note which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the boundary between the French and British spheres in Syria.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador).

NEVILLE M. HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 202.

Note respecting Boundary between French and British Spheres in Syria.

PAR une note du 20 décembre courant, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a bien voulu entretenir le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la question des limites entre les sphères d'occupation militaire française et anglaise respectivement en Syrie et Palestine, et exprimer le sentiment que le Gouvernement français serait d'accord sur le maintien de l'occupation anglaise au nord de la Palestine dans une partie de la zone bleue, contrairement aux demandes du Général Gouraud.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères par intérim, a l'honneur d'informer Lord Derby qu'il insiste de la manière la plus pressante pour que satisfaction soit donnée au Général Gouraud, qui, s'appuyant sur la décision de la Conférence de la Paix en date du 15 septembre 1919, ainsi que sur les instructions qu'il a reçues, estime indispensable que l'occupation militaire française s'étende sur la zone bleue entière. Si l'on se reporte à la décision précitée du Conseil suprême, on voit que toute autre solution serait une violation de la résolution des Alliés.

Le mémorandum du Premier Ministre britannique exprimait les vues de Mr. Lloyd George, mais il n'a pas été accepté par M. Clemenceau (qui a exprimé, à son tour, ses vues dans un mémoire remis du 13 octobre). La seule décision à laquelle on puisse référer est celle de la Conférence de la Paix.

Il y a lieu de remarquer, d'autre part, que si les limites des zones d'administration déterminées par le Maréchal Allenby ne concordent pas avec les zones fixées par les accords franco-anglais de 1916, après une étude minutieuse des régions syriennes, cette modification a été faite arbitrairement et malgré les protestations formelles du Haut-Commissaire français, M. Picot.

Quant à la décision française de retarder l'occupation de la Béka, elle a été inspirée uniquement par le désir de donner une satisfaction à l'Emir Faysal et de faciliter l'accord avec lui conformément aux demandes du Gouvernement britannique. Ce n'est nullement le cas pour le cas de Safed, car l'Emir Faysal, loin de désirer le maintien de l'occupation anglaise sur ce point, souhaite vivement que les troupes anglaises d'occupation se retirent non seulement de cette région, mais des parties de la Transjordanie occupées.

Il y a lieu d'ajouter qu'en se conformant à la résolution du Conseil suprême du 15 septembre dernier, qui prescrit le remplacement des troupes anglaises par des troupes françaises dans toute la zone bleue, les Gouvernements français et anglais ne préjugent nullement la solution définitive des frontières, qui est du ressort de la Conférence de la Paix.

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris,
le 26 décembre 1919.